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ABSTRACT 	  	  	  	  	  
This thesis discusses differences in countries' approaches to investor protection 
regulation and explores the reasons why they exist in the first place as well as why 
they are likely to persist. I first provide a framework that can explain the need for 
regulation in financial markets in general and secondary capital markets in particular. 
Next, taking the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia as case studies, I present 
descriptive and stylised evidence on regulatory and institutional differences across 
countries with regards to private enforcement of regulatory duties. Differences in the 
institutional treatment of those entitled to the regulatory protection as well as what 
regulatory duties entail are evident. However, the two countries are similar in that 
they both provide for private enforcement of regulatory duties through a cause of 
action in tort. An important implication of this finding is that the level of protection 
provided is unlikely to converge globally, despite efforts to harmonies by the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Convergence of the 
legal protection provided for investors is also unlikely due to persistent differences in 
tort law around the world. Given an ostensibly strong need for appropriate level of 
protection for investors, I propose a different way forward that does not require 
convergence of substantive regulation and enforcement across countries.  	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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Part I Research Background  
 
In a world of greatly increased financial mobility between countries, a national 
financial market requires strong securities laws and institutions in order to protect the 
property rights of investors and to sustain domestic and international confidence in 
the economy.1 Certainly, particular jurisdictions will have securities law regimes that 
differ in the relative burden of information disclosure, regulation of financial 
intermediaries, surveillance of trading systems, enforcement of the rights of investors, 
and control of required capital balances as a percentage of total assets held by 
financial firms.2  
 However, the competitiveness of international financial capital markets, 
combined with the increased utilization of technological advances in communications, 
permit investors to locate their trading activities wherever they find to be most 
appealing. Empirical research concerning the attitudes of investors shows that, in their 
decisions, confidence in a particular jurisdiction is based on the provision of a degree 
of certainty in the existence of clear remedies, accessible and comprehensible 
measures for participants, and predictable outcomes of judicial decisions.3 Therefore, 
it is claimed that the failure to provide adequate protection for investors can damage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, 'Capital Control Liberalization and Stock Market Development' 
(1998) 26 World Dev. 1169, 1179-89; John Coffee, Jr., 'Privatization and Corporate Governance: The 
Lessons from Securities Market Failure' (1999) 25 J. Corp. L. 1  
2 See for a general discussion Roberta S. Karmel, 'The Case for a European Securities Commission', 
(1999) 38 Colum. J. Trans. Law 9, 43 
3 Bernard Black, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets: The Non-
triviality of Securities Law' in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective (OECD 2001); Gerard McMeel and John 
Virgo, Financial Advice and Financial Product (OUP 2001). 
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confidence in the operation of capital markets, which is one category of securities 
markets, and, subsequently, undermine economic growth.4 It is within this framework 
of understanding of the public interest in the law applied to securities markets that the 
current role of the state in such law can be understood.  
  Accordingly, the principal remit of this thesis is twofold: firstly, to analyse 
how Saudi Arabia, as a geopolitical entity, has put into effect the framework of 
understanding in the relationship between the state, the law and secondary securities 
markets; and, secondly, to evaluate whether or not the outcomes of the 
implementation process can be explained by theoretical and empirical research.  
 Saudi Arabia is a developing country shifting towards new economic policies 
and moving towards a market economy model. The government’s commitment in this 
respect is reflected in the adoption of market-oriented policies which resulted in Saudi 
Arabia’s membership of the World Trade Organization (henceforth WTO) in 
December 2005.5 In the process of preparing for membership, Saudi Arabia enacted 
42 new trade-related laws, created nine new regulatory bodies, and signed 38 bilateral 
trade agreements.6 As a result of these legal reforms, current investment and securities 
business activities (such as the provision of advisory services, asset management 
services, brokerage services, custodial services and the offer of securities by public 
offer or private placement) are now governed by the Capital Market Law (henceforth 
CML), which was enacted by Royal Decree M/30 on 1 August 2003. A new 
regulatory agency was established (the Capital Market Authority (henceforth CMA) 
and was given regulatory power to supervise and regulate securities markets.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Iain MacNeil, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (Hart Publishing 2005) 290 
5  WTO, ‘Accession Saudi Arabia’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/acc_e/a1_arabie_saoudite_e.htm> accessed 29 June 2011 
6 Samba Financial Group, ‘Saudi Arabia and the WTO’ (2006,) 
<http://www.susris.com/articles/2006/ioi/060318-samba-wto.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
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 However, only limited research concerning the effectiveness of the enacted 
law and the regulatory regime introduced in Saudi Arabia has been conducted,7 and 
no previous Saudi study has dealt in detail with regulatory duties in secondary 
securities markets. Consequently, it is intended that this research will be of benefit in 
three ways. Firstly, it will fill a gap in the literature concerned with securities markets 
in Saudi Arabia; secondly, it will provide an understanding of the legal context and 
challenges facing securities markets in Saudi Arabia; and finally, it will make 
available to policymakers and the draftsmen of future legislation on securities markets 
in Saudi Arabia recommendations about certain measures for development. 
 To achieve the aims of this research, it is deemed appropriate to conduct a 
comparison of the Saudi legal system for securities markets with one that is well-
established and recognised to be a leading and sophisticated legal system, such as the 
United Kingdom. Accordingly, this research analyses the legislation concerning 
securities markets in the United Kingdom, namely the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (henceforth FSMA). However, given that Saudi Arabia is a developing 
country whereas the UK is a developed one, it is understandable that the two countries 
differ in the development and sophistication of their securities markets. Thus, the 
research attempts to compare like for like by focusing on a specific type of 
intermediaries in secondary capital markets that exists in both countries, namely 
brokers working in secondary shares and bond markets.   
 Traditionally, a significant amount of discussion in legal studies focuses on 
the vital importance of periodic disclosure and corporate governance, with rather less 
attention devoted to trading in secondary markets itself.  However, it is very difficult 
to ignore or minimize the role of trading in modern secondary capital markets, given 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Roy Girasa, ‘Commentary: The Quiet Revolution: The Opening of Saudi Arabia Securities Market to 
the West’ (Luben School of Business Newsletter, Pace University, May 2005) 3-7 
<http://www.pace.edu/emplibrary/GlobalFinanceNewsletterFeb05.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
 19	  
their large size relative to the overall size of the economy. Within the countries 
examined in the present research, for instance, the size of market capitalization of 
listed companies (i.e. listed in an organised exchange) to GDP in the UK was 69.3% 
in 2008.8 In other words, public companies that list their shares have a value equal to 
two-thirds of the entire British economy, even taking into account the collapse of 
prices because of the financial crisis in 2007.9 More fundamental to this investigation, 
the value of traded stock in equity markets (a secondary market) to GDP was 242.5% 
in 2008, or in other words more than double the size of the entire British economy.10 
Given that the GDP of the British economy in 2008 in dollar terms was 
$2,674,060,000,000, one may readily appreciate how big secondary capital markets 
are. Irrespective of current developments in bonds markets in Saudi Arabia, similar 
numbers are found there as well. The market capitalisation of listed companies in the 
formal exchange in Saudi Arabia  was over 85% of the size of the economy.11 
 From a public policy perspective, there are various justifications of the 
importance of secondary capital markets for both the UK and Saudi Arabia. In 
particular, there is a need to transfer public ownership to private agents, a fact that is 
not confined to developing countries or countries shifting towards market orientation 
policies since even well-developed countries rely on such processes. For example, the 
public support that banks in the UK received during the financial crisis of 2007 
resulted in the state holding major stakes in some financial institutions. The 
government has indicated that it will dispose of its holding to the private sector as 
soon as the market stabilises and appropriate prices can be obtained for these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  The World Bank, ‘World Development Indicators’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS> accessed 29 June 2011 
9 Before the 2008 financial crises, capital markets capitalization between 2005 and 2007 was on 
average 135% of the entire British economy. World Bank, ‘Market Capitalization of Listed Companies 
(% of GDP)’ < http://data.worldbank.org/topic/financial-sector> accessed 29 June 2011 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid  
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holdings. One of the options available to the government is to offer its holding to the 
public. Another option is to sell them directly to private investors. Underlying these 
two options is the availability of secondary markets for these holdings in facilitating 
the selling process as well as appropriate sums being generated from the process 
without huge discount.  
Part II Aims and Objectives 
  
The main aim of the thesis is to conduct an evaluation of regulatory duties supported 
by private causes of actions related to investor protection in secondary securities 
markets in general, and capital markets in particular. These duties are provided by 
regulations concerning the brokerage business in Saudi Arabia which are evaluated 
with comparative reference to those which prevail in the UK. The thesis focuses 
mainly upon the substantive regulatory protection provided where a broker offers the 
services of executing orders and giving advice, and links that framework of protection 
to the wider context of the legal system in each country.  
 However, a pure textual analysis without appropriate consideration given to 
the complexity surrounding transactions such as those pertaining to an investment 
brokerage relationship would be insufficient. Current epistemological methods warn 
against evaluating the substantive content of legislation while ignoring the context 
within which the law operates.12 This is also true in determining the effectiveness of a 
regulatory framework in achieving optimal legal standards for an effective, modern 
securities market. 13   
 Consequently, the principal question asked in this thesis is structured so as to 
take into consideration the above mentioned points, asking: are regulatory duties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Andrzej Rapaczynski , ‘The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights’ 
(1996) 10 Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 87-103 
13 Ibid   
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introduced on the basis of investor protection supported by private causes of action in 
secondary securities markets, such as by the CMA in Saudi Arabia and the FSMA in 
the UK, effective in providing a framework for the private enforcement of applicable  
behavioural standards to retail investors? This principal question is complemented by 
the following, more specific questions: 
 (1) Should policymakers be concerned with the regulation of securities 
markets in general, and secondary securities markets in particular? If the answer to 
this question is ‘Yes’, then it must be asked to what extent is it justified that a 
government should be involved? To put the matter differently, what makes securities 
markets differ from other markets, such as car sales or maintenance services, so as to 
supports the currently fashionable perception that securities markets are better off 
with regulations?  
 (2) Is investor protection pursued by the state using specific laws, through the 
provision of regulatory obligations and remedies in secondary securities markets, a 
desirable legal objective? Empirical research shows that the priority accorded to 
protecting investors against unacceptable behaviour within financial markets 
correlates positively with the strength of a country’s capital markets.14 Given a 
positive relationship between the quality of the legal environment and the 
development of capital markets,15 the critical inquiry would seek to determine whether 
or not private enforcement of regulations is part of these laws, standards and legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Coffee (n 1); Bernard S. Black, 'Information, Asymmetry, the Internet, and Securities Offerings' 
(1998) 2 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 91, 98  
15 Ross Levine, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’ (1997) 35 Journal 
of Economic Literature 688; Ross Levine, 'The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic 
Growth' (1998) 30 J.M.C.B. 596, 603  
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institutions which are necessary for the optimal functioning of capital markets in a 
country.16 
 (3) Should those who draft legislation and hence shape securities markets law 
within a country take into account the social and political context in addition to 
economic and administrative considerations? Studies of political economy emphasise 
the importance of recognising the economic interests which are at stake in 
determining the applicability and enforceability of regulation.17 It is therefore 
reasonable to expect a linkage between particular economic interests, working 
through, but not confined to, the commercial activities of brokerage firms and other 
financial market participants such as banks and pension funds, and the policy process 
which regulates and supervises the national securities markets. This linkage may find 
expression in a regulator’s powers and jurisdiction over securities markets that 
emerge from the legislative process.  
 (4) Finally, what are the effects of the importation of legal rules and principles 
that have characteristics foreign to a national legal system, especially in the case of 
securities markets regulation? This thesis shows, in line with previous comparative 
research, that a common national response to the perceived need for legal reform is to 
borrow rules, principles, or procedures from different legal jurisdictions, and 
sometimes from different legal families, in order to achieve similar outcomes.18 
Hooker points out a side-effect associated with such legal borrowing; it leads to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a literature review on the subject see Mathias Siems and Simon Deakin, ‘Comparative Law and 
Finance: Past, Present and Future Research’ (2010) 166 JITE 120 
17 Effi Benmelech and Tobias J. Moskowitz, ‘The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: 
Evidence from US State Usury Laws in the 18th and 19th Century’ (AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings 
Paper, March 2006) < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891663> accessed 29 June 
2011; Erlik Berglof and Patrick Bolton, ‘The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial Architecture in 
Transition’ (2002) 16 Journal of Economic Perspectives 77 
18 Katharina Pistor, ‘Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition 
Economies’ (2004) 1 EBOR 59 
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pluralism of legal principles within a legal system.19 The thesis, thus, seeks to analyse 
not only questions of the existence of plural legal systems for the protection provided 
to investors in Saudi Arabia and the UK, but also to critically appraise the practice of 
pluralism within legal systems in terms of the strength of securities markets and 
economic growth.20 
 In contextualising the above questions and approaching the afore-mentioned 
issues, the thesis initially identifies the nature of the general legal institutions in both 
countries which support secondary securities markets in general and securities 
markets in particular. To this end, the discussion is extended to cover those areas of 
general law which deal with tort law, regulatory bodies and the attendant private 
enforcement frameworks in both countries. Particular regard is paid to the contours of 
the regulatory structure throughout the history of securities markets regulatory 
systems in the UK and Saudi Arabia. This does not mean, however, that the thesis 
ignores traditional substantive law, such as agency and tort. These aspects are 
examined as part of the process of evaluating regulatory obligations. 
Part III Theory, Methodology and Literature 
 
A) Theory 
 
It is generally recognised that securities markets enjoy a significant role in facilitating 
economic growth and, subsequently, increasing the standard of living for national 
citizens.21 This significant role is enacted through enhancing the utilization of national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 M. B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-colonial Laws (Clarendon 
Press 1975) 
20 For the determination of the effectiveness of pluralism in substantive law, see Ihsan Yilmaz, Muslim 
Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States (Ashgate 2005) 25 
21 Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza, ‘Finance and the Sources of Growth’ (Policy 
Research for The World Bank 2057/1999, 1999) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=569227> accessed 29 June 
2011; Aubhik Khan, ‘Financial Development And Economic Growth’ (2001) 5 Macroeconomic 
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savings and wealth as well as attracting foreign investment.22 The theory 
underpinning this thesis is that a successful national securities market which functions 
well in terms of size, liquidity and integration within global financial markets requires 
strong securities laws and institutions.23 To that end, law and regulations which 
protect investors in secondary securities markets have been recognised as an 
important element.24   
 However, ‘financial law’ may be seen as shorthand for a complex system 
according to which firms and finance are structured and controlled; citizens are 
protected and encouraged to invest and insure; and governments control, promote and 
apply social policies. Despite the fact that many relevant rules are provided by the 
state, the objectives, protection and structure of incentives and priorities in the legal 
system are deeply embedded in the political, social, and economic infrastructure. An 
extended inquiry into regulatory obligations therefore requires a deeper investigation 
of the institutional and historical structure of the entire economy. Regulatory 
obligations, hence, are considered here as a means to develop a much larger array of 
institutional arrangements and to analyse the fitness of regulatory regimes in suiting 
national economic and legal requirements. 
 There are three justifications for the focus of the thesis on the regulatory 
obligations of those providing brokerage services in securities markets. The first is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Dynamics 413; Chaido Dritsaki and Melia Dritsaki-Bargiota, ‘The Causal Relationship Between Stock, 
Credit Market and Economic Development: An Empirical Evidence for Greece’ (2005) 38 Economic 
Change and Restructuring 413 
22 Nicholas Apergis, Katerina Lyroudi and Athanasois Vamvakidis, ‘The Relationship Between 
Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Evidence From Transition Countries’  (2008) 15 
Transition Studies Review 37. For a review of literature on the relationship between law and foreign 
investment see Amanda J. Perry, ‘The Relationship Between Legal Systems and Economic 
Development: Integrating Economic and Cultural Approaches’ (2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 
282, and by the same author ‘Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search of The 
Evidence’ (2000) 49 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 779 
23 Levine and Zervos (n 1) 
24Katharina Pistor, 'Law as a Determinant for Equity Market Development: The Experience of 
Transition Economies', a chapter in Peter Murrell (edt) Assessing the Value of Law in Transition 
Economies (University of Michigan Press 2001) 250 
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importance of the securities market itself and of credit and liquidity intermediation as 
an instrument of general economic development. It has been pointed out that, in 
developed countries, the control of capital has shifted from private financial 
institutions such as banks and wealthy investors to public markets.25 In contrast, the 
markets for credit in developing countries are still dominated by financial institutions, 
and are still far smaller in terms of market capitalisation than those in developed 
countries.26 So it could be maintained that any legal system that restrains the 
development of capital markets in an economy cannot reap the rewards of 
modernisation. Secondly, Pistor’s research has drawn attention to the relevance of the 
law of obligations in secondary markets to investors and potential investors in such 
markets.27 Such factors are of paramount importance for the ability of strong capital 
markets to deliver their intended economic rewards.  
 Finally, the influence of substantive law in economic development is well 
established. Some scholars refer to Max Weber’s assertion that ‘rational law’ supports 
economic activities by lending predictability and legitimacy to the rules of market 
exchange.28 Others prefer to cite Hayek, who asserted that common law is better 
suited to economic development than civil law on the basis that the former imposes 
constraints against the authority of government.29 Whether substantive law is vital 
because it provides predictably and legitimacy or because it assures economic agents 
that governments will be restrained from unjustified intervention, economic research 
has been able to identify some impacts of substantive law on the way that economies 
develop. For instance, some economists link aspects of economic structure such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Michael Milken, ‘Prosperity and Social Capital’ Wall Street Journal, 23 June 1999; Waleed Alajlan, 
‘Ownership Pattern and The Saudi Market’ (2004) 9 Advances in Financial Economics 161, 162 
26 Ibid 
27 Pistor (n 18) 
28 David Trubek, ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ (1972) 1972 Wis. L. Rev. 720  
29 F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press 1960); Paul Mahoney, ‘The 
Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right’  (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 503 
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size and liquidity of stock markets and concentration of ownership to the shareholder 
protection provided by the legal system.30 Furthermore, a study by La Porta et al. 
suggested that, in recent history, countries with common law systems have 
experienced faster economic growth than those characterised as civil law systems.31 It 
is reasonable to try understanding how regulatory duties that affect contractual 
relationships subject to the general law can enhance economic development.  
 Given that there is a public interest in ensuring that financial law supports 
economic growth, it should be emphasised that law and regulations are not the only 
means available to a state to intervene in financial markets in general, or securities 
markets in particular. Generally speaking, there are a range of policy instruments, 
tools and methods at the disposal of a government to influence the operation of 
financial markets, the conduct of participants, or the ‘outcome’ of specific financial 
markets.32 These include surveillance, incentives with market-based solutions, 
ownership and control, guarantees, lending, subsidies, and regulation.33  
 Nevertheless, regulation is seen as the most important and key tool in modern 
societies.34  The term regulation is frequently used to refer to a technique of modern 
government whereby control is exercised (often through specialized agencies) over 
various aspects of social and economic life.35 A regulation, thereby, is purposive in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Randall Peerenboom, ‘What Have We Learned about Law and Development? Describing, 
Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China’ (2006) 27 Mich. J. Int'l L. 823, 866  
31 Rafael La Porta and others, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113 
32 See OECD publication, ‘Policy Framework for Effective and Efficient Financial Regulation’ (2009) 
2 Financial Market Trends 267, 272 
33 Ibid 
34 It is claimed that ‘[c]apitalism is manifested in the emergence of civil regulation as an alternative, 
complementary and innovative form of regulatory governance’, David Levi-Faur, ‘Regulatory 
Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public Interests’ (2008) 27 Policy and Society 181  
35 Simon Halliday, Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law, (Hart Publishing 2004) 
10; Steve Tomb, ‘Book Review: Understanding Regulation’ (2002) 11 Soci. & Leg. 113. Baldwin and 
Cave note that the term regulation is used in three different senses: (1) a specific set of commands; (2) 
deliberate state influence; and (3) all forms of social control or influence; see Robert Baldwin and 
Martin Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice (OUP 1999) 2 
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orientation;36 it seeks to implement particular collective goals which are considered 
by the community to be socially valuable and worthy of pursuit but which would not 
otherwise be achieved, or would not be likely to be achieved, in the absence of 
regulation.37 Accordingly, throughout this thesis, the term ‘regulation(s)’ focuses on 
the state as a purposeful actor; this does not, however, in any sense seek to deny the 
significance of private actors and societies in the regulatory process.38 Their impact 
on government policies or a regulatory agency in securities markets should not be 
neglected, and hence special reference is made where relevant to the influence of 
private actors on the shaping of regulation.  
 However, in recent years, there has been an increasing volume of literature on 
the need to investigate the impact of various formal and non-formal factors that may 
affect financial markets. Current legal discussions in respect of state intervention 
suggest that the entire panoply of methods and instruments which regulators use, and 
their consequences for financial markets, should be examined. This approach is given 
formal expression by the term  ‘the regulatory regime’.39 
 Although differences of opinion still exist, there appears to be some agreement 
that a ‘regulatory regime’ refers to a wider concept than merely the substantive 
content of the prevailing set of rules established by regulatory agencies.40 The concept 
encompasses external factors other than regulations that have a demonstrable impact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Baldwin and Cave, ibid. 
37 The particular collective goals will vary depending on the scheme in questions. Those goals could be 
economic, political or social; see Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (Hart 
Publishing 2003) 6  
38 For a theoretical discussion of the role of the state in governing through regulation see Colin Scott, 
‘Regulation in The Age of Governance: The Rise of The Post Regulatory State’ in Jacint Jordana and 
David Levi-Faur (eds) The Politics of Regulation : Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for The Age of 
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39 Jeffrey Carmichael and Michael Pomerleano, The Development and Regulation of Non-bank 
Financial Institutions (World Bank 2002) ch.2; David Llewellyn, ‘The Optimal Regulatory 
Environment’ in Thea Kuppens, Henriëtte Prast and Sandra Wesseling (eds.), Banking Supervision at 
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on financial markets. There is no complete list to include all such factors,41 but 
Llewellyn’s description may be the clearest. He lists seven elements of a regulatory 
regime:42 (1) the rules established by regulatory agencies; (2) monitoring and 
supervision by official agencies; (3) the incentive structures faced by regulatory 
agencies, consumers and institutions; (4) the role of market discipline and monitoring; 
(5) intervention arrangements in the event of a failure of a financial institution; (6) the 
role of internal corporate governance arrangements within financial institutions, and 
(7) the disciplining and accountability arrangements applied to regulatory agencies. It 
was hoped that the present research would have been able to cover all these factors, 
but given limited space and time this thesis focuses mainly on the first factor and 
builds upon previous research regarding theory and practice.  
  Having said that, considerable developments have occurred in the last twenty 
years in the theory of securities regulations in general, and securities market in 
particular. Since La Porta et al.’s study mentioned above,43 extensive economic 
research has begun to suggest a causal relationship between common law and 
economic growth, often concluding that common law represents ‘good law’.44 
Subsequently, good law for commerce, including financial markets, corporate 
governance and shareholders rights, has been equated with Anglo-American law.45 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of economic globalization can 
be seen as putting such perceptions into practice. Many countries have faced serious 
institutional challenges as a result of one or other of these two factors (sometimes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 For instance, it is argued that there are four components: (1) regulatory objectives; (2) regulatory 
structure; (3) regulatory backing, and; (4) regulatory implementation; see Carmichael, and Pomerleano, 
Llewellyn, ibid  
42 Llewellyn (n 39) 
43 La Porta and others (n 31) 
44 Curtis Milhaupt and Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About 
Legal Systems and Economic Development Around the World (Univ. of Chicago Press 2008) 2 
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for foreign import’ Esinn Örücü, ‘Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems 
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both) and have been confronted with severe national macroeconomic problems. Those 
countries turned, either voluntarily or under external pressure from international 
organisations, to a prepared standard menu of legal reforms which was clearly based 
on what were perceived to be ‘good laws’ for economic growth and/or to attract 
foreign investment.46  
 However, the failure of certain transformation attempts,47 combined with the 
economic success of countries which do not subscribe to the same concepts of either 
‘good laws’ or the role of law as identified by Western countries, such as China, led 
Milhaupt and Pistor to suggest that present trends require a perspective different from 
what was previously received wisdom about law and development.48 They argue that 
what was thought of as such common wisdom was not actually an understanding of 
how law and the economy interact, but rather about the relationship between law and 
capitalism.49 Moreover, the application of theories of how law influences economic 
development has been subject to criticism by scholars who question the basic 
assumptions and models upon which such practice is based.50 It is then proposed that 
assumed relationships between legal frameworks and economic growth and 
development should be thoroughly re-examined.51  
As far as secondary securities markets are concerned, a notable type of current 
explanation that attempts to explain national difference concerns the role of 
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47 Ibid  
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49 Ibid, 3 
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enforcement in the effectiveness of regulatory regimes. In a realist view of the world, 
the proposition that the law on the books does not fully capture the significance of a 
legal regime is uncontroversial. Consequently, it is often accepted that agents within a 
certain market may not pursue their rights against other agents. This may, in cases left 
without intervention, lead to undesirable consequences for both agents (such as lack 
of mutual confidence) and for the market itself (for example, a decrease in demand).52 
It is thus argued that: 
‘[l]egal mechanisms for correcting of popular capitalism's mistakes 
in the regulatory state now range more widely beyond those of 
traditional private law enforcement by victims to include important 
enforcement and recovery mechanisms that are firmly embedded in 
statute and initiated by a statutory body’.53 
 
 In explaining the differences in outcomes among countries that have adopted 
similar securities markets reforms, it is then proposed that it is the differences in 
‘regulatory intensity’ among countries that have resulted in different efficiency 
outcomes irrespective of the similarities in regulatory measures taken.54  
Thus, a recent research trend has started to look at the enforceability of the 
regulatory protection of investors in reality, rather than at the law on paper. The first 
study to empirically compare enforceability between two major common law 
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industries, for example.  
53 (emphasis added) Joanna Gray, ‘The Legislative Basis of Systemic Review and Compensation for 
the Misselling of Retail Financial Services and Products’ (2004) 25 Stat. L.R. 196 
54 Regulatory intensity in general is defined as ‘the level of regulatory intervention, the appropriateness 
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jurisdictions was published in 2005.55 That study contrasted the financial authorities 
in the United States and UK jurisdictions with regards to enforcement intensity in 
securities markets by the regulatory agencies. The problem that faced the researcher 
was how intensity was to be measured, and it was subsequently decided to rely on the 
amounts of money generated by each authority in settlements and fines. The paper’s 
main finding was that fines, settlements and restitution in the US were relatively 
higher than those in the UK, taking into account adjustments for size of GDP as well 
as the size of the capital market.56 A second study concerned with enforcement 
attempted to approach the subject differently by looking at agents of enforcement 
within securities market.57 The study compared the two jurisdictions by measuring 
different inputs as factors influencing enforceability, such as the number of cases 
handled by the authorities, and the size of enforcement department staff, among 
others. The researchers then evaluated those factors against the outcomes generated 
from the previous study in 2005, arriving at the same conclusion; that enforcement 
intensity in the UK is less than in the US. 
It could be argued that the recent research interest in regulatory enforcement 
faces some issues which need to be addressed. In particular, it is still controversial as 
to what may be deemed appropriate comparative factors to be utilized in this area of 
research.58 Furthermore, numbers do not tell the whole story; differences in the 
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institutional structures of the countries could affect the data collected. For example, 
there is currently a unitary authority to deal with financial markets in the UK and it 
pursues different regulatory objectives, including but not limited to the supervision of 
banking and setting prudential standards for financial institutions. Whereas many 
agencies in the US, both at federal and states level, have roles in enforcement but are 
not included in the scopes of either study.59 In other words, the problem with the 
comparative assessment of comparative regulatory enforcement intensity is the lack 
of consensus on assessment methodology.  
 Thus, the present study investigates the origins of prevailing theories 
concerning the way in which knowledge about securities market law and the economy 
is variously construed and constructed, and the role that such different understandings 
play in theory, policy and practice.60  
 It may be suggested that the best criteria for designing a regulatory regime 
capable of accomplishing its intended purposes will involve effectiveness and 
efficiency. The term effectiveness relates to whether the objectives are met, while 
efficiency relates to them being met in an efficient way without imposing unnecessary 
costs on consumers or regulated firms.61 Cost here is not limited to cost-benefit 
analysis; it also includes direct and indirect costs borne by individuals and firms in 
compliance.62 Accordingly, it is pointed out that a regulatory structure should ensure 
that there are no excessive compliance costs, which might diminish the 
competitiveness of a country in global financial markets and increase the costs of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The study conducted by Coffee (n56) includes figures from class-action cases in the US in assessing 
the overall redress mechanisms with the US. The paper, though, does not include figures from statutory 
alternative disputes resolution, which plays an important role in the UK which is likely to be due to the 
lack of availability of data in this respect.    
60 For a financial explanation see Joseph Stiglitz, ‘The Role of The State in Financial Markets’ World 
Bank Research Observer, Annual Conference on Development Economics Supplement 19 
61 Llewellyn (n 39) 17 
62 See for an example Julian R. Franks, Stephen M. Schaefer and Michael D. Staunton, ‘The Direct and 
Compliance Costs of Financial Regulation’ (1997) 21 Journal of Banking and Finance 1547 
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services and products for recipients in national markets.63 To avoid excessive 
compliance costs, various precautionary measures may be suggested. For instance, 
Goodhart warns against investing excessive authority in a regulatory agency, which 
might easily fall into the trap of over-regulation, because:  
‘[T]he incentive for regulators, especially when they do not bear 
the burden of costs themselves, is to impose such comprehensive 
regulations that they will not personally be likely to be held 
responsible for failures and failing during their own term of office. 
Since success for a regulator, when the costs of regulation are not 
taken fully into account, can be measured by the absence of 
newsworthy failures, the incentive will be for over-regulation’.64 
 
 While a considerable amount of researches focuses on public enforcement, 
researches as to the role of regulatory private enforcement has attracted little attention 
in comparison. Thus, a separate section in this thesis specifies the relationship 
between public enforcement and private enforcement by emphasising the three 
necessary conditions provided by the state for the existence of financial markets: 
substantive law, enforcement of contracts and dispute settlement. The aim here is to 
determine what is essential in achieving effectiveness in securities markets, without 
regards to arguments that a compromise needs to be made between efficiency and 
effectiveness. This realistic strategy should help in understanding which elements are 
important but may take different forms in different legal systems.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ibid  
64 Charles Goodhart, The Central Bank and the Financial System (MIT Press 1995) 451. It is also 
suggested by Schooner and Taylor that: ‘regulators must respond to the demands of a diverse 
constellation of conflicting interests’, and thus regulators will prioritize ‘… the demands of these 
different audiences’, Hedi Mandanis Schooner and Michael Taylor, ‘Convergence and Competition: 
The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States’ (1999) 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 653 
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It should be noted that, whereas this thesis discusses Saudi Arabia and the UK, 
it does so with the full knowledge that the former is considered to be a traditional 
country which applies Islamic principles65 and that its economy is not capitalist in 
orientation.66 While Islamic finance provides theories and practices which have 
generated alternatives to the transactions in commercial or traditional banking and 
capital markets (such as sukuk), these developments have not reached such a level as 
to be the foundation of a new paradigm of an overall regulatory structure in Muslim 
countries. The existing regulatory structures are based on concepts that were 
developed by Western countries.67 The lack of such a paradigm, among other factors, 
is probably the reason why transplanting legal rules has become the centrepiece of 
government efforts to meet development needs and to accommodate new economic 
policies in Saudi Arabia. The lack of specifically Islamic paradigms could help in 
explaining why the draftsmen of the CML relied upon foreign law and imported rules 
and institutions in order to develop the legal system of capital markets in Saudi 
Arabia.68 This would support Watson’s claim that ‘most changes in most systems are 
the result of borrowing’.69  
However, this approach to developing financial law calls for an inquiry into 
theories of legal transplant and legal borrowing. For a start, the question arises as to 
the capability of legal rules transferred from one legal system to another to fit their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 For a detailed discussion of the Islamic legal culture, see Lawrence Rosen, The Justice of Islam: 
Comparative Perspectives on Islamic Law and Society (OUP 2000); Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of 
the World (2ed ed, OUP 2004); Lawrence Rosen, Varieties of Muslim Experience: Encounters With 
Arab Political and Cultural Life (University of Chicago Press 2008)  
66 Amr Marar, ‘Saudi Arabia: The Duality of the Legal System and the Challenge of Adapting Law to 
Market Economies’ (2004) 19 Arab L.Q. 91 
67 Girasa (n 7) 
68 Joseph Beach, ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the Creation of Law in 
Developing Markets’ (2005) 41 Stan. J. Int'l L. 307.  The importance of this paper is that it is the only 
paper that gives insights as to the legislation drafting process in Saudi Arabia for the CML by a co-
drafter of the act.  
69 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach To Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press 
1993) 111 
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new environment, regardless of the legal, social and political order in which they were 
initially created. Disagreements in the literature on this matter reflect contrasting 
understandings of the relationship between the legal rules and the society in which 
they are created.70 In his seminal book ‘Legal Transplants’, Watson argues that law is 
independent and autonomous and, hence, there is no relationship between it and 
society. Legal rules are transplanted because they are basically inherently good ideas 
and hence there is no need for systemic analysis.71 At the other extreme, Kahn-Freund 
claims that laws are not autonomous, and cannot be separable from their purpose or 
the circumstances in which they are made.72 So, according to Khan-Freund, even 
when there is a common objective, transplanting law from elsewhere will rarely 
work.73 The spectrum of opinion between these two extreme views aims to determine 
the feasibility of legal transplants.74 The range of theory in this field is of vital 
importance for the present study as the regulatory duties examined of ‘suitability’ and 
‘best execution’ were both transplanted into the case study countries.  
More recent literature on legal transplantation shifts the focus from the content 
of the law itself to the law-making process, ascribing importance to political factors 
and motivations as elements that determine the success or the failure of legal 
transplants. Taking into consideration the importance of such views in supporting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty 
to Japanese Corporate Law’ (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 889  
71 Watson (n 69). See also Miller who points out that ‘… academic scholarship has identified 
transplants virtually in every area of law’, Jonathan Miller, ‘Typology of Legal Transplants: Using 
Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process’ (2003) 51 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 839, 841; Alan Watson, ‘Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture’ (1983) 131 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1136, 1135-1136; Jan M Smits, ‘The Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe: Some 
Insights from Evolutionary Theory’, (2002) 31 Special Volume in Honor of Alan Watson, Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 79 
72 O. Kahn-Freund, 'On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1 
73  Ibid 
74 For example, it is suggested it will depend on the ‘universalism’ of the legal rule itself and the 
‘cultural relativism’ in William Twining, ‘Generalizing About Law: The Case of Legal Transplants’’ 
The Tilburg-Warwick Lectures 2000: General Jurisprudence, (Lecture 4) 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/jurisprudence/publications.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
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utilization of the law as an economic tool in the last twenty years, such a conception 
poses its own theoretical challenges.75 Experience shows that the effective usage of 
law as an instrument of economic development may vary among different legal 
systems, let alone between different legal cultures.76 In some instances there may be 
flaws in what is formally proclaimed as law; 77 in others a perfectly sound law may 
fail to accomplish its purpose because of lack of implementation78 or of pluralism in 
the political environment. 79 
Because of the uncertainty over and disagreement about the nature of the legal 
transplantation process, a methodological difficulty arises in what measurements must 
be made in order to define the ‘success’ or otherwise of a legal transplantation. The 
provisions of the CML in Saudi Arabia were imported from sources in United States, 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, which makes it difficult to specify one country as 
the donor.80 Consequently, given the lack of tools for measuring its success, this 
thesis is not concerned with the evaluation of the transplantation process per se. 
Rather, it seeks to compare the regulatory regimes for secondary securities markets in 
Saudi Arabia and the UK on the basis of whether or not they achieve what a 
regulatory regime is expected to achieve. Questions of appropriate frameworks, 
standards and criteria for the success of the evaluation process are therefore important 
and these concerns are dealt with next. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The purpose of law as an instrument is seen as being ‘essentially one of problem solving in which 
solutions developed elsewhere are imported to solve local problems’ William Twining, ‘Diffusion of 
Law: A Global Perspective’ (2004) 49 J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L 1, 20 
76 ‘The whole structure of law in a non-Western society is, seen from a cultural point of view, formed 
in the interaction between received law and indigenous law’ Masaji Chiba, Asian Indigenous Law: In 
Interaction With Received Law (KPI 1986) cited in Warner Menski, Comparative Law in a Global 
Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (CUP 2006); David Nelken, ‘The Meaning of Success 
in Transnational Legal Transfers’ (2001) 19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 349, 351 
77 Rudolf Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases, Text, Materials (Foundation Press 1998) 317 
78 Ibid 
79 In the absence of pluralism, law is used as a ‘mechanism for the entrenchment and legitimization of 
state power’ in Lan Cao, ‘Book Review: Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?’ (1992) 
32 Tex.Int'l L.J., 544, 550 
80 Beach (n 68) 
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B) Methodology:  A Library-Based Comparative Case Study  
 
The aim of this is to analyse in depth the effectiveness of the implementation of 
regulatory duties in secondary securities markets provided by the regulatory regime in 
Saudi Arabia, taking the regulation of brokerage business as an example. While it is 
acknowledged that there are several components of a regulatory regime,81 substantive 
standards and the content of regulation are nonetheless still central. It is the 
enforcement of these duties not by regulatory agencies but rather by investors 
themselves that the present study attempts to evaluate.  
Accordingly, the thesis targets a gap in the literature dealing with securities 
regulation in Saudi Arabia by focusing on three areas: (1) the regulatory regime in 
Saudi Arabia, (2) the regulatory duties and remedies provided by the regulatory 
regime, and (3) the role enjoyed by the main institutions which apply the law in the 
secondary securities markets, namely the judicial system and the regulatory agency. 
Given these considerations, both the methodology and the methods of the research 
were developed accordingly.  
B.1.  Comparative Study 
  
In achieving the research aims and answering the questions posed, various potential 
methodologies have been rejected in favour of a comparative approach. Such an 
approach can be conducted not only among different countries but also within a 
specific country. Within a domestic context it can help in evaluating a given situation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Such as supervision and market discipline For a detailed list, see David Llewellyn, ‘A Regulatory 
Regime for Financial Stability’ in George G. Kaufman (edt), Research in Financial Services: Private 
and Public Policy: v. 12 Bank Fragility and Regulation: Evidence from Different Countries (JAI 2000) 
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before and after particular events. This research focuses on state intervention in 
secondary securities markets through the establishment of a regulatory regime, which 
hence is the incident which the domestic analysis in this comparative study focuses 
on. The inclusion of this domestic comparative analysis is of considerable benefit. 
Firstly, it helps in the appraisal of policy achievements and hence the ability of the 
system to meet the needs of the economy. Secondly, an appraisal of implementation 
can determine whether or not the system or process of policy change through 
regulations has been effective in achieving the intended economic and social changes. 
Thirdly, it can help to discover a regulatory pattern in one policy domain, such as 
capital market regulation, so that we would be in a position to predict comparable 
regulatory patterns in other domains within the same nation.82 
This study also conducts a comparative analysis between two different 
jurisdictions, namely the UK and Saudi Arabia. From the point of view of the main 
research question of the thesis, comparative techniques allow an objective 
appreciation of any given system through an evaluation of the applicability of 
different theories to the social and economic context of national institutions.83 
Moreover, the preference for a comparative methodology is based on other grounds. 
Firstly, it is noted that the comparative methodology represents a valuable tool in 
taking into account the cultural and social characteristics of the financial legal system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation. Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United 
States (Cornell University Press 1986); Susanne Lutz, ‘Convergence Within National Diversity: A 
Comparative Perspective on the Regulatory State in Finance’ (2004) 24 Journal of Public Policy 169 
83 George Fletcher, ‘Two Modes of Legal Thoughts’ (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 970, 999; Hugh Collin, 
‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’ (1991) 11 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 396, 398; Ugo 
Mattei, ‘Opportunity Not to Be Missed: The Future of Comparative Law in the United States’ (1998) 
46 Am. J. Comp. L. 709, who notes that: ‘In the global world there is a fundamental need for 
sophisticated  comparative scholarship that can be produced only by interdisciplinary efforts involving 
legal experts in basic research’ 717 
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in Saudi Arabia.84 Secondly, the conclusions drawn after applying such approach 
would then be likely to increase understanding of the national and global issues 
involved and encourage the development of global legal communication as well as, if 
possible, convergence. Thirdly, even if convergence of law would not be a direct 
benefit of the present study, it would, at least, enhance understanding of the nature of 
legal changes and how the law relates to other aspects of social life.  
 Moreover, a comparative analysis of the two countries is valuable in 
analysing potential ways forward with a view to accomplishing similar outcomes and 
increasing the possibility of harmonisation. It helps in providing practical 
recommendations for the development of capital regimes for capital markets. 
 
B.2.  Case Study 
 
The thesis is based on a case study approach, which is defined as ‘the study of the 
particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within 
important circumstances’,85 especially when the case in question ‘is of very special 
interests’.86  
Consequently, there are several grounds to justify the choice of this approach 
in achieving the objectives of this thesis. Most critically, the two countries began their 
regulatory reform programmes at different times, under very different circumstances, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 ‘Another distinctive feature of the theory of comparative law as a method of legal science is that it 
plays an important role in the interpretation of legal norms pertaining to various legal systems, as well 
as in the adaptation of one socio-legal system to another’ in Djalil Kiekbaev, ‘Comparative Law: 
Method, Science or Educational Discipline?’ (2003) 7.3 Web EJCL <http://www.ejcl.org/41/abs41-
1.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
85 Robert Stake, The Art of Case Study Research (Sage 1995), at xi 
86 Ibid 
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for different reasons. Interestingly, the variation in timing exists regardless of the fact 
that both countries are influenced by the phenomena of globalisation and deregulation 
and have worked closely in international organisations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (henceforth IMF) and the World Bank. Moreover, the analysis of the 
two cases may not test the same concepts and theories, due to each country’s different 
history and conception of the meaning of the role of law. 
In dealing with such complex settings of situations or events, the case study 
approach has been suggested to be best suited to the examination of a specific 
condition of the position of a particular case.87 A case study approach is also deemed 
important when there is a lack of useful literature introducing the social, economic 
and cultural differences between the UK and Saudi Arabia and the subsequent legal 
impact of these factors.88 
Accordingly, it could be reasonably asserted that a case study approach is 
suitable for the present study, given the complexity imposed by the comparative 
methodology chosen as well as the lack of secondary sources concerned with Saudi 
Arabia.   
The present author is aware that the approach applied in this research has 
some shortcomings. The choice of the case study as an approach requires that both of 
the states whose law is subject to comparison see their problems as similar, and that 
they are pursuing similar policy objectives which, if not identical, differ in clearly 
understood ways. It is deemed necessary, therefore, to select and compare similar 
problems and/or similar policy objectives. Accordingly, it is assumed that both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 See Jean Hartley, ‘Case Study Research’ in Catherine Cassell and Gillian Symon, Essential Guide to 
Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research (Sage 2004) 324 
88 Izak Benbasat, David K. Goldstein and Melissa Mead, ‘The Case Research Strategy in Studies of 
Information Systems’ (1987) 11 MIS Quarterly 396, 370 
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countries genuinely aim to implement the legal principles and objectives provided by 
the International Organisation of Securities Regulations (IOSCO) in their national 
contexts.89  
Moreover, the present cases were not selected from a random sample and it is 
possible, thus, that the selection itself may affect the conclusions drawn. Accordingly, 
it is a question of how to ensure that the chosen variables compared in the case studies 
have adequate explanatory powers. It is accepted that a mere assembly of different 
national sets of legislative enactments is not as effective as tracing them back to their 
origins. But by following such approach the present author would encounter various 
different political, economic and legal circumstances, about which data may not be 
available. For example, the evaluation of the regulatory context in Saudi Arabia lacks 
feedback from the judicial system, since case reporting in Saudi Arabia does not exist. 
Hence, the account given is neither complete nor comprehensive. 
The difficulty with the lack of access to judicial decisions creates two major 
difficulties for the current research. Firstly, it becomes inevitable that speculation is 
necessary as to what the judicial interpretation of legislative texts within a regulatory 
regime might be. Secondly, it is impossible to compare the judicial interpretations of 
legal texts in the two countries, and therefore to exclude various explanatory factors 
such as differences between the two countries resulting from different judicial 
interpretations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 IOSCO helps regulators to determine objectives, structure, and principles of financial markets. Its 
website states that ‘IOSCO adopted in 1998 a comprehensive set of Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation (IOSCO Principles), which are today recognised as the international regulatory 
benchmarks for all securities markets. The Organization endorsed in 2003 a comprehensive 
methodology (IOSCO Principles Assessment Methodology) that enables an objective assessment of the 
level of implementation of the IOSCO Principles in the jurisdictions of its members and the 
development of practical action plans to correct identified deficiencies, 
<http://www.iosco.org/about/index.cfm?section=history> accessed 29 June 2011 
 42	  
The above-mentioned shortcomings are brought into the discussion wherever 
it is deemed possible that they are likely to influence the analysis or the conclusions 
drawn. It is thought this is the most appropriate way to deal with these shortcomings 
without undermining the value of the discussion.  
 
B.3. Scope of the Research  
 
The reasons for choosing the regulatory regimes of Saudi Arabia and the UK and for 
the discussion in the thesis to centre upon them are as follows. The present researcher 
is a Saudi Arabian national and his government sponsored the research described 
here. It was thought that he might orient his research to an area of direct interest and 
relevance to his sponsor by assessing its laws and regulations and making the 
identification of its defects one of the primary goals of this thesis.  
However, other, less pragmatic grounds, also justify Saudi Arabia as a choice. 
The desire to increase access to foreign capital in the Saudi economy, as evidenced by 
recent changes in government policies, encounters the problem of a lack of research 
on the subject, which may itself increase the costs of attracting foreign investment. In 
its assessment of the compliance of securities regulations in Saudi Arabia with 
IOSCO principles, the Financial Standards Foundation notes that, as to the IOSCO 
principle that requires intermediaries’ compliance with regulations aiming to protect 
the interest of clients, there ‘is insufficient information publicly available addressing 
Saudi Arabia's compliance with this principle’.90 Additionally, Saudi Arabia’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Through its eStandardsForum, which ‘promotes a sound, transparent, and equitable global economy. 
It collects and disseminates, as a public good, information on countries’ compliance with global best 
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economy is evolving towards, rather than already possessing, market institutions. 
Therefore, the on-going experience of Saudi Arabia provides an opportunity to 
analyse the influence of law in facilitating the movement towards a market economy.  
The choice of the UK as a case in this study has been made for reasons 
different from those used to select Saudi Arabia. Firstly, the UK has a long-
established system of securities law; secondly, its regulatory regime has transplanted 
some regulatory duties from the US, and hence Saudi Arabia and the UK share some 
experiences. Thirdly, the UK has the most effective financial intermediations and 
markets based on, inter alia, existing policies and institutions according to the index 
of the Financial Development Report (FDR).91 In addition to being praised for having 
the most sophisticated regulations concerning securities markets, the FDR points out 
that financial intermediaries in the UK are world class, given top marks for insurance, 
securitisation, and merger and acquisitions activities, with better protection for 
minority shareholders and shareholder rights and extensive regulatory obligations. 
Therefore, it was initially thought that the present discussions could never be 
complete, and would be unable to properly enrich the field of legal studies, if the UK 
was excluded. For these reasons, the UK was chosen as the preferred case study. 
Given the limitations imposed on this PhD research in relation to time, place, 
and cost, an extensive comparative study of regulatory obligations and remedies in the 
two systems would have necessarily been largely descriptive, hence impairing the 
quality of the discussion. Therefore, in order to produce a more significant and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
practice standards’ <http://www.estandardsforum.org/saudi-arabia/standards/objectives-and-principles-
of-securities-regulation> accessed 29 June 2011  
91 See World Economic Forum, The Financial Development Report 2009 (World Economic Forum 
2009). The report is available online at 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FinancialDevelopmentReport_2009.pdf> accessed 29 June 
2011. In the report of 2010 the UK is placed second after the US 
<http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FinancialDevelopmentReport_2010.pdf> accessed 29 June 
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analytical study it was thought preferable to limit the scope of inquiry to certain duties 
and their remedies as provided by the regulatory regimes in each country. 
Accordingly, in evaluating the two regulatory regimes of the case studies, the thesis 
uses a ‘top to bottom’ approach by, firstly, analysing the regulatory regimes 
established in each country with special reference to their backgrounds; and, 
secondly, investigating thoroughly how the two countries have implemented 
regulatory requirements to serve particular duties. These concern a group of 
indispensable intermediaries in secondary capital markets, namely stockbrokers, for 
whom the chosen duties are suitability and best execution. It is thought that such an 
analysis provides both depth and breadth to the present evaluation. 
B.4. Method: Library-Based Research  	  
The thesis requires a method that suits the nature of this comparative methodology, 
the research aim, and the questions posed. As outlined above, the thesis adopts a case 
study strategy due to the complexity of the subject and, therefore, it is now a question 
of how to deal with the case studies. To this end, various methodological options were 
considered and rejected. Interviews and questionnaires were deemed unsuitable in 
providing evidence to evaluate the pre-intervention legal systems. Additionally, such 
methods would encounter practical barriers due to language differences and 
difficulties accessing subjects. Moreover, the possibility of subjective bias among 
individual actors involved in the system examined, along with the political, regulatory 
and commercial requirements of confidentiality would hinder any reliable evaluation.  
 In contrast, a library based method easily suits the objectives of the thesis, 
which conducts an examination of how financial law as it stands in reality meets the 
requirements of developing securities markets, and how differences between the two 
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countries may be objectively explained while at the same time pointing to the 
potential effectiveness of alternatives measures. Consequently, the nature of the 
present inquiry straddles various different disciplines, including law, finance, 
economics, and jurisprudence. It was thought, therefore, that library-based research 
was the most appropriate method since many aspects of the study require conceptual 
and critical analyses of the contents of different materials at hand, in addition to the 
effort needed to collect data. 
C) Literature Review 	  
Both primary and secondary sources feature widely throughout this thesis, the former 
comprising both formal instruments and case law, and a list of primary sources is 
included as well as a full bibliography detailing the secondary sources consulted. 
C.1. Primary Sources  
 
The thesis focuses mainly on the regulatory regimes created in the two countries, with 
close examinations of legislation and its effects, and, therefore, the starting point is 
legislation in respect of brokerage services, namely the CML for Saudi Arabia, and 
FSMA for the UK.  
Additionally, a number of documents produced by international organisations 
are mentioned in the course of the discussion. These include IOSCO publications such 
as ‘IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ and ‘IOSCO 
Principles Assessment Methodology’. These documents set out three objectives and 
thirty principles upon which the regulation of securities markets is based, including 
the regimes in Saudi Arabia and the UK.   
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Other primary sources in the thesis take the form of case material. Important 
cases with regard to brokerage business and financial advice are available within the 
English jurisdiction, such as JP Morgan Bank (formerly Chase Manhattan Bank) v 
Springwell Navigation Corp92. Again, the absence of a reporting system for cases in 
Saudi Arabia makes it difficult to obtain details of judicial decisions and, hence, 
determine the judicial approach used and interpretation made of legal texts. 
Fortunately, there is a publication of the general principles reached by the Committee 
for Settling Banking Disputes, which has been of importance in providing insights 
into traditional tort principles in Saudi Arabia.  
The publications by those authorities dealing with securities markets, 
including regulations, have been essential to the discussion and analysis in this 
research. Thus, the Financial Services Authority (henceforth FSA) materials in its 
Handbook, Policy Statements and other guidance have formed a major part of the 
primary resources used. In similar vein, the publications of the authority in Saudi 
Arabia, namely the CMA, that deals with the subject, such as its Conduct of Market 
Regulations (henceforth CMR) and Authorised Persons Regulations (henceforth 
APR), have been central subjects of discussion.  
C.2. Secondary Sources 
 
The nature of this inquiry dictates the examination of various different sources from a 
range of disciplines throughout the thesis, including those related to finance and 
economics, politics and political economy, the law, and theories of regulations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) 
 47	  
Major works in finance and economics such as Stiglitz’, ‘The Role of The 
State in Financial Markets’ discuss the importance of states in financial markets. 
Within the sphere of the relationship between financial markets and economic growth, 
different works by Levine have been prominent in discussions of relations between 
finance and the economy in the last decade, such as ‘Finance and the Sources of 
Growth’, ‘Financial Functions, Institutions, and Growth’, and ‘Financial 
Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda’. A methodological 
challenge was how to assess the relevant material, judging the quality of the 
contribution and the validity of the data analysis contained therein. For these reasons, 
special consideration has been given to factors such as citation history and the 
reputation of the journal as well as the reputation of the author.  
The research relies on numerous previous studies that attempt to explain the 
role of law in the development of financial markets. These studies include Rioja et 
al.’s ‘Finance and the Sources of Growth at Various Stages of Economic 
Development’, Beck’s ‘Creating an Efficient Financial System: Challenges in a 
Global Economy’, Beck’s et al.’s ‘Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin 
Matter?’, and La Porta et al’s seminal work ‘Law and Finance’. In determining the 
relative importance of particular studies, consideration was given to strength of the 
narrative and analysis contained in then. It was also necessary to identify the 
limitations of the approaches adopted.  
In the context of financial law and regulation, journal articles and Internet 
sources have been consulted relating to international organisations such as the IMF 
and the World Bank. These studies are important as they provide up-to-date 
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information and empirical and quantitative analyses which are adopted, promoted, or 
implemented by such organisations.  
As far as English law in concerned, the study makes reference to major books, 
such as Black’s ‘Rules and Regulators’, Benjamin’s ‘Financial Law’ and Blair’s 
‘Banking and Financial Services Regulation’. Reference is also made to documents 
and research provided by the FSA through its website, including the most notable and 
often-referenced work of Llewellyn, ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial 
Regulation’. In reviewing this type of literature, the contribution of an author was 
judged by his or her ability to cite relevant key texts from primary sources and to root 
their work in appropriate theories and concepts.   
On the other hand, there is little published research concerning the CML. 
Apart from an article by Beach, namely ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A 
Practical Study of the Creation of Law in Developing Markets’, there is no published 
work that deals thoroughly with the capital markets regulatory regime in Saudi 
Arabia. Most extant discussions relate to macro-economic analyses which are 
presented in works of politics or political economy without any detailed examination 
of the content of the law or regulations. Nevertheless, these books, such as ‘Islamic 
Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia’ by Vogel, were of help in 
developing arguments in the present study as they provide details of the judicial 
structure in Saudi Arabia. Thus, extensive references to journals, articles, newsletters 
and business websites are included to substitute for the lack of academic references 
for Saudi Arabia, in addition to previous works by Saudi nationals in the form of PhD 
theses.  
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All secondary sources are fully referenced throughout the text on the basis of 
the Oxford Standard for Citation of Legal Authorities (OSCOLA).93 Abbreviations for 
legal journals throughout this thesis are given in accordance with the Cardiff Index of 
Legal Abbreviations.94 Otherwise, the full name of the journal is cited. It must be 
emphasised that most of the references are secondary, although primary sources of 
law and regulation are always preferred and given priority over secondary sources 
whenever each case study country’s legal framework is discussed. It is hoped that the 
weight of referencing does not affect the quality or flow of the arguments presented.   
    
Part IV The Structure of the Thesis  
 
The main inquiry of this thesis concerns whether or not the regulatory regimes 
established in the UK and Saudi Arabia are effective in providing protection for 
investors in secondary securities markets through privately enforced regulatory duties. 
The analysis focuses upon the regulatory doctrines of ‘best execution’ and 
‘suitability’. 
Chapter two demonstrates the relatively higher importance now ascribed to 
securities markets. It reviews the literature to show why there is a greater public 
interest in maintaining the functioning of securities markets in contrast to other 
markets. Then, the chapter after reviewing different existing definitions of securities 
markets, attempts to provide a classification of different types of securities markets as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Oxford Law Faculty, ‘Oxford Standard for Citation Of Legal Authorities’ (4th ed., November 2010) 
<http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/publications/oscola.php> accessed 29 June 2011 
94 Cardiff Index of Legal Abbreviations < http://www.legalabbrevs.cardiff.ac.uk/> accessed 29 June 
2011  
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well as a definition for financial assets as the main object of exchanges in securities 
markets. Critically, the classification suggested includes capital markets with other 
markets known as ‘securities’. The second chapter then explains the different kinds of 
such markets; the role of the state in regulating secondary securities markets; 
justifications of the need for such regulation; and the relationship between securities 
markets regulation and economic growth. This chapter also deals with one of the 
purposes of the thesis, which is to assess the general importance of secondary 
securities markets. The chapter then reviews the current debate as between public 
enforcement and private enforcement of regulations. While it is argued that private 
enforcement is a complementary rather a substitute for public enforcement, it is 
pointed out that within the theory of optimal regulations for secondary securities 
markets there is an absence of a well-established paradigm for accommodating private 
enforcement. The chapter concludes with a review of the two key regulatory duties 
examined in this thesis which are integral to financial intermediation in securities 
markets in Saudi Arabia and the UK, namely suitability and best execution, 
describing their historical development, economic importance, and current meaning in 
the jurisdiction in which they originated, namely the US.  
Chapters three and chapter four deal with the UK and Saudi Arabia 
respectively. Each chapter provides a brief overview of the historical development of 
the regulatory regimes for securities markets, and demonstrates how regulatory duties 
are introduced through the regulatory regime as well as how they are privately 
enforced. Both chapters take into considerations the national political economy and 
context in which regulatory duties are meant to work. They eventually conclude with 
the main findings of the thesis and some practical recommendations for improvements 
as well as recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter five draws the conclusion of the study and integrates the findings of 
previous chapters of the comparative analysis. It also provides overall 
recommendations for both systems which have emerged from the comparative 
analysis as well as illustrating the difficulties and limitations that were faced in the 
research and providing some suggestions for future research.      
 It is important at this stage to define a few key terms that recur throughout the 
following pages. In this paper, the terms ‘regulation’ and ‘legislation’ are used to 
distinguish this type of authority from informal governance mechanisms such as 
norms, religions, codes of conduct and practices provided by organisations. 
Furthermore, a distinction is made between legislation, which represents the rules and 
principles introduced by the relevant legislative power in a country,95 and regulations 
which are rules and principles issued by regulatory agencies which, generally 
speaking in financial law, enjoy rule-making authority. The term ‘legal system’ is not 
limited to those rules found in statutes and case law; it is the formal legal system 
which includes the process by which law is made, contested, and ultimately 
implemented and enforced. The term ‘legal system’ should thus be distinguished from 
the concept of ‘regulatory regime’. The term ‘private enforcement’ is used to 
differentiate between the enforcement of the law by public authorities and individuals. 
Private enforcement refers to 'individuals or groups whose interests the law or 
regulation is designed to protect’ and are able to ‘enforce compliance obligations 
directly against infringers in the civil courts and recover their losses directly’.96 In 
cases where these terms are used differently it will be specified.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95  In the UK, it includes primary legislation (Acts of Parliament) and secondary legislation (Statutory 
Instruments), whereas in Saudi Arabia legislation is introduced by Royal Decree. 
96 Joanna Gray, ‘Financial Services Act 1986 reforms: Part 2’ (1991) 9 Int. Bank. L. 414 
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 An issue with the concept of ‘retail investor’ is the difficulty in maintaining a 
consistent definition. There are inconsistencies not only between countries as to the 
definitions of retail investors, but also among different regulatory agencies within 
financial markets in one country.97 Thus, the issue of the definition of ‘retail 
investors’ could be seen as regulatory understanding rather than geopolitical 
differences. This being the case, it is important to identify rationale for the 
identification of ‘retail investors’ as a distinct class of investors within the regulatory 
framework examined. Hence, the term ‘retail investor’ in this thesis refers to a 
member of a class of investors thought to be in need for specific protection by the 
regulator of secondary capital markets.  
Finally, a market oriented system is associated with the private ownership of 
the means of production, which is compatible with the definitions and models of 
market economics including those which include extensive state ownership or a hybrid 
ownership system.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 In countries where there are more than one regulatory agency that deals with certain financial 
markets, such as the USA, see the US Government Accountability Office, Financial Regulations: 
Clearer Goals and Reporting Requirements Could Enhance Efforts by CFT and SEC to Harmonise 
their Regulatory Approach (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2010) 22 
 53	  
Chapter Two  
The Private Enforcement of Securities Market Regulations  
 
 
 
It was noted in the previous chapter that, in relation to its main inquiries concerning 
investor protection in secondary capital markets, this thesis approaches the subject at 
two levels. The first adopts a tactic of institutional investigation to give a theoretical 
framework for the private enforcement of investor protection regulations as perceived 
to be a matter of ‘between market and state’.98 The second is conducted by 
investigating the scope and appropriateness of the private enforcement of investor 
protection provisions and their place within the regularity regimes of securities 
markets in both the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia. 
 At the first level of analysis, this chapter undertakes an investigation so as to 
provide a theoretical framework for the importance of private enforcement of 
regulations in securities markets. Certainly, the role of private enforcement might be 
undermined or neglected as a result of the role of public enforcement. However, the 
necessity implied in claims of the role of public enforcement not only for capital 
markets regulations, but also securities markets in general, is insufficient in clarifying 
two critical questions. These are vital in determining, firstly, when and where a 
private enforcement is most favourable within the chosen institutional design in 
contrast to public enforcement and secondly, what is the optimal paradigm for 
effective private enforcement through a regulatory private right of action on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Andreas Maurer, ‘Consumer Protection and Social Models of Continental and Anglo-American 
Contract Law and the Transnational Outlook’ (2007) 14 Ind. J. Global Legal Studies 353, 355 
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grounds of investor protection while also achieving the economic benefits of capital 
markets. 
 While it is noted in the previous introductory chapter that this thesis focuses 
mainly on capital markets in both case studies, current regulatory legal frameworks do 
not deal specifically with capital markets but approach regulatory problems from the 
wider perspective of securities markets. Accordingly, the thesis deals with securities 
markets but with special reference to capital markets as a branch of these markets. 
Consequently, this chapter develops a general theoretical framework in relation to 
securities markets from a legal perspective. 
 Generally, securities regulations aim to enhance the social welfare through 
increasing the efficient allocation of resources, by either facilitating the distribution of 
wealth and funds or decreasing the costs of the allocation process.99 Because of the 
reliance on the efficiency of the process, the most common economic justification for 
securities regulation, as a means of state intervention, is the correction of market 
failure regarding information identified in these markets.100  
 The notion of ‘market failure’ is an economic analysis that presumes that 
markets should be perfectly efficient.101 For a given market to be considered in or 
near a state of perfection, three conditions have to be met. Firstly, consumers and 
producers take decisions that reflect all possible relevant information, and, hence, 
there is no information asymmetry. Secondly, a price of a product, or a range of 
products, reflects all costs, including those associated with third parties, social, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 William Allen, ‘Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis’ (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 556 
100 Generally speaking, there are a range of policy instruments at the disposal of a government to 
influence the operation of financial markets: surveillance, ownership and control, guarantees, lending, 
subsidies, and regulation; OECD (n 32) 15 
101 FSA, ‘A Guide to Market Failure Analysis and High Level Cost Benefit Analysis’ November 2006, 
5. The publication is available on the FSA website at : 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/mfa_guide.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
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environmental factors. In the event that all these costs are represented in the available 
price in the market, the market is categorised as having an ‘absence of externality’.102 
Thirdly, suppliers cannot profitably charge prices in excess of fair or reasonable 
costs.103 In other words, there is no market power to control prices in the markets. The 
notion of market failure is deemed to be of help as a device to facilitate: (1) the 
analysis of market forces; (2) the detection of deviations from perfect market 
conditions; and (3) the identification of mechanisms that may correct those 
deviations.104  
 As far as securities markets are concerned, imperfect information among 
participants and investors is seen as the principal justification for regulations which 
aim to correct such imperfections through disclosure requirements.105 Imperfect 
information results not only in information asymmetry and therefore inefficient 
allocation, but also permits opportunistic behaviour based on the inequality of the 
distribution of information. Some such behaviours are deemed so risky as to be likely 
to threaten the integrity of securities markets and hence to damage investors’ 
confidence.  
 While securities markets regulations aim to enhance the social welfare through 
increasing the efficient allocation of resources, as noted above, these regulations 
involve costs: both direct, such as compliance costs among participants, and arguably 
indirect costs, for example, the costs of establishing a regulatory agency. From a legal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Externalities may be positive or negative; they are negative for those on whom they impose costs 
and positive for those who gain from them. An example of this in financial services is consumer fraud; 
consumer fraud may have a negative externality in consumption reflected in the costs people incur in 
defending themselves against it. Ibid, 42 
103 The economic literature usually refers to ‘marginal costs’, which is the saving in a firm’s total cost 
when output is lowered by a very small unit, and in the long run includes the cost of capital, Ibid 
104 For further explanation, see OECD (n 32) 8. But see some criticism of market failure theory as a 
rationale for regulatory objectives in Harry MacVea, ‘Financial services regulation under the Financial 
Services Authority: A Reassertion of the Market Failure Thesis?’ (2005) 64 C.L.J. 413 
105 Stiglitz identifies seven types of market failures in financial markets; Stiglitz (n 60); Alan Page and 
Robert Ferguson, Investor Protection (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1992). 
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perspective, McCormick points out that an important overlooked area of costs is those 
associated with the uncertainty of legal rules; his premise is that financial markets, 
including securities markets, cannot be expected to deliver outcomes in the most 
efficient manner if the costs and risks associated with contracting are relatively high 
for both businesses and investors. He suggests that a means to decrease costs is to 
increase the certainty of legal rules, which is based on the assumption that legal risks 
increase with the increase in uncertainty of legal rules.106   
 Consequently, it could be suggested that an economic view of the economic 
efficiency of regulations on legal grounds is justified in terms of the reduced risks and 
costs associated with the decreasing uncertainty arising from transacting. However, 
regulations should not impose costs through reducing uncertainty to such a level that 
is more likely to decrease the level of the efficient allocation of resources, which 
securities markets regulations should aim to increase.  
 The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to investigate the literature as to the 
relationship between legal uncertainty, securities markets regulations, exemplified in 
criteria of the regulatory duties of best execution and suitability, and private 
enforcement of regulation. The conclusion of this investigation points out that an 
adequate level of private enforcement within the enforcement framework of securities 
markets regulatory regimes is more likely to support the effective and efficient 
regulation of behavioural standards. Having said that, little understanding is available 
as to when and how, on the one hand, private enforcement enabled by the regulatory 
regime directly is more likely to be effective combined with public enforcement; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 ‘Legal risk tends to arise in the financial markets when there is a misunderstanding as to the law’s 
effect on a transaction or on an entity’s financial or commercial position, or when someone’s behaviour 
gives rise to a possibility of legal redress’ in Roger McCormick, ‘Legal Risk, Law and Justice in a 
Globalising Financial Market’ (2007) 1 Financial Markets Review 283 
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on the other, where reliance on public enforcement is the best choice within securities 
markets.  
 It should be emphasised at the outset that the argument advanced here has two 
main limitations. Firstly, it focuses only on the role of private enforcement in 
deterring, detecting, and correcting socially harmful violations of the law, rather than 
on the private compensatory purpose that private rights of action also sometimes 
serve.107 While the two functions are often interrelated, in some cases being 
impossible to separate, the argument developed here considers the deterrent function 
and so would not necessarily apply directly to private remedies with primarily 
compensatory purposes.108 For the same reason, the argument does not consider views 
based on the grounds of distributive justice, which would require a remedy to rectify a 
contract where there is apparent inequality between parties or the circumstances 
around it that makes it unfair to one of the parties.109  
 The second limitation on the scope of the investigation is that it focuses 
exclusively on private enforcement of securities markets regulations in which a 
private plaintiff sues to compel a private defendant to comply with the regulatory 
regime, make restitution, and perhaps pay damages or civil fines. The analysis, 
therefore, does not consider actions by private parties against the regulatory agency 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Pamela Bucy, ‘Private Justice’ (2002) 76 S. Cal. L. Rev. 15–17, cited in Matthew Stephenson, 
‘Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies’ 
(2005) 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, at footnote 6 
108 Stephenson, Ibid, 97 
109 See Michael Trebilcock, ‘Winners and Losers in the Modern Regulatory System: Must the 
Consumer always Lose’ (1975) 13 Osgoode Hall. 619, 624; Iain Ramsay, ‘Consumer Credit Law, 
Distributive Justice and the Welfare State’ (1995) 15 OJLS 177. Distributive justice should be 
distinguished from corrective justice. The latter specifies that where there is a breach of a specific legal 
wrong there is a remedy to rectify it. Distributive justice, on the other hand, is concerned with the idea 
of distributing resources (including rights) on the basis of what is fair   
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which they claim has neglected some nondiscretionary legal duty or inappropriately 
performed such discretion.110 
 It is also important to add some preliminary remarks regarding the scope of 
the investigation and the analysis. First, it is assumed that courts will carry out the 
adjudication of legal disputes. While the issue of alternative adjudication methods, 
such as arbitration and ombudsmen, are extremely interesting from an economic 
standpoint, it exceeds the scope of this comparative thesis. Second, this chapter does 
not cover the economics of legal harmonization among countries or legal families. An 
argument invoked by supporters of private enforcement of laws in the European 
context could be that it better lends itself to harmonization because it does not require 
states to adjust their public enforcement apparatus.111 Such arguments would require 
an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of legal harmonization within the 
EU project,112 but also, since the EU project does not provide the direct right of action 
as a means of redress among member countries,113 this subject including the EU 
initiatives were left out of the argument.  
 Accordingly, this chapter is divided into three parts. Part I illustrates the social 
welfare policy behind securities regulations by pointing out the economic importance 
of regulations for securities markets in general and capital markets in particular. It 
starts by attempting to provide a definition of securities markets as well as the kinds 
of securities markets that are included within the scope of the thesis, namely those for 
shares and bonds. It also examines the extent of the role of regulations in securities 
markets with the objective to clarify what regulations are meant to achieve. It reviews 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Lars Klöhn, ‘Private Versus Public Enforcement of Laws - A Law & Economics Perspective’ 
(December 23, 2010) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=1730308>  accessed 29 June 2011  
111 Gerhard Wagner, ‘The Economics of Harmonisation: The Case of Contract Law’ (2003) 39 
Common Market L. Rev. 995  
112 Klöhn (n 110) 
113 Niamh Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK (Cambridge 2010) 
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the relevant literature to demonstrate the importance of securities markets and the role 
of regulation in enhancing the economic benefits expected from them.     
 Part II demonstrates the importance of private enforcement of regulations for 
an effective and efficient regime imposing business conduct regulations in securities 
markets. It provides, firstly, a historical background regarding the development of 
private enforcement in securities regulations in the U.S,; and, secondly, lays out the 
advantages and disadvantages of using private rights of action to enforce substantive 
regulatory protection. The analysis in this part makes clear that an assessment of the 
net social benefits of private enforcement entails complex, contingent, and context-
specific policy judgments.  
 Part III provides an investigation of the literature into the importance of the 
investor protection substantive regulatory duties, namely the regulatory duties of 
suitability and best execution, and their effects on the efficiency function of securities 
markets. It points out the importance of stockbrokers for the functioning of securities 
markets as well as the IOSCO general principles for the protection of investors in 
secondary capital markets. It examines the evolution of both best execution and 
suitability towards being recognised as regulatory duties, as well as their importance 
as part of the role of securities markets in enhancing the allocation of resources
 Part IV gives the conclusions of the analysis provided throughout this chapter.   
 
    Part I   The Importance of Securities Markets Regulations  
 
A) Definition of Securities Markets 	  
Financial activities have enjoyed rapid expansion around the world in recent decades 
thanks to de-regulation initiatives combined with advances in information and 
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communications technologies. Currently, financial activities vary in both scope and 
level and the nature of participation in comparison to the historical development of 
these markets. The demand side of financial markets, for example, includes state 
finance, corporate finance, and individual finance. Finance is sought to enhance 
various specific activities (consumption, production, risk transfer, insurance, hedging, 
investment and acquisition), and those different needs are met by different agents 
(banks, insurance companies, foreign investors, leasing companies) in different 
markets (banking, stock markets, insurance, derivatives).114 
 This rapid expansion of financial activities raises a number of difficult issues 
in determining the precise extent of securities markets.115 Traditionally, the 
boundaries dividing instruments and markets were drawn within the different classes 
of intermediaries. Banks specialized in short or medium/long term maturities, 
functional/commercial operations, deposits and investments; and financial 
intermediaries handled broker-dealer negotiations, asset management and advisory 
functions within stock or equity markets; whereas insurance companies dealt in life 
and other insurance policies.116 However, as a result of the deregulation initiatives in 
the 1980s, this model of the segmentation of financial markets now fails to match 
participants’ involvement in different segments as intermediaries, who consequently 
become involved with various instruments and segments of financial markets that cut 
across traditional boundaries. The term ‘financial markets’ is not restricted to 
insurance, banking and brokerage services; there are different markets that are 
categorised as financial markets, but nonetheless cannot be included under the three 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Michael Knoll, ‘The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early History of 
Regulatory Arbitrage’ (2004) 87 Oregon Law Review 1, 93 
115 Gerogio Di Giorgio, Carmine Di Noia and Laura Piatti, ‘Financial Market Regulation: The Case of 
Italy and a Proposal for the Euro Area’ (2000) Wharton Financial Institutions Center Working Paper, 
No. 24-B, 4 <http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/00/0024.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
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traditional segments. Walker and Blair, for example, assert that the term financial 
markets consists of: credit markets (banks and bonds markets), commodity markets, 
money markets, derivatives markets, insurance markets, the gold market, stock 
markets and foreign exchange markets.117  
 Even the list of markets suggested by Walker and Blair does not spell out the 
various sub-markets. For example, under commodity markets there is an oil market, 
cotton market, potato market, and so on. For each market there are different 
derivatives markets (options, futures, spot and forward), and some derivatives markets 
include on-exchange markets (where transactions are executed through an official 
exchange) and off-exchange markets (with transactions executed among the parties 
themselves). 
 As far as securities markets are concerned, it is difficult to identify a 
comprehensive definition of ‘securities markets’, since the term  ‘securities’ is 
employed differently in the literature depending on the perception of a particular 
author as to which instruments the terms implies. For example, the Bank of 
International Settlement (henceforth BIS)118 perceives the term securities to include 
both international and domestic debt and equity instruments, but excludes other forms 
of securities.119 In a similar vein, the term ‘securities’ is used by Hudson, a well-
known scholar in financial law in the UK, to include shares (ordinary shares, 
preference shares and treasury shares), bonds, derivatives, and mortgages.120 For the 
same reason, one must be cautious when referring to the American literature, since the 
sense of the term ‘securities’ there varies widely, which could be attributed to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Michael Blair and Gorge Walker, Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (OUP 2007) 17-18 
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website at <http://www.bis.org/> accessed 29 June 2011 
119 <http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm> accessed 29 June 2011 
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contrasting definitions provided in a range of legislations and regulations dealing with 
securities markets.121 
 Consequently, disagreements in relation to definitions dictate a need to be 
explicit about exactly what is meant by the term securities markets throughout the 
thesis. To this end, it is deemed insufficient to attach the word ‘market’ to certain 
kinds of financial contracts, transactions, or activities, but rather to investigate what 
the meaning of ‘markets’ is and why they exist in order to specify what is necessary 
for a market to be recognised as such. 
Generally, a market is considered to be ‘any identifiable location, system or 
other set of formalised relations through which any commodity or product may be 
bought and sold’.122 Essentially, markets are perceived to exist because they improve 
the production of the products exchanged by increasing the specialisation in trade – or 
the ‘division in labour’ as proposed by Adam Smith.123 Specialisation facilitated by 
the exchange process, whereby scarce resources are channelled to various sectors of 
the economy, will eventually increase the welfare of a society.124 
Subsequently, it is a question as to what is being exchanged in financial 
markets in general and securities markets in particular. While it is suggested that what 
is taking place in such market is the exchange of financial assets,125 this does not 
clarify how financial assets would benefit from specialisation based on the exchange 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See for example, Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (Aspen 
2003) 231; Edward Green and others, U.S. Regulation of the International Securities and Derivatives 
Markets: Volume 1 (9ed, Aspen Publication 2006) 14-42, 14-59; and Jeffrey Beatty and Susan 
Samuelson, Introduction to Business Law (South-Western Cengage Learning 2010) 361  
122 Blair and Walker (n 117) 19 
123 In his seminal work An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) 
(Arlington House 1965), chapter III. For a recent survey for economic analysis on the subject, see 
James Buchanan, ‘Let Us Understand Adam Smith’ (2008) 30 Journal of the History of Economic 
Thought 21, 23    
124 Smith, ibid. Further details as to the implication of this assumption in financial markets is available 
in B. G. Pettet, John Lowry and Arad Reisberg, Pettet’s Company Law: Company and Capital Markets 
Law (Pearson Longman 2009) 353 
125 Clifford Gomiz, Financial Markets Institutions And Financial Services, (New Delhi, Prentice-Hall, 
2008) where he states that financial markets are ‘… a place in which financial assets are created or 
transferred’, 8 
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process. A better understanding, thus, can be achieved if the term financial asset is 
defined.  
Ridley’s concise definition of financial assets describes them as contracts, 
claims, or transactions which represent a process where ‘money passes in one 
direction, in exchange for some right, … typically consisting, for example, of an 
obligation to pay, repay or share in profits; or contingent rights in the form of options, 
general life insurance, sickness pay, pensions, and so on’.126  
Such a definition of financial assets helps in emphasising the importance of 
law in the functioning of financial markets. To start with, financial assets are mere 
claims and obligations and hence are evidently intangible. Given that they involve 
intangible claims and obligations, it is argued that a key feature of all financial 
instruments is thus the presumption that ‘they are based on legally enforceable 
contracts’, of a promise or an obligation. 127 It is for this reason that it is argued that 
financial assets are ‘…creatures of the law and without an effective legal 
infrastructure they have no value’.128 Therefore, a financial market can be defined as 
any organised process in identifiable locations or systems through which financial 
contracts, claims or transactions that represent money are exchanged, issued and 
traded for an obligation or a right. 
 That being the case, one can find three elements in a financial asset which are 
essential for them to be considered as securities. Firstly, they are instruments that 
represent financial claims; secondly, they have their own value in cash terms; and, 
thirdly, they are freely transferable.129 In retrospect, these three essential elements do 
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not contradict the definition of a financial market suggested previously, that is, a 
market for financial contracts, claims or transactions that represent money exchanged, 
issued and traded for an obligation or a right.130 It is, however, more specific in that 
they are transferable and have their own value.  
 Consequently, it is possible to suggest that a securities market is any organised 
process in an identifiable location or system through which financial contracts or 
claims which represent an obligation or right that have their own value and are 
transferable are exchanged, issued and traded. 
B) The Importance of Securities Markets	  
 
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel prize recipient in economics well-known for his critical view 
of the management of globalization and free-markets, once described financial 
markets as ‘the brain of the entire economic system, the central locus of decision 
making’. He added that ‘if [financial markets] fail .... the performance of the entire 
economic system may be impaired’.131 
 The vital role of financial markets is deemed to arise from the help that these 
markets provide in increasing the accumulation of savings within a country and 
transferring these savings to wealth-enhancing investment projects.132 Financial 
markets execute their functions through both distributing and providing liquidity and 
credit efficiently to agents in the wider economy.133 Both credit and liquidity are 
essential not only for the production of goods and services, but also to allow the 
desire to consume these goods and services to take effect.134 In addition, financial 
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markets are supposed to help in adjusting any imbalances between the supply and 
demand sides within an economy; financial markets should be able to provide a self-
regulating mechanism that leads, more or less on its own, to its own stability.135 While 
it has become, to say the least, unfashionable to insist on the self-correcting character 
of financial markets after the 2007 crisis,136 they are nonetheless the principal means 
to implement any decision concerning the adjustment of credit and liquidity. 
 In addition to their influence on credit and liquidity, Levine demonstrates that 
financial markets provide five services which enhance efficiency, increase 
productivity and reduce the costs to agents in the economy in addition to their role in 
increasing savings and the distribution of credit and liquidity.137 Those services are: 1) 
risk management;138 (2) screening;139 (3) providing information for the prices of 
events, risks and assets; (4) facilitating transactions, and (5) managing the behaviour 
of managements.140 
 Having said that, both the importance and role of financial markets have 
arguably increased with the spread of market oriented economic policies as the 
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optimal economic structure throughout the world.141 Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and communism as an economic ideology, state control over the economy has 
been considered inappropriate, not only among previous communist countries142 but 
also less developed countries which had previously been dominated by the role of the 
public sector in providing services and the ownership of productive resources.143 
Currently, the market economy structure is still the default economic model in the 
world; for example, membership of the World Trade Organisation (henceforth WTO) 
requires adopting a policy based on the market economy orientation. 
 Consequently, it is of great importance at this time to clarify the importance of 
financial markets in general, and securities markets in particular, for understanding 
market oriented policies and the transformation of an economy towards such policies. 
 Notwithstanding the existence of different forms of market economy,144 they 
share a core concept of minimising the influence of non-economic factors that could 
influence the allocation of resources through market forces.145 To that end, the pricing 
mechanisms provided by markets are assumed to be the best available means to 
channel goods and services to their most highly valued use in the most efficient way. 
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Stout captures the relations between price, efficiency and increased prosperity, noting 
that: 
 ‘A free market relies on a willingness to pay, as measured in monetary terms, 
to determine how highly individual consumers value particular goods. A good is 
presumed to be worth most to the consumer who will pay the highest price for it. 
Market distortions may shift price from the equilibrium that would be set by supply 
and demand in a perfect market. Whether these distortions are the result of price 
controls (such as minimum wage laws), monopoly, or the slow incorporation of 
information concerning value, they are assumed to produce sub-optimal allocations of 
resources. These diminish the total wealth available to be distributed and reduce 
social welfare’.146 
 Thus, it can be argued that a competitive private sector should be able to both 
gather savings at a market rate of interest and allocate capital to the most efficient 
private sector projects,147 given that allocative decisions are rationed by price and 
borrower insolvency.148 It is therefore plausible to suggest that the most important 
aspect of financial markets in a market economy model is the process of price 
discovery for the provision of credit and payment of interest.  
 In addition to the pricing of credit and liquidity, financial markets are also 
used increasingly as a means to transfer the ownership of resources not only from 
states to the private sector, but also between agents in the private sector itself. This is 
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done mostly through an initial public offer of state owned enterprise or raising capital 
by companies and private agents.149  
 It should be noted that any careful investigation of the function of stock 
markets must distinguish between two types of markets: (i) primary markets in which 
the securities are issued and offered to the public and where privatisation is taking 
place, and (ii) secondary markets in which those securities are traded among 
investors, which is the main focus of this thesis.150  
 The primary markets are these where newly issued securities are sold to 
investors, whether national or international. The proceeds generated from the primary 
market go from subscribers to the organizations that issued the securities.151 Thus, it is 
reasonable to maintain that these markets cause savings and wealth to move from 
savers to producers, therefore yielding economic rewards. 
 However, the economic benefits of secondary capital markets are not as 
clearly straightforward as those in primary markets. Critically, exchanges in 
secondary markets do not move savings or wealth to producers or wealth enhancing 
projects. Secondary markets are those where sellers of existing securities meet buyers 
to exchange ownership only, and thus no new securities are created.152 One question 
that needs to be asked, consequently, is whether or not there are economic benefits 
from secondary markets given their abstention from the process of the allocation of 
resources between producers and savers ascribed to financial markets in general and 
primary securities markets in particular. 
 It could be argued that the vital role of secondary securities markets is 
considered to be their support for primary markets. It is evident that a liquid 	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secondary market for shares or securities encourages the involvement of citizens in 
the primary market and ensures the efficient distribution of ownership after a 
privatisation programme.153 Secondary markets do so by raising the confidence of 
savers and investors to subscribe in a primary offering, through providing a means to 
transfer risk and available liquidity pursuant to the subscription process.154 It is 
claimed that, by offering subscribers to securities a forum for exchange, secondary 
markets effectively supply subscribers in primary markets with the opportunity to 
‘alter their investment horizon’.155 To that end, it is claimed that it is the high level of 
liquidity which permits buyers and sellers to transact quickly and without substantial 
changes in price, which increases confidence in the financial instruments.156 Bernstein 
notes that, ‘paradoxical as it may seem, the easier the exit from ownership of a 
corporation, the more attractive its ownership becomes’.157 Therefore, it could be 
argued that the principal function of secondary securities markets is to increase the 
confidence in securities offered to investors through the availability of a means to 
transform long-term investment into liquid funds. 
 In addition to supporting primary markets, it has been argued that effective 
secondary securities markets increase the wealth within the economy by reducing the 
price of credit through the provision of liquidity. A large volume of published studies 
describing the role of secondary capital markets, namely for stock, has emphasised 
the important function of liquidity in increasing efficiency by reducing the costs of 
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capital.158 By reducing the volatility in prices of stocks and other securities, these 
financial instruments become marketable and easy to transfer; 159 eventually 
facilitating the usage of those securities as collateral which in turn generates 
additional capital in an economy.160 
 Interestingly, the role of secondary markets is far clearer with regards to the 
role of financial markets in generating information about the price of risks, assets, 
management or events as pointed out by Levine. This price information generated by 
secondary securities markets is asserted to work as a guide to decisions about the 
allocation of capital within an economy.161 For instance, it helps to assess 
management performance, gives indications of the pricing of new issues in the 
primary market and reflects the cost of capital within an economy.162  
 In short, it is thus reasonable to suggest that secondary securities markets are 
able to enhance the social welfare not only in transferring the ownerships of 
productive resources to the private sector within a market economy, but also in 
supporting economic growth and wealth creation. Given their economic importance 
and size, it could be argued that there is a public interest in maintaining the efficient 
functioning of secondary securities markets. Having said that, it should be emphasised 
that modern securities markets are extremely complex and vary widely in the 
substantive securities traded in them, and the next section attempts to provide an 
understanding of the different kinds of these markets.   
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C) Types of Securities Markets	  
 
The definition provided in the proceeding discussion permits the inclusion of different 
kinds of financial instruments that have been developed in modern markets. For 
clarity, securities markets can generally be grouped into three categories: capital 
markets, derivatives markets and money markets.163 A brief explanation of each group 
is deemed essential to avoid any confusion in the following analysis and discussion, 
since the main inquiry of this thesis focuses on capital markets but excludes 
derivatives and money markets.  
 The term ‘money markets’ includes those dealing in securities representing 
short-term debt which matures within one year.164 Examples of money markets 
trading in such instruments are: treasury bills (or T-bills) markets, interbank markets, 
certified deposit markets, inter-corporate depositary markets, commercial bill markets 
and repo markets.165 A well functioning and developed money market trades to 
provide mechanisms for liquidating commercial papers, such as discounting bills of 
exchange. It also provides instant access to funds needed urgently by financial 
institutions such as banks, as well as helping governments in short term financial need 
through treasury bills. Additionally, money markets are one of the means available to 
central banks to execute monetary policies, including the maintenance of a moderate 
level of inflation.166 
 Capital markets, on the other hand, exchange securities that represent 
ownership or debt with maturity dates of over one year. Capital markets are thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Jae Shim and Michael Constas, Encyclopedic Dictionary of International Finance and Banking (St. 
Lucie Press 2001) 103 
164 Ibid 
165 Repo stands for ready forward contract. It is a contract where a seller sells and repurchases the same 
securities at a mutually decided future date and price. For more information see Moorad Choudhry, The 
REPO Handbook (Elsevier 2002) 3   
166 For more elaborate analysis, see Jens Forssbaeck and Lars Oxelheim, Money Markets and Politics: 
A Study of European Financial Integration and Monetary Policy Options (Edward Elgar 2003) ch. 3   
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classified into debt and equity markets depending on the nature of the legal right 
embodied in the instrument.  
 In debt capital markets, participants exchange financial instruments that have a 
fixed income claim with a maturity date of more than one year. Holders of debt 
instruments expect to receive from the issuer of the instrument interest on the loan at 
regular fixed times and, by the maturity date, the full amount of the loan.167 The 
holder’s rights to interest and repayment of the principal amount are secured against 
the assets of the issuer.168 Well-known examples of debt instruments are treasury 
bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds, convertible bonds and mortgage-backed 
bonds.  
 In contrast to debt markets, equity markets deal with instruments that 
represent rights of ownership.169 A claim of ownership entitles the holder, inter alia, 
to receive from the issuer two sources of future cash: first, the right to a regular 
dividend payment, and second, the right to a portion of the company once it is sold or 
liquidated.170 Examples of equities are preferred stocks and common stocks. 
  Derivatives markets are more complex because of the nature of the financial 
claims exchanged. Derivatives are contracts whose values are “based on other 
underlying assets such as stocks, currencies, interest rates or commodities’’.171 There 
are three criteria for categorising derivatives: the nature of the obligation (future, 
option or swap), the underlying assets (share, bond, or mortgage), and trading style 
(on-exchange traded or off-exchange bespoke ‘over the counter’ or OTC). 172 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 There are different kinds of bonds and repayments of the principal amounts by instalments or at 
specific dates during the life of the instrument.     
168 Hudson, The Law of Finance (n 120) 912 
169 Ibid 
170 Neil Johnson, Paul Jefferies and Pak Ming Hui, Financial Market Complexity (OUP 2003) 6 
171 Pratap Subramanyam, Investment Banking: Concepts, Analyses and Cases (Tata McGraw-Hill 
2008) 14 
172 Errol Dansieger, ‘Derivative Risk- OTC and ETD’ ch. in Dennis Cox (edt), Frontiers of Risk 
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Accordingly, derivatives that are considered to fall within the scope of capital markets 
are those whose underlying assets are an instrument in capital markets.173 
Methodology dictates that the discussion in this thesis is restricted to capital 
markets, particularly those for common shares and bonds and their derivates. It is 
thought that, since the study is comparative in nature and aims to examine the 
effectiveness and efficiency of certain regulatory rules across two jurisdictions, it is 
necessary to restrict the inquiry to those markets that exist in the U.K. and Saudi 
Arabia. While the U.K. possesses almost all kinds of securities markets, Saudi Arabia 
has only capital markets consisting of a common shares market and a recently 
developed Islamic bond market (Sukuk) as well as a narrow OTC derivatives 
markets.174 Accordingly, the following discussion focuses mainly on secondary 
capital markets and the next section demonstrates the importance of securities markets 
regulations with special references to secondary capital markets. 
D) Rationale for Securities Markets Regulations  
 
Some have suggested that, historically, the state’s attempts to intervene in and 
regulate secondary securities markets can be traced back to a Statute of Edward I in 
England in 1285, when brokers who worked as agents were required to take an oath 
of good behaviour.175 Others suggest that the more appropriate event was the Bubble 
Act in the seventeenth century.176 Notwithstanding the differences as to the beginning 
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Future Regulation of Derivatives Markets: Is the EU on the Right Track?’ European Union Committee, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/93/93we13.htmb> accessed 29 
June 2011 
173 Pratap Subramanyam, Investment Banking: Concepts, Analyses and Cases (Tata McGraw-Hill 
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174 Oxford Business Group, The Report: Saudi Arabia 2008, (OUP 2008) 80. For more historical 
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of state intervention, it is accepted that modern securities regulation as a sophisticated 
and comprehensive system of law first emerged in the U.S. in the 1930s. 
 As far as primary securities markets are concerned, it was with the passing of 
the Securities Act 1933 first regulated the public offerings of securities.177 In the 
following year, the Securities and Exchange Act 1934 was passed to regulate 
secondary markets and also established the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(henceforth SEC) as a regulator of securities markets, brokers, dealers, and other 
matters. Since then, it has become a matter of public and general interest that 
securities markets should function properly, based on the belief that part of the cause 
of the Great Depression in the US resulted from their collapse.178 
 Currently, it is hardly disputed that the state has a role in regulating securities 
markets as well as instituting regulatory agencies to deal with them, to the extent that 
state intervention itself is considered as best practice by international organisations.179 
The principal justification for regulations as far as secondary securities markets are 
concerned is to protect investors and maintain their confidence.180 It was noted in the 
Introduction chapter that empirical researches suggests a positive correlation between 
the strength of capital markets and the higher priority accorded to protecting investors 
against unacceptable behaviour in securities markets. In this case, it is necessary to ask 
if strengthening securities markets law by introducing regulations against 
unacceptable behaviour is a sufficient justification to introduce regulations and, if so, 
why. 	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Department, ‘Close To the Investor’ (2009) Focus, World Federation of Exchanges, 3, 
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 The premise of securities regulations is that mandatory disclosure combined 
with anti-fraud liability and the regulation of securities intermediaries will permit 
securities investors and their advisors to have the information necessary to move 
capital to its optimal use. 181 In other words the protection of investors is a means to 
achieve healthy capital markets. Such a claim is based on the conclusion that securities 
markets involve major difficulties that market forces find burdensome or impossible to 
overcome on their own. 
 Initially, investors are unable to be sure of the quality of assets exchanged in 
the markets. Lacking the resources to gain access to information or to analyse 
information provided in different forms, investors may thus act irrationally and make 
poor investment choices.182 In the absence of regulation there is no incentive for those 
holding information, such as managements and issuers if shares, to share it with other 
participants, and it is meanwhile economically unjustifiable to force all participants to 
work to obtain it.183 Consequently, it is believed that regulation which imposes 
periodical disclosure requirements helps in redistributing information among 
participants in securities markets, and hence allowing investors to make informed 
decisions.184 
 In addition to judging the quality of assets, the Securities and Exchange Act 
1934 is claimed to have been introduced to provide two primary benefits for investors 
through disclosure: firstly, determining the quality of the assets which should be 
reflected correctly in the price, and; secondly, to ‘prevent some fraudulent transactions 
that cannot stand the light of publicity’.185 
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 Conceptually, it could be suggested that the disclosure requirements that aim to 
protect investors are based on the informational disadvantages of investors against 
issuers of securities. Investors might be subject to sharp practices by professionals 
with access to greater information and resources who are willing to take advantage of 
it. Different regulatory techniques are recognised as essential, among which are 
periodic disclosure, standardising disclosure and the external auditing of companies’ 
financial statements.     
 Moreover, certain acts based on informational advantages are prohibited in 
securities regulations.186 Insider dealing regulations, for example, are introduced to 
prohibit corporate officials and owners with information about the financial prospects 
of their companies to profit at the expense of non-insiders. Defrauding investors by 
leading them to subscribe or purchase securities in bogus companies was a common 
practice that led to the development of the concept of the suitability of advice in the 
US.187 Such importance ascribed to the disclosure and informational disadvantage of 
investors is supported by research that shows that the priority accorded to investor 
protection against unacceptable behaviour correlate positively with the strength of 
capital markets.188 
 It should be emphasised that there are other investor protection measures 
deemed necessary which, nonetheless, are not based on informational advantages. 
These measures are fundamentally based on the notion that regulations should protect 
investors against ‘excessive prices or opportunistic behaviour by providers of financial 
services’.189 Takeover rules and the protection of minority shareholders are based on 
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the notion that minority shareholders should not be exploited by majority 
shareholders.190  
 Therefore, it could be claimed that regulation in secondary markets is justified 
to ensure a level of quality of protection provided to investors.191 An important 
regulatory technique to ensure this level, in addition to disclosure, is for the regulatory 
regime to establish and publish a minimum level of accepted standards of conduct that 
are binding for the participants in services in securities markets.    
 Another rationale for securities regulations is the reduction of systemic risk in 
these markets. In general, a systemic risk in financial markets refers to the risk of an 
event which ‘will trigger a loss of confidence in a substantial portion of the financial 
system that is serious enough to have adverse consequences for the real economy’.192 
Whereas systemic risk is cited as the most common rationale for regulations in the 
banking industry, counter-party risk in wholesale markets has recently become a 
matter of importance in both academia and policy markers. In theory, a systemic event 
in securities markets, exemplified in the insolvency of a service provider or massive 
fraud by issuers, may have a severe impact on the real economy in three ways. Firstly, 
it may trigger a domino effect that will affect other financial institutions and 
undermine confidence in whole financial markets.193 Secondly, it may result in a 
subsequent decrease in levels of engagement so that fewer resources are available to 
be allocated through securities markets;194 and, finally, the disappearance of a 
financial institution may lead to the disappearance of information related to persons 	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193 See a speech by Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of International Monetary Fund, 
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and projects that the failed institution was engaging with.195 In practice, the existence 
of financial institutions so large that their failure is deemed to have a severe impact on 
the economy, also known as ‘too big to fail’, is currently an ongoing concern for 
policy makers in terms of how to reduce the likelihood of such an event or its impact. 
An important technique is the imposition of prudential regulation as to minimum 
liquidity and capital requirements.  
 Accordingly, it could be claimed that securities regulations are necessary to 
reduce the informational advantages in the market, ensure the solvency of financial 
institutions, and protect investors against malpractices by participants which may 
affect the integrity of the market. For each issue a solution to the problem is proposed: 
disclosure, prudential requirements and the conduct of business, respectively. 
 As far as the protection of investors as a justification for securities regulations 
is concerned, it raises the question of who is eligible for protection and from what 
behaviour. Any systematic research attempting to approach questions of the concept of 
investor protection from a cross-country perspective will likely end with confusion 
rather than clarity as a result of different national and theoretical frameworks.  
 Essentially, countries may differ in terms of protecting whom from what. For 
instance, Allen and Herring point out that, whereas insider dealing has been outlawed 
in the US since the 1930s, ‘insider trading was not illegal in Germany nor effectively 
policed in Japan’ until recently.196 The situation changed in these two countries 
because of the introduction of the Insider Trading Directive of the European Union in 
the former, and the disclosure of insider dealing cases in the latter.197 
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 Furthermore, confusion as to how investor protection should be provided is 
evident in the literature on securities markets, economy and regulations.  Such 
confusion exists because, firstly, the term has been used so broadly by some scholars 
to the extent that it overlaps conceptually with other justifications for different kind 
from misconduct.198 For example, investor protection has been used as the basis for 
measures taken to reduce systemic risks of the insolvency of financial institutions, 
whereas these are not based on the theoretical justifications for securities regulations 
based on disclosure and anti-fraud.199  
Secondly, there are different conceptual perspectives as to the existing 
problems in securities markets and different views as how to solve these problems. 
There is little agreement as to the subject, but nonetheless, it is possible to identify 
three major strands of explanation in the literature: economic, political and moral. 
Each type of explanation suggests different measures for investor protection 
initiatives. A little explanation is necessarily to evaluate the benefits and shortcomings 
of each strand. 
The first and most dominant strand is the economic perspective on investor 
protection. This suggests that state intervention on the basis of investor protection is 
needed to increase efficiency in securities markets by widening the engagement of 
economic agents. It should be emphasised that this explanation is different from the 
rationale of enhancing efficiency. Theories underpinning the economic efficiency 
rationale tend to see markets as a whole and aim to decrease costs in the financial 	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system. Theories based on the rationale of investor protection which support economic 
efficiency are distinguished by their focus on increasing investors’ engagement with 
financial markets in general and securities markets in particular. The justification, 
subsequently, focuses on the behaviour of investors rather than pure cost analysis. 
 The economic explanation of investor protection poses a difficulty to this 
thesis. Different economic models and hypotheses are provided to deal with the type 
of specific securities market in question, whether, equity, bonds, on-exchange or over 
the counter. To cover them all is not within the remit of this thesis, nor does the 
limitation imposed by space permit such an exercise. Therefore, the following 
discussion is narrowed towards making some generalisations and proving some 
examples. 
A good starting point is Llewellyn’s paper ‘The Economic Rationale for 
Financial Regulation’,200 where he identifies seven different perspectives for how to 
look systemically at problems in financial markets in general, and securities markets 
in particular: (1) potential systemic problems associated with externalities (a particular 
form of market failure); (2) the correction of other market imperfections and failures; 
(3) the need for the monitoring of financial firms and the economies of scale that exist 
in this activity; (4) the need for consumer confidence which also has a positive 
externality; (5) the potential for gridlock, with associated adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems; (6) moral hazard associated with the revealed preference of 
governments to create safety net arrangements such as lender of last resort, deposit 
insurance, and compensation schemes; and (7) consumer demand for regulation in 
order to gain a degree of assurance and lower transactions costs. 
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Given the complexity of the economic explanations within these different 
perspectives, it is possible to identify different explanations reaching different 
conclusions and extremely different recommendations, from no-regulation at all to 
detailed regulations. By way of illustration, an important question concerns when 
there is a need to introduce a new regulation, and two broad themes of explanation can 
be identified.  
The first theme includes economic models that are based on so-called ‘rational 
expectation theory’. This theory states that investors are self-interested agents who are 
rational in making their own decisions.201 It presumes that a rational investor assumes 
that other professional participants, such as brokers and corporate managers, are self-
interested as well. An investor would assume, therefore, that corporate insiders or a 
professional participants will steal money if they can do so, and subsequently a 
rational investor would hesitate to invest (especially in intangible assets such as bonds 
or shares) unless he or she is presented with enough evidence to show that 
professional participants face external constraints that deter them from defrauding 
them or stealing their money. It follows that a rational investor would be willing to 
invest should he or she assume that a legal system would effectively deter negligence, 
disloyalty, and dishonesty. If the legal system fails, rational investors will be the first 
to recognise that and to remove their money from the market and refuse to invest.202 
Within this framework, it could be suggested that the role of a state is to assure 
investors that there are appropriate measures provided by a regulatory regime that 
constrain professional participants from defrauding investors. 
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The second theme is not only different from the first, but also advances 
economic models that undermine the main assumption in the previous economic 
explanations, namely the rationality of investors in securities markets.203 There are 
different proposals based on the irrationality of investors, but the economic model 
provided by Professor Stout can exemplify this theme since it is based on trust and 
confidence.  
Stout points to the failure of the theory of rational expectations to explain some 
irrational behaviour by investors in financial markets. To solve the puzzle, she 
suggests an understanding of the role of trust.204 She claims that investors are willing 
to believe that at least some people or some institutions might be trustworthy because 
it is more convenient or cost-saving to do so.205 Trusting investors behave in this way 
with people who have shown honest and co-operative behaviour in the past and 
assume that such persons will continue to behave in a similar way in the future (in 
contrast to a rational expectation investor who neglects past behaviour).206 Stout tells 
us that trust can encompass both institutions and systems. ‘Trust’ in humans ‘…is so 
strong and universal that many people are prepared to believe … in the innate 
character or trustworthiness of things - including perhaps such abstract things such as 
“the law” or “the stock market”’.207 Consequently, she claims that trusting investors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 For example on the basis of cognitive weaknesses in individuals, see Emilios Avgouleas, 
‘Reforming Investor Protection Regulation: The Impact of Cognitive Biases’ in Michael Faure and 
Frank Stephen (eds), Essays in the Law and Economics of Regulation: In Honour of Anthony Ogus 
(Intersentia 2008) 
204 Lynn Stout, ‘Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets’ (UCLA School of 
Law/ Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-15, 2009) 12-14 <http://ssrn.com/abstract=144202> accessed 
29 June 2011 
205 Similar emphasis on the importance of trust is mentioned by other writers: it is noted that ‘trust is a 
kind of social glue that allows people to interact at low transaction costs’ in Larry Ribstein, ‘Law v. 
Trust’ (2001) 81 B.U. L. Rev. 553; Lynn Stout, ‘The Investor Confidence Game’ (2002) 68 Brook. L. 
Rev. 407, 428 
206 Stout ‘Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets’ (n 204) 416. Stout also 
claims that ‘…real people behave as if they believe that, for some reason, some players refrain from 
opportunistic behavior even when they could safely indulge in it’, 425 
207 Ibid, 427. See further discussion in Peter Huang, ‘Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation’ (2003) 
151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1059; Peter Huang, ‘Emotional Impact Analysis in Financial Regulation: Going 
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may not trust a manager, broker or advisor, but they, nonetheless, invest because ‘… 
they rely on the legal system (including legally enforceable contracts) to discourage 
managers, brokers and investment advisors from behaving like the scoundrels that 
they are’.208 When the trust in the system is shaken, by financial scandal for example, 
to the extent that it requires a rapid response, the state is the only actor who can 
provide reassurance and maintain the confidence of investors in financial markets.209 It 
could be suggested, thus, that according to this theme of economic explanations, state 
intervention is necessary to maintain the trust of investors in the legal system that 
controls financial markets in order to ensure an optimal level of engagement. 
Both themes of economic explanations suffer from flaws. They presuppose that 
investment and engagement with financial markets are voluntary acts. But investing, 
as a voluntary activity, may no longer be an option; many citizens, particularly in 
developed countries, are expected to assume responsibility for their financial security 
in retirement, and thus have no choice but to save and invest and, therefore, become 
investors. 
Moreover, rational investor theory explanations ignore the fact that there are 
irrational and unsophisticated investors in financial markets. The theory considers 
them as ‘…a weak animal’ which ‘…must sadly but necessarily be culled out of the 
investing herd in order to improve the species’.210 On the other hand, economic 
explanations such as those relying on trust or cognitive weaknesses in individuals 
cannot provide answers to questions in respect of the criteria needed to determine the 
scope and the need for intervention: trust among which investors? Are foreign or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2006-21, 2006) 
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=870453> accessed 29 June 2011 
208 Stout (n 204) 426 
209 Ibid, 435; Tamar Frankel, ‘Regulation and Investors' Trust in the Securities Market’ (2003) 68 
Brook. L. Rev. 439, 444   
210 Stout (n 204) 430 
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domestic investors more important? What is the level of mistrust among investors that 
requires state intervention? And how can we measure trust? 
Having considered the economic strand of explanation, more importance may 
be ascribed to the other two non-economic explanations for state intervention on the 
grounds of investor protection: the political and moral. 
The political explanation suggests that if citizens are required to invest in a 
market that is perceived as unfair, or treating them unfairly, investors may direct their 
frustration towards politicians or the political system.211 Hence, the state has to 
intervene in securities markets to ensure the stability of the political system within a 
country. It is for this reason that major securities market reforms have been observed 
to follow market scandals or crashes.212  
However, our case studies suggest otherwise. While it is observed that changes 
in securities law in the UK tend to occur at times of shift between political parties, it 
has never been suggested that those changes were proposed to avoid a threat to the 
stability of the political system.213 In the same vein, the change in securities law in 
Saudi Arabia is demonstrated to be part of the preparation for membership of the 
WTO.214 While it might be argued that membership of the WTO was sought partly 
because of high unemployment which might generate political instability, high 
unemployment in fact supported a change in the economic management model used in 
the country. In other words, the change in securities law in Saudi Arabia was a means 
for economic restructuring, rather than a response to a political threat arising from 
perceived unfair treatment within the markets themselves. Accordingly, it is unlikely 
that the political explanations would suit the case studies of this research.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 Stuart Banner, ‘What Causes New Securities Regulation--300 Years of Evidence’ (1997) 75 Wash. 
U. L. Q. 849, 850 
212 Stout (n 205) 430 
213 See chapter four Part I (a) and (b)  
214 See chapter five Part I (e) 
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An equally compelling justification for investor protection is morality. 
According to this view, since citizens must invest in the market by law or by need, as 
a result of the state’s retreat from providing a financial safety net, the state then has a 
moral obligation towards its citizens to ensure that investors are treated fairly and 
honestly.215 However, moral explanations do not provide direction as to the 
limitations and standards of appropriateness for a state to intervene. Nor does this 
explanation specify the source of moral value in financial markets such as religion, 
fairness, equality, or justice, each of which may lead to different conclusions. Another 
critical weakness of this explanation is the fact that similar measures have been taken 
in financial markets in different countries which hold different moral cultures, such as 
the prohibition of loan sharks in the UK and Saudi Arabia.   
Taking all three strands together, it is reasonable to suggest that it would be 
too simplistic to argue or to seek explanation of securities regulations upon the basis 
of any single theory or approach. The importance of these theories, nonetheless, could 
be claimed to lie in their influence on methodology, as noted by Baldwin and Cave:  
 ‘ … in seeking to explain particular regulatory developments, an awareness of 
the variety available explanations does help the observer to evaluate the insights 
offered by different theories, to develop a sense of the limitations and assumptions 
underpinning those theories, and to identify the kind of information necessary for 
applying and testing them’.216 
Thus, it can be said that the various explanations are of help in advancing 
knowledge about a particular special phenomenon, which here is the concept of 
investor protection regulations in securities markets.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Barbara Black, ‘Are Retail Investors Better Off Today’ (2007) 2 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 
301, 305 
216 Baldwin and Cave (n 35) 32 
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One of the fundamental conclusions from the forgoing discussion is that the 
aims should not be confused with the means of securities regulations grounded in 
investor protection. Economic explanations state that deterring malpractice is not an 
objective for securities regulations per se, but rather to cut down on the unnecessary 
misuse of resources as a result of the unwillingness of investors to invest or participate 
in securities markets. In other words, it is all about increasing the efficiency of 
securities markets; hence if markets are efficient there are no grounds for investor 
additional protection regulations. Morality as a ground is suggested to be too broad to 
constitute a universal explanation applicable irrespective of context or the moral 
values of societies and hence to provide a coherent conceptual framework for investor 
protection. The political argument is claimed to limit the necessity of regulation to 
pure political motivations or threats of instability; it proposes that if there is no risk to 
the political interest, there is no need for regulation. However, the analysis advanced  
in this thesis is that a political explanation for regulations suggests regulations based 
on investor protection could be introduced, notwithstanding the nonexistence of any 
threat of any political instability. 
Having said that, the following central discussion in this thesis rests strongly 
on the economic rather than moral and political explanations. A key factor in this is 
the fact that regulations aim to implement broader social policy of enhancing the 
social welfare by increasing the efficiency of process for allocation the limited 
resources within the economy. Moreover, the analysis focuses on the deterrence 
rationale for the private enforcement of regulations, as noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, rather than the compensatory or fairness outcome of the markets. Little 
considerations, therefore, should be given to answer questions related to morality and 
fairness. 
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E) Concluding Remarks for Part I 
 
Part I started by attempting to define what securities markets are. It is illustrated that 
there is no agreement in the literature as to exactly what securities markets are. 
Consequently, the chapter endeavoured to provide a definition of securities markets 
on the basis of the meaning of markets and why they exist. Following this exercise, it 
was proposed that the term securities market is any organised process in an 
identifiable location or system through which financial contracts or claims which  
represent obligations or rights that have their own value and are transferable are 
exchanged, issued and traded. It is noted that there are different securities markets but 
the focus of this inquiry is mainly on capital markets, which include stock markets, 
bonds markets, and derivatives.  
 Having provided for a definition of securities markets, Part I attempted to 
demonstrate the relatively higher importance given to securities markets in modern 
times. It is shown that securities markets play a vital role in increasing the efficiency 
of the economy by working as a bridge between savings and wealth enhancing 
projects. Also, securities markets work to increase savings and distribute both credit 
and liquidity as well as discovering market prices for risks, events, management and 
liquidity. In addition, it is claimed that the spread of market oriented structures for 
economic activities provides additional support for the importance of securities 
markets in general and capital markets in particular, due to the important role they 
enjoy in the process of shifting towards a market economy model as well as 
transferring the public ownership of production units to the private sector. 
Accordingly, it is maintained that there are public policy considerations in ensuring 
the efficient functioning of securities markets that justify the attention given to them 
by policymakers, which is an answer to one of the research questions of this study. 
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 This part has also attempted to answer one of the present research questions 
presented as a sub-question of the thesis, which is to assess the importance of 
secondary securities markets. It is pointed out that secondary markets play an 
important role in enhancing confidence in primary markets, subsequently increasing 
the supply of credit. Furthermore, it is suggested that secondary markets benefit the 
economy by providing prices that can be utilized to guide the process of the allocation 
of capital and wealth. 
It is pointed out that problems of disclosure and the quality of assets are of the 
essence of the regulation of securities markets. The lack of incentive for managements 
and issuers to provide the information needed to assess the quality of the assets may 
render price discovery in the markets unreliable. Accordingly, it is claimed that 
disclosure requirements aim to bridge the gap in the informational disadvantages 
against investors. Another rationale for regulations is to protect investors from sharp 
practice and  opportunistic behaviour by participants in the markets which may 
undermine the integrity of the markets and investor confidence in them.  
Accordingly, it is argued that it is worthwhile for policymakers to introduce 
regulations that aim to ensure the efficient functioning securities markets, including 
secondary one, by reducing the informational disadvantages, ensuring the solvency of 
participants, and maintaining investor confidence against opportunistic behaviour by 
participants in these markets. It follows that securities markets regulations could be 
categorised as regulations that aim to increase disclosure, ensure the solvency of 
participants such as prudential requirements, and to protect investors from malpractice 
by participants in terms of the conduct of business.217  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 It should be noted different views exists, but a large agreement as to the underlying issues. 
Goodhart, for instance, refers to the reasons for public sector regulations as to protect customers 
against monopolistic exploitation, to provide smaller, less informed client with protection, and ensure 
systemic stability; Charles Goodhart, Financial Regulation: Why, How, and Where Now? (Routledge 
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However, regardless of what good regulations are introduced or what they aim 
to achieve, they are in themselves without any practical benefits. ‘A statute’ noted 
Walter, ‘is merely a suggestion, rather than a mandate, if it cannot be enforced.’ 
Ensuring compliance with and the enforcement of regulations is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition to ensure an optimal regulatory regime is in place. Whereas the 
literature focusing on enforcement in securities markets emphasises the importance of 
public enforcement, in comparison less attention has been paid to the role of private 
enforcement of securities regulations as a policy choice and elements of institutional 
design in the overall enforcement framework of securities regulations. Accordingly, 
the next part focuses on the subject of the private enforcement of securities 
regulations. 
      
Part II Private Enforcement of Securities Regulations  
 
Part I demonstrates the importance securities regulations in deterring malpractice and 
opportunistic behaviour, in addition to reducing systemic risk as well as informational 
disadvantages, that are deemed to undermine the integrity of securities markets. 
However, introducing regulations and rules is one thing, ensuring compliance with 
them is completely different. While mechanisms to increase compliance with 
securities regulations have been identified and promoted, such as ‘fit and proper tests’ 
for both financial firms and the main personnel working in them, it is more likely that 
compliance with conduct of business rules would rely on strict enforcement with civil 
and criminal sanctions.218 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1999) 4. The thesis in agreement with Goodhart but points out the monopolistic problem is rooted in 
informational disadvantages.  
218 Allen and Herring (n 186) 9 
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 The emphasis of the relevant empirical and theoretical legal literature on 
conduct of business regulations aiming to protect investors, with the exception of 
some studies dealing with the US which consider class-actions system, may be 
classified as falling within one of two broad themes: public and private. A great deal 
of the literature focuses on public enforcement, especially concerning insider dealing 
and conflict of interests.  
 Private enforcement as a means to ensure compliance, however, has received 
far less attention in comparative debate. Even IOSCIO documents rarely refer to 
private enforcement as an important part of securities regulations; nor does IOSCO 
suggest how to implement an effective regulatory regime taking account of private 
enforcement of securities regulations. In the absence of any guidance or optimal 
framework, countries have taken different approaches in terms of how to implement 
private enforcement within their regulatory regime.   
 Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the important role of private enforcement 
of securities regulations as facilitated by the regulatory regime and how it can support 
public enforcement. It starts by providing a history of private enforcement within 
securities regulations in the U.S. Then, it reviews the debate about the pure public 
enforcement versus private enforcement of securities regulations and argues that there 
is a role for private enforcement in an optimal regulatory regime. However, given the 
absence of any accepted framework, this section indentifies some problems with 
enforcement by unsophisticated private actors, especially in retail sectors, who are 
considered in need of additional substantive protection. It demonstrates how 
regulation might facilitate such action and what a regulatory regime of private 
enforcement should take into account.   
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A) The History of Regulatory Private Action of Conduct of Business in Securities 
Regulations 
 
The role of private enforcement in securities regulations has been recognised since the 
introduction of modern securities regulations in the U.S in the 1930s. At that time, 
Congress affirmed the right of citizens to seek redress for non-compliance or violation 
of securities legislations.219 The Securities Act 1933 provided an express private right 
of action against signers of registration statements containing material misstatements 
or omissions.220 The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 expressly provided for a 
private right to sue against certain violations, for instance, the rights to sue for 
manipulation or deception,221 to recover profit gained by corporate insiders,222 and to 
recover damages for false or misleading statements.223  The Act also imposed certain 
limitation on these rights.224 
 Interestingly, the most frequently cited provisions for an anti-fraud right of 
action, which are s.10(b) and Rule 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act, does not 
itself expressly provide for an right of action for non-fraudulent actions or statements 
by participants . The federal courts in the U.S. over the following years interpreted the 
statutes to imply a private right of action to sue for non-fraudulent acts.225 Initially, 
the recognition of an implied private right to sue was considered as ‘an exercise of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 For more discussion as the subject of private enforcement of public law in the U.S., see Stephenson 
(n 107) 
220 Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 
221 Section 9(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
222 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
223 Section 18(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
224 Section 9(f) of the Securities and Exchange Act (provisions for costs and attorney’s fees), and 
Section 13 of the Securities Act (statute of limitations for Section 11 and 12(a) (2)  
225 For example in Kardon et al. v. National Gypsum Co. et al., 73 F.Supp. 798, 802 (E.D Penn.)(1947) 
and Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. Bankers life and Casualty Company et al., 
404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971). For more discussion, see SEC commissioner’s speech Elisse Walter, 
‘Remarks Before the FINRA Institute’ (Wharton Certified Regulatory and Compliance Professional 
(CRCP) Program, 2011), available on the internet at 
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federal courts’ common law power to supply an appropriate remedy for every 
statutorily conferred right’ and hence private action based on Rule 10b flourished.226 
 However, the Supreme Court of the U.S. in the mid 1970s, in the case Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, shifted its rationale for such recognition to be an 
exercise of statutory interpretation, at least with respect to private claims under Rule 
Rule 10b.227 Such a move was driven by the court’s ‘belief that Rule 10b-5 
“vexatious” litigation needed to be constrained’.228 Accordingly, the role of the court 
was changed, since it: 
‘…will no longer consider policy arguments such as the need to 
compensate injured parties or the useful role that these parties could play 
as private attorneys general when deciding whether or not to imply a 
private right of action. Rather, congressional intent alone is supposed to 
govern.’229 
 
 Moreover, Walter, a Commissioner of the SEC, notably described the 
Supreme Court’s decisions since Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug as ‘hostility 
towards private rights’. Walter pointed out that the Supreme Court not only refused to 
recognise implied private rights in subsequent cases,230 but also restricted the scope of 
the previously recognised private rights. For instance, the Supreme Court in Morrison 
v. National Australia Bank231 stated that Rule 10(b) did not provide ‘a private cause of 
action against foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with 
securities traded on foreign exchanges’, and that it applied only to transactions in 	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227 Blue Chip Stamps et al. v. Manor Drug Stores, etc., 421 U.S. 723 (1975) 
228 Elisse Walter (n 225) 
229 Stephenson (n 107) 105 
230 Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 
(1979) and Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) 
231 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010) 
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securities listed on domestic exchanges. Such a restriction implies that private 
enforcement is not recognised in cases of fraud of securities traded on foreign 
exchanges. 
 In addition to restricting the scope of Rule 10(b), the court in a subsequent 
decision restricted the liability of those involved in fraud activities. In 2011, the 
Supreme Court held that an investment adviser cannot be liable under rule 10(b) for 
false statements included in mutual funds’ prospectuses.232 The court was of the 
opinion that a private right should have ‘narrow dimensions’ and held that the 
investment adviser was not liable because it did not make the statements.233  
 Accordingly, given the scope of this thesis on business conduct regulations, 
specifically the issue of suitability which is demonstrated to develop under Rule-
10(b), these historical developments suggest that one should be cautious about relying 
on s.10-b of the Securities and Exchange Act as a central argument for the promotion 
for the private enforcement of securities regulations. Firstly, it was the courts that 
developed the private right of action under Rule-10(b) for non-fraudulent acts, rather 
than it being introduced as part of the institutional design of securities regulations. It 
is true that s.10(b) has played a more important role than other express right to private 
action in statutes in securities regulations, as well as being part of the current 
institutional design of U.S. securities regulatory regime.234 However, it was not 
initially intended to this. Secondly, as well as the SEC as a means of public 
enforcement, private parties can bring an action based on Rule 10(b). However, it is 
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Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the Bite Back Into the Toothless Tiger’, (1978) 47 Fordham Law 
Review 115, 116 
 94	  
unclear how much consideration is given to private enforcement by U.S. legislators in 
the recent regulatory reforms, known as Dodd-Frank, in comparison to public 
enforcement by a regulatory agency. For example, following the Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank case that rejected an application of rule 10-b on fraud committed to 
securities traded on foreign exchanges, s.929P of the Dodd-Frank Act confirms the 
SEC authority in cases involving securities traded outside the U.S.235 In contrast, the 
Dodd-Frank Act does not confirm such authority to a private right to sue; s. 929Y 
required the Commission to solicit public comment and conduct a study to determine 
the extent to which private rights under the antifraud provisions should be extended 
across international boundaries and to submit the commission’s report to the 
Congress. This suggests that public enforcement will be more likely to be 
distinguished from private plaintiffs in the future, but it is unclear how.  
 Lastly, following the Supreme Court’s arguments, many scholars have 
concluded that court decisions implying a private cause of action which was not 
expressly provided are not rationalised in terms of compensation as much as 
deterrence and improving the overall enforcement of statutes.236 Accordingly, it could 
be argued that anti-fraud action reliant on s.10(b) and Rule 10(b) have essentially 
evolved as a means of deterrence rather than compensation and, therefore, it is 
possibly to consider this  cause of action as a means for enforcement aiming at 
deterrence within the enforcement framework for securities regulations.   
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B)  Pure Public Enforcement Or A Role for Private Enforcement: The Debate 
 
There are two divergent approaches to arguments concerning enforcement of 
securities regulations: public and private. Public enforcement refers to enforcement 
actions taken by a regulator to ensure that investors are protected, and that fair, 
orderly and efficient capital markets are maintained. The term ‘private enforcement’ 
is used to differentiate between the enforcement of the law by public authorities and 
by individuals. Private enforcement refers to 'individuals or groups whose interests 
the law or regulation is designed to protect’ and are able to ‘enforce compliance 
obligations directly against infringers in the civil courts and recover their losses 
directly’.237  
 It should be noted that public enforcement is not by any means limited to one 
regulatory agency; in some cases where criminal sanctions are imposed by securities 
statutes, criminal enforcement by the criminal prosecution authority may take place. 
The following discussion, however, is more focused on civil rather than criminal 
liability and considers unacceptable, but not criminal, behaviour as defined by the 
regulatory agency responsible for the enforcement of conduct of business regulations. 
I. Disadvantage of Private Enforcement  
 
This section considers the argument that public enforcement is a sufficient condition 
for effective enforcement of securities regulation. 
 Fundamentally, there is a strong case for the claim that public enforcement is a 
necessary condition for effective securities regulations. Experience demonstrates that 
there is a need for systematic enforcement within securities markets.238 In the 	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238 Ibid, also in Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silane and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in 
Securities Laws?’ (2006) 61 J. Finance 1  
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transition process from a state-controlled towards a market economy, similar to that 
underway in Saudi Arabia through its privatisation programme, Poland adopted an 
SEC style of enforcement and a rapid development of the stock market was observed; 
whereas in the neighbouring Czech republic ‘the hands off’ approach to enforcement 
caused the near collapse of its stock market.239 
 Different explanations offered as to the centrality of the role of public 
enforcement. The main argument is that the incentives for private enforcement are 
insufficient to support compliance with regulation.  A public enforcement agency is 
more focused and expert, and is able to interpret rules properly as well as sanction 
misconduct. either on its own or by bringing suits against violators. 
 In addition to the benefits of public enforcement, its supporters correctly point 
out some shortcomings associated with reliance on the private enforcement of 
securities regulations. The principal shortcoming is said to be that private enforcement 
based on deterrence rather than compensatory justifications are very difficult to 
control. This poses a dilemma where, on one hand private enforcement is rigid and 
very difficult to adjust, and on the other hand deterrence is based on incomplete 
information and sometimes ‘decisions are guided by intuition’.240 
 An additional shortcoming is that broad reliance on private enforcement may 
result in excessive litigation or enforcement, which may restrict any adjustment of 
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enforcement policy of the regulatory regime.241 The maximum enforcement is not 
necessarily its optimal level and could result in the system of private enforcement 
being misused or abused for private gains which would conflict with social or 
economic policies, such as, for instance, the benefit to a private business of damaging 
the reputation of a competitor by bringing a private lawsuit.242  
 Moreover, enforcement actions by private parties may interfere with public 
enforcement and undermine the benefits of enforcement by its agencies. Many public 
enforcement policies, such as principles-based, and strategies, such as coercion or 
cooperation, rely on a cooperative relationship between regulators and regulated 
entities which is essential to ‘establish a workable and consistent regulatory 
system.’243  The threat of private enforcement is that it may hinder efforts by public 
agencies to establish an accepted standard of conduct within an industry’s self-
regulatory body. A further criticism associated with private enforcement concerns 
costs. Private parties are less concerned than public enforcement agencies with the 
economic and social costs of specific enforcement action.244 For instance, numerous 
private enforcement actions may drain judicial resources.245 
 Such problems identified with private enforcement are deemed to justify 
reliance on public enforcement alone in order to ensure a higher level of compliance 
with regulations.246   
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II.  Advantages of Private Enforcement  
 
The foregoing disadvantages notwithstanding, private enforcement of public 
securities law and regulations can provide a number of benefits, and in many cases 
can be productive rather than counter-productive for at least three reasons. First, 
private enforcement facilitates a more efficient allocation of resources by providing 
resources additional to those of the regulatory enforcement framework. Second, 
private enforcement can provide a check on public agencies preventing them from 
shirking their responsibilities. Third, private enforcement can facilitate a reduction in 
the ambiguity associated with the writing of financial contracts, and hence reduce 
costs. Whereas these advantages do not necessarily refute or negate the benefits 
associated with public enforcement discussed above, they suggest that there is a case 
for private enforcement having a role in supporting a regulatory regime which public 
enforcement cannot fulfil. 
a.	  Providing additional resources for enforcement 
 
Public agencies have limited budgetary discretion and must work within limited 
resources to enforce the law adequately. Enforcement by private parties would 
increase the resources available to law enforcement and hence reinforce government 
enforcement efforts.247 Limiting the role of private enforcement or relying on public 
enforcement alone would place more pressure on regulators to be ‘the sole guardians 
of statutes’.248 
 The resource constraint on public agencies make them unable to bring every 
case which is considered important, and many factors need to be considered in 
deciding whether or not to bring an action such as the extent of the harm, the deterrent 	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impact of the case on future conduct across the market. If private enforcement is not 
available, legally unacceptable behaviour may go uncorrected and may fail both to 
deter wrongdoing and improve standards of quality and safety within securities 
markets. Consequently, fewer agents within the economy would be willing to engage 
with securities markets due to lack of trust in the behaviour of service providers or 
issuers.249  
 In short, it could be argued that there are cases which, even though public 
agencies consider them socially and economically worth enforcing, due to resource 
constraints they are unable to pursue. Private enforcement, therefore, could arguably 
provide the needed resources in these areas.    
b. Private Enforcement as a Check on Lax Enforcement 
 
Another potential benefit of private enforcement is that it can correct any laxity in 
enforcement by the public enforcement agencies. Lax enforcement refers to the 
tendency of government regulators to underenforce a statute or statutory requirements 
as a result of political pressure, lobbying by regulated entities, or the self-interest of 
the regulators themselves.250 
 Research on the subject of private enforcement of public laws points out that 
private actions can address lax enforcement by public agencies in two ways. Firstly, 
private lawsuits can be a substitute for the enforcement actions of the agency.251 
Secondly, and indirectly, a private lawsuit ‘can prod an agency into action, either by 
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shaming it or by forcing it to intervene to take over the management of those private 
suits where the government cares about the outcome.’252 
 Moreover, though this justification for private enforcement is most often 
associated with legislative distrust of the executive branch, it is likely that in some 
cases, due to lack of resources, the agency is unaware of non-compliance or statutory 
breach by regulatees. The ability to detect violation is necessary for effective 
enforcement, and private parties are more likely to be better positioned than public 
agencies to detect violation or non-compliance since they are directly affected by a 
defendant’s conduct or misconduct.253 For these reasons, it is argued that the policing 
of statutory violations provided by private parties is more likely to be of benefit since 
the latter are well-informed and have sufficient incentives to bring suits.254 By 
permitting private enforcement, an incentive for victims is created to ‘detect, report 
and assist in the apprehension and prosecution of violators’.255 
Moreover, lax enforcement can seriously undermine the price functioning of 
securities markets. It was noted previously in Part I that one function of securities 
markets in a market-oriented economy is price discovery for credit, liquidity, events, 
risks and management. Hayek points out that the most important role of prices is 
based on necessity; freely formed and freely adjusting market prices contain 
information about the plans and intentions of millions of market participants that is 
impossible to represent by any other means.256 Changes in prices reflect changing 
relative scarcities of input factors, goods, and services, and they thereby enable 
market agents to plan and to bring their subjectively formed perceptions and 
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expectations of the market conditions into line with reality. The impact of mis-pricing 
on the relations of quality in markets can cause serious economic problems. Initially, 
it scarcely helps that individuals incapable of differentiating between relative qualities 
would rely on price as a quality indicator. Providers in these cases tend to compete on 
prices as there is no other available indicator of the true quality of their products or 
services. In such circumstances, it is highly likely that this may lead to a general 
depression of quality within a market and eventually the existence of the so-called 
‘market for lemons’.257  
Therefore, given that some investors in securities markets are not always 
capable of feeding back their subjective preferences and wants to the markets,258 and 
in cases where lax enforcement exist, it would be reasonable to expect that mis-
pricing in securities markets is highly likely. 
c. Private enforcement and clarification of the law 
 
There is also an advantage of private enforcement in clarifying the law. The logic of 
this argument is that private enforcement may decrease the costs of writing and 
enforcing contracts which are negotiated privately, which will subsequently increase 
the efficiency of securities markets by minimising both legal risk and cost of 
transacting.  
 As far as legal risk in financial markets is concerned, the premise is that 
financial markets cannot generally be expected to deliver outcomes in the most 
efficient manner if the costs and risks associated with contracting are relatively high 
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for both businesses and investors. A means to decrease costs is to increase the 
certainty of legal rules, which is based on the assumption that legal risks increase with 
the increase in uncertainty of legal rules.259 Thus, low levels of litigation may also 
cause a reduction in the level of legal certainty needed in relation to securities 
markets.  
 In practice, it is evident that financial markets are able to develop more rapidly 
than regulatory regimes or regulatory agencies. As to the general law, courts are 
reactive and not proactive to developments in financial markets in general, and 
therefore there may be cases of specific practices where there is no regulatory 
guidance as to a matter of dispute.260 Hence, exactly what the legal position is in 
relation to a new product, service or practice would remain a matter of legal 
speculation until this is tested before a court when a dispute arises relating to such 
products or services.  
 Thus, it could be argued that there will be a need for contracting parties to go 
the courts and the process will increase the clarity as to the law at this subject not only 
for future contracting parties, but also for the regulators. 
C)  A Case for Private Enforcement for Securities Regulations 
 
Any claim that the absence of systematic enforcement might lead to market collapse, 
as indicated by experience, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that no benefits 
accrue from private enforcement of securities statutes and regulations. Moreover, 
recent studies suggest that public enforcement can be effective only when the relevant 
government bureaucracies are efficient. For instance, it is claimed that the 
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effectiveness of public enforcement is statistically significant only for IPOs and 
earnings manipulation in countries with well-staffed regulatory bodies.261 While the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the public enforcement of securities regulations are 
attracting more attention,262 such studies still emphasise the importance of regulatory 
resources as an important factor in an effective securities markets regulations.263  
 But this approach neglects to answer an important but simple question from a 
public policy perspective: whether or not a comprehensive system for the civil 
enforcement of securities regulations which is welfare maximizing requires a 
combination of public and private action or pure public enforcement. It was noted by 
Grundfest that within the U.S. context ‘... [while] praise for private party litigation is 
well-deserved in many situations, the relationship between private and federal 
enforcement of securities laws has not been subject to rigorous analysis.’264 Many of 
the studies focusing on the U.S. context put emphasis on the impact, benefits and 
shortcomings of class-action suits, but less empirical emphasis is directed towards 
private enforcement per se within the design of the regime of securities regulations. 
 Ultimately, the issues discussed above regarding the importance of the private 
enforcement of securities regulations and the optimal structure of the regulatory 
bodies need to be put into context. The preceding discussion makes clear that the use 
of private suits to enforce securities laws and regulations has advantages and 
disadvantages. We can agree that it might be correct that private enforcement is no 
substitute for systematic enforcement, and it is even possible to argue that investors 
are better off with systematic enforcement in terms of both the effort involved and 	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costs. However, it is argued here that the debate should not be about public versus 
private enforcement as if they were alternatives, but rather that the use of private 
enforcement should complement rather than be a substitute for public enforcement. 
The benefits of clarity in substantive law and the risks associated with lax 
enforcement and inadequate resources available to public enforcers mean that private 
actions are likely to increase the welfare maximization aim of social policy both 
directly, through ensuring that an adequate level of deterrence is available, and 
indirectly, by clarifying the law and substituting for lax enforcement.265   
 Therefore, it is proposes in this thesis that it is a question of how to effectively 
and efficiently provide a framework that combines both types of enforcement. It is 
more likely than not that, if implemented correctly, such a combination could provide 
the advantages of private enforcement and at the same time mitigate the 
disadvantages identified. 
Unfortunately, no paradigm for the optimal combination of the private and 
public enforcement of securities regulations has been promoted by IOSCO. It is also 
unfortunate that little existing research provides guidance as to what the optimal 
institutional design might be for private causes of action in relation to securities 
regulations which would be suitable internationally. Furthermore, substantive research 
analysing the private enforcement of financial law, including corporate and securities 
public law, focuses on it’s the positive and negative impacts of class-action suits rather 
than of private enforcement of substantive obligations, not through class-action, let 
alone enforcement by retail investors. Accordingly, this thesis investigates the 
importance of the private enforcement of investor protection regulations in secondary 	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securities markets. It emphasises the application of conduct of business regulations 
aiming to control the behaviour of participants rather than using securities regulations 
to control the behaviour of managements. Therefore, given the lack of a specific 
paradigm which takes into account such concerns, the next section endeavours to 
review the issue with reference to the literature on the private enforcement of public 
law.  
D) The Private Enforcement of Securities Markets Regulations  
 
In Part I, it was pointed out that securities markets regulations aim to solve the 
informational problem through disclosure, to prohibit opportunistic behaviours as well 
as malpractice among participants which can undermine the integrity of markets, and 
to reduce systemic risk by imposing prudential requirements. While the above 
discussion argues that private enforcement is complementary to rather than a 
substitute for public enforcement, the thesis assumes that, given the different 
justifications, different regulations may require different frameworks for private 
enforcement.  
 Such an assumption fits well with the literature on the private enforcement of 
public law. In his analysis, Stephenson points out that, from the point of view of 
institutional design, the desirability of private enforcement in a particular policy area 
will depend on three criteria: (a) context-specific information about the regulatory 
problem; (b) the characteristics of the potential private plaintiffs; and (c) the effect of 
private enforcement on public enforcement efforts.266 Given that there are three broad 
rationales for securities regulations, it could be suggested, therefore, that there are 
three broad regulatory problems that may involve different regulatory solutions: 	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information disclosure, malpractice and conduct of business, and systemic risk 
reduction by imposing prudential requirements. 
 However, It is important to identify the regulatory issues presented by such 
substantive obligations and to link this to the literature about the private enforcement 
of public law. Only then can a list be provided of the pre-requisites for an effective 
private enforcement of conduct of business regulations in secondary securities 
markets. Critically, it is important to understand how securities markets regulations 
aim to protect investors from malpractice in such a way that they are likely to enhance 
economic activity. In other words, it is necessary to specify the link between securities 
regulations and the economic benefits that result in the achieving the objective of the 
efficient allocation of limited resources.  
 As a determinant of economic development through its effects on capital 
markets, the influence of law was empirically demonstrated for the first time in the 
late 1990s. Two empirical studies by La Porta et al examined shareholder and creditor 
rights, among other variables, in evaluating investor protection in 49 countries.267 La 
Porta et al provided valuable insights into the law and development debate, among 
which two are of importance here. Firstly, the two studies suggest that there is a 
causal link between law and economic growth stemming from aspects of company 
law, and in particular the protection of a shareholder’s property rights which affect 
finance and thus eventually feed into the overall efficiency of the economy. Secondly, 
the two studies attribute to company law a role in determining the concentration of 
ownership. The authors claim that there is a positive correlation between the quality 
of the legal protection for minority shareholders provided by the corporate 
governance structure and increased concentration of ownership.  	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In his seminal work ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global 
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications’, Coffee argues that the 
investor protection included in a country’s corporate law has become increasingly 
marginalized, whereas what matters more are the investor protection rules provided 
by securities and exchange legislation.268 The latter are capable of providing more 
comprehensive and effective rules.269 Clearly, Coffee re-directs attention away from 
corporate law to secondary markets law as the more substantive law in generating 
economic growth. But while Coffee accepts the first premise of La Porta’s et al 
studies, he undermines the second premise by shifting the focus to those legal rules 
that deal with disclosure, takeovers, insider trading and anti-fraud provisions in 
association with the establishment of an independent state agency charged with 
supervising securities markets. He proposes that securities regulation will promote 
good corporate governance among participants and the subsequent development of 
capital markets.270 An empirical study supports Coffee’s proposition, finding that 
improved disclosure regulations have the effect of reducing firms’ costs of capital and 
hence increasing  efficiency within the economy.271 
Pistor takes the discussion a step further by proposing a new paradigm to 
explain the impact of law through finance, including, for the first time, trading 
rules.272 These are rules which ‘establish the procedure by which property rights in 
firms can be traded, and they determine who may trade on the exchange’.273 She 
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argues for a better understanding of the relationship between shareholder property 
rights, investor protection and trading rules by claiming that the law interacts with 
two models of ownership which differ from each other:274 (1) concentrated 
ownership, which mainly involves a conflict between minority shareholders and the 
controlling shareholder(s); and (2) dispersed ownership, which mainly involves 
conflicts between shareholders and managements.  
Pistor claims that this new paradigm would eliminate the contradictions 
between the findings of La Porta et al. and Coffee’s; whereas La Porta et. al. focus on 
shareholders’ rules, which concern the allocation of property rights in the corporation; 
Coffee’s focus is on rules which are not limited to existing shareholders but also 
potential ones, which can thus increase the attractiveness of investment in shares. 
Pistor proposes that the third set of rules – trading rules - should accommodate these 
conditions so that the kind of trading system is adopted which suits national 
conditions.275  
Even though Pistor’s argument is being open to criticism on the basis of her 
data and methodology,276 her analysis may be correct in that relationships among 
participants in secondary capital markets are regulated mostly by company legislation, 
and only partly by securities legislation. But from a secondary securities markets’ 
perspective, her inclusion of trading rules in any explanatory theoretical framework 
for a securities markets law does not take into account the various needs of 
participants in secondary markets which are different from those in corporate 
governance. These different relationships entail differences in needs between: (i) 
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issuers of securities and investors (Coffee) (ii) shareholders (or investors) and 
managements (La Porta et al. and Pistor), (iii) minority shareholders and controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al. and Pistor), and (iv) shareholders (investors) and 
intermediaries (Pistor).  
The existence of four different relationships demonstrates that there are three 
major drawbacks in Pistor’s approach to analyzing trading rules. Firstly, Pistor’s 
reliance on ownership structure with respect to trading rules will lead to the 
conclusion that legal systems will diverge rather than converge even functionally, 
since experience shows that corporate governance varies according to the political, 
economic, and cultural environments.277 It follows that listings in countries with 
different corporate governance regimes might fail since there would be a 
disconnection between the corporate governance with which the issuing company 
works and the trading rules that govern its shares. Empirical research, however, 
suggests otherwise; it is found that, as a sign of successful trading, liquidity increases 
in companies with controlling shareholders even when they are listed in foreign 
countries with different patterns of corporate governance.278 It should be emphasised 
that it is not argued here that corporate governance has no impact, because of course it 
does.279 But this does not mean that trading rules have to correspond to those 
suggested by Pistor. 
Secondly, Pistor’s account neglects the fact that there is a class of investors in 
secondary markets who trade there with the goal of making short-term profit by re-	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selling shares to others.280 Such trading in secondary markets for purposes other than 
investment is also important for economic development on the grounds of increased 
liquidity. Thus, Levine and Zervos suggest that it is stock market liquidity, rather than 
stock market size, that is correlated with economic growth.281 
Finally, the final group of relations – between investors and intermediaries - 
involves legal issues different from those suggested by the corporate governance 
literature. Essentially, such relationships rely on exchange transactions supported by 
the institution of law, including contracts and tort, rather than problems of agency 
arising from the separation of ownership and management.282 These exchanges are 
concerned with the exploitative behaviour of the intermediaries who provide services. 
In short, even Pistor’s account does not fully or satisfactorily explain the 
requirements of the different relationships involved. What the foregoing discussion 
could suggest is that, for an efficient secondary market, the literature emphasises three 
sets of legal rules: corporate law, securities law, and trading law. Each branch of law 
deals with different type of relationships. It is the relationship between shareholders 
(investors) and intermediaries that investor protection in secondary markets is 
concerned with, and the literature is unclear as to how these type of rule should 
accommodate the legal context.  
However, different types of misconduct arise for different reasons; for 
instance, takeover regulations aim to protect minority shareholders, whereas insider 
dealing arise from informational advantages as a result of an insider’s ability to access 
certain information not available to the public. In line with the main argument of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Ibid 
281 Levine and Zervos, ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’ (1998) 88 The American 
Economic Review 537 
282 High Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP 1999) 213  
 111	  
thesis, the ensuing discussion focuses mainly on the private enforcement of conduct 
of business regulations which aim to deter behaviour deemed misconduct or 
undesirable by a regulator in secondary securities markets. Accordingly, to be precise 
as to the subject, the discussion is elaborated to deal with the misconduct of service 
providers in secondary securities markets in relation to contracts aiming to transact 
for trading in secondary securities markets only.   
 As to the regulatory issues to be initially considered in the design of private 
enforcement frameworks, the next section discusses provide in detail what suitability 
and best executions as regulatory duties aim to achieve. Given the focus of this thesis 
on the conduct of service providers, namely stockbrokers and financial advisers, 
suitability and best execution are first identified as requirements promoted by IOSCO 
in order to enhance the integrity of markets.  
This brings the discussion to the second requirement pointed out at the 
beginning of this section, which concerns the institutional design of the private 
enforcement of public law in terms of the characteristics of the potential private 
plaintiffs.  
There are many different kinds of private parties in securities markets with 
different characteristics: regular investors, citizens, companies, investment firms, 
pensions funds, central banks and governments, for example. Thus, different 
frameworks may be needed to accommodate these different characteristics. However, 
in line with the comparative method of this thesis and with accepted standards as 
promoted by IOSCO, it could be argued there are two main classes of investors: 
unsophisticated or ‘retail investors’ and sophisticated investors. Such a categorisation 
is provided by the IOSCO as reflecting the most fundamental distinction between 
investors in securities markets.   
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Given the focus on retail investors, it is a question of their characteristics from 
a private enforcement perspective. Three problems have been identified with regard to 
private enforcement by retail investors: the latter are not aware of their position in la; 
the law itself is unclear as to the dispute; and there is a lack of incentive for retail 
investors to pursue a lawsuit.  
To start with, a general feature of private law is that it is not self-implementing 
and, consequently, investors must take the initiative to enforce their legal rights since, 
presumably, their self-interest will lead them to take action against businesses which 
have infringed their legal rights.283 However, the applicability of the two premises 
under this statement, that investors know their rights and are sufficiently motivated to 
press them, are substantially reduced in financial markets in general, including 
securities markets.284 Many studies have reported that the willingness to sue of those 
who engage in financial markets is limited because they are unaware of the true 
position in law where they have a remedy against the wrong committed against them, 
or the law is not clear as to their cases.285  
Moreover, it has been observed that retail investors may sometimes lack the 
economic incentive to exercise their legal rights, whether because of the high costs 
associated with enforcement or the low level of compensation likely to be awarded.286 
It is argued that one of the reasons for the high costs associated with litigations related 
to financial services is the need to link market standards to the quality provided to the 
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complainant, which requires expert evidence.287 In such a case, average (mainly retail) 
investors are at a disadvantage - particularly with small claims – because, firstly, 
experts are expensive to employ288 and, secondly, under some legal systems the 
plaintiff has to bear the costs.289 Furthermore, other procedures associated with 
enforcement could increase the cost of enforcement to such an extent that investors 
may give up on enforcing their rights even after obtaining a judgement. Studies have 
found that the time and costs associated with enforcement are evidently burdensome in 
some legal systems; for example, a British study shows that a substantial number of 
litigants in small claims abandoned enforcing their judgements because of the costs 
associated with such enforcement.290 
Consequently, it is possible to suggest that, as far as the characteristics of retail 
investors are concerned, their powers for the private enforcement of the law of 
securities markets are affected, or rather impaired, by their lack of awareness of their 
position in law. Furthermore, the law itself is unclear as to the dispute, and there is a 
lack of incentive for retail investors to pursue lawsuits. Such factors, accordingly, 
should be taken into account in the institutional design of the private enforcement of 
regulations which protect retail investors.  
The last consideration in deciding whether or not to provide for private 
enforcement is its effect on public enforcement efforts. It would be unrealistic to 
generalise as to this effect because of the complexity associated with the different 
kinds of public enforcement strategies; be these prosecutions, administrative 
sanctions, or processes of persuasion, negotiation, advice, education, or promotion. 	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But in general, there are two broad categories of enforcement style: a ‘compliance’ 
approach, which emphasises the use of measures falling short of prosecution in order 
to encourage compliance with regulations; and ‘deterrence’ approaches, which are 
penal and use prosecution in order to deter future infractions. Whether the style is a 
matter of choice by policymakers is still debatable. For example, it has been suggested 
that the American system of enforcement tends to be more litigious, adversarial, and 
deterrence-based than the more compliance-oriented British approach. However, 
Baldwin et al. argue that such categories, deterrence versus compliance, do not fit new 
theories of enforcement style of a regulator and subsequent compliance by regulatees. 
Current well-established theories of ‘responsive regulations’ and ‘smart regulations’ 
have resulted in more attention to motivation and behaviour, and to ‘risk-based’ 
regulations’ and a ‘principles-based’ approach to regulatory enforcement.291  
This complexity has two implications: first, any evaluation of public 
enforcement with private enforcement in mind has now become a more country-
specific issue;292 and, second, there is little research as to what the optimal role for 
private enforcement might be among the different enforcement strategies. For these 
reasons, as well as the comparative method used in this thesis, less emphasis is placed 
upon enforcement strategies and more focus is placed on the institutional design of 
private enforcement of regulations in the UK and Saudi Arabia.  
E)  Concluding Remark 	   	  
This section builds upon the previous discussion where it was claimed that a securities 
market is any organised process in an identifiable location or system through which 
financial contracts or claims which represent obligations or rights that have their own 	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value and are transferable are exchanged, issued and traded. It was noted that there 
are different types of securities markets but that the focus of this inquiry is mainly on 
capital markets, which include stock, bonds, and derivatives markets. It was also 
pointed out that secondary markets play an important role in enhancing confidence in 
primary markets, as well as providing prices that can be utilized to guide the process 
of the allocation of capital and wealth. 
The previous sections in this part have presented views of what is deemed 
important by international organisations with respect to the investor protection 
provided in secondary capital market regulations, and the conceptual framework for 
securities markets regulations supported by evidence is proposed. It is demonstrated 
that there is still disagreement among scholars as to what legal rules are important for 
a well-functioning secondary capital market. Generally, this chapter identifies three 
areas of law: (1) corporate law; (2) securities law; and (3) trading law. It is argued that 
none of these three areas alone is capable of satisfying the needs associated with the 
different relationships which are identified to exist in secondary securities markets. 
Nevertheless, as far as trading is concerned, it is pointed out that many company 
shares are able to enjoy a high level of liquidity and trading even though they are 
listed in countries with legal systems that have characteristics of corporate law 
different from those in their home countries.  Accordingly, it could be suggested that 
there is no connection between trading rules and corporate law.  
Such a suggestion resolves a well-known subject of debate among 
comparative legal scholars that convergence between legal systems which belong to 
different legal families, for instance those based on common or civil law, is likely to 
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be difficult because of irreconcilable theoretical differences between them.293 
Moreover, it supports attempts by international organisations to propose regulations 
based on experience in common-law countries among other countries from different 
legal families.   
 It is pointed out that, whereas public enforcement is necessary for securities 
markets, it is arguably accurate that securities markets are better off with private 
enforcement because: (1) the latter provides additional resources for enforcement, (2) 
it makes up for lax enforcement by public agencies, and (3) it helps in clarifying the 
law. However, given the lack of an optimal framework for private enforcement of 
securities markets regulations within a regulatory regime, reference to the literature on 
the private enforcement of public regulations suggests three criteria for designing an 
effective framework: (a) context-specific information about the regulatory problem; 
(b) the characteristics of potential private plaintiffs; and (c) the effect of private 
enforcement on public enforcement efforts.  
 As to the regulatory problem, it is pointed out that conduct of business 
regulations are claimed to be one of the three underlying rationale for regulations in 
securities markets. Overall, as pointed out by Llewellyn, conduct of business 
regulation ‘is designed to establish rules and guidelines about appropriate behaviour 
and business practices in dealing with customers.’294 This category of regulations 
deals mainly with unfair practices between financial institutions and participants, but it 
may also include dealing with conflicts of interest, disclosure issues, competition 
issues, and anti-money laundering rules. Accordingly, given the diversity of regulatory 
problems dealt with in conduct of business regulations, it is argued that additional 	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precision is needed for the specific problem that a particular rule aims to promote. 
Thus, Part III spells out in more details the regulatory issue of standards of conduct of 
service providers providing financial services to retail investor in secondary markets 
subject to suitability and best execution rules.  
 As to the characteristics of potential plaintiffs, it is argued that empirical 
research suggests that enforcement by retail investors is impaired by their lack of 
awareness of their position in law, the law itself being unclear as to the dispute, and 
the lack of incentive for retail investors to pursue lawsuits. It is, therefore, important to 
take into account these problems in designing effective frameworks for private 
enforcement of secondary securities markets regulations.  
Finally, it is very difficult to generalise on the effect of private enforcement on 
public enforcement due to the availability of different kinds of public enforcement 
strategy. It is argued that such an analysis should be country-specific given that it is 
unclear what the impact of private enforcement is within each of these strategies, and 
in addition an overall theoretical explanation that links the role of private enforcement 
to regulatory strategy is lacking.  
The next part builds upon the argument provided in Part II by investigating the 
regulatory problems that suitability and best execution as regulatory duties aim to 
resolve. This is followed by the conclusion part to bring together the whole discussion 
so far.  
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Part II The Regulatory Duties on Stockbrokers of Best Execution and 
Suitability 	  
A) The Role of Stockbrokers as Intermediaries 
 
When talking about capital markets, special references is made to stocks and 
stockbrokers because the history of these markets, and securities markets in general, is 
closely associated with the evolution of stock markets.295 Evidently, stock markets 
have been in existence for a long time. In the seventeenth century, shares in public 
companies became very attractive and were sold by Dutch, French and English 
companies to people in their countries.296 Stockbrokers were deemed important 
because they worked as intermediaries ‘who arrange on behalf of private investors the 
sale and purchase of shares’.297 In England, company shares were sold and traded at 
the Royal Exchange and in coffeehouses by agents of investors, and this activity is 
considered the first expression of specialized jobbers and brokers.298 
 In well-functioning stock markets, it has long been considered that a broker or 
brokerage firm should exercise care and demonstrate a reasonable level of skill in 
accordance with reasonable practice in the brokerage business.299 It is for this reason, 
it is claimed, that stock exchanges were established; to restrict entrance to stock 
exchanges to brokers in order to ensure the conduct of its members and to limit 
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fraudulent practices.300 Accordingly, it could be argued that the conduct of brokers can 
affect the health of stock markets. 
 In the twenty-first century brokers are just as important for the functioning of 
capital markets as they always were in acting as intermediaries between sellers and 
buyers. The role of brokers has been extended from the execution of their customers’ 
orders to performing other services for them such as clearing, custody and settlement 
services.301 It should be noted that investment and merchant banks also work as 
intermediaries to arrange the sale and purchase of stocks and other securities, but they 
work mainly with institutional investors and financial institutions.302 
While the important role of brokers could be highlighted in theory, in practice 
it is evident that stockbrokers have various roles depending on the structure of the 
markets in which they work. Three broad forms of the structure for secondary 
securities markets have been identified: brokers-markets, dealers-markets and 
auction-markets. In each form, brokers play different roles in facilitating the 
functioning of these markets. 
The first form of structure of secondary capital markets is the auction markets, 
of which there are two kinds: call auctions where brokers meet at a specific time such 
as in gold markets; or continuous auctions which offer trading throughout the day 
such as with shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The distinctive 
feature of an auction market is that orders are centralized, and thus the highest bidder 
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and the lowest offer are exposed to each other.303 In this type of secondary market the 
broker serves as a recorder or an auctioneer of the interests of buyers and sellers.304 
Secondly, a secondary securities market could tend to take the form of a 
brokered market if there was a lack of sufficient participants to deal with each other at 
the same time.305 In a brokered market buyers and sellers employ a broker to search 
for the other side of the deal in exchange for a commission.306 Certain derivatives 
markets that are OTC or off-exchange are brokered markets. Here, the behaviour of 
brokers is more important compared to these in auction markets, because they 
maintain a high degree of influence and are aware of the trading and prices of 
securities executed where there is no public transparency. 
Finally, dealer markets exist where there are rapid shifts in the movement of 
prices. This makes it profitable to remain in the market to serve as a counterparty 
while brokers are still searching for sellers or buyers.307 A dealer or a jobber, thus, 
buys for herself when people are selling and sells when people are buying. Dealer 
markets can exist in either brokered markets or auction markets. The United States 
government bonds and equities are examples of auction markets, whereas bonds 
traded off-exchange are examples of dealers markets existing in brokered markets.  
Moreover, it is possible for a certain market to exhibit the characteristics of 
two types. The NYSE market, for example, shifts to being a dealers market when 
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there is insufficient public demand or offers. In this case, brokers are part auctioneers 
and part dealers.308 
However, looking at brokerage from a business services perspective rather 
than as part of the market structure appears to raise different legal issues. Essentially, 
it has been argued that as a result of globalization and de-regulation, investment 
banking including brokerage, has merged with other banking activities and is being 
provided with other financial services by the same institution.  
Such business practice of brokerage business has in the last thirty years shifted 
its business model. Previously, for years if not centuries, charging commission for 
each transaction was the most common, if not the only practice enabling profit to be 
made from providing brokerage services. Currently, it is argued that the business 
model adopted by most, but not all, financial institutions has shifted to charging fees 
based on the volume of assets under management.309  
Such a change in business model has resulted in two major developments in 
practice. Firstly, from an investor’s perspective, the investor is better off increasing 
the volume of trading;310 since the more trade which is executed, the less costly the 
charges become. Secondly, brokers have become more aggressive in marketing other 
services in order to generate additional income.311 In doing so, brokers and brokerage 
institutions may encourage their customers to amend their investment strategies or 
adopt a strategy that would bring more benefit to the brokers, but at the same time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 Ibid; Spencer (n 140) 80 
309 Ingo Walter, ‘Conflicts of Interest and Market Discipline Among Financial Service Firms’ (2004) 
22 European Management Journal 361. Note that the commission-base model still exists especially in 
retail markets. 
310 See Claudio Salini, ‘Recent Evolution in Securities Market Price Formation Mechanisms’ (IOSCO 
Conference, Amman, 2004) <http://www.iosco.org/library/annual_conferences/pdf/ac18-14.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
311 Ingo Walter (n 309)  
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exposing the customers to additional risks, such as in stock lending and margin 
financing. 
Despite the significance and importance of the topic, there has been little 
empirical research into how such a change in business model may increase the 
exposure of stockbrokers to regulatory risks. A similarly neglected more fundamental 
question is whether or not the legal solutions which have evolved throughout history 
are still appropriate in dealing with brokerage service given the change in business 
model.  
For example, a broker may be encouraged by a firm’s compensation 
arrangements to sell in-house products as opposed to other products that would better 
suit the client’s needs,312 or a broker may inadequately assess the customer’s attitude 
towards risks.313 It is one thing to say that brokers are selling services and products 
aggressively, but it is quite a different thing to state that brokers provide inappropriate 
advice to their customers. The difference between them is critical from an economic 
point of view; an intermediary with no direct selling or buying interests will use her 
experience and skills to filter out bad items and provide the investor with the best 
available products in the market,314 thus guiding demand to the most efficient and 
most needed financial products.315  
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313 In a recent survey about stockbrokers in retail markets in Australia, it has been found that 
stockbrokers overestimate their customers’ attitude to risk when brokers are giving advice, see Marilyn 
Clark-Murphy and Geoffrey Soutar, ‘Do Retail Stockbrokers Understand Clients' Investment 
Preferences?’ (2008) 13 J.F.S.M. 135 
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In short, brokers in general, and stockbrokers in particular, play an important 
role in the functioning of secondary securities markets. This role will be determined 
to a great extent by the structure of the market itself. It is also clear that the 
globalisation and deregulation of financial markets and services as well as the change 
in the business model of brokerage businesses are likely to have created an incentive 
for brokers to mis-sell financial services and products to their customers, which may 
negatively affect the efficiency of the distributional process in financial markets in 
general and securities markets in particular. The discussion so far draws attention to 
the importance of evaluating common legal resolutions in relation to the brokerage 
business, and to question the need for revising some of these legal assumptions.   
B) IOSCO’s Principles Concerning the Conduct of Intermediaries 
 
   
The increased globalization of securities markets and markets for capital renders the 
role of international organisations more critical for their effective and efficient 
function.316 These organisations are important as a forum in which professionals 
exchange experience and transfer knowledge about how to attract and deal with 
international funds and finance.  
The international organisations that deal with financial markets issues can be 
classified into three groups depending on their functions. Firstly, there are 
organisations which promote broad policy agendas relevant to capital markets, such 
as the liberalisation of financial markets. Examples are the WTO, International 
Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the World Bank. Secondly, some private international organisations enjoy the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 Dominik Egli, ‘How Global Are Global Financial Markets? The Impact of Country Risk’ (2000) a 
paper presented in International Financial Markets and The Implications for Monetary and Financial 
Stability, BIS Conference Papers No. 8, <http://www.bis.org/publ/confer08.htm> accessed 29 June 
2011 
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power to create de facto soft laws, since they either influence the behaviour of 
participants in financial markets, or reference to their publications represent accepted 
international standards. Examples are credit rating agencies, the International Centre 
for Financial Regulation (ICFR) and the International Swap and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA).317 
Lastly, there are officially recognised international organisations which do not 
exercise legal authority but do enjoy powers to set standards for national regulation 
and supervision which could be seen as the parameters within which national systems 
formally operate. This group includes the Basel Committee, BIS, the Financial 
Stability Board, and IOSCO. 
As far as the institutional design of regulatory regimes for securities markets is 
concerned, it could be argued that the most influential organisation is the IOSCO. 
Whereas it started with a membership of 40 countries in the 1970s,318 IOSCO 
currently pronounces that its ‘wide membership regulates more than 90% of the 
world's securities markets’, and asserts that its members ‘regulate more than one 
hundred jurisdictions’.319 
Those members have endorsed IOSCO’s principal document, the ‘Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation’, and expressed their commitment to the 
objectives and principles in the document: ‘[i]nsofar as it is within their authority, 
they intend to use their best endeavors within their jurisdiction to ensure adherence to 
those principles. To the extent that current legislation, policy or regulatory 
arrangements may impede adherence to these principles, they intend that changes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 For more information see the organisation website at <www.isda.org/> accessed 29 June 2011 
318 Lewis Solomon and Louise Corso, ‘The Impact of Technology on the Trading of Securities: The 
Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation’ (1990) 24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 299, 333  
319 IOSCO, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (n 89) 1  
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should be sought’.320 In addition to its recognition by many countries, influential 
international organisations such as the IMF and Financial Stability Forum recognise 
the IOSCO document as representing the ‘key global standards of securities 
regulation’.321 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that, given its wide recognition, IOSCO could 
be seen as the international standards agency whose rules all countries are bound to 
follow, including Saudi Arabia and the UK. The UK is an ordinary member of 
IOSCO through the membership of the FSA, and in addition the London Stock 
Exchange is an affiliate member.322 In the same vein, Saudi Arabia became a member 
of IOSCO in June 2010.323   
Accordingly, it could be claimed that the fact that both the UK and Saudi 
Arabia are members of the IOSCO means that both case study countries are bound by 
the IOSCO document.     
Having said that, it could also be suggested that the IOSCO document has 
been successful in establishing a universal, clear and comprehensive list of objectives 
in respect of capital and securities markets. The ‘Objectives and Principles of 
Securities Regulation’ states that there are three principal objectives for effective 
securities regulation: (i) to secure the protection of investors; (ii) to secure the 
integrity of markets in the sense that they embrace fairness, and: (iii) the need to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
320 Ibid, 3; also see IOSCO Resolution No. 41, ‘Resolution on IOSCO Adoption of the Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation (P.C.)’ (September 1998), 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES16.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011  
321 The World Bank and IMF, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook, (World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund 2005) 140 
322 A list of all members of IOSCO is available on the internet at: 
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and Syria’ (June 2010), IOSCO News Release, < http://www.iosco2010.com/pdf/com09juin2010-
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reduce systemic risk.324 Consequently, it could be maintained that investor protection, 
market integrity through fairness and reducing systemic risks are the three principal 
objectives for securities regimes within our case studies as well as in hundreds of 
other jurisdictions. It is the objective of investor protection with which this thesis is 
concerned.  
The IOSCO document spells out the protection of investors from ‘misleading, 
manipulative or fraudulent practices, including insider trading, front running or 
trading ahead of customers and the misuse of client assets’.325 The IOSCO has 
specified 38 principles to give these three objectives ‘practical effect’,326 which are 
categorised into nine groups:327 (1) principles relating to the regulator; (2) principles 
for self-regulation; (3) principles for the enforcement of securities regulation; (4) 
principles for cooperation in regulation; (5) principles for issuers; (6) principles for 
auditors, credit rating agencies, and other information providers; (7) principles for 
collective investment schemes; (8) principles for market intermediaries; and (9) 
principles for secondary markets. The IOSCO recommends different regulatory 
techniques for implementing these principles, including: disclosure, authorizing 
participants, intermediaries and providers, supervision, regulatory enforcement, 
access to courts as a means of redress, and cooperation with other regulators.328 
Given that the focus of this thesis is secondary capital markets, it could be 
suggested that the IOSCO document encourages the protection of investors against 
misleading conduct, misbehaviour and abuse carried out in secondary capital markets. 
Here, group 8 of the IOSCO principles, which concerns principles dealing with 	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325 IOSCO, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (May 2003) (n 89) 5 
326 The World Bank and IMF (n 321) 140 
327 In the publication of 2003 there were 30 principles and section. IOSCO introduced section F after 
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market intermediaries, is of relevance to the inquiry in this research, and, therefore, is 
addressed in this section in detail.329 This group includes principles 31-34, specified 
as follows:  
Principle 31: ‘Regulation should provide for minimum entry standards for 
market intermediaries’;  
Principle 32: ‘There should be initial and ongoing capital and other prudential 
requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks that the intermediaries 
undertake’;  
Principle 33: ‘Market intermediaries should be required to comply with 
standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to protect the 
interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and under which management 
of the intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters’; and  
Principle 34: ‘There should be procedures for dealing with the failure of a 
market intermediary in order to minimize damage and loss to investors and to contain 
systemic risk’.  
Whereas principles 31 and 32 deal with market entry and the prudential 
regulations of intermediaries respectively, and principle 34 is clearly concerned with 
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systemic risk, it could be suggested that only principle 33 is related to the conduct of 
intermediaries which is the main focus of the current study.  
A careful reading of principle 33 supports the view that its main focus is the 
conduct of intermediaries. In addition to emphasising that operational conduct should 
aim to protect the interest of the client, it should be pointed out that the management 
of risk includes risks associated with the conduct of intermediaries. In the IOSCO 
document, the risk mentioned in principle 33 refers to intermediaries’ capital, client 
money and market confidence that could result from the conduct of intermediaries.330 
According to IOSCO, market confidence risks include inter alia a failure of due 
execution or inadequate advice, the misuse of the client’s instructions for the benefit 
of intermediaries, ‘manipulation and other trading irregularities, or fraud on the part 
of the intermediary or its employees’.331  
In the view of IOSCO, in order to contain such risk, a regulatory regime should 
ensure that intermediaries are required to ‘conduct themselves in a way that protects 
the interests of their clients and helps to preserve the integrity of the market … [by] 
ensuring the maintenance of appropriate standards of conduct and adherence to proper 
procedures by the whole firm’.332 For example, where a financial advisory service is 
provided, 333 a regulator should ensure that advisors are licensed, keep records, ensure 
adequate disclosure to the client, and introduce rules and procedures covering 
‘guarantees of future investment performance, misuse of client assets, and potential 
conflicts of interest’.334  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
330 IOSCO, ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (n 89) 32 
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334 Ibid, 39 
 129	  
The IOSCO recommends different regulatory initiatives to control the conduct 
of financial advisers, including substantive obligations such as the suitability of 
advice provided and ensuring that an investor or a customer is aware of the risk 
associated with a recommended investment.  
However, it could be noted that, throughout its documents as to the conduct of 
intermediaries IOSCO recommendations focuse mainly on retail clients. For instance, 
the regulatory requirement of suitability, which imposes an obligation upon the 
adviser that his or her advice ‘matches the retail client's financial situation, investment 
objectives, level of risk tolerance, financial need, knowledge and experience’,335 is 
recommended to be applied to retail customers only who, accepting differences 
among jurisdictions, are investors other than those normally referred to as 
‘professional,’ ‘qualified’ or ‘sophisticated’ investors.336  
Such a perception of retail customers suggests that this type of investor is not 
determined by specific criteria so much as by excluding other types of investors who 
are not eligible for the added protection provided by a regulatory regime. 
Consequently, it could be suggested that the lack of rationale or criteria from the 
IOSCO with regards to ‘retail investors’ is more likely to result in the existence of 
more than one perception of the concept of ‘retail investors’ in different jurisdictions.  
Accordingly, a suggestion made in this thesis is that, as far as secondary 
markets are concerned, it seems likely that countries will differ in their 
implementation and hence in the outcome of regulatory protection because of the 
deeper underlying differences in their perceptions of the ‘retail investor’.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 IOSCO, ‘Customer Suitability in the Retail Sale of Financial Products and Services’ (2008) The 
Joint Forum, <http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD268.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011.  
Note that the document defines mis-selling as ‘the situation where the firm sells a product to a client 
that is not suitable for that client, whether or not a recommendation is made’. 
336 IOSCO, ‘Regulatory and Investor Protection Issues Arising from the Participation by Retail 
Investors in (Funds-of) Hedge Funds’ (Report of the Technical Committee of the IOSCO, 2003) 
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Lack of clarity is also evident in specifying what appropriate regulatory duties 
in monitoring conduct or misconduct should be regulated, spelled out, enforced and 
complied with. However, by reading the different documents, it is possible to compile 
a short list of principles, which include suitability, conflicts of interest and disclosure, 
among others. The documents provide no detail as to what these principles entail. 
Moreover, the absence of reference to private enforcement leaves countries with no 
option but to pursue their own choices as to an institutional design for it; that is, if 
policymakers decide to include private enforcement within their regime.  
The absence of such clarity accordingly requires an investigation as to why 
these regulatory duties have been developed, what they facilitate in securities markets, 
and how they relate to the wider social welfare. The following two sections thus 
examine the development of suitability and best execution as regulatory duties as well 
as the justifications for introducing them into modern securities markets regulations.  
C)  The Regulatory Requirement of Suitability 
 
The word ‘suitability’ in ordinary language means being ‘right or appropriate for a 
particular person, purpose, or situation’337 or ‘acceptable or right for someone or 
something’.338 The term has acquired a more specific meaning within financial 
services and markets referring to the ‘requirement that any investing strategy falls 
within the financial means and investment objectives of an investor or trader’.339 
From a policymaking perspective, there is a specific conception as to the meaning of 
suitability, which can be said to be ‘a policy judgement that investors should neither 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Oxford Dictionary Online <http://oxforddictionaries.com/> accessed 29 June 2011  
338 Cambridge Dictionary Online <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/> accessed 29 June 2011 
339 The Options Industry Council, Glossary, 
<http://www.optionseducation.org/help/glossary/default.jsp?letter=S> accessed 29 June 2011 
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be encouraged nor permitted to invest outside their tolerance of risk’.340 This section 
attempts to demonstrate the importance of suitability in modern financial markets and 
links this to the public interest in regulating financial markets in general and securities 
markets in particular.  
The historical development of the requirement of ‘suitability’ is important in 
determining the context and expected benefits of imposing such a requirement. Even 
though securities regulations have existed in the US since the 1920s, the regulatory 
duty of suitability did not emerge until the 1960s.341 In the time between the 
introduction of securities regulations and the recognition of suitability as a regulatory 
duty, suitability was imposed through the NYSE as a sub-rule of the exchange’s duty 
of  ‘know your customer’ and in the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) under the association rule of ‘Fair Trading’.342  
Interestingly, while it is suggested that suitability evolved as a response to 
high pressure selling by stockbrokers through long-distance telephone calls, known as 
the ‘boiler room’,343 it should be emphasised that it was the American courts rather 
than the exchanges which successfully articulated such a duty. In response to boiler 
room activities that involved misrepresentation and gross overreach, the courts 
recognised suitability to be a private cause of action for investors on the basis that it 
constituted a violation of Rule 10b-5 which deals with fraud or deceit.344 From 
different cases brought before the courts, a general notion developed that ‘a security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340 Harvey Bines and Steve Thel, Investment Management Law and Regulation (Aspen 2004) 176-186. 
341 Frederick Gedicks, ‘Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: a Theory of 
Broker-Dealer’ (2005) 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 535, 543 
342 NYSE rule 405(1) and NASD Rules for Fair Trading, Article III, s.2(a) cited in Lyle Roberts, 
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(1996) 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 801, 808 
343 For detailed discussion, see Loss and Seligman (n 121) 1084-1088 
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deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
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being sold must reasonably fit the requirements of the person being solicited’.345  
Subsequently, the SEC in1967 promulgated a general suitability rule, Rule 15b 10-3, 
which was applicable to brokers who were not member of NASD.346 It could be 
suggested, thus, that this date marks the beginning of suitability as a regulatory duty. 
As a regulatory rule, it is thought that the concept of ‘suitability’ was 
developed in order to impose two distinct kinds of duties upon advisers in the US: 1) 
suitability as to specific customer needs and requirements, and; (2) the suitability of a 
financial product to be a ‘suitable investment’ upon a reasonable basis, known as 
‘reasonable-basis suitability’.347 
As to the customer’s need in category (1), there is agreement that advisers are 
under a duty to collect sufficient information about their customers to enable them to 
make informed judgements about the suitability of financial products or securities . 
For example, the NASD requires that: 
 ‘any recommendation a broker makes to a non-institutional customer be 
supported by a reasonable belief that the recommendation is ‘suitable’ for the 
customer, and requiring … the broker [to] obtain information about the customer’s 
financial and tax status, his or her investment objectives, and such other information 
used or considered to be reasonable … in making recommendations to the 
customer’.348 
 In contrast, reasonable-basis suitability requires that ‘broker-dealers have a 
reasonable belief that the securities they recommend are suitable for somebody’.349 
This dimension of suitability imposes on an adviser the requirement to look at the 
security or the product objectively without reference to the customer’s needs or 	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346 Ibid 
347 Loss and Seligman (n 121) 
348 NASD Manual, 2310. Similarly, see the New York Stock Exchange's suitability rule – Rule 405   
349 [original emphasis], Gedicks (n 341) 549  
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objectives. An example of a breach of this requirement of suitability is to recommend 
a share in a ‘thinly traded shell corporation with no operations, earnings, or assets’.350 
The economic importance of suitability, as demonstrated by its historical 
development, could be linked to the importance of financial advice in improving 
efficiency. Generally, two broad themes of economic analysis of the relationship 
between economic efficiency, regulations and investor protection can be identified. 
Briefly, one theme of economic models focuses on the supply of capital as a 
government rationale for intervention. The premise here is that, by increasing the 
engagement of agents (investors) within an economy, the cost of finance within the 
whole economy will decrease because of the increased supply provided by new 
investors. The second theme of economic models focuses on reducing the uncertainty 
around transacting in financial markets, so that the costs of transactions will 
eventually decrease. As a service, financial advice guides investors to the optimal 
choice of asset allocations within an economy by matching their needs to the assets 
that most satisfy them.351 At an individual level,352 financial advice is of benefit too in 
helping individuals to find the appropriate products without the need to spend too 
much effort and time on the purchase of something once in a lifetime.354 
Moreover, any reliance on the rationality of investors in correcting 
information asymmetry in financial markets has been proven to be inefficient at best 
and ineffective at worst.356 The underlying assumptions behind disclosure 
requirements, concerning the rationality of investors and their ability to interpret 
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financial documents, are not always applicable, especially where unsophisticated 
investors are involved.357 Benjamin argues that the recent excessive development of 
disclosure requirements amount to a “distortion”, since no amount of disclosure 
would ever be enough for truly informed consent.358 Empirical research shows that 
excessive information provided to investors can cause confusion and may eventually 
discourage them from engaging and purchasing financial instruments.359 
Therefore, it could be expected that inadequate financial advice would lead to 
losses in the welfare of society in terms of the misallocation of resources.360 It is for 
this reason that it is argued that suitability helps in increasing investor confidence 
through the knowledge that no unsuitable advice will be provided.361 Accordingly, it 
could be argued that suitability is an important regulatory duty since it increases not 
only the efficiency of the economy by ensuring the quality of advisory services, but 
also the confidence of investors that they will receive suitable advice.  
However, it should emphasised that suitability was not the only regulatory 
response developed in response to financial advisers not always providing adequate 
advice and exploiting their customers.362 To ensure the adequacy of financial advice, 
general policies have been implemented through regulations which can be categorised 
under three general groups: (1) those aiming to reduce the need for financial advice, 
for instance increasing the investor’s knowledge or reducing the complexity of 
products; (2) those ensuring the quality of advice, such as risk warning; and (3) those 	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targeting the way investors deal with financial advice, for example forcing advisers to 
disclose any commission received.363 It could be suggested, therefore, that suitability 
is concerned mainly with the quality of the financial advice.  
Stating that suitability is concerned with the quality of financial advice does 
not mean that it imposes a duty to inform the investor about a particular aspect of the 
advice, such as helping investors to make informed decisions and to warn them about 
the risk. 364 Rather, it requires the adviser to make an effort to judge the impact of the 
proposed decision on the circumstances of investors on the basis of the information 
gathered from them. A conclusion as to the suitability of financial advice, therefore, 
will vary not only between different investors, but also for the same investor because 
it depends on many imperative factors including the experience of the person 
providing the financial advice, the circumstance of the investor and the kind and 
amount of information gathered from the investor.  
Accordingly, it could be suggested that it is not an easy or straightforward task 
to determine suitability, given that there is no objective determination of it even in the 
case of one investor. In other words, the problem identified with this requirement is 
its subjectivity in relying on subjective judgment to decide its meaning.365 When this 
problem is not acknowledged, it can be mistakenly argued that the conflict underlying 
suitability is one between an objective suitability, on the one hand, and suitability in 
terms of the intermediary’s subjective beliefs, on the other.366 The mistaken view of 
the existence of an objective suitability could be attributed to the SEC, when it shifted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
363 Ibid, 50  
364 This type of financial regulation is described as ‘conservative paternalism’, see James Fanto, ‘We 
Are All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation of Investor Education’ 
(1998) cited in Barbara Black and Jill Gross, ‘Elusive Balance between Investor Protection and Wealth 
Creation’ (2005) 26 Pace L.Rev. 27, 37 
365 The Treasury Committee, European Financial Services Regulation: Seventh Report of Session 
2005-06 (UK Parliament, House of Commons, Stationery Office, 2006) 37 
366 Iris Chiue, Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation (Wolters Kluwer 2008) 31 
 136	  
its initial view of suitability from ‘subjective standards’, meaning suitability in the 
customer’s own eyes, to ‘objective standards’, meaning in the eye of the provider.367 
It is for this reason that it is the court’s job to rely on different expert witnesses to 
determine what is the common view of suitability among intermediaries rather than to 
identify an objective suitability. 
Such characteristics of the regulatory duty may require, in the event of a 
private action, a reliance on experts to prove that unsuitable advice which had been 
supplied could not be considered suitable in accordance with the standard judgement 
within the industry at that particular time. Such reliance on experts was argued to be 
one of the main causes of difficulties associated with the law relating to securities 
markets. Thus, within the U.S. context, it is currently argued that an investor willing 
to sue for unsuitable advice, in the absence of fraud, can do no more than to bring a 
claim for negligence, which may be ineffective in cases where the financial advisers 
did advise as to the risk involved and hence no reliance on the advice is claimed.368 In 
other words, even in the event of the advice provided being considered unsuitable, 
this would not in itself be sufficient to establish the liability of an adviser. It is for this 
reason that Gedicks claims that ‘[s]tand-alone suitability actions, in which breach of 
the suitability obligation is the core of the action, were unusual, and customer 
recovery on such actions rarer still’.369 
If suitability, as a regulatory duty, is justified on the basis of ensuring the 
quality and maintaining investor confidence but does not add to a private action, it 
would be important to know whether or not the concept of regulatory suitability is 
universally applicable irrespective of the context in which is applied. There are two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 Hersh Shefrin and Mier Statman, ‘Ethics, Fairness, Efficiency, and Financial Markets’ (1993) 49 
Financial Analysts Journal 21  
368 Ibid, 564 
369 Ibid 
 137	  
reasons for this enquiry to know, firstly, whether or not it could be transplanted as it 
is; and, secondly, if yes, whether or not the receiving legal system of suitability is 
entitled to alter the entitlement of suitability to suit its national context.  
There is no clear answer to this question. But it seems that the underlying 
nature of the regulatory duty of suitability is in a continuous state of evolution in 
order to keep up with what is considered important in affecting the quality of advice 
supplied. This can be observed in the way the substantive duties of suitability has 
developed through litigation and regulatory initiatives which currently require 
financial advisers to conduct two assessments: of ‘reasonable basis’ and to be 
‘customer specific’. Furthermore, a third type of assessment is currently being added 
to the regulatory concept of suitability. At the moment, the general application of the 
suitability of financial advice in financial markets in the US is imposed by the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).370 FINRA perceives the 
requirements of suitability to include three obligations: reasonable-basis suitability, 
customer-specific suitability, and ‘quantitative suitability’.371 This additional 
assessment of ‘quantitative suitability’ requires a financial adviser ‘who has actual or 
de facto control over a customer account to have a reasonable basis for believing that 
a series of recommended transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, are 
not excessive and unsuitable for the customer when taken together in light of the 
customer's investment profile’.372 FINRA does not provide any definition of the term 
‘excessive’ but provides some criteria to determine when conduct is considered 
excessive and thus in breach of ‘quantitative suitability’ 
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There are three points worth mentioning in the evolving process of suitability 
in the US. Firstly, the shift towards imposing suitability through the regulator rather 
than self-regulating organizations suggests a shift in the understanding of the optimal 
methods to impose suitability in financial markets. Interestingly, the movement 
towards imposing suitability through the regulator was attempted in the UK long 
before the US in the previous regulatory regime of securities markets, as illustrated in 
the discussion below.373  
Secondly, it is not clear whether or not the evolving suitability process is re-
active or proactive. A reactive process in this sense means that a regulator identifies 
widespread practice by practitioners and in response attempts to ensure that suitability 
is clearly covered in such practices. In contrast, a proactive process results from 
reflection on the concept of suitability itself and then attempts to develop a new 
modification of the concept in line with the way that financial advisory services are 
evolving. In principle, deciding that advice about repeated transactions or courses of 
action are not in the best interest of a customer is not a novel type of assessment, and 
in fact it is similar to ‘churning’, a well-known malpractice of stockbrokers involving 
moving the same money or funds from one investment to another in order to generate 
commission.374 But whether such malpractice among financial advisers becomes so 
common that regulators are induced to change the concept of suitability, or if 
financial advisory services because of de-regulation have evolved in such a way that 
the suitability duty needs to include quantitative assessment, are questions for future 
research. The former reasoning would be justified on the economic grounds that states 
intervene to maintain confidence and hence increases engagement, whereas the latter 	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would be justified if the state needs to increase the certainty in market by including 
what a given regulatory duty imposes. The difference between these two economic 
explanations is important. In modern financial and regulatory theory, economic 
analysis and justifications are paramount not only to justify certain government 
interventions, but also to identify the appropriate measures to be taken, including 
policy options as to the subsequent means used to intervene.375    
 Finally, the shift by the SEC concerning the concept of suitability from 
‘subjective standards’, meaning suitability in the customer’s own eyes, to ‘objective 
standards’, meaning in the eye of the provider, has resulted in different kinds of 
obligations being imposed. It is because of the notion of objective suitability that 
regulators tend to impose a duty upon advisers to collect as much information as 
needed to ensure that they gather a minimum level of available information before the 
provider can judge suitability. This suggests that, where it is possible for a regulatory 
duty to have several meanings, it is the view of the authority that matters.  
In short, in the US experience, where suitability as a regulatory duty was first 
recognised, it aimed to ensure that stockbrokers would determine that the content of 
the advice was appropriate to the needs of customers/investors. However, the meaning 
of suitability is still evolving even in the jurisdiction where it was originally 
introduced. Currently, suitability encompasses three kinds of suitability: customer 
suitability, reasonable-basis suitability and quantitative suitability. It is claimed that 
suitability involves an exercise of judgment by the financial advisers that is likely to 
create difficulties for private action, as observed within the American context.   	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D)  The Regulatory Requirement of Best Execution 
 
Simply put, the regulatory concept of ‘best execution’ aims to ensure that a financial 
services provider who is executing a customer’s orders takes into account various 
factors such as price movements, timing and execution venues. To understand the 
need for this regulatory doctrine as well as the purpose for which it was recognised, it 
needs to be placed in historical context. 
In his study of the duty of best execution in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, Facciolo demonstrates that the doctrine was originally developed 
in the U.S. from common law principles, particularly agency law. 376 Generally, 
common law agency principles impose fiduciary duties upon agents to secure their 
action in the best interest of the principal.377 Within securities markets these duties 
have evolved within American common law to require stockbrokers to execute the 
principal’s orders promptly, in an appropriate market, and to obtain the best price, and 
these are articulated as the duty of ‘best execution’.378  
The common law development of the duty was in response to the fragmented 
nature of US stock markets where different markets dealt in the same security. 
Information asymmetries as well as the high cost of communication gave advantages 
to stockbrokers over many investors, which was exploited by some of the former. The 
availability of multi-exchanges enabled stockbrokers to buy from the lowest quoted 
price and sell back to investors for the highest quoted price.379 That was deemed to be 	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in direct conflict with the agency principles that govern a broker-investor relationship, 
which the best execution duty aimed to remedy.  
It was not until the 1960s, however, that best execution was given regulatory 
status. At that time, the U.S. Congress adopted an initiative called the National 
System for Trading Securities in order to promote national trading in securities rather 
than being oriented to individual states.380 In such an environment, experience proved 
that it was still possible for stockbrokers to abuse the trust of investors, a fact of 
which investors were well aware. It was thought that, by introducing best execution as 
a regulatory requirement, investors would be assured of a trading environment where 
competing exchanges were linked to a single national market.381  
Thus, it could be suggested that best execution as a regulatory duty was meant 
to bridge the gap of mistrust between brokers and investors in a mutli-exchange 
environment. Having said that, it would be reasonable to state that best execution is 
unimportant, if not completely unnecessary, in single exchange environments. It 
follows that the importance of and the entitlement to the regulatory duty of best 
execution depend on the context in which the duty applies.   
The micro-economic analysis of the duty itself provides rigorous justifications 
to sustain the regulatory doctrine of best execution in modern securities market 
regulation based on arguments about economic efficiency founded on two lines of 
economic thought. The first states that the requirement of best execution enhances the 
functioning of securities markets by safeguarding the accurate appraisal of a security, 
which helps in increasing the efficiency of the allocation of investment capital within 
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an economy.382 Thus, it could be suggested that this explanation links best execution 
to the role of prices in financial markets in enhancing the efficiency of the economy. 
The second explanation is also based on economic efficiency, but it focuses on 
a different economic framework by asserting the effect of ‘best execution’ on investor 
confidence and subsequently on the formation of capital in enhancing the economy as 
a whole.383 Here it is argued that the regulatory requirement of best execution 
increases investor perceptions of the fairness of markets and, hence, strengthens 
confidence attached to the financial system.384 It follows then that the higher the level 
of confidence, the more investors and capital will come to securities markets, which 
ultimately lowers the costs of raising capital.385 This explanation is more likely to 
represent the underlying thoughts of the Congress in the development of best 
execution.  
Taking these two explanations together, it could be suggested that best 
execution is needed to maintain the benefits sought from securities markets by, firstly, 
ensuring the accuracy of prices, and secondly increasing capital formation. Since best 
execution is important for capital formation and the efficient allocation of resources 
through prices, it could be argued that it is needed irrespective of the level of 
economic development of a country given that it has a multi-exchange environment. 
In other words, economic analysis suggests that best execution is as important for 
developed economies such as the UK as it is for developing economies like Saudi 
Arabia.  
In short, this section demonstrates that best execution was developed at first 
by common law in response to the multi-exchange American securities markets in 	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order to ensure that stockbrokers did not abuse the trust of investors. It is also 
illustrated that the regulatory element was conferred on the best execution concept by 
policymakers to maintain investor confidence in national markets. It is pointed out 
that the current economics literature suggests that the rationale for imposing best 
execution is its role in capital formation and the efficient allocation of resources 
through the accuracy of appraisal. Based on the two economic explanations, it is then 
argued that best execution is of great significance for both developed and developing 
countries that have multi-exchanges in their markets.	  
Part IV  Summery and Conclusion  
 
This chapter started by demonstrating the relatively higher importance given to 
securities markets in modern times. The premise of this discussion is that it is argued 
that the nature of private financial exchanges through legally enforceable contracts is 
the cornerstone of the role of securities markets in enhancing economic growth. It is 
shown that securities markets play a vital role in increasing the efficiency of the 
economy by working as a bridge between savings and wealth enhancing projects. 
This chapter starts by distinguishing securities markets from other financial 
markets and proposes that a securities market is any organised process in an 
identifiable location or system through which financial contracts or claims which 
represent obligations or rights that have their own value and are transferable are 
exchanged, issued and traded. It is noted that there are different securities markets but 
the focus of this inquiry is mainly on capital markets, which include stock markets, 
bonds markets, and derivatives.  
 Having provided a definition of securities markets, Part I attempted to 
demonstrate the relatively higher importance given to securities markets in modern 
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times. It is shown that securities markets play a vital role in increasing the efficiency 
of the economy by working as a bridge between savings and wealth enhancing 
projects. Also, securities markets work to increase savings and distribute both credit 
and liquidity as well as discovering market prices for risks, events, management and 
liquidity. In addition, it is claimed that the spread of market oriented structures for 
economic activities provides additional support for the importance of securities 
markets in general and capital markets in particular, due to the important role they 
play in the process of shifting towards a market economy model as well as the 
transferring of the public ownership of production units to the private sector. 
Accordingly, it is maintained that there are public policy considerations to ensure the 
efficient functioning of securities markets that justify the attention given to them by 
policymakers. 
 This part also attempted to answer one of the present research questions 
presented as a sub-question of the thesis, which is to assess the importance of 
secondary securities markets, including secondary ones. It is pointed out that 
secondary markets play an important role in enhancing confidence in primary markets 
as well as increasing the supply of credit by using securities as a liquid guarantee for 
obtaining credit. Furthermore, it is suggested that secondary markets benefit the 
economy by providing prices that can be utilized to guide the process of the allocation 
of capital and wealth.  
 It is pointed out that problems of information within securities markets make it 
difficult to determine the quality of assets, and that these problems are of the essence 
of the regulation of securities markets. Accordingly, it is claimed that regulations that 
impose disclosure requirements aim to bridge the gap in the informational 
disadvantages against investors. Another rationale for regulations is to protect 
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investors from sharp practice and opportunistic behaviour by participants in the 
markets which may undermine the integrity of markets and investor confidence in 
them. Regulations should promote a minimum level of accepted standards that ensure 
the integrity of the market. A third justification is the systemic risk that certain 
financial institutions pose, so that regulations ensuring a minimum level of capital and 
liquidity are essential to minimise the possibility of such risks.       
Accordingly, it is argued that securities markets, including secondary ones, are 
worth focusing on by policymakers in introducing regulations that aim to ensure their 
efficient functioning by reducing the informational disadvantages, ensuring the 
solvency of participants, and maintaining investor confidence against any 
opportunistic behaviour by participants in these markets. It follows that securities 
market regulations could be categorised as regulations that aim (a) to increase 
disclosure, (b) to ensure the solvency of participants such as liquidity requirements, 
and (c) to protect investors from malpractice by participants such as conduct of 
business regulations. 
 It is then argued that ensuring compliance through the enforcement of 
regulations is necessary, but not sufficient, for optimal and effective regulatory 
regime for securities markets. Private enforcement should be considered as a 
complement to rather than a substitute for public enforcement. The existence of the 
private enforcement of securities regulations helps in achieving the wider social 
purpose behind securities market regulations, which is to improve the process of the 
allocation of limited resources. Private enforcement is argued can support the 
achievement of this by: providing additional resources for enforcement, safeguarding 
the price functioning of securities markets in cases of lax enforcement, and reducing 
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the costs of private transaction by reducing the legal risk through more certainty and 
clarity in the substantive law. 
Having said that, supporters of pure public enforcement of securities market 
regulations raise legitimate concerns as to the disadvantages of private enforcement, 
and particularly that private actors may neglect the wider social benefits as well as 
interfere with public enforcement. Such concerns are supported by considering the 
restrictive approach of the Supreme Court in the U.S., where the private enforcement 
of modern securities markets regulations for malpractice first developed for action 
based on Rule 10-(b).  
In accommodating such conflicting concerns, the thesis argues that private 
enforcement within securities markets regulation, if effectively implemented, is able 
to provide the advantages and avoid the disadvantages. A substantial volume of 
literature analysing private enforcement within the U.S. context recognises its 
shortcomings as a result of the reliance on courts to identify and develop causes of 
action as well as the existence of the class-action system. The provision of private 
enforcement within the regulatory regime for securities markets regulations is likely 
to mitigate the inclination of courts to develop such actions as well as mitigating 
problems with class-actions suits.  
Accordingly, a legitimate question is what would be an effective framework for 
the private enforcement of secondary markets regulations. Unfortunately, very few 
studies were identified in the literature which deal with the U.S. context, or provide 
general analysis of the private enforcement of regulations. Because of this, the thesis 
relies on the literature about the public enforcement of public regulation to identify 
what the criteria would be for an effective framework. From this, three criteria should 
be taken into account in designing a private enforcement framework: (a) context-
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specific information about the regulatory problem; (b) the characteristics of potential 
private plaintiffs; and (c) the effect of private enforcement on public enforcement 
efforts.  
 In contextualising these criteria in securities market regulations, it is argued 
that the availability of different kinds of public enforcement policies in addition to 
different approaches to the execution of policies, combined with scarce research into 
the role of private enforcement in each approach for each policy, renders 
generalisation extremely difficult. Thus, building a regulatory regime that involves 
private enforcement taking into account a particular enforcement policy may likely 
hinder the flexibility needed for the regulatory authority, which makes decisions as to 
the choice of particular enforcement policy. It may do so by restricting the choices of 
available enforcement policies to the regulatory agency. Therefore, it could be argued 
that less attention should be given to the enforcement strategy in the institutional 
design of private enforcement of securities market regulation.  
 The preceding discussion, particularly in Part II, concludes that effective 
private enforcement by retail investors of securities market regulations should take 
into account the characteristics of potential plaintiffs. Within securities markets, three 
problems have been identified with private action by retail investors: the latter are not 
aware of their position in law, the law itself is unclear, and there is a lack of incentive 
for retail investors to pursue a lawsuit.  
 The final criterion for the effective private enforcement of securities 
regulations concerns context-specific information about the regulatory problem. Part 
III provides an investigation of the regulatory problems which suitability and best 
execution as regulatory duties aim to resolve.  
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 Experience in the U.S., where suitability as a regulatory duty was first 
recognised, shows that it aimed to ensure that stockbrokers would determine that the 
content of the advice was appropriate to the needs of customers/investors. Suitability, 
therefore, aims to ensure that demand is properly matched to the right products in the 
market and subsequently the allocation of resources to this demand.  
 The analysis of best execution shows that, whereas the duty was developed by 
common law in the U.S., the regulatory element was conferred on best execution by 
policymakers to maintain investor confidence in national markets. It is pointed out that 
the current economics literature suggests that the rationale for imposing best execution 
is its role in capital formation and the efficient allocation of resources, through the 
accuracy of appraisal and investors’ confidence as principals that their agents are not 
going to exploit them for their own profit. Based on these economic explanations, it is 
then argued that best execution is of great significance for both developed and 
developing countries that have multi-exchanges in their markets. 
 What distinguishes suitability and best execution from some other regulatory 
duties is that they are imposed on contracts between private parties and affect the 
contract law that the transaction is subject to. The economic analysis of the 
enforcement of regulations points out that, whereas public regulations without 
incentives which involve criminality are best suited for public enforcement, the 
contracting parties are in the best position to enforce contract law. In particular, this is 
because private parties are best able to detect a violation of the contract when it 
occurs, as well as being likely to overlook minor breaches of contracts in order to 
preserve long-term relationships. They also can determine whether or not the costs of 
enforcement justify pursuing action, and because of their informational advantages as 
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to the subject matter of the contract, they are better suited to make these choices.386  
Accordingly, given that suitability and best execution are imposed on contractual 
relationships, it could be argued that private enforcement may be more advantageous 
than public enforcement. Consequently, it could be suggested that the private 
enforcement of both suitability and best execution regulations is likely to be effective 
in supporting the public enforcement of these particular duties.  
 Overall, the preceeding discussion supports the existence of direct and explicit 
private enforcement of suitability and best execution regulations because: a) these 
duties interfere with the substantive obligations provided by contract law; b) private 
parties are better suited to detect violations of contracts; c) the incentive is reduced for 
courts to imply a cause of action from a statute and hence more certainty is provided; 
d) it could support wider social purpose of securities market regulations by reducing 
the uncertainty and therefore the costs of private transaction; e) it may compensate for 
lax enforcement by public agencies; and f) provide additional resources for 
enforcement in addition to those already assigned to public enforcement.  
 However, whereas there is no optimal paradigm to accommodate private 
enforcement by retail investors in a securities market regulatory regime, let alone for 
suitability and best execution in particular, it is crucial to point out that such a 
framework should take into account several factors. Firstly, difficulties face retail 
investors in enforcing regulations; particularly in the clarity of the substantive law, the 
emphasis on the existence of their rights and the lack of incentives or higher costs of 
litigation. Secondly, the substantive duties imposed by the regulations concerning best 
execution and suitability should ensure that, whatever the means by which investors’ 
demand is directed by financial services, it should aim to facilitate the accurate end of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
386 Klöhn (n 108); Andrei Shleifer, ‘Understanding regulation’ (2005) 11 Europ. Finan. Manage 439 
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ensuring retail investors’ needs are promptly satisfied. Finally, in order to mitigate the 
disadvantages of private enforcement in terms of excessive enforcement and 
interference with public enforcement, a certain level of supervision and control should 
be exercised.               
 Whereas this thesis acknowledges the significance of all of these factors, there 
is little information available as to the practice in different countries in relation to their 
institutional design. Therefore, the current thesis provides a survey of the institutional 
design of private enforcement of these regulatory duties in both the UK and Saudi 
Arabia. It attempts to identify, firstly, why and how private enforcement took shape in 
each country and, secondly, how effective it is in facilitating the achievement of 
broader policy aims of compliance with securities market regulations. These 
investigations are followed by conclusions about the pros and cons of each national 
design. From this evaluation, recommendations are subsequently provided as well as a 
paradigm for the optimal design of private enforcement of regulations secondary 
securities markets.  
 It should be emphasised that the facts and circumstances in each country are 
examined in a separate chapter. By doing so the thesis endeavours to assess whether or 
not there are certain national restraints, whether these be legal, social or political, that 
may hinder the implementation of any recommendations for improvements or reforms.   
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Chapter Three 
The United Kingdom 
 
The chapter on the UK experience attempts to evaluate whether or not the current 
regulatory framework ensures that both ‘suitability’ and ‘best execution’ have been 
implemented in a way that permits retail investors to enforce them. The focus of 
discussion on retail investors is due to the limits of time and space, whereas further 
research would be needed to examine different classes of investors (for example 
professionals and financial institutions). Each class of investors involves specific 
circumstances needing to be examined in details. The choice of ‘retail investor’ was 
made in reference to the emphasis by IOSCO on this class of investors. 
 Accordingly, this chapter attempts to answer three questions. Firstly, what 
advantages do suitability and best execution, as implemented by the FSMA regulatory 
regime, provide to retail investors? Secondly, what are the problems with existing 
regulatory regime in facilitating civil actions by retail investors? And finally, what 
might be the way forwards in terms of improving the situation? Answers to these 
questions will contribute to the conclusion of this study and help answer the research 
question of the thesis.  
 This chapter is divided into four parts. Part I provides a background to the 
current regulatory regime in the UK. Part II examines the current regulatory 
framework, focusing on the techniques used for both suitability and best execution as 
implemented in permitting retail investor to pursue civil actions. Part III evaluates 
both suitability and best execution in their applied contexts, discussing the relevant 
definition, criteria and guidance. Finally, part IV includes a discussion and 
conclusions.  
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Part I Background 
 
An informed analysis of the regulation of securities markets in the UK requires an 
understanding of the environment within which the current regulatory regime 
developed. There have been two major regulatory frameworks in the UK. The first 
was established by the Financial Services Act 1986 (henceforth FS) and the second 
was the regulatory framework established by the FSMA in 2000. The discussion 
below demonstrates problems with the FS regime particularly in regards to private 
enforcement, and considers whether the FSMA is different from the FS as far as 
enforcement by retail investors is concerned. Furthermore, it is thought important to 
demonstrate how suitability and best execution as implemented are of help in the 
achievement of the policies underpinning the FSMA. For this reason, an analysis of 
the suitability and best execution within the UK context is provided.   
 The discussion starts by considering the motivation for introducing the 
regulatory regime, followed by the problems associated with the FS regime and 
private enforcement. Thereafter, the introduction of the FSMA is detailed, including 
public policy underpinning it. It is followed by two subsections that review literature 
demonstrating the importance of suitability and best execution to the regulation of 
financial markets, and then links that to the public policy underpinning the FSMA. 
This Part concludes with the assertion of the importance of suitability and best 
execution to achieve public policies underpinning the FSMA.    
A) The FS Regulatory Framework  
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 It was noted in a previous chapter that, from a positive law viewpoint, modern 
financial services law, as a distinctive branch of state law, was first established in the 
U.S. in 1933.387 In contrast, the first distinct law as an act of the Parliament in the UK 
to regulate mainly securities markets was not introduced until the FS in the 1980s.  
There had been nonetheless some minor interventions before the FS regime and after 
World War II mostly requiring the registration of participants or organising them in 
certain ways.388 For example, stockbrokers were required to register with the London 
Stock Exchange (henceforth LSE) and to follow its rules.389 But regardless of various 
state interventions, nothing is suggested that any of these interventions resulted in the 
creation of a regulatory regime with a special regulator for the industry. That is 
because both laissez faire and pure self-regulation continued to dominate in dealing 
with the protection of investors in secondary markets.390 
 However, between 1982 and 1984, the Conservative government considered 
the status quo of securities markets to be unsustainable. The abolition of exchange 
controls exposed the City to great international competition.391 Foreign firms, 
particularly from the US and Japan, disturbed the governance model of the self-
regulation system in the UK, which was based on the assumption that there was a 
common community understanding ‘where shared common, culture, practice, enabled 
business to be conducted on the basis of trust’.392 But some of the newcomers did not 
share these values, and by the mid 1980s an increase in the level of fraud in financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
387 See ch 2 Part II 
388 For detailed discussion, see Laurence Gower, Review of Investor Protection: A Discussion 
Document (H.M.S.O. 1982) 
389 See Edward Stringham and Peter Boettke, ‘Brokers, Bureaucrats and the Emergence of Financial 
Markets’ (2004) 30 Managerial Finance 57, 64 
390 Sharon Chain, ‘Financial Services Regulation: Can History Teach Us Anything’ in Cartwright (n 
198) 
391 House of Common, Financial Services and Markets Bill (House of Commons Library Research 
Paper 99/68, 1999) 7 
392 See Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Clarendon Press 1997) 52. See also John Kay and others, 
‘Regulatory Reform in Britain’ (1988) 3 Economic Policy 285 
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markets had become noticeable.393 In addition, public scrutiny and enforcement 
existing at the time was not able to ensure compliance with the rules and to maintain 
the integrity of the city. For instance, the Council for Securities Industry, formed by 
the Bank of England to co-ordinate self-regulation among participants in securities 
markets, had no permanent staff to deal with its broad responsibilities.394  
 Consequently, the government assigned Professor Laurence Gower to initiate 
a public enquiry and he published his discussion paper in 1982 followed by a full 
report in 1984.395 The underlying claim of the report was the need to change the 
institutional structure in order for regulation to work. The government’s subsequent 
White Paper, Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework for 
Investor Protection396 implemented most of Gower’s recommendations and proposed, 
contrary to Gower’s recommendations, two tiers of regulatory agencies. The White 
Paper introduced a regulatory framework based on a self-regulatory regime with a 
statutory framework as a governance model. The institutional structure was based 
upon an umbrella organisation with statutory powers (the Securities and Investment 
Board (hereafter SIB)) overseeing self-regulating organisations (hereafter SROs).  
 The rationale for the two-tier structure was the combination of two 
assumptions. The first is the assumption that participants were better suited to 
organise themselves and their industry, and not to disturb the important roles of 
market forces.397 The second was that both market forces and caveat emptor are not 
enough on their own ‘to create the necessary investor confidence’.398 The government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
393 For example Bank Singer and Friedlander, Lloyds scandal, the failure of Johnson Matthey Bank, 
and the collapse of McDonald Wheeler; further details at Chain (n 388) 
394 Note that self-regulatory associations were supervised mostly, except in insurance, by the Bank of 
England, see Gower (n 386) 
395 Ibid; and also see Laurence Gower, Review of Investor Protection: Report Part I (H.M.S.O., 1984)  
396 Department of Trade and Industry, Financial Services in the United Kingdom: A New Framework 
for Investor Protection (H.M.S.O., 1985) 
397 Ibid, 6 
398 Ibid, 8 
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wanted a law that ensured disclosure and maintained competition, and a structure that 
cures problem with standards maintained by self-regulatory bodies. It is from these 
complex objectives that the two-tier structure could be understood. 
 Before the FS came into force in 1988, it already had been subject to criticism. 
For example in Part II of Gower’s report, published in 1985, it was noted that due to 
the various services and products that financial institutions dealt with, there would be 
an overlap between regulatory agencies. This would require double reporting and thus 
increases in costs.399 This raised questions about the reasons for the government 
siding with the FS regime despite criticism about expected problems and costs. It is an 
area within the history of British financial law where different explanations are 
provided.  
 Different authors argue in favour of private interest theory for law that 
maintain the law was pushed through in response to the interest pursued by 
participants in financial markets. They, however, differ as to the motivation and the 
particular interests that were sought after by pushing the FS regime. Three prominent 
reasons could explain the government’s decision to seek a reform in financial services 
with speed in the way it was.  
 Firstly, it is argued that the incentive to develop regulations was brought about 
by threat of an action by the Office of Fair Trading (hereafter OFT) against the LSE 
to take it to the Restrictive Trade Practice Court.400 The OFT claimed that certain 
practices by LSE (namely fixed commission, single capacity, and membership 
restrictions) impeded competition and fair-trading. The Bank of England brokered an 
agreement between the LSE and the government that the latter would instruct the OFT 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 Laurence Gower, Review of Investor Protection: Report: Part II (H.M.S.O., 1985) 
400 The jurisdiction of the OFT was extended by the Restrictive Trade Practice Order in 1976 to include 
trading law in service industries. For further discussion see Michael Moran, The Politics of Financial 
Services Revolution: the USA, UK, and Japan (Macmillan1991)  
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to drop the action, and in exchange the LSE would agree to reform its rules under the 
supervision of the Bank.401 Chain argues that at this point the political autonomy of 
the City changed; the Bank for the first time pursued a different policy from those 
advocated by the City.402  Therefore, participants sought a new structure that provides 
an agency that voice their concerns and protect their interest.   
 Secondly, the change in the nature of the City forced participants to seek a 
new regulatory structure that could maintain standards and confidence in financial 
markets. It is noted above that foreign firms, particularly from the US and Japan, were 
disturbing the governance model of self-regulation based on trust. With the threatened 
loss of confidence there was an understanding of the need to maintain and improve 
trust among investors, which was thought better achieved by establishing a separate 
regulatory agency which could produce tough regulations, effective enforcement and 
combat fraud.403 Thus, it could be suggested that this explanation proposes that the FS 
regime was a means for participants to re-organise themselves with no intention of the 
protection of investors per se.    
 Thirdly, the push for the FS regime came from participants fearing the impact 
of private law on their commercial interests. Professor Black argues that the need for 
government intervention arose from the ability to combine the role of a broker and a 
market maker at the same time, known as dual capacity.404 Dual capacity generated 
immediate conflicts between participants’ interests as principals and agents. Black 
argues such conflicts of interest force those involved in financial markets, including 
regulators such as the Bank of England, to seek regulations to protect participants 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Also known as the Goodison-Parkinson agreement, 1983, for a historical review of the context at 
that time see Geoffrey Ingham, Capitalisms Divided: The City and Industry British Social Development 
(Schocken 1984) 
402Chain (n 388) 
403 For an detailed economic perspective of that period, see Kay and others (390) 
404 The elimination of dual capacity is known as the ‘Big Bang’ which took place on 27 October 1986, 
when fixed commission and the single capacity rule were ended, Kay and others (390) 
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from the harsh application of private law.405 Those needs could not be resolved on the 
basis of self-regulating institutions whose rules lacked legitimacy and enforceability. 
Therefore, there was a need to establish a regulatory agency to protect participants 
from the consequences of private law. This need was fulfilled by the FS regime as it 
was.  
 However, all the above-mentioned explanations suffer from some serious 
weaknesses. Black’s claim failed to address the fact that, although practitioners were 
seeking protection from private law, private law was still causing problems in regards 
to commercial conflict of interest long after the introduction of the FS.406 The first 
two explanations would be more persuasive if the authors had included the criticism 
concerning costs, or were more specific about those participants who pushed for the 
FS regime regardless of costs.  
 It is probably more suitable to examine the political and economic context 
surrounding the FS, which suggest that it was used as an instrument to support a 
policy shift in the economy. The Conservative government was about to conduct a 
privatisation programme of many public utilities.407 Consequently, a decrease in 
levels of trust among the public was not a risk that the government was willing to 
take. That being the case, the increased importance of financial service because of 
privatisation required ensuring the increase participation of investors. There was a 
need thus to ensure an adequate level of protection provided. Accordingly, it could be 
argued that the objective of the regulatory change at that time was not investor 
protection per se as promoted by the government in its documents, but investor 
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protection was seen as a means to promote the subscription in the privatisation 
program. This helps explaining why the FS was introduced regardless of additional 
costs imposed upon participants in financial markets while at the same time 
neglecting some legal issues arise from commercial transactions.  
 Moreover, this explanation helps to accommodate the development of private 
enforcement of regulatory rules within the FS regulatory regime. None of the three 
explanations of private interests could explain the introduction of s.62 and the concept 
of private enforcement. Section 62 of the FS act provided for a right of action for 
damages at the suit of a person who suffers loss as the result of a contravention of the 
Conduct of Business rules. It was brought into force six months after the FS regime, 
to permit financial institutions to have become more familiar with it.  
 The subsequent complaints about s.62 by participants support that the claim 
that FS was introduced for political reasons rather than in response to participants’ 
pressure. Participants argued later that s.62 might encourage strategic suits to the 
advantage of other professionals or financial institutions.408 The speed of government 
response to participants’ complaint about s.62 was impressive. The Parliament 
introduced s.62A through s.193 of the Companies Act 1989, which restricted the right 
of action to ‘private investors’.409 Considering all that, it is possible to suggest that the 
government introduced the FS to increase confidence with less regards to interests of 
participants which was considered later on.  
     As far as private action is concerned, it is reasonable to assert that private 
enforcement was one of the regulatory tools used to enforce regulatory rules within 
the FS regime. It does not follow, however, it was an effective tool. The FS created a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 See Department of Industry, Defining the Private Investor Regulations To Be Made Under Section 
62A of the Financial Services Act 1986 (Department of Trade and Industry 1990) 
409 For more discussion as to the policy and development of the concept of private person under the FS 
regime, see Titan Steel Steel Wheels Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2010] EWHC 211 
(Comm), paras 53-61 
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complex structure which brought into question the effectiveness of s.62 and s.62A. 
The institutional structure was a challenge for investors in enforcing their rights 
because of the complexity of rulebooks and procedures produced by many SROs. It 
created uncertainty not only because of the overlapping rules and jurisdictions, but 
also investors were confused as to where they stood before the law.410  
 Moreover, the absence of private action as a tool for enforcing regulatory rules 
was combined with a lack of public enforcement. As the main regulator, the SIB 
lacked an effective structure and resources to meet public expectations of deterring 
inappropriate financial behaviour. The authority’s failure of redress, enforcement and 
deterrence was clear; up until 1997, not one person or company had been prosecuted 
under the FS's mis-selling clauses.  
 These two factors manifested themselves in various financial scandals that 
attracted the attention of the public and threatened public trust. Two examples 
illustrate the negative impact of those scandals on the level of public trust. The first is 
the so-called ‘Maxwell’ scandal. Following the death of Robert Maxwell on 5 
November 1991, it became apparent that hundreds of millions of pounds were missing 
from the pension funds of companies belonging to Maxwell’s business empire, and 
that the lives of approximately 30,000 pensioners across the UK were affected. It was 
discovered that Robert Maxwell had essentially juggled assets around his business 
empire using company pension scheme assets as collateral for bank loans that were 
then partly used to fund a lavish lifestyle.411 The subsequent negative impact of the 
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Maxwell scandal on financial services has been recently documented.412 The authors 
of the paper concluded that: 
‘while victims of financial crime may continue to hold a generalised trust 
towards the financial system, the extent of this trust may be significantly 
reduced. Many of the Maxwell pensioners revealed that although they 
continue to place some degree of trust in the financial system, the 'spread' of 
their 'investment portfolio' has declined’. 
 
The second example is the so-called ‘pension mis-selling’. The 1990s saw a 
mis-selling of a large scale of unsuitable personal pension policies by financial 
advisers to two million citizens.413 In support of the assertion that the FS was an 
instrument in economic shift, the government through The Social Security Act 1986 
permitted, among other things, contracting out of the state pension scheme and 
occupational schemes.414 Pensioners were able to move from one scheme to another. 
It emerged that some pensioners were told to opt out although they would have been 
better off remaining in their schemes, or opting into an occupational scheme. 
It is therefore plausible to expect investors to hold negative views as a result 
of this complexity and the authority’s failure within the FS regime. Within this 
environment a new Labour government came to power with a strong vision to change 
the regulatory framework due to, inter alia, its complexity and lack of confidence by 
investors. The new regulatory framework is discussed in Part II of this chapter.  
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B) The Regulatory Requirement of The Suitability of Financial Advice  
It was noted above that the term ‘suitability’ has acquired a more specific meaning 
within financial services and markets to refer to the “requirement that any investing 
strategy fall within the financial means and investment objectives of an investor or 
trader”.415 As demonstrated that suitability as a regulatory rule was developed to 
imposed two duties: to ensure the product recommended is suitable on reasonable 
grounds and the suitability of the recommended products to the circumstances and 
needs of the investor. This section attempts to demonstrate the development of the 
regulatory duty of suitability within the UK context  
An analysis of the concept of suitability in the UK demonstrates a difference 
between what suitability is in the US and how it has been implemented.  
Initially, the requirement of suitability was introduced in the FS regime 
through the main regulator, the SIB, and not through SROs as in the US. The SIB 
Core Rule 16 states that ‘a firm must take reasonable steps to ensure that it does not 
… make any personal recommendation to a private customer of an investment or an 
investment agreement … unless the recommendation is suitable for him having 
regards to the facts disclosed by that customer and other relevant facts about the 
customer of which the firm is or reasonably should be aware’.  
Part III of this chapter provides an analysis of the concept of suitability under 
the current regulatory regime established by the FSMA.416 However, even though 
suitability was introduced under the FS regime, it is difficult to find agreement among 
British scholars as to what suitability entails in comparison to the US. Blair, for 
example, focuses her definition of suitability on the outcome, recognising it as an area 
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somewhere along the spectrum between ‘not unsuitable’ and ‘positively and 
indisputably the most suitable advice’ for an investor.417 Whereas McMeel and Virgo 
are of the view that suitability is ‘a requirement of an individualized exercise of 
judgment based firmly upon information obtained from the customer and other 
information of which the financial service provider ought to be aware’.418  
These two views of suitability are very different because McMeel and Virgo 
focus on the process upon which a suitability requirement is imposed while Blair 
suggests suitability is related to the outcome. Consequently, the duty of an adviser 
according to Blair should be wider to collect the necessary information to provide a 
suitable advice, while according to McMeel and Virgo the duty of adviser is narrower 
to exercise the judgement regarding the information provided by investors without 
judging whether or not the information available is sufficient to provide a suitable 
advice.    
In contextualising these abstract differences, two important observations about 
the concept of suitability within the UK are identified. As to the above two views, 
some court decisions suggest that suitability as a requirement is more concerned with 
procedures rather than outcome. For instance, in Investor Compensation Scheme v. 
West Bromwich Building Society,419 Evans-Lombe J emphasises that English 
common law view is that suitability imposes on an adviser the duty to investigate and 
evaluate the products and other financial arrangements available on the market.420 
Evans-Lombe J stopped short of defining the scope of an adviser’s duty towards an 
investor. For example, whether there is essential information that an adviser should 
seek from the investor, or whether an adviser’s duty is limited to the level of 	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information provided by the investor.  The likely explanation for that is that it would 
depend on the circumstances and facts of each case, but nonetheless there is nothing 
to indicate what the general principle is, at least in dealing with retail investors. 
Furthermore, there is no clear distinction in the British financial law literature 
between customer-related suitability and reasonable-basis suitability as in the US.421  
Accordingly, taking the two observations together, it can be suggested that the 
doctrine of suitability in the UK focuses only on the first component of suitability in 
contrast to the US. But why is this? 
Several hypotheses to explain the difference are possible. Firstly, it was the 
implementation of the regulator in the UK that resulted in the focus on customer-
related suitability. Secondly, the doctrine of suitability has evolved to fit the UK 
context through enforcement means other than the regulator, such as the courts. 
Thirdly, regardless of the regulator’s attempt, reasonable basis suitability is 
incompatible with English private law.  
The historical analysis of cases suggests that it is the first explanation that is 
likely to be more accurate. In rejecting the third hypothesis, it could be argued that the 
requirement of the suitability of financial advice was recognised under tort law before 
its introduction by the FS regulatory regime that involve the two duties. In Woods v. 
Martins Bank Ltd (1959)422 a case before the FS regulatory regime, a bank manager 
offered to act as a financial adviser for a wealthy client who upon the 
recommendation of the manager, purchased preference shares in a company called 
B.R. for the total sum of £10,500. The manager negligently assured the client that 
B.R. was financially sound. However, B.R. later became insolvent, and the wealthy 
client lost his money and sued the bank. The court found that the bank had breached 	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the duty of care by recommending an unsuitable investment. The conclusion as to the 
unsuitability of the investment was reached on the basis that the product 
recommended (preference shares in an unhealthy financial company) combined with 
the strategy (two-thirds of the investment pool) could not be considered as a safe 
investment.423 On the basis of the reasoning of the court, it could thus be argued that 
the court reached its conclusion on a view of suitability similar to those developed in 
the US.  
Furthermore, in his comparative study, Cherednychenko argues although 
common law is guided by the caveat emptor principle in an advisory relationship, it 
was capable of developing suitability on its own if no regulatory intervention 
occurred.424 Underlying Cherednychenko’s claim is the court reasoning in Woods v. 
Martins Bank Ltd which identified the two different kinds of suitability. Therefore, it 
could be argued that common law was capable of developing the doctrine of 
‘suitability’ in line with developments in the American context, where the regulatory 
requirement was first developed. It follows that the requirement of suitability did not 
change because of the courts.  
Given that suitability had been recognised, and could have been recognised 
under common law, it could be reasonably claimed that the UK practice of suitability 
diverged from the US as a result of the regulatory framework. It is a question thus of 
the benefits of divergence from the US doctrine of suitability.   
In retrospect, the US experience of suitability was more related to 
stockbrokers and their behaviour in providing recommendation and execution at the 
same time.  There were no such concerns in the UK. Most notably, the UK experience 
of financial advice was arguably affected by and viewed more from its experience 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 See also same the reasoning in Rust v. Abbey Life Insurance Co. Ltd [1978] Lloyd’s Rep 386 
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with financial advice providers which resulted in general mis-silling of financial 
products (for example, pension mis-selling) rather than recommendations by 
stockbrokers. Thus, the different contexts in which the concept of suitability became 
an issue (ex. pension v. securities) may likely have led to different interpretations of 
suitability among regulators.   
Accordingly, the UK experience as to the doctrine of suitability shows that 
there is a difference as the concept of suitability. On the basis of the discussion above, 
it could be argued that differences in concept of suitability between the US, where it 
was originally initiated, and the UK suggest that (1) suitability can differ from a 
country to another; and (2) differences between states as to the doctrine could be 
attributed to the regulatory framework. The next section attempts to analyse the 
development of the doctrine of best execution in the UK.   
C) The Regulatory Requirement of Best Execution     
It is pointed out above that the regulatory concept of best execution requires financial 
services providers executing customers’ orders to take into account various factors 
such as price movements, timing and execution venues.  
 As far as the UK is concerned, the regulatory doctrine of best execution was 
first introduced in the FS regulatory regime as a stock-exchange rule in 1986.425 For a 
period of time, compliance with the best execution rule was not an issue as the LSE 
was the only stock exchange where a broker could execute a customer order for a 
price quoted.426 However, in 1997, an automated trading system for the largest 
companies quoted on the LSE was introduced which was commonly known as SETS 
(Stock Exchange Electronic Trading). Trade through SETS matched buyers and 
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sellers automatically, which cut out the need for market makers.427 Trading in the 
traditional way was still occurring in parallel to SETS generating some divergence 
between prices. Accordingly, the regulatory regime was modified so that the best 
execution requirement could be fulfilled with the focus on the best available price. 
That is well-illustrated by the action taken by the Securities and Future Authority 
(henceforth SFA) against ICE and C. Woodgate.428  
 ICE was working as a broker and adviser for an unlisted Russian company and 
agreed to buy shares from the directors. The purchase price ($3,900) by ICE was far 
below the actual available price for the share in the market and the customers were 
not aware of the difference (sold for $18,000). The SFA fined ICE on the basis that 
ICE owed a duty of best execution to their customer, meaning the best price. ICE 
appealed against the SFA decision, but the Disciplinary Appeal Tribunal upheld SFA’ 
action. As far as best execution was concerned, the notice issued by the tribunal 
clearly shows what ‘best execution’ entails:  
 ‘as private customers, the Directors were entitled to best 
execution … [the claimants] had not given best execution in breach of 
SFA's rules: they had made no attempt to find out what was the best 
price available … on the market .... ICE was obliged to obtain the best 
price for its customers’429 
  
 While the notice focused on the particular facts of the cases, it could be noted 
the two main duties imposed by best execution on brokers were: (1) an attempt to find 
out the best available price, and (2) to obtain the best price for the customer. 	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Accordingly, it could be argued that a broker was under a duty to make efforts to 
determine what was the best price available in the markets and to obtain that price. 
 However, the focus of best execution on the notion of best prices has been 
subject to criticism. It is argued that the ‘best price’ effectively restricts competition 
by reinforcing a tendency in securities markets to concentrate trading in a single 
exchange.430 The notion of best price would lead to a concentration of trading on 
SETS, and that would reinforce its monopoly position. Such argument demonstrates 
the difficulty facing a regulator in financial markets: the contradiction between two 
public interests; in this case promoting competition and protecting investors.  
 It is likely that there is a subtle and slow movement by the regulator in the UK 
to prioritise competition rather than the best interest in the client represented in the 
best available price. In 2000, the FSA– the authority at that time- initiated a review of 
best execution policy which was followed by a consultation paper in 2002.431 The 
result was a shift by the FSA from the focus on the price displayed to the concept of 
the customer’s net price.432 The new concept permitted the inclusion of other factors 
(such as order type, size, settlement arrangement and timing) in determining the 
exchange or the medium through which a customer’s order is executed.433 It was the 
duty of the service provider to identify the balance between these factors.  
 Many of the previous changes have been attributed to the influence of the 
EU’s efforts to regulate retail markets and increase the harmonisation among member 
countries.434 Most recently, another shift occurred as a result of the implementation of 
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 2007.435 The MiFID 
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promoted increased competition and reduced concentration in trading at exchanges on 
the basis that competition will provide better services and decrease the charges 
imposed by exchanges.436 In response, the FSA introduced its consultation paper and 
as a result the FSA introduced the current regulatory approach for best execution in 
the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (henceforth COBS), which is the subject of Part 
III below.437 
 However, these efforts by regulators and policymakers in promoting 
competition among exchanges are recognised to increase the importance of the duty 
of best execution. For instance, promoting competition among exchanges by 
regulations would create data fragmentation as to the best quoted price because of the 
availability of many venues that execute a security.438 The U.S. experience suggests 
the possibility of stockbrokers gaining financial advantage of the information 
symmetry sustained by investors in fragmented stock markets. Thus, there would a 
need for an instant consolidation for data by participants, whether among themselves, 
or provided by a third party.439 So long as there is no current solution to data 
fragmentation, the role of best execution is vital in maintaining confidence and 
reducing costs. Accordingly, it could be maintained that the duty of best execution is 
important in a regulator’s efforts in developing a multi-exchanges market. Given that 
it is the current policy to promote competition, it could be suggested that an effective 
implementation of the regulatory duty of ‘best execution’ helps in achieving policy 
objectives. 
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 To sum up, the regulatory concept of best execution was transplanted to other 
countries, including the UK, which did not have multi-exchange markets. In such an 
environment, there were no difficulties with the practical application of the rule, 
obtaining the best price available in the sole exchange was considered sufficient. 
However, once the securities environment changed, particularly stocks, by the 
introduction of new venues, what the rule of best execution entailed changed 
subsequently.  
D) Concluding Remarks 
The historical context of the regulatory framework is helpful in providing some 
specific observations about the UK experience. The first is the need to avoid complex 
systems. Although private enforcement was part of the framework established by the 
FS through s,62 and subsequently s.62A, the complexity of the FS regulatory regime 
resulted in difficulties for investors in determining the substantive law and then 
enforcing it. Whereas it is argued that clarity and certainty are important for the 
functioning of securities markets in previous chapters, the UK experience suggests 
that such lack of clarity and certainty negatively impact the regulatory regime through 
its effects on enforcement. Thus it could be suggested that lack of clarity in the legal 
system decreases the level of enforcement, including the private one, which affects 
the function of securities markets.    
The second observation is the intervention to establish the first regulatory 
regime used as a means to promote certain public polices based on political ideology. 
It is argued that none of the private interest explanations was capable of fully 
explaining the outcome of the state intervention. It was then suggested that 
intervening in secondary capital markets to establish a regulatory regime for the first 
time was used as a means to achieve other policy objectives. It could be suggested 
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thus, that it is the public interest theory, the first theme of political economy, that 
could explain the intervention for the first time in financial markets.    
The third observation is the influence of the domestic context on the 
implementation of regulatory concepts. Even though suitability was recognised under 
English law before it was introduced through the FS regulatory regime, it has not 
developed under the regulatory regime in line with concepts of suitability in the US. It 
is suggested that this was due to the impact of inappropriate sales techniques by 
financial advisory services, namely in cases of the mis-selling pensions. Such 
incidents shifted the focus of suitability in financial advice away from brokerage 
services, as in the US. In contrast, the regulatory requirement of best execution was 
not an issue at first when there was only one venue to execute an investor’s order. But 
once the context changed, there was a shift in what best execution imposed on those 
executing customer’s orders.  
The fourth observation is the impact of the EU project on the regulatory 
regime. Whereas the EU project does not rely on a private cause of action as means of 
redress to customers,440 it certainly has affected the substance of the regulatory duties. 
For instance, notwithstanding the fact that suitability as a regulatory requirements has 
been identified in the regulatory regime, it could be maintained that MiFID has 
changed the substances of the duties to a large extent; it has required the introduction 
of ‘appropriateness’ (which permits a ‘lighter touch’ suitability test in certain 
circumstances), lowering the level of the duties imposed on advisers from 
recommendation from ‘the most suitable’ to suitable, and restrictions on the UK 
regime as to the suitability model chosen.441  
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Finally, recognition of private enforcement does not imply its effectiveness as 
a tool for enforcement. The complex system established by the FS created difficulties 
for individuals in determining the applicable substantive law, and this negatively 
affected the benefits ascribed to private enforcement. Accordingly, the FS experience 
suggests the importance of evaluating how useful private enforcement is in context. 
Part II       The FSMA Regulatory Regime         
Part I has examined the historical development of the FSMA, illustrating how the 
framework established by the FS recognised private enforcement through ss. 62 and 
62A. This section examines how effective the FSMA regulatory regime is in 
permitting retail investors to enforce the regulatory rules of ‘suitability’ and ‘best 
execution’. The focus of retail investor is justified on, firstly, the assumption that the 
complexity of the FS regime was deemed to be solved by a simplified regulatory 
regime revolving around retail investors;442 and, secondly, the emphasis placed by 
IOSCO on ‘retail investor’ as a class neededing for protection.  
Accordingly, the discussion focuses on the way the FSMA permits retail 
investors to enforce their rights, rather than what the regulatory rules themselves 
entail. It is therefore necessary to demonstrate how retail investors are defined, how 
the FSMA provides them with a right to enforce, and how effective the new 
provisions related to retail to enforce regulatory rules in contrast to the FS regulatory 
regime. It is thought that an appropriate evaluation of a regulatory rule requires, first, 
an understanding of the role of the regulator as constructed by the FSMA in providing 
substantive investor protection; second, how financial services are recognised; and 
third, how retail investors are permitted to enforce the regulatory rules of suitability 
and best execution. These three considerations are dealt with respectively below. 	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A) The Primary Legislation: The FSMA  
The current regulatory regime established by the FSMA includes all kinds of financial 
services within a single broad regulatory framework. Within this regulatory 
framework, the FSMA is the core legislation that covers all kinds of intermediation in 
banking, investment and insurance. Moreover, under the FSMA unified supervision is 
created with different regulatory powers given to a unified authority including 
licensing, standard setting and enforcement for both prudential, conduct of business 
and systemic risks. 443 The unified regulator is thought to provide simplicity to the 
institutional structure of the regulatory regime and hence increase investor 
confidence. 444   
The adoption of a unified regulator has many implications, including the 
choice of the term ‘consumer’ rather than investor. Section 425(2)A defines 
consumers as any persons who ‘use, have used or may use’ or ‘have relevant rights or 
interests’ in a ‘regulated activity’ or with an ‘authorised person’.445 Presumably, then, 
the term ‘investor’ would be limited and would not facilitate the needs of generality 
within the FSMA regulatory regime to deal with non-investing activities, such as 
deposits and money transfers. Accordingly, and in line with the wording of the 
FSAM, the word ‘consumer(s)’ is used in the following text to refer to the protection 
provided by the FSMA regime to investors in secondary capital markets. However, 
where the term “investor” is used, it refers to the theoretical and intellectual meaning 
in economic and legal literature rather than the perception intended within the 
regulatory framework. 	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 Consumers’ protection is an objective of the FSMA regulatory regime. Section 
2(2) of the FSMA maintains that the regulatory objectives of the authority are: (1) 
maintaining confidence in the financial system, (2|) ensuring the stability of the 
financial system, (3) consumer protection, and (4) the reduction of financial crime.446  
 Of particular concern is s.5 of FSMA, which spells out the details of the 
regulatory objective of the ‘protection of consumers’, which is defined as  ‘securing 
the appropriate degree of protection for consumers’.447 The FSMA states that, in 
determining the appropriate level of consumer protection, the authority –the FSA- 
should take into account: (1) the kind of risk involved in the investment or 
transaction; (2) the difference of experience enjoyed by consumers ‘in relation to 
different kinds of regulated activity’, which includes the information provided by the 
FSA in its exercise of the consumer education function; (3) the need of consumers to 
have advice or accurate information; and (4) ‘the general principle that consumers 
should take responsibility for their decisions’.448 The FSMA allows the FSA to 
determine the priority of any of these factors, stating that there is no ‘obligation on the 
Authority to place particular weight on any one of these factors’.449 It could be 
suggested, therefore, that the FSMA permits the FSA to differentiate between 
investors on the basis of the risk involved, how experienced the consumers are, the 
amount of information provided by the FSA in its education function, the need for 
advice, and the responsibilities of consumers.  
 It is likely that because of the extensive powers given to the FSA, the FSMA 
provides guidance to the FSA in making its decisions. These are known as the 
‘regulatory principles’. They require the FSA to take into account in discharging its 	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regulatory functions: (1) the efficient and economic use of resources; (2) the 
responsibilities of managers (or authorised persons); (3) the burdens proportionate to 
benefits; (4) the facilitation of innovation; (5) maintaining the international 
competitiveness of the UK as a financial centre; (6) minimisng the adverse effects of 
competition arising from the authority’s discharge of its function,  (7) facilitating 
competition between regulated persons; and (8) ‘enhancing the understanding and 
knowledge of members of the public of financial matters (including the UK financial 
system)’.450 
The change in the institutional structure and the extensive powers of the FSA 
in protecting consumers have induced some to suggest a change in the philosophy of 
financial services regulation in the UK. It is noted above that the government’s main 
focus with regards to the FS regulatory regime was to maintain the principle of caveat 
emptor with a focus on disclosure. Schooner and Taylor maintain that that FSMA 
represented a shift in the philosophical justification of financial markets from an 
economic justification “freedom-with-disclosure” towards moral grounds (to take into 
account consumers’ need for advice and accurate information).451 The FSMA was 
meant to provide fairness for retail investors in the financial services industry in 
contrast to the philosophy of caveat emptor with disclosure.452 Such a suggestion 
could be supported by the requirement of ‘fairness’ in awards made by the Financial 
Ombudsmen Services (henceforth FOS).453 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 FSMA s.2(3), as amended by the Financial Services Act 2010 s.2(2)(b) 
451 Heidi Schooner and Michael Taylor, ‘United Kingdom and United States Responses to The 
Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets’ (2003) 38 Tex.Int'l L.J. 317, 334 
452 For detailed discussion on the fairness of the FSMA, see Department of Trade and Industry (n 406) 
453 For a brief explanation about the FOS see text to n 558. Within the legal context the terminology 
‘ombudsman’ currently means a person or an organisation that ‘deals with complaints from the public 
regarding decisions, actions or omissions of public administration’ More details are available from 
International Ombudsman Organisation, <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ioi/About-the-
I.O.I./Concept-and-Organization.php>	  accessed 29 June 2011	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Thus, it could be reasonable to state that the FSMA recognises the protection 
of investors as an objective of the regulator and the regulatory regime. The FSMA 
differentiates between investors in regards to protection according to the risk and the 
product, experience, amount of information, the need for financial advice and the 
responsibility of consumers. By permitting the authority to differentiate between 
investors in their needs for financial advice and experience, the FSMA is, relatively 
speaking, fairer with respect to investor protection in comparison to the FS. The next 
sections examine how the two regulatory requirements of suitability and best 
execution can help in achieving those regulatory objectives.   
B) The Scope of the FSMA 
 The techniques used by the FSMA in determining the scope of the act are the 
financial activities and persons involved. Upon these two factors, the protection of the 
FSMA can essentially be determined.    
The principal technique deployed by the FSMA to ensure adherence to the 
regulatory framework and to the authority is the so-called “General Prohibition”. 
Section 19 states that no person should carry on investment business in the UK unless 
he was authorised so to do by the authority.454 The FSMA considers any breach of the 
general prohibition to have far-reaching consequences; thus, in addition to 
establishing a right to sue for a breach for consumers, a person who is in breach of the 
general prohibition is subject to criminal prosecution.455  
The FSMA provides two categories of regulated activities included in the 
general prohibition: firstly, the activity of a specified kind and related to specified 
investment; and, secondly, where specified activity is related to property of any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 Section 19 of the FSMA 
455 FSMA s.23 
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kind.456 The term ‘investment’ used in the FSMA for the purpose of breaching the 
General Prohibition includes ‘any asset, right, or interest’ in the context of regulated 
activities,457and financial promotion.458 The FSMA confers to the Treasury the task of 
spelling out the meaning of investment of specific kinds and requires it to publish 
orders as to the meaning of ‘investment’. Accordingly, reference to secondary 
legislation is needed to determine what ‘investment’ includes.  
The phrase ‘investment of a specific kind’ is clarified by the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (henceforth the 
Order).459 The Order lists different types of investments for the purpose of the 
FSMA,460 including shares (Article 76), options (Article 83), futures (article 84) and 
bonds (articles 77 and 78).  
The Order clearly brings both financial advice and execution as services to the 
scope of the FSMA by providing details as to the ‘regulated activities’. These 
activities that are related to the broker, which need to take permissions when 
According to the Order, the following services are considered ‘investment activities’’ 
for the purpose of the FSMA: agreeing to carry on a regulated activity (article 64); 
arranging (bringing about) deals in investments (article 25(1)); sending dematerialised 
instructions (article 45(1)); dealing in investments as agent (article 21); dealing in 
investments as principal (article 14); making arrangements with a view to transactions 
in investments (article25(2)); managing investments (article 37); and operating a 
Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF) (article 25 D). Financial advice is included within 
the definition of ‘investment activities’ by article 53 of the Order covering: advising 
on investments for an investor or a potential investor (article 53).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 FSMA ss.22 (1) a and 22(2) b 
457 FSMA2000 s.22 (4) 
458 FSMA2000 s.21 (14) 
459 SI 2001/544  made under FSMA200 s.22 Sch.2 
460 FSMA s.22 
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The previous paragraphs demonstrate that both financial advice and executing 
customers orders by brokers are within the scope of the FSMA. Execution orders for 
consumers is recognised as a service related to ‘investment of specified kinds’, that 
includes securities. Advice subject to the general prohibition includes that on 
securities, which concerns buying, selling, subscribing to, or underwriting a security 
or exercising any right conferred by such security to buy, sell, subscribe to, or 
underwrite a security.461Accordingly, both financial advice and executing customers’ 
orders are considered within the scope of the FSMA.  
Given that both services are within the scope of the FSMA, they are within the 
parameter of the ‘General Prohibition’. The FSMA clearly establishes a consumer’s 
right to a cause of action for a breach of the general prohibition. Section 26(1) 
declares that an agreement reached with a provider in breach of the General 
Prohibition is firstly, unenforceable, and, secondly, that the victim of a breach of the 
General Prohibition is entitled to recover the money or the property paid or 
transferred under the agreement, as well as compensation for any loss ‘sustained as a 
result of having parted with it’.462 This wording is presumed to be wide enough not 
only to include loss of interest on the value of the money paid, but also to include 
losses that were not foreseeable by either party at the time of transaction.463 
The FSMA provides similar protection for a consumer who reaches an 
agreement with an authorised person, but as a result of an inducement by 
unauthorised persons. This could arise simply because of ‘a contract …entered into as 
a result of investment advice given by an unauthorised third party’.464 Section 27 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 See Art. 53 of the Order 
462 FSMA s. 26 (2) (a) and (b) 
463 McMeel and Virgo (n 3) 414 
464 FSMA Explanatory Note, para 3 
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declares that such an agreement is unenforceable and a consumer is entitled, inter alia, 
to compensation.465 
The approach of the FSA with respect to a breach of the General Prohibition 
has three main characteristics that facilitate its usefulness to ‘private enforcement’. 
Firstly, the FSMA does not restrict the right to classes of consumers; accordingly, 
there is no need for an examination of the entitlement of a consumer to a cause of 
action. Secondly, the FSMA provides neither exception nor reference to general 
principles of private law particularly for damages; thus, there is no application for 
causations or reliance in accordance with the general principles of private law, which 
may restrict a cause of action. Thirdly, the amount of damages provided for those 
dealing with a person in breach of the general prohibition is generous to include 
losses or profits which were not expected at the time of contracting.  
These three characteristics illustrate that private enforcement with respect to 
the General Prohibition is unique in comparison to other cause of actions provided by 
the FSMA. For example, in case an authorised service provider supplies a service out 
of the scope of its permission, the FSMA permits, in some cases, consumers to sue 
according to the tort of breach of statutory duty.466 By accommodating private 
enforcement of the rule through a tort action, the consumer’s right to sue is 
undermined because private law may not only make it difficult to enforce, but reduce 
the amount of compensation, such as contributory negligence.467   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 FSMA s.27 
466 FSMA s.20. The FSMA does not details what the prescribed cases are and are left to secondary 
legislation, namely Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 
2001/2256 (henceforth ROA), reg. 3 and reg.4  
467 For further discussion about tort for a breach of statutory duty, see text to n 552.  
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The claim of the negative impact of the private law principles is well 
illustrated by the case Re Whiteley Insurance Consultants (WIC).468 WIC was an 
insurance intermediary which had issued policies that it had no authority from the 
insurers to issue, or where the insurers did not even exist. From January 2005, 
insurance intermediaries were required to obtain authorisation from the FSA. WIC 
went bankrupt a short time after obtaining authorisation as an insurance intermediary, 
and an action was brought to determine what amounts policyholders were permitted 
to prove in WIC’s liquidation. The court decided that WIC effectively acted as the 
insurer – receiving premiums and paying claims - and, hence, was carrying out the 
insurance policies as principal and was liable to policyholders. Consequently, holders 
of WIC’s policies issued before January 2005 enjoyed the right to the 
unenforceability of their contracts, since WIC was not authorised at that time and, 
therefore, they were entitled to a return of their premium and compensation for any 
loss sustained as a result of having previously parted with their premiums. In contrast, 
holders of policies issued after the authorisation as an insurance intermediary of WIC 
in January 2005 had a tort for a breach of statutory duty according to s.20 and thus 
their contracts were enforceable. As a result, policyholders received nothing since 
they did not suffer losses as they enjoyed insurance coverage from WIC during that 
time. 
There is a case to be made as to the WIC judgement. It could be argued that 
the difference is in the remedy available rather than private law principles that 
resulted in the outcome of WIC case. While it is a correct and just objection, it misses 
the principal point. The principal argument in this section is that ‘private 
enforcement’ of the General Prohibition is treated differently from other rules, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
468 Also known as Kingfisher Travel Insurance Services (a firm)) [2008] All ER, [2008] EWHC 1782 
(Ch) 
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including the availability of enforcement. WIC demonstrates the benefit if the 
availability of unenforceability.469 It could be suggested thus that it is possible to have 
a cause of action that is not subject to traditional law principles.  
To sum up, the FSMA provides for private enforcement for consumers dealing 
with unauthorised persons. Four elements add to the effectiveness of private 
enforcement of the General Prohibition: the substantive law: clarity concerning the 
breach, availability to all consumers, avoidance of the application of general law 
principles, and generous compensation since there is no reduction to the damages. It is 
noted also that the FSMA provides two remedies, compensations and 
unenforceability, which consumers need to choose between.   
C) The Authority: The FSA 
The way that the two regulatory duties of suitability and best execution have been 
implemented in the UK dictates how to address the issue. Both requirements are 
imposed through the COBS published by the FSA. A non-compliance with a rule in 
COBS can give rise for private enforcement. Of particular importance is s.150 of the 
FSMA, which supplies a cause of action for a breach of statutory duty to a private 
person in cases of non-compliance with the rules introduced by the authority. 
Consequently, an analysis is required of the FSA role in financial services as a 
publisher of the COBS. 
It is noted that the FSMA established a unified regulator for all financial 
markets, and delegates powers to the FSA to supervise, manage and publish rules to 
regulate both financial services and the behaviour of authorised individuals and 
firms.470 The powers given to the FSA vary, including prudential and accepted 
conduct, authorisation, enforcement, listing, and financial promotions. In order to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 Subject to court discretion, FSMA2000, s.28 (2) 
470 See Part X of the FSMA 
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ensure a degree of accountability and to restrict the wide powers given to the FSA, a 
separate Financial Services and Markets Tribunal (henceforth the Tribunal) was 
established which is responsible for discharging several of the functions conferred by 
FSMA.471 The Tribunal may receive appeals against decisions by the FSA in 
discharging its supervisory, regulatory and enforceability functions, and may also 
give a party permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal on a point of law arising 
from its decisions. 472 Thus, it could be argued that the FSA enjoys rule-making 
powers which are subject to the Tribunal.  
 Moreover, it could be maintained that the rule-making powers given dictate 
that the FSA should be exercised to inter alia protect investors.  Such statement could 
be inferred from the clear regulatory objectives that FSMA defines the FSA in s.2(2): 
(1) maintaining confidence in the financial system, (2|) the financial stability of the 
financial system, (3) consumer protection, and (4) the reduction of financial crime.473 
It is illustrated above that s.5 spells out the details of the regulatory objective 
‘securing the appropriate degree of protection for consumers’.474  
In maintaining consumer protection, it is noted that the FSMA requires the 
FSA to take into consideration the risk involved, the relative experience of 
consumers, the need of consumers to obtain financial advice or accurate information, 
and the consumer’s responsibilities for their decisions.475 Furthermore, the FSMA 
delegates to the FSA the task of determining the priority among these factors.476 
Accordingly, in its role in maintaining public confidence, it could be suggested that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 FSMA ss.132 (1) and (2)  
472 FSMA ss. 132 (3) and 133 
473 FSMA s.2 as amended by Financial Services Act 2010  
474 FSMA s. 5(1) 
475 FSMA s.5(2)  
476 FSMA c. 8 Explanatory Note, para 2, at paragraph 39 
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the FSA has a wide power as to how to define the relative level of protection provided 
for retail clients.     
Moreover, the FSMA obliges the authority to exercise its rule-making powers 
in writing, but provides flexibility by allowing the FSA to publish all rule-making 
instruments in such a way that appears to the FSA to be best calculated to bring it to 
the attention of the public.477 To simplify and provide better communication with 
stakeholders, the FSA published a handbook (the Handbook) which details all of its 
powers and is divided into several parts.  
In protecting the interest of consumers, the FSMA delegates to the FSA the 
power to define the accepted behaviour by authorised firms in financial services.478 Of 
particular importance to the conduct of services providers are two groups of 
regulatory rules: the Principles for Business (the Principles) and COBS.  
The Principles are general statements with respect to the rules of conduct 
applicable to all authorised persons carrying out regulated activities in the UK.479  
Their main focus is an authorised person’s responsibilities when undertaking 
regulated activities.480 Eleven principles describes the recommended conduct of 
business affairs: 1. integrity, 2. skill, care and diligence, 3. management and control, 
4. financial prudence, 5. market conduct, 6. customers’ interests, 7. communications 
with clients, 8. conflicts of interest, 9. relationships of trust with customers, 10. 
clients’ assets, and 11. relations with regulators.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 FSMA s.153 
478 FSMA s,138(1) 
479 For the FSA’s power to publish rules see FSMA ss. 138,145,150(2), and 156, and to publish 
guidance FSMA s.157 
480 Not to be confused with the Statements of Principles for Approved Persons (SPAP).  SPAP are 
made in accordance with s.64 of FSMA and focuses on authorized individuals’ responsibilities when 
undertaking controlled functions. 
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 However, even though the Principles are the main justification for different 
disciplinary sanctions imposed on authorised persons,481 the FSA clearly states that 
they do not give rise to the right of a civil action against authorised persons as 
provided by FSMA s.150.482 Additionally, English courts have refused to recognise a 
cause of action for investors for a breach of a Principle,483 although FOS’s decision 
can be based on the Principles alone.484 Consequently, it could be reasonably 
maintained that the Principles introduced by the FSA do not supply any added value 
for private enforcement.  
 In contrast to the Principles, some of the rules in COBS permit private 
enforcement in case of breaches of these rules. The FSA states that some rules will 
not give rise to actionability. To clarify this, the FSA introduces three kinds of 
provisions in the COBS: rules, evidential, and guidance.485 Rules actionable by a 
private person are marked with the letter R in COBS. 486 ‘Evidential provisions’ 
indicate the expected conduct to be followed by service providers in complying with a 
specific rule; however, according to the FSA, ‘evidential provisions’ are not 
actionable and marked with a letter E in COBS. FSA’s guidance in the Handbook 
lacks both the binding nature of the general rules and the indicative status of 
evidential provisions and also non-actionable, and are with a G letter in COBS. 487 
 The COBS provides different levels of protection to different classes of 
investors by different kinds of rules that could be privately enforceable. For this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 FSA, Enforcement Annual Performance Account 2007/2008 (The FSA), 2008) para 10 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar07_08/Enforcement_report.pdf>	  accessed 29 June 2011 
482 The FSA Handbook PRIN 3.4.4. R  
483 In Clairon Ltd v. National Provident Institution, [2000] 1 WLR 1888, the case was ruled in 
accordance with the previous regulatory regime and SIB’s Principles. 
484 R (on the application of the British Bankers Association) v Financial Services Authority and another 
[2011] EWHC 999 
485 FSMA s.149(1) 
486 The power of discretion of the actionability of the rules is confined to the FSA according to 
FSMA2000 s.150(4), but it excludes listing rules and rules on the appropriate level of financial 
resources. 
487 FSA powers to give guidance in accordance with FSMA s.157  
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reason, it imposes on authorised firms the duty to determine the category that a 
consumer belongs to. This duty is introduced as the duty of ‘classifying a client’.488  
 Given the benefits of the duty of ‘classifying a client’, it is reasonable to 
expect clarity as to the criteria which differentiate between these classes. Inexplicably, 
while the COBS provides the highest level of protection to retail client, there are no 
criteria or definition to determine this class of investor. According to the Glossary in 
the Handbook, a retail client is a consumer who is not a professional, nor a 
counterparty client. Consequently, this passive approach of the Handbook requires 
determining the other two categories. The category of ‘professional client’ is divided 
into two sub-categories:489 firstly, per se professional clients, which includes any 
person whose regular occupation or business is the provision of one or more 
investment services and/or activities on a professional basis, such as investment firms, 
institutional investors, central banks, and insurance companies.490 The second sub-
category is the ‘elective professional client’ which includes clients who choose to be 
re-categorised from being a retail client in order to access certain financial 
products.491 Similarly, the category of ‘eligible counterparty’ is divided into two sub-
categories.492 There is a list of institutions deemed to be ‘per se eligible counterparty’, 
such as pension funds, central banks and governments.493 The other sub-category is 
‘elective eligible counter party’, who is a per se professional client with a share 
capital of at least £10m, and who asks to be treated or categorised as a eligible 
counterparty.494 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 COBS 3.1.4R  
489 COBS 3.5.1R 
490 COBS 3.5.2R 
491 COBS 3.5.3R, for example, individuals with high experience and understanding, special purpose 
vehicles, or overseas financial institutions. 
492 COBS 3.6.1R 
493 COBS 3.6.2R 
494 COBS 3.6.4R 
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 The COBS permits the movement of clients between these categories with 
restrictions. In cases where a client is to be re-classified to a lower level of regulatory 
protection, the COBS requires firms to follow procedures to ensure that a client 
understands the low level of protection and the high risk involved, including, inter 
alia, conducting a qualitative assessment of client knowledge and expertise before re-
categorising the client.495 The COBS indicates that it is the responsibilities of 
consumers to request a re-categorisation if they cannot assess or manage the risk.496 
The COBS, however, permits authorised persons to improve the level of protection 
provided for consumers on the initiative of the authorised person, such as in treating a 
per se eligible counterparty as a professional client, or treating per se professional 
client as a retail client.497 The COBS marks most of categorising clients rules with a 
letter R, which means that in case of non-compliance consumers have the right to sue 
for inappropriate categorisations.    
 In writing the rules in COBS, the FSA adopts two terms (consumer and client) 
to define the scope of rules, which may create confusion. According to the Glossary, 
the word ‘customer’ encompasses retail and professional clients, but excludes the 
eligible counterparties.498 In contrast, the word ‘client’ encompasses all three 
categories.499 This distinction is important and will be used throughout the following 
discussion. 
 In practice, the duty of classifying clients has two consequence of significant 
importance to the inquiry of the present study. Firstly, the process of classification 
helps in identifying those consumers entitled for actionability. Many rules in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495 COBS 3.5.3R (1) Both elective eligible counterparty and elective professional client must be 
requested by the client herself, COBS 3.5.3 R, COBS 3.6.4 R, in each case, the firm is under an 
obligation to notify the client about the risk of loosing the protection provided by the regulation 
496 COBS 3.7.2 G 
497 COBS 3.7.3R   
498 The Glossary 
499 Ibid 
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COBS are actionable for retail clients (the other two categories of client being the 
‘professional’ and the ‘eligible market counterparty’). Secondly, the classification of 
clients helps to focus regulatory protection upon those clients who need it most. 
Certain obligations are considered by the FSA to be provided to the retail client 
only;500 or to retail clients and professionals but excluding market counterparty 
consumers.501 
 To sum up this section, the FSA is the main authority in financial services in 
the UK and enjoys the power to set the rules as well as the discretion to decide which 
rules are actionable. In exercising its powers, the FSA introduced the Principles, 
which does not rely on private enforcement, whereas COBS includes rules that can 
provide for private enforcement. The FSA ascribe certain levels of protection, 
including private enforcement, to classes of consumers and requires authorised firms 
to categorise their clients. Within this framework, the importance of the COBS stems 
from the fact that its rules govern and provide for both suitability and best execution. 
According to s.150 of the FSMA, some COBS’s rules can constitute grounds for 
cause of action for a breach of statutory duty in the case of a breach by an authorised 
person. Accordingly, s. 150 and its effectiveness in providing private enforcement for 
regulatory rules are examined in details in the next section.  
D) Private Enforcement of COBS  
It is noted that there is a cause for private enforcement in case of a breach of the 
General Prohibition, that is the duty of financial service providers to obtain 
permission for regulated activities. This section deals with private enforcement for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Such as polarization and status disclosure rules, which apply only to advice given to private 
customers. 
501 As in provision related to the obligation on a firm to take reasonable steps to communicate in a way 
which is clear, fair and not misleading, see COBS 21.1.1 R, save in the case of an authorised unit trust 
scheme COBS 2.1.2 
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breach of the duty imposed on authorised firms to follow the rules introduced by the 
FSA. It should be emphasised that the FSMA provides private enforcements for 
breaches of several duties imposed by the FSMA, such as the duty not to employ a 
prohibited person.502 Given limitations of space, it is thought appropriate here to 
centre the discussion on the private enforcement of COBS since both suitability and 
best execution are imposed by its rules.  
 The consumer right to sue in case of a breach of a rule supplied by the 
authority is provided by s.150, which confers a right to “private persons” to sue a 
regulated person for a breach of statutory duty in the case of contravention of a rule 
imposed by the FSA. The SMA states that a person in breach of s.150 is not guilty of 
a criminal offence,503 and neither does a contravention of s.150 render an agreement 
void or unenforceable.504 Also, the FSMA limits available remedies to being to sue 
for damages only, and also excludes listing and prudential rules from the application 
of s.150.505  
 Accordingly, it could be suggested that under s.150 there are three conditions 
to bring an action. Firstly, there has been a contravention of a rule introduced by the 
FSA falling within s.150.506 Secondly, the contravention has caused a loss for the 
private investor, and thirdly, the individual suffering the loss is considered a private 
person.507 
 However, s.150 states that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502 FSMA, Part V, s.56 (2). However, the investor’s right to sue is provided by a different provision, 
namely s.71. 
503 FSMA s.51 (1) 
504 FSMA s.151 (2) 
505 FSMA s.150 (4) 
506 FSMA s.150 (1)  
507 As provided by ROA reg. 3,(c) ,and reg. 6(2)  (3)(c) 
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 ‘[a] contravention by an authorised person of a rule is actionable at the suit of 
a private person who suffers loss as a result of the contravention, subject to the 
defences and other incidents applying to actions for breach of statutory duty’. 508    
 By accommodating the cause of action into a tort action for a breach of 
statutory duty, there are further requirements that a ‘private person’ needs to fulfil. 
For this reason, it is deemed necessary to provide, firstly, the requirements for tort for 
a breach of statutory duty, and secondly, an examination of the effectiveness of this 
tort to enhance private enforcement.  
A claim for a breach of statutory duty is an action distinct from other tort 
actions under English law.509 Moreover, among major common law jurisdictions, 
Harpwood maintains that only English law recognises the tort for a breach of statutory 
duty as distinct from other torts.510 Probably, what makes tort of breach of statutory 
duty less appealing for other common law countries is that the damages and remedies 
provided are the same as for tort generally.511 But despite its damage measures being 
indistinguishable from other tort actions, Mcmeel and Vigro point out that the 
advantages of the tortious statutory claim is, firstly, to circumvent the need to argue 
that a duty of care should be recognised under tort law, and, secondly, to supply a 
more detailed picture of the appropriate standard of care for a particular activity.512 
Taken together, these different views suggest that the expected benefit of s.150 is to 
facilitate the recognition of a regulatory duty under tort law, to provide an additional 
more thorough picture of the standards of care for a duty, or possibly both.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
508 FSMA s.150(1) 
509 Thornton v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [1979] QB 626, 642. 
510 Vivienne Harpwood, Modern Tort Law (7th ed., Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 187 
511 Building and Civil Engineering Holidays Scheme Management Ltd v Post Office [1966] 1 QB 247 
512 McMeel  and Virgo (n 3) para 7.07 
 189	  
Commentators on English law identify five requirements for a successful 
claim for a tort for a breach of statutory duty.513 Firstly, a claimant’s interest that has 
been injured must be within the scope of protection afforded by the legislation, or it 
was the intention of the statute to protect it.514 Secondly, there is no presumption that 
a breach of statuary duty which results in harm to an individual is actionable in 
itself.515 Unless otherwise clearly specified, a court has to examine whether or not a 
duty is actionable. Thirdly, there has been a breach by the defendant of requirement of 
the duty towards the claimant. Fourthly, there has to be a loss; in a financial context, 
losses can be more than a diminution of value of the funds placed for investment that 
fall at once below their value.516 Losses will also include ‘the loss of unrealised gain’; 
any additional loss because of the lack of gain or increase in value which would have 
come about but for the breach in question.517 Finally, a claimant must establish that 
the losses suffered were caused by the breach of the duty. Lord Hoffmann’s speech in 
South Australia Asset Management Corporation v. York Management Ltd 518 clearly 
states the position of English law: 
‘A [claimant] who sues for a breach of duty imposed by the law 
(whether in contract or in tort or under statutes) must do more than prove that 
the Defendant has failed to comply. He must show that the duty was owed to 
him and that it was a duty in respect of the kind of loss which he had suffered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
513 John Murphy and Harry Street, Street on Torts (12th ed, OUP 2007) 491-511; Harpwood (508) 188-
199; McMeel and Virgo (n 3) paras 15.01-16.03 
514 This requirement is reaffirmed with respect of the FSMA in Hall v Cable and Wireless Plc [2009] 
EWHC 1793 (Comm) 
515 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd (No 2) (No.2) [1982] AC 173; Hall v Cable, ibid 
516 It includes higher fund management charges, poor interest returns, set-up costs, and exit penalty. 
517 Nestle v. National Westminster Bank plc [1994] 1 All ER 118, at 140 per Legatt LJ; Esso Petroleum 
Co Ltd v. Mardon [1976] 2 All ER 801; South Australia Assets Management Corpn v. York 
Management Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 365 
518 [1997] AC 191  
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... normally the law limits liability to those consequences which are 
attributable to that which made the act wrongful’.519 
 
Consequently, from a regulatory point of view, it could be argued that s.150 is 
an important tool that permits retail investors who are classified as private investors to 
acquire a legitimate claim against a services provider. By doing so, the FSMA 
provides the actionability of the rule and defines the scope protected to be limited to 
‘private investors’ as required by an action of tort for a breach of statutory duty.520  
However, such a view has been widely criticised by commentators who have 
examined s.62A of the FS regime.521 The ineffectiveness of s.62A resulted mainly 
from its restrictions of the right to sue to private persons, which ‘ensured that it is 
only those who probably cannot afford to take action, who have the right to do so. A 
private investor would be unlikely to make a loss of the kind of magnitude that would 
render the cost of legal action feasible’.522 In other words, the ‘incentives for such an 
individual to enforce regulatory compliance are … likely to be at their very weakest 
for this particular group of individual’ which consequently ‘severely curtails that 
potential both on the formal level and on the functional level [of s.62A]’.523  
Accordingly, it could justly be suggested that s.62 was ineffective because of 
the restrictions of its scope to those unable to rely on it. Such argument supports the 
claim in chapter two that in financial markets it is common that investors lack an 
incentive to enforce their rights and therefore render traditional private enforcement 
mechanisms ineffective in reaching the expected benefits of financial markets.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 Ibid, at 211-213 
520 FSMA s.150(1) 
521 See for example Iain MacNeil, ‘FSA 1986: Does s.62 Provide an Effective Remedy for Breaches of 
Conduct of Business Rules?’ (1994) 15 Comp.Lawy 172; Julian Pritchard, ‘Investor Protection 
Sacrificed: the New Settlement and s.62: Part 2’ (1992) 13 Comp. Lawy. 210 
522 Pritchard, ibid, 212 
523 Gray (n 96) 415 
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In similar vein to s.62A, s.150 restricts an action to a ‘private person’. Private 
persons are defined by the secondary legislation to include all individuals and 
business not involved with financial services with any kind of business.524 This 
restriction was carried over from the previous regulatory regime and justified with the 
same reasoning; to exclude financial firms and corporations from enjoying the right to 
sue for technical breaches of rules.525 Therefore, it is possible to expect s.150 to be 
attacked using the same reasoning as in critique above of s.62A. This does happen to 
be the case. For example, MacNeil, who thoroughly evaluated s.62A, describes the 
private enforcement provisions in the FSMA, and particularly s.150, as ‘a dead letter’ 
for reasons similar to those given about s.62A.526  
Additionally, a recent court decision may further restrict the scope of s.150 
and subsequently its effectiveness. In Titan Steel Wheels Limited v The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc527 the court had to interpret the definition of private person provided by 
the ROA. The ROA provides that a ‘private person’ for the application of s.150 
includes ‘any person who is not an individual, unless he suffers the loss in question in 
the course of carrying on business of any kind’.528 Titan was a steel wheel 
manufacturer whose earnings were in Euros while its spending was in Sterling. Titan 
purchased two swap contracts from its banks while it was classified as an 
intermediary client under the old conduct of business regime.529  Needless to say, 
Titan ended up with losses and subsequently sued its bank on the grounds that it 
provided advice to purchase financial products unsuitable for its needs. The court 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 ROA  
525 See the case Titan Steel Wheels Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, (n 407) para 69-70 for 
the policy reasons behind the restriction.  
526 Iain MacNeil, ‘The Evolution of Regulatory Enforcement Action in the UK Capital Markets: A 
Case of ‘Less is More’?’ (2007) 2 CMLJ 345, 362  
527 (n 407) 
528 ROA, reg.3(1) b 
529 The old conduct of business, known as COB, was effective until 2007. Suffice to say, in this case, 
an intermediary client is similar to the professional client under COBS.  
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rejected Titan’s claims to be treated as private person since it core business was wheel 
steel:‘[t]he fact that Titan's business was not confined to or focused on investment 
business is not to the point. The regulations expressly refer to the carrying on of 
business of any kind. This expression should be … given a wide interpretation’.530 
This means that ‘the scope of the exception in Reg. 3(1)(b) embraces a corporation 
which carries on business of any kind even if does not constitute a regulated activity 
or something akin to it’.531  
Irrespective of the conclusion of the facts of the case, this wide approach 
might lead to further restrictions on the scope of s.150. In a global commercial 
context where corporations need to trade in different countries with different 
economic contexts (such as currency), it is plausible for ordinary business to seek 
protection against changing circumstances by engaging with financial services. 
Within the UK, the increased emphasis on the integration of the EU single market 
would reasonably lead corporations of different sizes to seek opportunities abroad. 
Therefore, there is a need to be involved with financial markets to a certain extent. It 
follows that the wide interpretation of the court in the Titan case would lead most 
businesses to be considered non-private persons. Accordingly, it is possible to suggest 
that this narrowing of the interpretation of the court of ‘private persons’ may reduce 
the scope of the potential meaning of private persons, and, for the same reasons 
mentioned above, reduce the effectiveness of s.150.  
The subtle role of the regulator (the FSA) may also have influenced the 
ineffectiveness of private enforcement of regulatory duties in two ways: in the 
classification of clients and the eligibility of consumers for FOS services.  
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It is noted above that the FSA embraces the concept of a classification of 
customers to determine the appropriate level of protection and to provide the 
actionability elements of the regulatory rules. These are detailed in Part III of this 
chapter with respect to suitability and best execution. By reducing the scope of ‘retail 
consumers’, who are the main focus of most of its substantive regulatory protection, 
the FSA can influence the effectiveness of private enforcement by extending the 
protection of the rules to those able to enforce it within the meaning of “private 
persons” defined by the ROA. While the ROA provides a right on the basis of the 
characteristic of the person suing, the FSA may further influence those who are 
entitled to regulatory protection. For example, a corporation that holds net assets of 
capital of at least 5 million might be considered as a private person but, since it is 
considered as a professional client according to the COBS,532 the corporation is 
effectively not entitled to sue on the basis of these rules applicable to retail 
consumers. Moreover, there is a subtle difference between an investor’s entitlements 
under ROA and COBS. For an investor to be identified as ‘private person’ someone 
should look objectively at the characteristics of the investor to determine whether or 
not the investor is entitled to be classified as ‘private person’. In contrast, the court in 
Bank Leumi (UK) plc v Wachner,533 pointed out that the duty to classify a client is a 
duty to take reasonable care in following the criteria in the rule-book: 
‘… in determining whether there is "appropriate" classification 
of a client as an intermediate customer [similar classification to 
professional] where the classification procedure adopted is under COB 
4.1.9 R one does not ask whether the client has the characteristics, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
532 See COBS 3.5.2(3) R  
533 [2011] EWHC 656 (Comm) 
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objectively considered, of an intermediate customer but one instead 
asks whether COB 4.1.9 R has been complied with’.534 
   
The consequences of the judgement are that it is possible that a retail client 
would be mis-classified as a professional and hence loses his or her regulatory 
protection, so long as the service provider can establish reasonable care has been 
taken in the classification process. Thus, it could be suggested that the FSA is able to 
influence the effectiveness of s.150 and subsequently private enforcement within the 
FSMA regulatory regime by determining how clients are properly classified.  
The influence of the FSA on the important position of the FOS as a means of 
the private enforcement of COBS is conferred from the FSMA. The current financial 
ombudsman was created from the merger of seven ombudsmen that dealt with 
different aspects of financial services, and the rationale behind establishing a single 
ombudsman was to reduce the confusion associated with the previous regime.535 The 
FSMA lays down the objective of the FOS to be a ‘scheme under which certain 
disputes may be resolved quickly and with minimum formality by an independent 
person to resolve individual disputes between consumers and financial services 
firms’. 536 The institutional arrangement employed by the FSMA dictates that the FOS 
is independent from the FSA; the FSMA, however, confers to the FSA authority over 
the FOS, appointing its board members, setting the its rules and determine the cap on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 Ibid, para 129 
535 Charles Rickett and Thomas Telfer, International Perspectives on Consumers' Access to Justice 
(CUP 2003) 167. For more details as to the concept of the ombudsman see Luigi Cominelli, ‘An 
Ombudsman for the European: Gradually Moving Towards “Effective Dispute Resolution” Between 
Citizens and Public Administration’ in Linda Reif (ed.), The International Ombudsman Yearbook Vol. 
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compensation payable.537 In fulfilling its role in determining who is eligible for FOS 
services, the FSA has published rules and included them in the Complaint Sourcebook 
(DISP) and the Compensation Sourcebook (COMP) within the Handbook.538  
The FOS represents a mechanism for alternative dispute resolution rather than 
formal dispute resolution. A claim has to start at the firm with which a consumer is 
alleging breach and cannot be straightforwardly brought to the FOS. The firm has to 
respond to the claim within eight weeks. If the dispute is not solved between the 
consumer and the firm, the former can then bring the complaint to the FOS. If the 
ombudsman upholds the complaint, the firm at fault can be required to make 
appropriate redress to the complainant. 539 After a decision by an ombudsman is made, 
the decision is binding on a firm although a complainant who does not accept the 
decision may take the case to court.540 If a firm fails to abide by an FOS’s award, the 
FOS will report the firm to the FSA to take action against them.541 Four criteria are 
provided through the DISP and the COMP according to which a consumer is able to 
bring a claim to the FOS: firstly, the type of activity to which the complaint relates; 
secondly, the place where the activity took place; thirdly, the eligibility of the 
complainant; and finally, the time limits for referring a complaint to the FOS.542 It is 
the criterion of eligibility which allows the FSA to influence the protection provided 
by s.150.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 For the on-going relationship between the FOS and the FSA, see a speech by Clive Briault, 
‘Markets, Regulation and Disputes’ (the International Federation of Financial Ombudsmen Conference, 
September 2007) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0928_cb.shtml> accessed 29 
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538 Those rules are made pursuant to FSMA Part 16 and Schedule 17   
539 FSMA s.228(5) 
540 Ibid 
541 Memorandum of Understanding between the FSA and FOS, July 11, 2002, para. 17(e) 
542 For a full discussion and details in respect of those elements and other requirements, see the FSA, 
‘Dispute Resolution: Complaint’ (release number 076, April 2008) <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/hb-
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Most importantly, the FSA restrict the awards limits of FOS services to the 
amount of £100,000. Effectively there are two classes of those who are eligible for 
FOS services: eligible complainants with awards of less than £100,000, and those 
with greater awards. These classes enjoy different levels of substantive protection. 
The differences arise from the FSMA requirement that the ombudsman has to 
determine complaints with ‘reference to what is, in the opinion of the ombudsman, 
fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case’.543 As a result, it is not 
disputed that no legal precedent binds the ombudsman’s decisions; the approach they 
take is to decide what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of each particular 
case.544 The FSA limitation is meant to identify people who can afford to pay for legal 
services and to have access to justice.545   
Given the advantages of the FOS, it is then a question of the importance of the 
FOS for s.150. This can be emphasised in the role of the FOS in bringing claims for a 
breach of authority rule. Firstly, all eligible complainants are de facto private persons 
in accordance with the ROA; consequently, it is possible to suggest that the FOS 
permits the application of consumers’ rights according to the ROA. Secondly, if the 
FOS is the only applicable means for compensation available to the consumer;546 it is 
an impractical proposition for most investors in dispute with financial services firms 
to bring cases to court, because the balance of financial and legal resources is all on 
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standards; and (3) codes of practice. DISP 3.6.4 R 
545 See the FSA, Review of Compensation Scheme and Ombudsman Service Limits and Miscellaneous 
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one side.547 Accordingly, it could be suggested that the FOS permits some consumers, 
otherwise unable to bring their complaints to courts, to be dealt with and thus helps to 
enforce the authority’s rules in accordance with s.150. This would be based on the 
fact that that there are nearly 300 cases every year which exceed the FOS’s cap,548 but 
‘none of the cases that go to ombudsman would actually reach the courts’.549 
Therefore, it could be maintained that, given that the objective of s.150 is to 
provide for the enforcement of regulatory rules to private persons (including 
legitimate complainant) it is therefore possible that the FSA is able, by exercising its 
rights according to FSMA, to influence the application of s.150 by determining who is 
eligible and the limits of compensation.  
In short, this section has demonstrated how private enforcement is provided 
for within the FSMA framework of rules introduced by the authority relating to the 
conduct of business. The private enforcement of COBS has been accommodated 
through a tort for a breach of statutory duty. However, an action in tort for a breach of 
statutory duty under s.150 has been restricted to ‘private persons’ by the FSMA. It is 
argued here that the means through which private enforcement is provided (i.e. tort 
for a breach of statutory duty) is ineffective. Bearing similarity to critiques of s.62A 
of the FS regime, the FSMA provides the right to those who lack the resources to 
bring an action. The discussion also demonstrates that there have been developments 
which further reduce the effectiveness of s.150 under the FSMA regime; firstly, the 
wide interpretation of secondary legislation (namely ROA) by the courts which 
effectively exclude many business from the definition of ‘private person’; and, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
547 Jeremy Mitchell, ‘Response to the Commission Green Paper: Financial services: Meeting 
Consumers’ Expectations’ (1997) 20 Journal of Consumer Policy 379 
548 The FSA, Review of Compensation Scheme and Ombudsman Service Limits and Miscellaneous 
Amendments to the Compensation Sourcebook (n 543) para 10.16 
549 A speech by Tony King, lead ombudsman for pensions and securities at the FOS, (Pensions 
Management Institute Annual Dinner, February 2006) <http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/news/speech/PM_feb06.htm> accessed 29 June 2011 
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secondly, the role of the FSA. The FSA has decreased the effectiveness of s.150 by 
limiting the substantive protection provided by the regulatory rules to retail 
consumers and by restricting the eligibility of FOS services to certain classes of retail 
consumers.  
E) Concluding Remark     
The discussion demonstrates that the private enforcement of the rules has the potential 
to play a more valuable part of the FSMA regulatory regime. This is demonstrated in 
two regulatory ways. Firstly, consumers of financial services have been given a direct 
claim for compensation or restitution against those who are in breach of the General 
Prohibition. Secondly, consumers are given a claim in case of a breach of the rules of 
the authority, but here through a cause of action of ‘tort for a breach of statutory 
duty’. Thus, it could be argued that the FSMA, similarly to the previous  FS regime, 
considers private enforcement a part of its framework.  
An account of the role of the FSA in the regulatory regime has also been 
given. The framework established by the FSMA and the way that private enforcement 
is accommodated through a tort action puts the FSA at the centre of the private 
enforcement regime. Mainly, through its requirement of classification, which helps to 
focus protection on those most in need of it, the FSA is able to restrict and expand the 
scope of the regulatory rules and subsequently their private enforcement. In other 
words, by stating that this rule is applied to a particular class of consumers, that is 
retail consumers, the FSA effectively restricts the actionability of the regulatory rule 
to this class of consumers. 
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, what are the 
problems with the existing law in facilitating civil actions by retail investors? Two 
problems are suggested with the FSMA regulatory regime.  
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First, there is inconsistency in the concept of the ‘retail investors’ in the 
FSMA regime. The secondary legislation, the ROA, refers to ‘private persons’ as a 
class of investors that enjoys the right to bring an action for a breach of statutory duty; 
and the rationale for this is to avoid actions based on technical rules. The COBS, in 
contrast, adopts a different approach to those in most need of regulatory protection, 
i.e. ‘retail client’. In a different view from the COBS, the FSA considers legitimate 
complainants for FOS services to be limited upon the basis of the amount of the 
awards made, in order to identify people who can afford to pay for legal service and 
to be able to access justice.550 Inconsistency of the FSMA regime is not only ascribed 
to the concept of who is a ‘retail investor’, but also inconsistency in regards to the 
rationales behind them.  
Therefore, it is recommended to adopt a unified concept for ‘retail investors’. 
A unified concept would reduce levels of complexity, increasing certainty and 
maintain confidence. The FSMA regulatory regime would have been more effective if 
consistent concepts between protection and enforcement had been adopted.  
One further question needs to be asked, however. Which concept better serves 
private enforcement in the FSMA regime: private persons, retail consumers or eligible 
complainant? It is noted above that the restriction of private enforcement to private 
persons, in order to exclude financial institutions and commercial entities, has been 
widely criticised on the grounds of the lack of resources to those provided with the 
right to sue. The approach of the FSA to eligible complainants, a class of consumers 
who should have better enforcement mechanisms, is evasive as to important 
considerations concerning its ratio legis. Firstly, the justification for the FSA 
restricting FOS services to a £100,000 cap limit fails to take into account moral and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 See the FSA’s Consultation Paper and Policy Statement (n 535)  
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economic considerations. Morally, public law scholars recognise two important 
functions of private enforcement, including ombudsmen schemes, for citizens; the just 
resolution of complaints and individual grievances, and the “general quality assurance 
and improvement of private services for citizens”.551 To link these moral 
considerations with economic justification has been criticised; how in principle can 
the FSA morally justify entitlement for ‘fairness’ to certain class of consumers on 
their economic ability given that providing a cause of action to breach for a provision 
of securities regulations cannot be justified only on the basis of distributive justice, 
but also welfare concerns and as a means of regulating contractual relationship.552 The 
approach of the FSA in regards to ‘fairness’, however, arguably undermines certainty, 
not because of the fairness element itself, but the difficulty in determining whether or 
not the contract is subject to ‘fairness’ at the time of transacting. Both service 
providers and consumers are entitled to know the rules that would govern the time of 
the transaction.  
Economically, the approach of the FSA as to the cap limit can be undermined 
on the grounds the £100,000 cap was set almost 25 years ago by the Insurance 
Ombudsman Bureau.553 The purchase power of this amount would be between 
£286,000 and £439,000 in 2010’s value.554 Consequently, it could be reasonably 
claimed that the cap should have been lifted with increases in legal costs, or should at 
least increase with inflation, in order to maintain its original force as a just rationale. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
551 Gilad (n 544) 228  
552 Mahmood Bagheri, International Contracts and National Economic Regulation: Dispute Resolution 
(Kluwer 2000) 225-226 
553See the FSA’s Consultation Paper and Policy Statement (n 535) 
554 The difference in the figures is due to the different methods of calculation. The higher figure is 
based upon the worth of the money compared to average earning. The lower is calculated on the basis 
of Retail Price Index. The numbers are obtained from 
<http://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/result.php?use%5B%5D=CPI&use%5B%5D=NOMINA
LEARN&year_late=1981&typeamount=100000&amount=100000&year_source=1981&year_result=2
010> accessed 29 June 2011 
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Accordingly, it could be maintained that approach of the eligible complainant is also 
inappropriate.  
Given that neither ‘private person’ or ‘eligible complainant’ may enhance the 
value of private enforcement, we are left with the concept of ‘retail clients’ This will 
be analysed thoroughly later this chapter after an evaluation of the rules themselves in 
discussion of private enforcement of suitability and best execution in Part III.      
The second problem with the FSMA regulatory regime is that few cases have 
been brought before English courts relying on s.150. 555 This fact may render any 
claim for the effectiveness of s.150 questionable. In explaining the low number of 
actions brought before the courts, it can be argued that consumers are better off 
bringing their claim to FOS. While it is arguable that the FOS helps to solve 
consumer complaints, this is not the whole story. As previously discussed there are 
over 300 cases annually rejected by the FOS because of the monetary cap which are 
not brought to court. There is no empirical research in the literature on what happens 
to those cases when they are refused FOS services. Accordingly, it is possible to 
advance several different explanations. It is possible to suggest that these cases may 
not have legitimate claims at all; consumers are suing in response to frustration 
arising from their expectations but there is no breach of regulatory rules. Or it could 
be suggested that consumers are abandoning their claims. Obstacles in pursuing 
claims could include the expense and time consumed in enforcing their rights, or the 
complexity of the laws. The Law Commission suggests it’s the latter and claims that 
consumers are faced with the task of attempting to establish ‘a complex and novel 
action for breach of statutory duty before the courts’.556 Alternatively, it could also be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
555 See for example Spreadex Ltd v Sekhon [2008] EWHC 1136 (Ch) 
556 The Law Commission, Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith (Insurance 
Contract Law Papers, n.6, 2010) para 5-18 
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maintained that the low number of cases is due to the fact that consumers, or the 
majority of them, are settling their claims with financial services providers.  
These explanations are difficult to test because the FOS refuses to publish the 
details of cases Nevertheless, Part III below provides a detailed analysis of the law 
regarding suitability and best execution from a regulatory perspective, and thus will 
be of help in providing a conclusion concerning which explanation is most accurate. 
Moreover, another expected benefit of analyzing the regulatory rules is to test how the 
COBS measures up to the expected benefits of the statutory framework. To rephrase 
the benefit, it is to answer the question whether or a preferred instrument to achieve a 
desired policy (here, investor protection by stetting standards) is affected by the way 
that the instrument (private enforcement of the COBS) has been implemented (i.e. 
through tort of breach of statutory duty).   
Part III Best Execution and Suitability 
 
A difficulty arises when attempting to examine the whole sets of rules introduced by 
the regulatory regime that are supported by private enforcement. Given the restriction 
of both time and the space in this study, its examination needs to be restricted to the 
comparison between the two case study countries and therefore two regulatory duties 
have been chosen for detailed analysis: the duty on financial advisers to provide 
suitable financial advice; and, the duty imposed on financial providers in general, and 
brokers in particular, to ensure the best execution of an investor’s order.  
These duties have been chosen on the basis that the IOSCO promotes them as 
best standards for regulatory protection for investors in securities markets. It is 
thought that since ‘suitability’ and ‘best execution’ represent a global consensus of 
 203	  
proper regulatory instruments to protect investors in securities markets, they supply 
the most appropriate comparative element in the analysis of the UK and Saudi Arabia.  
Consequently, the way these global standards have been implemented dictates 
how the discussion is approached. As regulatory requirements, both suitability and 
best execution as regulatory requirements are imposed through the COBS introduced 
by the FSA. Part II of this chapter demonstrates how the FSMA established the 
private enforcement of COBS rules through s.150. It is noted moreover that, 
notwithstanding historical observations of its weakness as a private enforcement 
technique, the tort of ‘a breach of statutory duty’ is the chosen means for 
implementing private enforcement of COBS rules. That being the case, it is illustrated 
that the added benefit of a regulatory duty in tort for a ‘breach of statutory duty’, in 
contrast to traditional tort actions, is in providing a more detailed picture of what an 
existing duty entails, introducing a new duty not recognised under tort law, or both. It 
follows that it could be argued that the expected benefits of suitability and best 
execution as regulatory requirements for private enforcement might be in providing 
more details of an existing duty under tort law, introducing duties which were not 
previously recognised, or indeed both of these factors. Otherwise, in the absence of 
any of the expected benefits, it could be reasonably claimed that the means chosen by 
the regulatory regime (i.e. tort for a breach of statutory duty) to enforce suitability and 
best execution is not effective in the sense that it does not add any additional benefits 
for private enforcement over a traditional tort action.  
In the light of this, the two duties are now examined with two objectives: 
firstly, whether or not the two cases of suitability and best execution have introduced 
novel duties not previously recognised under private law; and second, in case this first 
objective is not met, whether or not consumers are better off suing under s.150 as a 
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result of the detailed pictures of duties introduced by the COBS. Required in this 
analysis are details of what each duty entails in COBS and to compare these with a 
similar duty recognised under English private law. For the sake of clarity, each duty is 
examined separately. 
A) The Regulatory Requirement of Best Execution 
 
In Part I d, it was demonstrated that the concept of best execution was initially 
developed in case law in the U.S. It was also in the US where it was first introduced 
as a regulatory requirement to deal with the fragmental securities markets there. The 
discussion also covered the historical development of the regulatory concepts of best 
execution in the UK, illustrating the relation between the nature of the concept with 
developments in financial services.    
Under the current FSMA regulatory regime, there is an emphasis on the 
importance of best execution in COBS with regards to relationships between 
consumers and service providers. COBS states that a ‘firm must take all reasonable 
steps to obtain, when executing orders, the best possible result for its clients’.557 
COBS constructs the concept of best execution around several factors and 
criteria.558 The Glossary lists ‘execution factors’ as including price, costs, speed, 
likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant 
to execution.559 As spelled out in the Glossary, execution criteria deal with the 
judgemental requirement of best execution. These criteria are: the characteristics of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
557 COBS 11.2.1 R. The term execute defined by the Glossary: to ‘carry into effect or perform the 
transaction, whether as principal or as agent, including instructing another person to execute the 
transaction’. 
558 COBS 11.2.1 R and see also 11.2.6. R 
559 See the Glossary under ‘execution factors’  
 205	  
the client (retail or professional),560 the characteristics of the client order,561 the 
characteristics of the financial product or instrument being executed,562 and 
characteristics of the venue through which the order is executed.563 COBS clarifies 
that the importance of execution criteria is to help authorised firms in ‘determining 
the relative importance of the execution factors’.564 It should be emphasised that there 
are other duties imposed on authorised firms in complying with best execution, 
including, for instance, to have an ‘execution policy’ and to not structure the charges 
in order to discriminate against ‘execution venues’.565   
It should be noted that while these requirements are imposed in dealing with 
all classes of consumer, the COBS provides certain rules that restricted certain of their 
protections to ‘retail clients’ only. Firstly, in dealing with retail clients, authorized 
persons are required to prioritize the total consideration of the execution; i.e. the price 
paid for the instrument executed in addition to costs associated with executing the 
order.566 Secondly, in executing a retail client’s order, an authorised firm must ensure 
that, before execution, the retail client is informed about the relative importance 
assigned to each factor, the different executing venues that the authorized firm deals 
with, and that any specific instructions from the client may prevent the best execution 
as provided in the execution policy.567  
These added two protections for retail clients demonstrate how the FSA can 
influence through COBS the scope of private enforcement. Other measures provided 
under best execution in effect permit all consumers who are considered to be private 
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562 COBS 11.2.6R (3) 
563 COBS 11.2.6R (4) 
564 COBS 11.2.6 R 
565 COBS 11.2.12 R and 11.2.14R, respectively 
566 COBS 11.2.7 R and 11.2.8 G 
567 COBS 11.2.23R 
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persons to sue in accordance with s.150. But the specific limitation to retail clients in 
the two added protections effectively restricts the actionability of the rules to those 
considered as retail clients.  
Overall, there are two general observations as to the regulatory concepts of 
best execution as currently implemented in COBS.  
 Firstly, the concept of best execution has departed from the concept of best 
execution in the US. In the UK, it is confined to giving guidance on how an 
authorized firm can decide what best execution is. It leaves it to the firms themselves 
to decide what the most important factor is and to prioritise among these factors, 
bearing in mind that in dealing with retail clients, an authorized firm has ‘to determine 
the best possible result in terms of the total consideration’.568 The focus on total 
consideration represents a shift in the regulatory understanding of the concept of best 
execution. In the previous conduct of business book (a.k.a. COB),569 best execution 
entailed two duties; firstly, a service provider should take reasonable care in 
determining the best available price in the market ‘for transactions of the kind and 
size concerned’;570 and secondly, should ‘execute the customer order at a price which 
is no less advantageous to the customer, unless the firm has taken reasonable steps to 
ensure that it would be in the customer's best interests not to do so’.571 In contrast to 
COBS, where there is emphasis on ‘total considerations’, the COB permitted service 
providers, in exercising reasonable care in determining the best available price, may 
disregard any commission or charge by the service provider so long as it had been 
disclosed to the customer.572 Moreover, COBS has a wider scope in its application in 
comparison to COB, which exempted from best execution certain structured products 	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569 COB was in force until 31/10/2007 
570 COB 7.5.5(1) R 
571 COB 7.5.5.(2) R 
572 COB 5.5.6.(1) E 
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and focused on executing deals in shares and other financial securities.573 There is no 
such exception in the COBS.  
 In contrast, the concept of best execution in the US is more akin to COB, 
emphasising securities and spelling out what reasonable care is for a broker.574 The 
difference could be attributed to the fact that scope of the FSA and subsequently 
COBS is wider, including other investments and not being confined to securities. That 
being said, the difference supports the claim that there could be different 
interpretations and perceptions of what the regulatory duty of best execution entails 
among geopolitical entities.    
 Secondly, as implemented, best execution seems to be based on the ideology 
of consumer choice rather than the expertise and knowledge on the part of a service 
provider. Specifically, the emphasis is organised around consumer consent; for 
instance, it is acceptable that an aggregate order will be disadvantageous for a client 
so long as the consumer provides consent.575 Though aggregation rules will be 
influenced and should be guided by the best execution rule, its introduction under the 
heading ‘client order handling’ rather than ‘best execution’ suggests one of two 
things.576 Either the FSA perceives best execution to be wider in scope than being 
limited to shares in secondary markets, or it perceives the relationship between a 
consumer and a provider of the execution service as a matter of competing options 
before consumers.  
 On balance, it is likely that the latter explanation is more accurate, since in 
COBS guidance and examples of how to implement best execution reference is made 
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575 COBS 11.3.7 R 
576 COBS 11.3 
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to ‘shares’.577 In addition, accepting that a service provider has obtained retail clients 
consent for a disadvantageous execution means that the duty to consider the best 
interests of the client imposed by best execution rules is cancelled out. Moreover, the 
focus of the FSA on the importance of the interaction between consumer choice and 
market forces could be deduced from the COBS demand that an authorised person 
should not structure the commission and charges in such a way as ‘to discriminate 
unfairly between execution venues’.578 This emphasis by the FSA on not intervening 
in market forces and consumer choice gives support to the claim that the FSA has 
implemented the doctrine of best execution using the concept of consumer choice.  
 So far, this discussion illustrates that under the duty of best execution, the 
COBS requires authorised persons, when dealing with retail clients, to prioritize the 
total consideration of the execution, i.e. the price paid for the instrument executed in 
addition to costs associated with executing the order.579 However, the consumer 
consent may relieve the service provider from seeking the best interests of a retail 
client in respect of some duties. Consequently, it could be suggested that the 
regulatory requirement of best execution in COBS provides a detailed account of the 
duty and hence supplies a benefit for a claim for a breach of statutory duty. 
 The second claimed benefit of the statutory framework as to a tort of breach of 
statutory duty is to provide a novel duty which did not previously exist in tort law. 
Thus, the issue is whether or not English private law had recognised a duty similar to 
the requirement of best execution.  
 The discussion in Part I demonstrates that the regulatory requirement of best 
execution developed from common law and agency principles in the US. English law 
recognises the importance of agency relationships and provides numerous principles 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 COBS 11.2.5 G 
578 COBS 11.2.12 R 
579 COBS 11.2.7 R and 11.2.8 G 
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governing the relationship between a principal and an agent through equity and 
fiduciary duty. In fact, before the introduction of the FS regulatory regime, 
relationships between firms and clients were regulated, according to Benjamin, 
primarily by the rules of equity.580  
 According to equity principles, whenever there is a relationship of trust 
between two parties, fiduciary duty arises even in commercial transactions.581 The 
significance of fiduciary duty is its ability to create  ‘obligations of a different 
character from those deriving from the contract itself’.582 The significance of 
fiduciary duty to the discussion is that it imposes an obligation on an agent to act in 
the best interests of the beneficiary of the fiduciary relationship (the duty of loyalty). 
In Aberdeen Railway Co v Blaikie Brothers, the court noted that 
 ‘[A fiduciary will not be permitted] to enter into engagements in which he has, 
or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the 
interests of those whom he is bound to protect’.583 
 To be more specific, equity recognises that stock-brokering involves a level of 
trust between the broker and the investor, at minimum to recognise an agency 
between the two parties. A stockbroker, in an execution only transaction, is 
considered as an agent with specific instructions which imposes on the broker the 
duty, inter alia, to act all times in the best interest of the client, not being permitted to 
deal as a principal with the client, and not able to make a secret profit whether or not 
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581 Ibid, see also Paul Finn, ‘Fiduciary Law and Modern Commercial World’ in Ewan McKendrick 
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582 Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership), Re sub nom Kensington v Unrepresented Non-allocated 
Claimants Neutral Treatment Indicated [1995] 1 AC 74, 98 
583 [1854] 1 Macq 461, 471 
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it is at the expense of the client.584 Taking these together, it could be maintained that, 
under English private law, stockbrokers were held to look for the best interest of the 
client; what best is for a client will depend on the circumstances and the context of the 
relationship between the parties.585 Consequently, it could be argued that, through 
best execution, COBS does not introduce a novel duty that has not been recognised 
previously under English private law.  
 Accordingly, it could be reasonably claimed that the benefit from the best 
execution in COBS is confined to spelling out the duty in detail in such a way as to 
facilitate private enforcement.  
 However, once the discussion of best execution is focused on retail clients, the 
role of private enforcement diminishes. The problem arises from the recognised 
problem that the small losses associated with breaches of ‘best execution’ create no 
incentive for consumers, especially retail ones, to sue.586 For this reason, the notion of 
best execution was developed in the US through regulatory oversight and class-action 
suits rather than direct legal action by investors.587 On re-examination, there is 
nothing in the UK that is successfully similar to the U.S. class-action system that 
could support the application of best execution. Moreover, placing the cause of action 
of s.150 through tort remedies results in the reliance on the concept of compensation 
rather than deterrence; thus, it is impossible to expect any sort of punitive damages to 
be awarded to consumers. In contrast, the Securities and Exchanges Act 1934 in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 See Rothschild v. Brookman (1831) 2 Dow. & Cl. 188; Bristol and West BS v. Mothew [1998] Ch.1 
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or an attorney able to recover fees from a common fund would have the resources to pursue such a 
claim’, 159 
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U.S. did not provide for punitive damages for breaching a regulatory rule, but this was 
permitted later.588 Accordingly, given the absence of a class-action system and 
punitive damages in the UK, it is the public enforcement, through the FSA, which is 
the principal means to enforce best execution. It is unlikely that retail clients would 
bring an action, even to FOS, for breaching the best execution rule.  
 The narrow scope of private enforcement and the reliance on the regulator’s 
role create three difficulties that may undermine the effectiveness of the concept of 
best execution. Firstly, there is a possibility of lax enforcement by the regulator as a 
result of lack of resources and/or regulatory captures by the service providers. 
Secondly, the perception of the regulator as to what constitutes best execution may 
not represent the best protection available to investors, or worse, it may prevent retail 
investors from enjoying the protection provided by private law. The School of Law 
and Economics law clearly spells out the conflict of two conflicted objectives that 
constrain public enforcement. Macey and O’Hara analysis points out that common 
law of agency, which includes fiduciary duty and loyalty, asks an agent to act in the 
best interest of the principal with reasonable care.589 A stockbroker in case of a retail 
investor, therefore, is legally required to try to obtain the best price, but may not 
actually obtain it, although the duty of loyalty and fiduciary duties demand a sole duty 
towards the principal. However, attempts by regulators to re-define this relationship 
resulted in including a duty toward the market by allowing the aggregation of orders 
to be driven to where trading benefits competition among exchanges, in contrast to 
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discussion as o the need for punitive damages in securities regulations see Note, ‘Securities 
Regulation--Damages--The Possibility of Punitive Damages As a Remedy for a Violation of Rule 10b-
5’ (1970) 68 Mich. L. Rev. 1608; William Walker, ‘Punitive Damages for Securities Regulation’ 
(1970) 8 Hous. L. Rev. 137  
589 Macey and O’Hara (n 375) 
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the individualistic approach imposed by common law that aggregation should provide 
better price wherever possible.590  
 Finally, regulatory techniques can divert best execution from its principal 
objective for which it was developed as a regulatory rule. Viewing the relationship 
between investor and broker as a matter of choice does not fit with agency law which 
focuses on the loyalty and trust between a principal and agent. Thus, in the absence of 
a private enforcement, a mistaken regulator view will dominate without correction. 
Such changes will result in inappropriate techniques being adopted to implement best 
execution that may reduce the protection provided by traditional law. For similar 
reasons, Benjamin criticises the focus of the regulatory regime on disclosure in 
relationships where confidence and trust are the incentive to seek the service.591  
 For the previous mentioned reasons, it could be argued that the absence of 
private enforcement may negatively influence the expected benefit of the regulatory 
rule of best execution. Given the absence of incentive to protect investors to privately 
enforce the duty, it could be argued that within the context in which it is implemented, 
the regulatory duty is ineffective to be privately enforced or to increase the protection 
for retail clients. 
 To sum up the discussion, it is suggested that COBS does not introduce a 
novel duty to English private law through best execution since it has been recognised 
under English law through agency law, namely in the loyalty and best interests of the 
principal. Through best execution, the COBS does provide fair guidance and details 
as to how to comply with best execution rule in dealing with retail clients: ‘to 
determine the best possible result in terms of the total consideration’. However, it is 
argued that the issue with private enforcement is that a breach of best execution rule 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
590 Ibid, ‘the SEC has re-interpreted the duty of best execution as a general duty to the markets, rather 
than as a particularlized contractual obligation between market participants’, 50 
591 Benjamin (n 356) para 25.23 
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does not create an incentive to sue; the losses suffered are minimal in the context of 
retail investors. Accordingly, it is claimed that private enforcement of ‘best execution’ 
rule in the UK context will not be effective due to the absence of both the concept of 
punitive damages and class-action suits. It is also noted the need for private 
enforcement is vital and suggested that relying on public enforcement alone as it 
stands now would have severe negative consequences. For these reasons and from the 
analysis in part II of the effectiveness of s.150, it could be justly asserted that the 
regulatory rule of best execution as implemented by the FSMA regulatory regime is 
ineffective in increasing the protection of investors needed to enhance the efficiency 
of the market.   
B) The Regulatory Requirement of Suitability  
 The previous section demonstrates that the regulatory requirement of best execution is 
ineffective in enhancing the role of private enforcement of the rule, even though it 
meets one of the criteria concerning the benefits expected from tort for a breach of a 
statutory duty. The root of this ineffectiveness is the lack of the incentive for 
individuals to enforce the rule because of the minimal amount of losses. This section 
attempts to evaluate and examine the regulatory rule of suitability as implemented in 
the COBS in enhancing private enforcement.  
 Part I illustrates that the importance of suitability arises from its role in 
financial advice. Historically, the concept of suitability was developed in response to 
the mis-selling techniques used by stockbrokers in the ‘boiler room’ and was intended 
to ensure that shares being sold meet the objectives and needs of the person to whom 
it is recommended.592 It follows that the provision of recommendation is a necessary 
condition for the application of the regulatory requirement of suitability, and since 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
592 See Part I, d 
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suitability is implemented through COBS, it is therefore necessary to identify what 
financial recommendation is, according to the COBS, which entails suitability. 
 The COBS adopts the terminology of ‘personal recommendation’ rather than 
financial advice or financial recommendation with respect to suitability.593 The COBS 
clearly states that suitability applies to a ‘personal recommendation’ in relation to a 
designated investment.594 The Glossary defines a personal recommendation for the 
purpose of COBS as a recommendation that takes into account the specific 
circumstances of the person, or which is presented to the client as suitable. It excludes 
any recommendation passed on through other distribution channels or to the public at 
large.595 The term ‘designated investment’ is wide enough in the Glossary to include 
securities, structured products, and even interests or rights to those investments.596 
Therefore, it could be asserted that financial advice that entails a suitability rule is any 
recommendation in relation to a designated investment, including shares, that takes 
into account the circumstances of the person to whom it is supplied, or which 
presented to the client as suitable.  
 However, COBS stops short from detailing how this would be applied in 
practice; such as how to differentiate between a sale process that appeals to the need 
of an investor, and a ‘personal recommendation’ that entails suitability. The parameter 
deduced from the definition of personal recommendation to determine its 
characteristics in the Handbook is twofold: firstly, to provide advice on investments 
‘based on a consideration of the circumstances of that person’, and secondly, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
593 Probably to differentiate between ‘published recommendation’ and research recommendation’  
594 COBS 9.1.1. R 
595 The Glossary’s exact definition: ‘a recommendation that is advice on investments, or advice on a 
home finance transaction and is presented as suitable for the person to whom it is made, or is based on 
a consideration of the circumstances of that person. A recommendation is not a personal 
recommendation if it is issued exclusively through distribution channels or to the public’. 
596 The Glossary. Note that this wide view of ‘designated investment’ is not chosen by the FSA but is 
supplied by the secondary legislation, namely the Order.  
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advice ‘is presented as suitable for the person to whom it is made’.597 These two 
conditions do not clearly state the line between an advice that is a ‘personal 
recommendation’ for the purpose of COBS from other financial advice or sales 
process. As to the latter criteria, it is difficult to believe that such a detailed 
explanation, tendered to a retail investor, would be any different from a 
straightforward recommendation.  
 Moreover, as to the former criteria for personal recommendation, an advice on 
investments based on a consideration of the circumstances of that person, it is unclear 
what level of consideration would amount to ‘personal recommendation’. There is 
even inconsistency within the overall regulatory regime as to the subject. Certain 
actions by the FSA imply a view of financial advice subject to the General Prohibition 
is different from those in the COBS. For instance, in Re Market Wizard Systems (UK) 
Ltd,598 the court held that a provider of advice generated by an automated system 
needed to be authorised by the FSA. In brief, Market Wizard supplied daily prices and 
other information to the customer via a modem link that had to be downloaded and 
entered by the customer. The system operated by producing ‘buy’, ‘sell’ or ‘hold’ 
signals in respect of options in each of twelve traded stocks. Although these signals 
did not indicate the amount of stock to be bought or sold, they did show the customer 
the current positions that should be held on that day. The way that the program 
analysed the data was a major factor in the court’s conclusion to recognise a financial 
advice: ‘guidance as to the course of action which the [client] should take in relation 
to the buying or selling of investments … in the ordinary use of English, is ‘advice on 
the merits’ of purchasing those investments’. 599 It could be noted that the reasoning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
597 The Glossary  
598 [1998] 2 B.C.L.C. 282 
599 Ibid, para 34. Similar views as to financial advice were taken in JP Morgan Bank (formerly Chase 
Manhattan Bank) v Springwell Navigation Corp [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm), para 107 
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of the court is based on the linkage not between guidance given and an investor’s 
needs, but to the portfolio of investors being linked to market movement. Such view 
represents a very broad understanding of financial advice since it is based on very 
limited data provided by investors about their strategy or risk preferences. It is unclear 
whether or not the FSA is of the view that such wide interpretation is restricted to 
advice generated by automated machine or to all kind of advice.  
 This wide approach is impractical and its impact in practice is undesirable and 
hence it is unlikely that the FSA is to extend it to advice that constitutes personal 
recommendation that entails suitability. Suppose a website asks for certain general 
information about a customer (age, gender, marital status and income) and asks for a 
preferred strategy (low-medium-high) and then suggests certain products for the 
customer to consider in the process of selling and promotion. According to this broad 
view, the website may have provided financial advice subject to regulatory protection 
(personal recommendation) and hence subject to suitability. Thus, whether or not the 
information collected justifies the recommended products is very unclear given the 
lack of guidance by the FSA. It is reasonable to expect the more risky and the more 
complex the products, the more information needed to be gathered. But whether the 
law imposes a certain level of information or failure to collect such information 
entitles the investor to seek remedy for ‘personal recommendation’ generated 
automatically is an unclear area within the FSMA regulatory regime. In the age of 
new media for communications, such as the Internet and sophisticated mobile phones, 
courts, consumers and businesses need regulatory requirements to be spelled out as to 
when rules are applicable. This issue of financial advice is not dealt with in the FSA’s 
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documents or scholarly writing, but similar concerns have been raised with respect to 
the FSA’s approach in its adoption of the concept of ‘treating customer fairly’.600 
 In principle, there is nothing wrong with this approach, since it is within the 
remit of the FSA, but there is a possibility of different treatment between financial 
advice that requires the obtaining of permission, which is the wide approach, and a 
narrower approach to financial advice for the purpose of private enforcement. In such 
a case, there would be two tiers of financial advice regulated by the FSMA regime; 
one tier subject only to public enforcement by the FSA, and another subject to both 
private and public enforcement. The two kinds of systems would forsake the benefits 
of private enforcement and increase uncertainty. 
 The limited case law in relation to financial advice and suitability creates 
difficulties in affirming or negating the existence of two tiers of financial advice. 
Nevertheless, two court cases may help to clarify the position. The first is Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society,601 which concerned 
the mis-selling of a Home Income Plan. The defendant argued that the representation 
made to the claimant as to the return was nothing more than predictions as to the 
likely future performance of the plan, and hence was not actionable. The court 
rejected this argument on the basis that when the defendant made the predictions, it 
was implicitly stated that these could be justified on reasonable grounds. Thus, the 
court was of the opinion that advice was provided and held the salesperson 
accountable. It is therefore possible to suggest that English law considers using 
predictions as a means to match financial products to the investor’s needs as a 
financial advice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 See for example Jenny Hamilton, ‘Negligence in the Corridor? The Interaction Between ‘Separate 
Rooms’ of Regulation and the Common Law in Financial Services’ (2007) 23 PN134 
601 [1999] Lloyd’s L.Rep P.N. 496 
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 The other case is Walker v Inter-Alliance Group Plc (In Administration)602, 
where the salesperson maintained that if he was in the claimant’s position, he would 
transfer from the occupational scheme to a drawdown scheme. The claimant followed 
this advice which subsequently resulted in a loss because of changing schemes. The 
court found that a statement about what the seller would do in the consumer’s position 
amounted to more than a neutral way of providing information.603 Similarly to the 
approach of the court in Re Market Wizard Systems (UK) Ltd, the court in Walker 
considered as financial advice ‘any communication with the client which, in the 
particular context in which it is given, goes beyond the mere provision of information 
and is objectively likely to influence the client's decision whether or not to undertake 
the transaction in question’.604  
 What the two cases do illustrate is the willingness of courts to recognise 
financial advice that entails suitability, even in absence of advisory contracts between 
a consumer and a provider. Although they support the application of a wide approach 
to private enforcement, one must be cautious in reaching that conclusion from such 
limited cases. The Market Wizard case is not concerned with private enforcement as 
much as public interest in winding up the company. This discussion has demonstrated 
a missed opportunity for the COBS to enhance certainty needed by both business and 
investors. After all, a right to sue according to s.150 is a tort action, and under English 
law not every careless act or fault on the part of a professional gives rise to liability in 
tort in general and negligence in particular, even where others sustain damages as a 
result. In general, it is necessary for a claimant to satisfy the court that, inter alia, a 
duty of care exists towards the claimant by the provider and the behaviour of the 
defendant falls below the standard of care imposed by law. Given that suitability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
602 [2007] EWHC 1858 (Ch)	  
603 Ibid, para 96 
604 (emphasis added) ibid, para 97 
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necessitates financial advice to be imposed, and courts are willing to recognise 
financial advice regardless of contractual terms, it could be argued that a clarification 
of when ‘advice’ is provided could facilitate the private enforcement of suitability as 
well as enhance the certainty.  
 Moreover, the scope of suitability is hindered by the different regulatory 
regimes for ‘personal recommendation’. As the law currently stands, the COBS 
requires that every ‘personal recommendation’ be suitable.605 COBS thus applies 
suitability to clients irrespective of the category of the recipients of financial advice; 
for instance whether a retail or professional client. However, the COBS exempts an 
authorised person, which is not an advisory but which recommends a stakeholder 
product, from the suitability requirement. Such an authorised person must follow a 
different protection scheme called ‘basic advice’ which is available for a retail client 
only.606 The main distinction here is that the FSA considers basic advice as ‘a process 
that involves putting pre-scripted questions to a retail client’.607 Accordingly, not 
every personal recommendation needs to be individually suitable. This approach in 
the COBS may narrow the level of the quality of recommendation expected from 
financial advice by investors. It is likely that the two regulatory frameworks would 
forsake the benefits of private enforcement in supporting public enforcement in 
enhancing the quality of services provided.  
 Subsequent to the establishment of financial advice that entails suitability, 
consumers need to know whether or not a service provider has fulfilled the suitability 
rule under the FSMA regulatory regime. As far as this issue is concerned, the COBS 
provides certain criteria to be taken into account by financial advisers in complying 
with the duty of suitability. Financial advisers are required to have regard to specific 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605 COBS 9.1.1R 
606 COBS 9.1.2.R 
607 The Glossary  
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information that has to be collected from the client.608 This may be: (a) knowledge 
and experience in the investment field relevant to the specific type of designated 
investment or service; (b) the client’s financial situation;609 and (c) the client’s 
investment objectives.610 Certain information about the objective has to be collected, 
such as the length of time a consumer wishes to hold investments, his/her preference 
regarding risk taking and risk profile, and the purpose of the investments.611 The 
adviser may be obliged to collect further information depending on the nature of the 
transaction and consumer’s objectives. For example, a series of transactions that are 
each suitable when viewed in isolation may be unsuitable if the recommendation or 
decisions to trade are made with a frequency that is not in the best interests of the 
client.612 In finalising the advisory process, the COBS requires financial advisers to 
supply a suitability report for any suitable financial advice provided to retail clients.613  
 The previous paragraph summarizes the regulatory requirement of suitability 
as implemented by the COBS which illustrate certain characteristic of suitability. The 
COBS approach leads to many questions worthy of discussion.  
 Firstly, the COBS implements the concept of suitability in very broad terms 
and in a different manner from the US, where it was originally introduced. There, 
suitability implies three things: (1) customer specific suitability, (2) reasonable basis 
suitability, and (3) quantitative suitability. The COBS does not construct suitability in 
that way but, nonetheless, recognises suitability as a broad concept that entails 
different criteria for judgement which are similar to customer specific suitability in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 See COBS 9.2.1 R, and also the case Marti v. Britannia Life Ltd [2000] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 412, at 
429, where the judge criticises the adviser who did not consider the affordability of the product.  
609 It must include, where it is relevant, information on the source and extent of his regular income, his 
assets, including liquid assets, investments and real property, and his regular financial commitments; 
COBS 9.2.2 R(3) 
610 COBS 9.2.2. R (2)  
611 COBS 9.2.2. R (2) 
612 COBS 9.3.2. G, (1)  
613 COBS 9.4.1 R 
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the US. This can be illustrated by the fact that there is nothing in the COBS about 
reasonable basis suitability. The COBS does recognise, however, quantitative 
suitability, but, unlike the way that the US regulatory regime identifies it as a separate 
pillar of suitability. Instead, COBS identifies quantitative suitability as guidance to 
advisers in assessing suitability. As a result, it could be claimed that the concept of 
suitability in the UK is different from the U.S. 
 Secondly, in dealing with suitability, COBS puts an emphasis on procedures 
rather than content, providing a list of the minimum of information needing to be 
collected from consumers before providing a ‘suitable personal recommendation’, and 
imposing a duty to provide a suitability report after providing this recommendation. 
There is nothing, however, concerning the content of the actual recommendation. 
Paradoxically, where the COBS provides direction as to the content of the 
recommendation, this take the form of guidance rather than actionable rules. 
Consequently, given that guidance in the Handbook is not actionable in accordance 
with s.150, it could be argued that in the view of the FSA, private enforcement of the 
regulatory duties of the content of the personal recommendation is not part of the 
FSMA regulatory regime.  
 Thirdly, there is nothing in the suitability rule that attempts to ensure that 
suitability is provided to a retail client receiving financial advice under the rule itself. 
For this reason, there is a need to refer to other rules; namely those concerning the 
client’s ‘best interest’.614 The client best interest rule states that a firm ‘must act 
honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its client’615 
which is applied to any “designated investment business carried on: (a) for retail 
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615 COBS 2.1.1 (1) R 
 222	  
client”.616 Thus, a firm must not seek to exclude, restrict or rely on an exclusion or 
restriction clause with respect to ‘any duty or liability it may have to a client under the 
regulatory system’.617 The absence of an emphasis in the COBS on the availability of 
suitability to retail clients is inexplicable, since: (1) previous experience in the UK, 
namely with the pensions mis-selling, indicates the importance of suitability for retail 
clients,618 and (2) conflict is possible between a client and an authorised person as to 
the correct categorisation of a client.619 The extensive protection provided by the 
COBS to retail client including the exclusion of liability combined with the way 
‘retail client’ is defined passively by defining other categories, creates an incentive for 
a client to claim mis-categorisation. Given private enforcement under s.150 is 
restricted to ‘private person’, it is reasonable to expect that ‘private persons’ who 
really can exercise an action under s.150, because of their resources and financial 
means, will seek being categorised as retail clients for the purpose of an action under 
s.150. It would have been a better approach to avoid such complexity to maintain the 
suitability of the advice within the rule itself. Accordingly, it could be argued that 
retail clients interests would have been better served by insisting on their right to 
receive suitable advice clearly, and to identify those who are eligible for this 
entitlement, at least as far as suitability in concerned.      
 Finally, there is the the absence of measures in the COBS to gauge the 
suitability of a personal recommendation in the hands of retail clients. Because of 
that, courts need to refer to and seek help from expert witnesses.620 It goes without 
saying that there would be expert witnesses on both sides; but the point to be 
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617 COBS 2.1.2 R. But see COBS 2.1.2(1) G that permits exclusion or restriction in case ‘it is honest, 
fair and professional for it to do so’.  
618 See text to n 466 
619 See for example Titan Steel Steel Wheels Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, (n 407) 
620 McMeel and Virgo (n 3) 369 
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illustrated here is that retail clients are not able to determine with certainty before 
suing or complaining if there had been a breach of the suitability rule.  
 Consequently, it could be suggested that the COBS does not provide a detailed 
picture that permits the easy invocation of the suitability standards as a foundation for 
redress by retail clients. Such a claim is based on the broad terms that suitability is 
defined, COBS focuses on procedures rather than content, not ensuring that suitability 
is maintained in dealing with retail clients within the rule itself, and not providing 
measures to gauge the suitability of a ‘personal recommendation’ provided. 
 Given that the COBS does not provide a detailed picture of the duty of 
suitability, ‘personal recommendation’, the only benefit that could be claimed about 
suitability enforced through s.150 is that the COBS introduces a novel duty that was 
not previously recognised under English private law. But this benefit could be 
rejected since cases that dealt with financial advice before the introduction of 
suitability in the FS regulatory regime recognised suitability; for example the case 
Woods v. Martins Bank Ltd,621 detailed in Part I of this chapter.  
Therefore, it could be argued that the FSMA regulatory regime is not clear as 
to: (1) what constitutes ‘personal recommendation’, (2) what kind of ‘personal 
recommendation’ calls for the duty of suitability, and (3) what the doctrine of 
suitability really entails. It is reasonable to maintain that, as far as private enforcement 
by a retail investor is concerned, suitability as implemented by COBS and the FSMA 
under s.150 is of limited effectiveness for enhancing private enforcement.  
 However, it is claimed that suitability as a regulatory requirement may 
enhance the protection of investors by facilitating an action in misrepresentation. 
Powell provides the convincing explanations of the effect of the regulatory regime on 
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misrepresentation. Powell links a suitability requirement to misrepresentation by 
proposing that suitability itself involves three representations:622 (1) the nature of the 
investment has been carefully considered by the adviser, (2) the investor’s needs have 
been carefully assessed by the adviser, and (3) the recommended investment meets 
the customer’s needs.623 In articulating the three implicit representations of the 
suitability requirement in this way, Powell is able to forcefully argue that the 
regulatory regime provides better protection since consumers do not need to prove the 
unsuitability of the advice to succeed. A consumer, according to Powell, needs to 
prove one of the following: (1) the investment recommended is not an investment to 
be recommended by any adviser (as in the first requirement of the doctrine of 
suitability under U.S. law), (2) the assessments conducted by the advisers fails short 
of an assessment by a prudent financial advisers, and (3) the investment 
recommended does not match an investor’s needs.  
 It is unnecessary to evaluate Powell’s claim here since it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. The framework used by Powell is based on the influence of the 
regulatory regime on the standards of conduct, which permits investors to sue on the 
basis of acting below the standards of the industry as represented in COBS. This 
framework for enforcing regulatory rules is better suited to examining the influence of 
the regulatory regime on private law principles or, vice versa, the role of traditional 
private law action in enforcing regulatory rules. In either case, these frameworks are 
unhelpful in the present study. Firstly, the nature of the inquiry is different. The main 
inquiry of this section is to determine how private enforcement of the regulatory rules 
has been effective, as provided by the regulatory regime. In doing so, Part II 
demonstrates that the instrument for the private enforcement of the regulatory rules is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
622 Jackson and Powell (n 579) para 15-014 
623 Ibid 
 225	  
s.150. Secondly, there is no direct indication within the regulatory regime that 
regulatory rules are meant to be privately enforced through normal private actions 
subsequent to their influence on the standards in any given industry.624 Finally, 
supposing that it is mistaken to exclude Powell’s claim from this section, on the face 
of his claim is that the investor might be better served to sue for a breach of suitability 
on the basis of a private cause of action on misrepresentation rather than s.150, would 
directly suggest the ineffectiveness of s.150 as an instrument to privately enforce the 
regulatory duty of suitability.  
 Suitability as upheld by the FOS is also excluded from the discussion, but for 
different reasons. Firstly, the unavailability of detailed accounts of awards makes it 
difficult to assess how the FOS has developed the requirement of suitability. How 
they differ would be a matter of speculation since there are no published awards and, 
thus, it is thought the research is better served by excluding suitability as treated by 
the FOS. Secondly, this study does not investigate whether or not FOS ‘fair’ treatment 
of suitability is different from the approach taken by courts. Nevertheless, this study 
does pre-suppose the existence of such differences, as a result of the regulatory 
mandate that the FOS decides complaints according to what is ‘fair and reasonable’. 
So far, English courts have shown little inclination to interfere with the work of the 
ombudsmen despite their departure from English law principles. It is noted that unless 
there is gross negligence, an ombudsman has discretion as to how to reach its 
conclusion. Some examples of gross negligence have been identified by courts, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
624 There was an argument that the rule-making power of the authority of in the FS regime would 
permit the modification of common law duties; however, there was no claim that the regulatory rules 
dealing with the conduct of business were meant to be enforced privately by traditional private action; 
see Jack Beatson, ‘The Regulations Governing The Financial Services Industry and Fiduciary Duties 
Under the General Law’ in Ewan McKendrick (ed.), Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary 
Obligations (n 633)  
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including exceeding the cap limit for awards;625 misapplying a code of conduct 
rule;626 an error of material fact;627 or where the ombudsman was irrational on the 
basis upon which they departed from legal rules.628 Moreover, it is recognised that an 
ombudsman has the right to make his judgement on the basis of the principles for 
business in awarding compensation for eligible complainants, even though the FSA 
expressly indicates that the Principles are not actionable.629 Accordingly, given the 
limited grounds for interference by courts, it is reasonable to expect that the FOS 
could reach different conclusions from courts.  
 If the FOS is able to reach different conclusions and since there is no 
empirical research that compares suitability standards as used in the courts with their 
use by the FOS, it is reasonable to claim that they may differ in their 
conceptualisation and application of suitability and avoid including them in the 
analysis in the present study. Interesting future research might compare treatment of 
suitability by the FOS and courts. It would also be interesting to examine how the 
impact of suitability through the regulatory regime enhances other private causes of 
action as suggested by Powell. These are some of the issues that this section has 
uncovered which would be suitable for future investigations.    
 To sum up, this section attempts to evaluate suitability according to the 
instrument provided by the FSMA in deploying the concept of private enforcement of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
625 Bunney v Burns Anderson Plc [2007] EWHC 1240 (Ch)  
626 R (on the application of Norwich and Peterborough Building Society) v Financial Ombudsman 
Service Limited (2002) EWHC 2379 (Admin), paras 69, 71 
627 Examples are ignoring established fact or the ombudsmen took into account irrelevant facts; R (on 
the application of Green trading as Green Denman & Co) v Financial Ombudsman Service Limited 
[2003] EWHC 338 QBD (Admin), para 60 
628 R. (on the application of IFG Financial Services Ltd) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2005] 
EWHC 1153 (Admin) 
629 ‘The high level of generality in the expression of the Principles is not of itself the reason for their 
exclusion under s150(2). After all, they are no more in some instances than broad expressions of 
common law concepts, which do suffice for actionability … [b]ut even if that were the reason for their 
exclusion, that could not assist in showing that they were incapable of giving rise to redress on a fair 
and reasonable basis’ in R (on the application of the British Bankers Association) v Financial Services 
Authority [2011] EWHC 999 (Admin), para 86  
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the regulatory rules, namely s.150 as illustrated in Part II. This section demonstrates 
that the regulatory framework has not provided additional protection to enhance 
private enforcement; COBS does not introduce a novel duty, since the concept of 
suitability had been already recognised under private law, neither does it provide a 
detailed picture that facilitates a s.150 action in comparison to normal tort action. For 
these reasons, it is argued that the private enforcement of suitability as discerned by 
the regulatory regime is ineffective. Problems with lack of clarity as to when a 
personal recommendation is provided, the scope of the duty of advisers and the 
absence of a means to assess how to fulfill suitability are suggested areas that lack 
details.  
Part  IV Conclusion  
 
 This chapter attempts to evaluate whether the current regulatory framework ensures 
that both suitability and best execution have been implemented in a way that permits 
retail investors to enforce them directly. In doing so, this chapter considers the 
instrument used by the framework to provide private enforcement. That was 
attempted by, firstly, analysing the regulatory regimes established with special 
reference to its backgrounds; and, secondly, investigating thoroughly how the UK has 
implemented the regulatory requirements.  
 In part II, it is noted that both suitability and best execution are imposed upon 
service providers by the FSA through its rule-making power exemplified in the 
COBS. That being the case, the regulatory rules provided in the COBS are supplied 
with private enforcement through s.150 of FSMA, which provides for a cause of 
action in form of tort for a ‘breach of statutory duty’. It is noted that s.150 is not novel 
in financial law in the UK and was carried forward from the previous regulatory 
regime, the FS. However, scholars have identified some issues that are related to the 
 228	  
effectiveness of tort for a breach of statutory duty for private enforcement. In 
particularly, the restriction of private causes of action to private persons is claimed to 
be the principal reason for the ineffectiveness. The restriction claimed to provide for a 
cause of action to those with few means or resources to actually exercise their rights. 
Part II concurs and, furthermore, advances the criticism that the role of the regulator 
itself, through the categorisation of clients and the association of the actionability with 
specific categories, may also provide additional restrictions upon those who could 
sue. In short, if s.62A is criticised for its narrow scope, s.150 is even narrower as most 
of the regulatory rules focus on retail clients given that it is an unnecessary condition 
for private persons, entitled to action under s.150, to be a retail client. 
 It could be expected that, regardless of the critiques, s.150 could have been 
effective at least for retail clients who are subject to the main protection in the COBS. 
Consequently, the two benefits associated with the tort of breach of statutory duty 
were analysed for each of the two regulatory requirements in terms of whether or not 
a new duty was introduced or a more detailed account of what constitutes the 
fulfilment of the requirements was provided.  
 In light of the discussion of suitability, it is pointed out that the concept of the 
suitability of financial advice was recognised before the introduction of suitability in 
the FS regime. Reference to cases before the FS regime was essential to counter any 
criticism that suitability spilled over from the regulatory regime to private law 
through representation of the standards of the industry. Moreover, while 
acknowledging the impact of the MiFID, it is argued that the COBS does not provide 
enough detail in significant areas to allow for private enforcement. Firstly, the COBS 
is unclear about when the substantive suitability requirement has to be complied with. 
The notion of ‘personal recommendation’ in the COBS makes it difficult for service 
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providers to determine whether or not there is a need to comply with suitability. As 
much as it is difficult for service providers, the wider approach adopted creates 
difficulties for private enforcement in terms of whether or not the advice supplied is 
subject to suitability. The ambiguity of the treatment of financial advice may spill 
over to other areas of private enforcement as a breach of the General Prohibition, 
where it is possible that consumers may face the burden of convincing the court that a 
financial advice has been provided. Furthermore, this approach requires an 
investigation by the courts into what was said at the time of advice. Thus, retail 
investors need to recollect conversations and what was said long ago in order to 
satisfy the court that there was an advice amounting to personal recommendation. 
Secondly, since suitability is provided through tort law, the COBS does not clarify the 
scope of the duty imposed on advisers. It is difficult to accept that the duty of a 
salesperson at a bank branch would be similar that of a full and independent financial 
adviser. Such a clarification would benefit private enforcement by reducing the level 
of uncertainty associated with determining whether or not the advice provided 
matched the standards within a specific class of advisers. Finally, the COBS does not 
detail how to assess or to gauge how suitability has been provided and fulfilled. While 
this might be a problem for compliance departments at service providers, it is a real 
burden on retail investors who need initially to make sure that the advice was 
unsuitable, and then to satisfy the court that such would be the common view within 
the industry.  
 These points support the view that suitability does not supply the benefit 
sought from the regulatory regime through a tort of breach of statutory duty, and 
therefore concludes that suitability as implemented by the FSMA regulatory 
framework is ineffective in enhancing private enforcement.     
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 In contrast to suitability, which provides neither a novel duty nor clarity, the 
best execution rule is clear and detailed. Such clarity and detail could have led to the 
conclusion that the FSMA regulatory framework has been effective. However, that is 
not the case. Reference to the history of best execution suggests that it was developed 
due to regulatory oversight and litigation through the class-action system rather than 
actions by individual investors. This is explained by the minimal damages that retail 
investors would receive in cases of breaches of the best execution requirement. 
Accordingly, in evaluating the FSMA regulatory regime, it is argued that there is no 
incentive for the private enforcement of best execution by retail investors. 
Consequently, it is claimed that best execution is ineffective, not because of the 
absence of the expected benefit of the instrument of implementation under s.150 as 
much as the lack of incentive to enforce the standard in practice.  
 One question that may arise concerns the reason for evaluating suitability in 
reference to the benefits sought after from a regulatory regime in a tort for a breach of 
statutory duty, whereas with best execution a historical examination was referred to 
reveal to claim its ineffectiveness. The answer to this question concerns the nature of 
the main research question of this study, which asks: ‘is the FSMA regulatory regime 
effective in providing a framework for private enforcement of the behavioural 
standards to retail investors’. The study supposed that the FSMA regulatory regime is 
effective and hence conducted an investigation to identify evidence to negate the 
statement. Accordingly, it was sufficient in case of suitability to demonstrate the 
ambiguity of the rule itself in COBS, whereas with best execution there was a need 
for certainty before claiming the effectiveness of the framework since the absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence. Therefore, the historical analysis helped to 
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identify the context that facilitated the application of best execution, which then was 
reflected back to the UK context.          
 Also, the historical analysis of the two regulatory requirements illustrates the 
policies behind them both being developed by courts in response to the malpractice of 
professionals. The mis-selling of securities by brokers to investors that do not match 
their needs or investment objectives required recognition of suitability to ensure the 
link between the products sold and the investor’s needs. Best execution was also 
developed in response to the malpractice of brokers profiting from buying cheap and 
selling high to their customers. In both rules, the issue of information asymmetry, as 
explained in detail in previous chapters, was present. In the case of selling shares, 
brokers exploited the information asymmetry of investors in relation to the risk 
associated with the securities sold. In contrast, in the case of executing orders, brokers 
took advantages of their knowledge about where to buy cheap in markets with 
multiple stock exchanges to profit at the expense of their customer.  
 Accordingly, the policies underlying suitability and best execution are 
suggested to be vital in maintaining investor’s confidence that there will not be 
malpractice by professionals.  
 But maintaining investor confidence through the regulatory requirements of 
suitability and best execution cannot be achieved without an enhancement of the role 
of private enforcement. The use of public enforcement is complementary rather than a 
substitute, as noted in previous chapters. To put this in perspective, comparative 
research in the field of enforcement by regulators of financial services illustrate that 
the FSA is not as strong as it should be in comparison to other enforcement agencies 
in other common law legal systems.630 Consequently, it could be argued that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 Jackson (n 55); Coffee (n 56); Jackson and Roe (n 56) 
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private enforcement is vital in the UK to compensate for weak public enforcment by 
the FSA.  
 The issue with the reliance on FOS to enforce suitability and best execution 
for retail clients is that it leaves some cases of retail investors above the cap limit 
outside the scope of its service, and therefore unable to access its service. Also, 
relying on the FOS does not help in developing the concept of suitability and best 
execution due to the lack of involvement by courts and their educative value of 
developing a public corpus of jurisprudence as well as providing normative rules to 
govern future transactions.  
 This part has prompted many questions worth investigation by future research. 
Powell argues that the importance of suitability lies in the misrepresentation private 
action provided by English law; and this is an area where there is a gap in the 
literature concerning the UK in comparison to the US. Thus, an objective analysis is 
required to examine the impact of suitability not only with regards to 
misrepresentation, but also other private causes of action such as the tort of 
negligence. Moreover, research could fruitfully examine the different kinds of private 
enforcement of securities regulations, such as the regulatory requirement to provide 
risk warning. More immediately practical would be a research able to suggest 
appropriate responses to financial advice received via the Internet; including how and 
when financial advice should be subject to suitability.   
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Chapter Four 
Saudi Arabia 
 
  
The previous chapter has examined how, as regulatory requirements, both suitability 
and best execution have been supported by regulatory private enforcement in the UK. 
It was shown that measures were introduced through the COBS rulebook and private 
enforcement was provided for through s.150 of the FSMA. It is argued, then, that the 
way that the FSMA framework works does not effectively permit retail investors to 
privately enforce the two regulatory requirements.  
 This chapter seeks to evaluate the implementation of these two regulatory 
requirements in Saudi Arabia by attempting to answer four questions. The first 
concerns what suitability and best execution entail, as implemented in Saudi Arabia. 
Secondly, what are the policies behind Saudi secondary capital market regulation in 
general and these regulatory requirements in particular? Thirdly, what are the 
difficulties, if any, in the existing law that hinder private enforcement by retail 
investors; and finally, what recommendations could analysis suggest to enhance the 
private enforcement of the two regulatory requirements?.   
 As with the UK, this chapter is divided into four parts. Part I provides a brief 
background of the current regulatory regime for securities markets in Saudi Arabia. 
Part II examines the current regulatory framework focusing on the techniques used in 
implementing suitability and best execution to permit retail investors to pursue a civil 
action. Part III evaluates both suitability and best execution in their context, giving 
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definition, criteria and guidance. Finally, part IV includes a discussion and 
conclusions.  
 Part I Background 
  
The modern legal system of Saudi, as opposed to Sharia, law is the main topic for 
discussion in the following parts. It is impossible, however, to discuss any legal or 
regulatory issue concerning Saudi Arabia without reference to the principles and rules 
of Islam or Shari’a. It is pointed out below that Islamic jurisprudence as strictly 
applied by the prevailing school of thoughts in Saudi Arabia makes it difficult to 
accommodates different aspects of legal modernisation needed to meet economic and 
social needs of the country. It is, furthermore, argued that these difficulties are not 
only confined to conventional banking transactions which include the application of 
interest, or usury, which are clearly prohibited by Islam, but also other areas of 
modern commercial transactions such as the recognition of corporations as legal 
entities separate from shareholders. While it would be interesting to pursue an inquiry 
as to compatibility between Shari’s as applied in Saudi Arabia and current modern 
business practices, this must be left for future research.  
 This study seeks to analyse the practice of the regulator in Saudi Arabia in 
implementing international standards for regulation of securities markets, namely 
those pertaining to suitability and best execution. Consequently, this part is organised 
into four sections. The first briefly demonstrates both the importance and legitimacy 
of Shari’a within the legal context of Saudi Arabia. The second section lists some 
difficulties facing policy makers in modernising the Saudi economy, and the third 
provides a historical background of the legal framework for securities markets in 
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Saudi Arabia. The final section summarises the discussion conducted so far and 
supplies some concluding remarks.  
A) The Shari’a as a legal source in Saudi Arabia   
 In principle, it is reasonable to maintain that the fundamental source of law in Saudi 
Arabia is Islamic Law (the Sharia) which consists of the Holy Qura’an and the 
teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (the Sunnah) as their primary sources.631 
Consequently, this section aims to highlight some difficulties associated with the 
reliance of Shari’a as foundemental source of law. 
   To start with, the primary sources, the Holy Qura’an and the Sunnah, address 
certain issues in general terms and are sometimes worded in a way that allows 
different interpretations. That being the case, developments in Islamic law have relied 
heavily on Ijtihad, or personal reasoning, which depends on the intellectual abilities 
of the relevant scholar.632 Having said that, the deductive processes used with the 
primary sources have been limited to four main Schools of Thought within Sunni 
Muslims: the Hanafi, the Mailiki, the Shafai’I and the Hanbali.633  
 However, notwithstanding the existence of the four Schools of Thought, it has 
been argued that the most significant issue is that due to its extreme complexity 
Sharia creates difficulties when applied in modern society.634 From a postcolonialism 
perspective, there are two explanations for this complexity and indeterminacy. Firstly, 
it arises from the lack of detailed guidance in the primary sources of Shari’a 
governing both commercial and civil transactions. For example, the Holy Qura’an 
provides only 80 verses concerned with strictly legal concepts out of over 6000 	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632 For a detailed analysis of ijtihad and its n current application in Saudi Arabia, see Frank Vogel, 
Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000) 
633 Ibid 
634 William Ballantyne, Essays and Addresses on Arab Laws (Curzon 2000) 84 
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verses.635 For this reasons, Islamic jurisprudence relies heavily on personal reasoning 
and deduction and the work of scholarship for it to develop in line with the needs of 
society. The problem with this approach, however, is that societies prioritise their 
needs and perceive justice differently and thus different scholarly opinions are 
available for the same issue.   
 Secondly, the deductive processes using with the main sources the four 
schools were established in the Middle Ages to deal with legal issues on a case by 
case basis and with a series of nominate contracts instead of providing general 
principles.636 As a result, within a Shari’a system it is difficult to determine what the 
law entails for an economic transaction before a dispute arises which is incompatible 
with modern economic contexts which require both certainty and clarity of law to 
allow economic agents to transact and develop novel economic activities and 
contracts. For instance, in the famous arbitration awards, Saudi Arabia v Arabian 
American Oil Company (Aramco),637 the arbitrators agreed that the Hanbali school of 
Islamic law, which was the basis of law in Saudi Arabia, was the applicable law for 
the disputed agreement. They had, however, to reject the application of Hanbali 
school and Islamic law and instead referred to world-wide practice for the kind of 
activity that the agreement governed on the grounds that Islamic law as a system 
developed before the demands of modern technologies, finance and marketing 
provided by modern international corporations arose.638 This study does not evaluate 
whether such claims are right or wrong since, this is not within the scope of the 
research,639 but brings attention to the problem identified by Ballantyne that a tribunal 
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638 But see criticism for the rejection of the law of Saudi Arabia in Abdulrahman Baamir, Shari'a Law 
in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and Practice in Saudi Arabia (Ashgate 2010) 97-107 
639 For such criticism see Baamir, Ibid 
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or a court within a geopolitical system that applies Shari’a does not enjoy the freedom 
of international arbitration tribunals to reject Islamic law and refer to modern 
practices.640 A national court or a tribunal subject to Shari’a must apply it to the 
dispute before it.  
 However, the difficulty facing any national court or tribunal is emphasised by 
Al-Sanhouri, a great authority in the Arab legal scholars, when he attempted to extract 
a theory of contractual liability in Shari’a:  
‘It cannot be said there is a theory of contractual liability in the Islamic 
jurisprudence akin to that which we have seen in Western jurisprudence. It is 
only possible to extract from the provisions laid down by Islamic 
jurisprudence the counterpart of the theory of contractual liability in Western 
jurisprudence.’ 641 
    
 It could be thus suggested that, in dealing with current problems, Al-Sanhouri 
supports the idea of relying on Western jurisprudence and examines problems in 
terms of their equivalents in Islamic jurisprudence, rather than making deduction 
based on scholars from different schools. While many comparative writers indeed 
have adopted such an approach,642 it is still possible to assert the absence of general 
principles for transactions, contracts and obligations under Shari’a still exists.  
 Further legal issues arise where the needs of a society for moderation are in 
conflict with Shari’a, particularly where states’ interests contradict with Shari’a 
principles. Such a state of affairs were not dealt with in pre twentieth century Islamic 
scholars because the concept of a state as an economic, social and political entity is a 	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641 Abduleazzag Al-Sanhouri A, ‘Masader Al-Haq Fi Al-Figh Al-Islami’ cited in Ballantyne, ibid, 86 
642 See for example Nicholas Foster, ‘Owing and Owning in Islamic and Western Law’ ch. in Eugene 
Cotran and Martin Lau(eds), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, Volume 10 (2003-2004) 
(Brill 2006) 68-73 
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European idea that was transplanted at the beginning of the 20th century to the Arab 
world in particular. Previously, the religious and political aspects of the state are 
united in Islamic legal theory and thus the head of state, namely the caliph, was the 
head of both political and religious institutions.643 It is inconceivable, therefore, that 
there would be a conflict between religious institutions on the one hand and the state 
on the other as was characteristic of relations between the Pope and heads of state in 
Europe in past centuries.644 
 The development of state as a source of legitimacy has not hindered the 
legitimacy of Shari’a; it is highly regarded among Muslims as a divine law or the 
sacred code and the source of legitimacy. From a Western perspective, this position of 
Shari’a is known as ‘divine nomocracy’ which evolved between the church heads of 
states in Europe.645 Nomocracy, which is a system of government ‘based on a legal 
code; the rule of law in a community’,646 exists where ‘a supreme law regarded as of 
divine or natural origin is the source of governing authority’.647  
 The previous account fails to provide a theoretical resolution of or conceptual 
justification for conflicts occurring between the need for modernisation and Shari’a, 
or in other words, where state interests conflict with Shari’a principles. Evidently, 
such an issue does arise when one Muslim state starts using the law as an instrument 
to achieve social or economic objectives which diverge from Islamic principles. 
Islamic jurisprudence has developed various justifications that permit overcoming 
some Shari’a principles on the grounds such as public interest (Masslaha A’ammah), 
or extreme necessity (Al-Darrorat Tobeeh Al-Mahthorat). However, where there is 
direct conflict with clear principles of Islam, such as with usury or ribba, it is very 	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difficult to maintain such justifications for society at large. In this respect, it is noted 
that Shari’a as a religious law ‘is not intended to develop according to the dictates or 
needs of society; quite to the contrary, society and its circumstances … [are] supposed 
to evolve according to the dictates of the Shari’a’.648 
 Saudi Arabia provides a living case through which to explore these theoretical 
issues. It is reasonable to expect high priority to be given to Shari’a and Islam within 
a society that proclaims itself to be a one-hundred per cent Muslim. However, the 
experience of Saudi Arabia with financial markets in general and securities markets in 
particular is proof of claims about the ambiguity and absence of both theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks within Islamic jurisprudence for conflicts between 
modernisation, modern states and Shari’a. This has resulted in uncertainty, vagueness 
and the division of substantive law within modern Saudi legal history, which is the 
subject of discussion in the next section.  
B) Saudi Modern Legal History 
The influence of Shari’a in Saudi Arabia can be traced back to the time of the 
establishment of the state itself as a geopolitical entity in 1932 by King Abdluaziz bin 
Abdularhaman Bin Saud. Several legal reforms have since been introduced up to the 
present but, nonetheless, the Shari’a has been always the paramount source of law.649 
 Currently, Islam and Shari’a are the primary sources of law within the Saudi 
legal context. The Basic Law of Governance, which was introduced as an application 
of the concept of constitution in 1992,650 Article 1, clearly states that: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 Ballantyne (n 632) 29 
649 For detailed analysis and discussion, see Vogel (n 630) 
650 Royal Decree No: A/90, 27-08-1412 (01 March 992) on the Basic Law of Governance. The Basic 
Law consists of 83 Articles and nine parts. A full and translated version of the Basic Law is available at 
<http://www.saudiembassy.net/about/country-
information/laws/The_Basic_Law_Of_Governance.aspx> accessed 29 June 2011	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 ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state 
with Islam as its religion; God's Book and the Sunnah of His Prophet, 
God's prayers and peace be upon him, are its constitution, Arabic is its 
language’ 
  
 Throughout the Basic Law, there are many references to Shari’a and its two 
major sources, the Qura’an and Sunnah.651 More importantly, the Basic Law states 
that the law applicable to disputes in Saudi Arabia is the Shari’a. Article 48 states 
that: 
 ‘The courts will apply the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah in the 
cases that are brought before them, in accordance with what is indicated in 
the Book and the Sunnah, and statutes decreed by the Ruler which do not 
contradict the Book or the Sunnah’. 
  
 Interestingly, nothing in the Basic Law refers to legislation and legislative 
powers as source of law, or Tashree’a or Tanithimat as known in Saudi Arabia. The 
Basic Law provides for separation of powers within the state, it refers to three 
recognised kinds of authorities; judicial, executive and regulatory.652 The three 
authorities would ‘cooperate with each other in the performance of their duties, in 
accordance with this and other laws’, with the understanding that ‘The King shall be 
the point of reference for all these authorities’. Consequently, it could be suggested 
that the Saudi legal system recognises three kinds of authority, but meanwhile 
identifies the King as the source of all authority.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 See for example Articles 5-8, 17, 21, 23, 26, 38, 45, 48, 57, 67 
652 Article 44  
 241	  
 That being the case, it should be noted that it is a mistake to assume that the 
regulatory power ascribed to the King in the Basic Law is similar to legislative 
powers associated with elected assemblies in democratic states. Reference in the 
Basic Law to the regulatory authority may suggest the recognition of such authority 
but using different words.653 As far as the regulatory authority is concerned, the Basic 
Law states that the regulatory authority’s duty 
  ‘lays down regulations and motions to meet the interests of the 
state or remove what is bad in its affairs, in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari'ah. This [regulatory] authority exercises its functions in accordance 
with this law and the laws pertaining to the Council of Ministers and the 
Consultative Council’.654  
  
 Thus, it is reasonable to state that a regulatory authority’s function is to meet 
the interests of the state and to exercise its function as subordinated to other 
institutions. But there is no role for the regulatory authority to define and specify the 
interest of the state ascribed to the legislators in democratic systems. Accordingly, it 
could be argued that the regulatory authority provided in the Basic Law is different 
from the legislative power provided in other countries constitutions. Accordingly, it 
could be claimed that a regulatory authority does not have legitimacy to shape the law 
or the interest of the state in the way that other regulators in western countries do 
unless the regulatory actions conform with Sharia.   
 Moreover, it is difficult to identify the real powers of the regulatory authority 
or to provide examples of it since the Basic Law does not elaborate. The Basic Law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
653 For example, it is suggested that the term regulator is adopted instead of legislator is Saudi Arabia 
because the latter can be only used to refer to God, the only legislator; see for example Jan Otto, Sharia 
Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in the Past 
and Present (Leiden University Press 2010) 146 
654 Article 67 
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mentions the ‘regulatory authority’ twice as stated above, and consequently it is 
reasonable to suggest this regulatory power is akin to the concept of regulation rather 
than legislation.   
 According to the previous discussion, two points could be emphasised. Firstly, 
Shari’a is the main source of law and obligations in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, it 
could be suggested that a breach of Shari’a in any law, regulation or action could be 
claimed to be unconstitutional, at least in theory. Secondly, while the Basic Law 
identifies three kinds of authority, there is no legislative authority as such perceived in 
democratic countries. However, such authority as institutionalized by the Basic Law 
is more akin to a regulatory regime rather than legislative power. Consequently, it 
could be argued that there is no recognition of legislative powers within the Saudi 
legal context that could have provided justifications for overcoming Shari’a and 
positive law.  
  These two factors, the emphasis on Shari’a and the absence of legislative 
power, reinforce the domination of Shari’a while they do not help to overcome the 
problems associated with the Shari’a as identified in the first section. In contrast with 
other Islamic countries where their constitutions state that Shar’a is a source in Saudi 
Arabia, it is considered the main source. Thus, it could be suggested that Saudi Arabia 
confines itself to Shari’a and its rules as the essence of the legal system. Such an 
approach may have two practical difficulties. Firstly, it does not clearly overcome the 
issue of the complexity of the application of Shari’s as a result of its lack of general 
principles.  
 Secondly, the Basic Law does not clearly consider the incompatibility between 
Shari’a and its principles that prohibit interests or usury and various financial 
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practices, such as banking, that are the core of modern economies.655  The lack of any 
source of legitimacy for public interests that contradict with Shari’a in contradiction 
with general legal notion as the rule of law and the certainty of legal rules. While such 
issue has existed in the past, it could be argued that it will still persist. Thus, it is 
necessary to evaluate how policymakers attempted to overcome the issue. 
Accordingly, the approach of policy makers in dealing legitimacy questions is 
demonstrated by the development of securities markets law, which is discussed in the 
next section.   
C) The History of Modern Legal System for Securities Markets    
It is reasonable to claim there has been an uneasy relationship between the needs for 
modernisation on one hand, and Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia on the other hand. 
This has been observed ever since the establishment of the country in 1932. The 
fractious relationship has not been confined to known major areas of conflict, such as 
with usury (riba) and excessive risk taking (garar), but it is also observed in other 
Western legal developments which were unfamiliar to Shari’a, such as corporations. 
For more discussion reference can be made to the literature dealing with Saudi 
Arabia, but nonetheless a snapshot of the historical background is essential to, firstly, 
identify the approach to reforms used in Saudi Arabia with financial markets, and 
secondly, understand the shape of the current position. 
 Given the direct clash between banking services and Shari’a principles; 
namely in relation to interest (usury), it is reasonable to expect that the government 
would have dealt with the issue as soon as banking services were introduced into the 
Kingdom. However, although banks and banking services have been available since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655 As phrased by Ballantyne, the problem is between ‘an irresistible forces against an irremovable 
object’, Ballantyne (n 632) 26 
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1932,656 it was thought that there was no need for legal intervention to isolate banking 
services from the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts until the 1980s before which time the 
government had neglected to deal with the issue of banking services, as discussed 
below. 
 It could be suggested that the first urgently needed for legal reform as a result 
of conflicts between substantive financial law and Shari’a was in the 1960s. The first 
need for regulatory intervention because of the incompatibility of Shari’a as applied 
in Saudi Arabia and modern practice of commerce appeared when the Commercial 
Paper Regulation was enacted.657 This regulation incorporated the Geneva Uniform 
Law of Bill of Exchange (1930) and of Checks (1931), which included provisions 
related to modern commercial practices, including interest in negotiable instruments. 
When the Saudi legislative authority came across a provision in the Geneva law 
dealing with interest, they stated that a term in a promissory note pertaining to a 
payment of interest should be treated as if it were not there.658 
  The real difficulty here was that the Saudi legislative authority could not 
overcome or simply consider as non-existent provisions that provided for statutory 
limitations on the validity of bills of exchanges (three years) and of cheques (six 
months). The requirement of a time limitation was in direct conflict with Shari’a as 
applied in Saudi Arabia where acquired rights are not forfeited by the lapse of time.659 
To get around this, the Saudi text provided different terminology to the same effect, 
by attaching the phrase ‘a cause of action will not be entertained by the courts’, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
656 For example, the first bank in Saudi Arabia was established in1926 and was called ‘The Netherlands 
Trading Society', currently named the Saudi Hollandi Bank, see 
http://www.shb.com.sa/vEnglish/showpage.asp?objectID={7216489E-FA3E-4EA5-A4B8-
99CEE053E3AA} accessed 29 June 2011	  
657 The Law of Commercial Papers, Nitham Alawraq Altejariyah. Issued by Royal Decree No. 37 dated 
11/10/1383 H. (1963) 
658 Article 6 
659 See George Sfeir, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ (1988) 36 Am.J.Comp.L. 729, 735 
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whenever limitations of time appeared in the Geneva Law.660 This approach, 
nevertheless, did not solve the issue at hand since Shari’a courts, which were the 
general court, could entertain such a claim after the lapse of prescribed time if the 
cause of action could be made on a non-regulatory basis.661 Therefore, a special 
tribunal with jurisdiction over disputes relating to negotiable instruments was created, 
known as the Committee for the Settlement of Negotiable Instruments Disputes 
(CSNID).662  
 In contrast to negotiable instruments, which Saudi policymakers dealt with 
from the start, they neglected the need to deal directly with the issue of banking 
services even though they involved usury which is prohibited by Islam.663 There are 
many instances where the government attempted not to confront the issue; a clear 
example of this ‘wilful neglect’ approach could be identified in the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA), which is the country’s central bank. SAMA’s 
establishment charter prohibits it from operating in violation of Shari’a, but 
meanwhile provides that its main responsibilities include the regulation of 
commercial banking and the stabilization of the country’s currency (the Riyal).664 
Without going into detail, both responsibilities require the involvement of SAMA in 
some interest-related activities prohibited under Islam and Shari’a.665  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
660 For instance in articles 84 and 116 
661 Sfeir (n 657) 
662 Note that this committee still exists in Saudi Arabia.  
663 The underlying concept was clearly put that ‘while it is legitimate to earn profits from earning 
money, money should not simply breed money’, Sfeir (n 657) 738 
664 ‘The Agency shall not charge any profits on its receipt and payments and shall not act in any 
manner which conflicts with the teaching of the Islamic law. The agency shall not undertake any of the 
following functions: 
(a) paying or receiving interest…”, Article 3 of the Charter of The Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, 
Royal Decree No.23 1377/2957.  The Charter is available on the internet at 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/RulesRegulation/BankingSystem/Pages/BankingSystemFD01.a
spx> (visited 07.03.2011)  
665 For example, as the central bank, SAMA needs to pay interest on funds deposited by local banks. 
Furthermore, the stabilisation of the country’s currency requires buying and selling certain derivatives 
contracts that involve the payment of interests. For discussion about the role of SAMA see J. O. 
Ronall, ‘Banking Regulation in Saudi Arabia’ (1967) 21 Middle E.J. 399     
 246	  
 An even clearer example of the approach of policymakers in Saudi Arabia as 
to avoid dealing with the problems of banking and Shari’a can be found in the 
Banking Control Law introduced in 1966.666  There is nothing in the law that refers to, 
or deals with, the subject of usury or interest.667 As strange as it sounds from a legal 
perspective, both Saudi and foreign banks had been conducting business in the 
conventional manner despite the threat of the unenforceability of interest payments 
under the Shari’a. But this unwritten rule, that banks paid and earned interest, was 
challenged when economic conditions deteriorated so badly that some borrowers tried 
to escape their obligations to the banks by invoking the Shari’a prohibition against 
usury in the 1980s.668 In response to this threat to banks, the Saudi Minister of 
Commerce entrusted his ministry’s legal committee with the settlement of disputes 
between banks and their customers ‘arising from the contracts and banking 
transactions’.669 This temporary solution of dealing with disputes through a legal 
committee turned into a permanent solution upon the establishment of a new 
committee under SAMA called the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes 
(henceforth CSBD).670 The CSBD was given jurisdiction over the settling of disputes 
between banks and their clients arising from contracts and transactions, except those 
concerning commercial papers such as bills of exchange which should be settled 
through CSNID. CSBD was in fact given powers similar to the courts; for example, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
666 Royal Decree No.M/5 of 1368/1966 
667 The law is available on the internet at 
<http://www.sama.gov.sa/sites/samaen/RulesRegulation/BankingSystem/Pages/BankingSystemFD03.a
spx> accessed 29 June 2011  
668 Sfeir (n 657) 
669 Those contracts concluded after 25 December 1985, see decision no 822 of 13/04/1406 (26 
December 1985)  
670 The regulation of the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes, issued by Royal Decree 
No. 8/729 of 10/07/1407 
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might decide to freeze a party’s assets or restrict parties from travelling outside of 
Saudi Arabia.671  
 This study has attempted in the previous paragraphs to draw attention to these 
issues associated with the prevailing approach in Saudi Arabia to avoid the 
incompatibility of modern economy and Shari’a but not to critically examine it. There 
are three insights that could be emphasised in this section. Firstly, the ad hoc 
approach of Saudi legislative authority in dealing with legal-economic issues that 
conflict with Shari’a is by entrusting the jurisdiction of these disputes to special 
tribunals. However, it is not maintained that there is a problem with the restriction of 
jurisdiction to special tribunals per se. Rather, it is maintained that, by relying on this 
approach to avoid dealing with many issues including legitimacy, it is unlikely that 
the rule of law or legal certainty needed in any country for economic development 
will be enhanced or achieved.  
 Secondly, the ad hoc approach may raise other questions as to the forms rather 
than the substance of law. For example, the historical background of the approach in 
response to banking disputes may be questionable in the way that it was executed. It 
is unacceptable from the rule of law perspective that a member of the executive 
power, namely a minister, has the authority to change the jurisdiction of particular 
disputes, such as those concerning banking and interest, all of a sudden to a 
committee that has no judicial legitimacy even from the King himself. It is possible to 
argue that there was a need for a quick response to calm the banks or otherwise severe 
economic disruption could have happened given that the CSBD was legitimately 
established a year later. However, such an answer may not be satisfactory for those in 
favour of the rule of law and market economy systems, especially after the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
671 It is noted that CSBD is ‘the only authority in Saudi Arabia that recognises charging interest as a 
valid practice’, see Abdulrahman Baamir, ‘Saudi Law and Judicial Practice in Commercial and 
Banking Arbitration’ (PhD Thesis, Brunel University, 2008) 223 
 248	  
membership of Saudi Arabia to the World Trade Organisation (henceforth WTO), as 
pointed out below.  
 Thirdly, the importance of the CSBD for this study is that it came into being at 
a time when only banks were allowed to provide brokerage services in the country 
and thus disputes between investors and banks with respect to these services had to be 
dealt with by the CSBD. As a result of this, the historical development of capital 
markets and their association with banks is critical for the understanding of the 
evolution of securities law in Saudi Arabia. The subject of historical development of 
capital market in Saudi Arabia is dealt with in the next section.  
D) The Development of Capital Markets 
 Within the Saudi context, references to securities markets in general and capital 
markets in particular are mostly associated with stock markets given the relatively 
recent development of Islamic bond markets within the current framework. Thus, 
reference is needed to the history of stock markets themselves in order to understand 
how law relating to securities markets evolved in Saudi Arabia.  
 To start with, the history of joint stock companies can be traced back to 1935, 
when shares in the Arabian Automobile Company (subsequently liquidated), were 
floated to handle the increasing importance at the time of automobiles.672 In 1954 
Saudi cement companies went public, followed by the privatisation of three electricity 
companies. However, it was not until the late 1970s that a Saudi secondary stock 
market began to emerge as a result of the oil boom in 1973. The stock market was 
supported by the government steps to improve the role of the private sector in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 The Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), available on its website at 
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-
ewIE8TIwMLj2AXA0_vQGNzY18Q1wAoH4kk7x4QZmrgaeITbBQc4GVs4GlEQHdwYpG-n0d-
bqp-QW5EOQAsB49z/dl2/d1/L0lHSkovd0RNQUprQUVnQSEhL1lCWncvZW4!/>accessed 29 June 
2011	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economy by participating in forming various joint stock companies through 
investment agencies.673 Another factor that supported the emergence of stock markets 
was the government’s decision to part-nationalise foreign banks, whereupon banks 
had to be 60% owned by the Saudi public and 40% retained by foreign shareholders. 
At this time a number of brokers started to buy and sell shares for themselves and for 
their Saudi clients; which represented the beginning of brokerage business.674 
 The high revenues from higher oil prices helped the government to initiate 
major infrastructure projects and modernise the economy between the 1970s and early 
1980s, which resulted in increases in both the volume of trading and market 
capitalisation in response to increased of spending by the government.675 In the mid 
1980s, the government decided to place all stock trading under the supervision and 
control of SAMA and, therefore, discontinued the existing broker-based stock trading 
system.676  
 It has been claimed that restricting brokerage to commercial banks was meant 
to protect the market against the adverse effects of speculation and to help it develop 
and mature.677 But such an account fails to explain why, at that moment, the 
government decided to do this. A more convincing explanation is that the Saudi 
government was responding to a stock bubble that had just burst in a neighbouring 
country - Kuwait, known as Souk Al-Manakh,678 that had severe effects on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673 For example the Retirement Pensions Agency and the General Organisation for Social Insurance. 
674 K.A. Al–Abdulqader, G Hannah and D.M. Power, ‘A Test of the Weak form of the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis for the Saudi Stock Market’ (2007) 6 Journal of Emerging Market Finance 167  
675 Ibid 
676 Tadawul (n 670) 
677 Alajlan (n 25) 
678 The market had developed as a parallel stock exchange dealing in the shares of Gulf companies not 
resident in Kuwait and fuelled by manic speculation. It is estimated that the crash cost $92 billion 
dollars at the time of the crash. For more details see Fadwa Darwiche and Fida Darwiche, The Gulf 
Stock Exchange Crash: The Rise and Fall of the Souq Al-Manakh (Croom Helm 1986); Pete Moor, 
‘Rentier Fiscal Crisis and Regime Stability: Business-State Relations in the Gulf’ (2002) 37 Studies in 
Comparative International Development 34 
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Kuwaiti economy.679 From this perspective, it becomes more plausible to suggest that 
the government’s response limiting brokerage services to banks was not per se about 
stock markets development as much as being a case of avoiding what had been 
witnessed in a neighbouring country. In other words, it was a political rather than 
economic rationale for intervening and regulating secondary capital markets in Saudi 
Arabia for the first time. 
 Similar to the government’s ad hoc approach described in the previous 
section, a ministerial committee comprising the Ministers of Finance, Commerce and 
the Governor of SAMA was formed to supervise activities in the stock markets. In 
order to fulfil this objective, the ministerial committee issued new rules and 
regulations in April 1984. These included: (i) the establishment of a share trading 
system that operated via commercial banks; (ii) the introduction of a supervisory body 
for all securities trading; and (iii) the opening of a share control department (SCD) 
under the jurisdiction of SAMA.680 Following this, the Securities Supervisory 
Committee, comprising senior representatives of the two ministries and SAMA, was 
established to supervise and report directly to the Ministerial Committee. On 
November 23, 1984, Royal Decree No. 1230/8 was issued to establish the Saudi Share 
Registration Company (SSRC), which was to be sponsored by local commercial 
banks under the supervision of SAMA. The SSRC was in charge of managing the 
records of shareholders and share certificates, as well as providing support facilities 
for transactions and automatically transferring and registering ownership of 
transactions.681  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679 Rodney Wilson and others, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia (RoutledgeCurzon 2004) 69 
680 Al Abdulqader, Hannah and Power (n 672) 
681 For a detailed historical background on the history of the stock market in Saudi Arabia since 1934 
see Sultan Al-Bogami, ‘An Examination of the Usefulness of Interim Financial Statements to Investors 
in the Saudi Stock Market’ (PhD Thesis, University of Dundee, 1996) 
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 In parallel to the establishment of SSRC, SAMA established a share trading 
system that was similar to the systems employed in Germany and Switzerland at that 
time. Transactions in joint stock companies’ shares, however, were to be conducted 
via Saudi commercial banks alone. While the commercial banks were to act as 
intermediaries in the transfer of shares on their clients’ behalf, they were not 
permitted to buy or sell shares for their own interest.682 With all these foundations for 
stock markets in place, it could be suggested that this was the beginning of a modern 
system for share trading. The positive side of SAMA’s approach is that it helped to 
institutionalise the business of brokerage, but at the same time facilitated neither the 
existence of separate brokerage businesses nor the development of market makers. 
 The 1990s was the beginning of a new era with the introduction of electronic 
share trading,683 and the government established an electronic trading system known 
as the Electronic Security Information System (ESIS). It was hoped that by 
introducing this system, the fragmented market would be centralised, share price 
spreads would be narrowed and market liquidity would also improve. The system was 
successful in achieving those objectives and remained in place until 2001, when a 
new electronic system called Tadawul, a word that means circulation in Arabic, 
replaced the ESIS system.684 Furthermore, in this new system, the ownership of shares 
was transferred immediately after the transaction had taken place, which was not 
possible with ESIS. While both ESIS and Tadawul revolutionised the way the trading 
of shares was conducted in Saudi Arabia, they neither were recognised formally as 
stock exchanges in terms of governance of members of the industry in the sense of 
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other modern markets such as the London Stock Exchange in the UK.685 The 
recognition of the existence of a legal stock exchange was confined later to Tadawul 
as a result of the introduction of the CML.  
 It could be suggested that the national capital market before the introduction 
of CML lack the depth needed in order to develop. The market was not meant to 
attract foreign investors since participation in capital secondary markets was available 
only to Saudi national citizens. The only option available to foreigners who wanted to 
invest in Saudi stock was a single closed-end mutual fund, the Saudi Arabia 
Investment Fund (SAIF), which was traded in London.686 However, in November 
1999, the government announced that foreigners, whether resident in Saudi Arabia or 
not, could invest in the Kingdom’s stock market through the purchase and sale of 
mutual funds that trade in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, before the introduction of the 
CML, the number of listed companies had increased to 71 companies with a market 
capitalisation of over US$ 187million.687 
 This historical account illustrates how policy decisions to monitor stock 
markets resulted in the restriction of brokerage business to banks. One unintended 
consequence of confining brokerage services to banks was to bring litigation 
concerning secondary markets to the CSBD.  
 The movement of jurisdiction towards the CSBD may have helped in avoiding 
another legal issue that could have arisen in the Shari’a court. In principle, as far as 
trading shares in secondary stock markets is concerned, no issue of illegitimacy with 
Shari’a should be of concerns given the Islamic principle of permissibility (ibaha), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
685 Federal Research Division, Saudi Arabia A Country Study (Kessinger Publishing 2004) 210; Wafik 
Grais and Zeynep Kantur, ‘The Changing Financial Landscape: Opportunities and Challenges for the 
Middle East and North Africa’ (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3050, 2003) 9 <	  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636412> accessed 29 June 2011	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687 Ibid 
 253	  
(which renders all commercial transactions Shari’a compliant in the absence of a clear 
prohibition), and it could be argued thus that trading in shares is acceptable, generally 
speaking.688 The problem, however, is that the school of thoughts of Sharia's 
principles adopted by judges in Saudi Arabia did not recognise separate legal 
personalities; it recognises the concept of a partnership but not a corporation.689 Given 
that Shari’a courts consider Shari’a in a similar way to the natural law in the Western 
legal philosophy,690 this could be expected to pose dilemmas for policymakers. It is 
for this reason, among others, that commercial transactions were taken away from the 
jurisdiction of general courts and included within the jurisdiction of the Board of 
Grievances.691 By not permitting Islamic courts to deal with brokerage contracts, a 
legal problem was avoided. Therefore, it could be argued that limiting brokerage 
services was beneficial also as a tool to exclude Islamic courts from reviewing these 
cases. 
 The discussion in the last two sections suggests that history and religion are 
two factors which may interact with other factors in producing a unique financial 
legal system that suits a country at any given time. However, society’s needs and 
circumstances change with time. Economic development and globalisation made it 
very difficult for the system as it was to be sustained, and thus there was a need for 
reform. Consequently, the government introduced bold reforms through the CML in 
2003. The CML allowed for not only the establishment of brokerage firms and 
advisory services but also prohibited banks from providing brokerage services. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 Since the view of the religious institution is the prohibition in trading and investing in companies 
that are not Shari’a compliance such as banks and insurance companies.   
689 H Patrick Glen, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (OUP 2007) 184 
690 This school of thoughts is called Hanbali; see Nimrod Hurvitz, ‘Schools of Law and Historical 
Context: Re-Examining the Formation of the Hanbali Madhhab’ (2000) 7 Islam L & Soc 37    
691 The Board of Grievances is equal to administrative courts under civil law systems which deal with 
litigation involving the government or governmental agencies. For an excellent reference to the the 
Board of Grievances in Saudi Arabia see Mohammed Al-Qahtani, ‘The Role and Jurisdiction of the 
Board of Grievances in Saudi Arabia’ (PhD thesis, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 2008); see also 
Vogel (n 630)   
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CMA provided also for a separate and distinct judicial committee to deal with claims 
and litigations brought under the CMA regulatory framework. More details of the 
CMA are provided in Part II of this chapter, but it is important to understand the 
reasons behind the introduction of the CML, which is the topic of the next section.  
E) The Capital Market Law 
In contrast to the UK, where the FSMA was introduced with a focus on the 
development of financial market regulation, the current regulatory framework in 
Saudi Arabia was introduced as one instrument among others to reorganise the wider 
economic and social structure. Thus, it could be suggested that it was more akin to the 
FS regime. Both social and economic conditions support such a claim. In the mid-
1990s these conditions led policymakers to rapidly adopt international financial 
standards in both trade and finance, resulting in starting the process of becoming a 
member of the WTO in 1995. Indeed, the case of Saudi Arabia in relation to securities 
regulation supports the claim that internal geopolitical pressures can be the forces for 
the development of the regulatory systems in securities markets.  
 Oil revenues have been the major contributor to the Saudi Arabian economy 
and budget,692 and in the 1990s the prices of oils sank dramatically to almost $10 per 
barrel. The government was the major employer in the country, with the private sector 
playing little part in employment. Due to substantial budget deficits, too little 
investment in social and economic infrastructure took place and unemployment, thus, 
was rising.693 The first reaction to the crisis was to increase the pace of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
692 Fouad Farsy, Saudi Arabia (Kegan Paul 1986); Tim Niblock and Monica Malik, The Political 
Economy of Saudi Arabia (Routledge 2007)  
693 Niblock and Malik, ibid, 174. This lead low mean level of per capita income for citizens. For a full 
discussion of the impact of oil revenues, people growth, and policy decisions in Saudi Arabia, see 
Anthony Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century (Greenwood 2003); Khaled Al-
Sultan, ‘Maintenance in Saudi Arabia: Needs and Recommendations for Improvement, (1996) 2 
Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering 5, 12  
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privatisation programme that the government had planned but had commenced only 
slowly.694 
  This decline in economic conditions occurred while considerable growth of 
the Saudi population was taking place. The UN report on World Population Prospects 
(2004) estimated that Saudi Arabia grew from a nation of only 3.5 million in 1950 to 
one with 24.6 million in 2005.695 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is a young nation and 
37.3% of its population below 14 years of age group, which compares to 20.8% for 
the US, and 17.9% for the UK. This is creating two main pressures: the consistent 
need to create enough jobs and constant increases in per capita earning. This situation 
is a proof of North’s claim, who argues that demographic changes results in 
institutional forces for changes to be responded to by policymakers by inter alia, 
regulation,696 which manifested in Saudi Arabia in high unemployment that created 
demands for economic growth and job creation.  
 In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is plausible to suggest that reforms were used as 
a means for economic policy to attract foreign investment, which was understood as 
needed to ease pressure on the government budget. However, it was deemed that 
attracting foreign investment would require a more explicit legal framework and 
liberal economic conditions to be developed of the kind offered to investors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
694 The central perception suggested by Niblock and Malik was that ‘new sources of investment 
funding were needed, leading to more substantial economic growth’ Niblock and Malik (n 690) 176 
695 A trend still taking place; the UN estimates that the population of Saudi Arabia will grow to 30.8 
million in 2015, 37.2 million in 2025, and 49.5 million in 2050 in Population Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, ‘World Population 
Prospects: The 2008 Revision’(UN, 2008) <http://esa.un.org/unpp> accessed 29 June 2011 
696 Douglass North, Understanding The Process Of Economic Change (CUP1990) 50-58; Casey 
Mulligan and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Population and Regulation’ (NBER Working Paper No. W10234, 2004) 
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=485722> accessed 29 June 2011 
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elsewhere.697 Therefore, membership of the WTO was seen as essential to boost the 
country’s image abroad and attract foreign investment.698 
 However, subsequent events changed conditions for the better and reduced the 
pressure on the government. Increase in oil prices started in 2000,699 helping to cover 
the deficit and turn the budget to surplus.700 Interestingly, the pace of reforms did not 
slow, but speeded up. This is evident in the fact that most of the main regulatory 
changes needed for economic reform, including the CML, were introduced between 
2001 and 2005,701 which led to the success of the application for WTO membership in 
2005.702 It is difficult to determine which led policymakers to continue pursuing 
change; some suggest that it was the slow speed of the political process, while others 
cite the increased influence of business elites.703  
 As far as the capital market is concerned, there have been four significant 
developments. Firstly, the government established the Saudi Arabian Stock Exchange 
to make it easier to float companies, provide better opportunities for Saudi citizens to 
invest their money domestically, and increase the capital available to companies for 
expansion and development.704 Secondly, the introduction of the CML recognised the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697 Craig Doidge, G. Karolyi and Rene Stulz, ‘Why Do Countries Matter So Much for Corporate 
Governance?’ (2007) 86 Journal of Financial Economics 1 
698 See a detailed discussion about factors that affect investments in the Middle East, including 
membership to TWO, in Ahmet Aysan, Mustapha Nabli and Marie-Ange Véganzonès, ‘Governance, 
Institutions, and Private Investments’ ch in Mustapha Nabli (edt.), Breaking the Barriers to Higher 
Economic Growth: Better Governance and Deeper Reforms in the Middle East and North Africa 
(World Bank 2007) 
699 The lowest point was $10 per barrel in 1996, and increased to $25 in 2001, and reaching $60 in 
2005.  
700 Saudi oil export revenues sank to only $34.3 billion in 1998, but they rose to $46.8 billion in 1999, 
$81.7 billion in 2000, $63.9 billion in 2001, $65.5 billion in 2002, $86.1 billion in 2003, and $106 
billion in 2004; Anthony Cordesman, ‘Saudi Arabia: Saudi Economic Health’ (Diplomatic Traffic, 17 
August 2005) <	  http://diplomatictraffic.com/debate_archives.asp?ID=458> accessed 29 June 2011  
701 ‘Altogether, Saudi Arabia enacted 42 laws and created nine new regulatory bodies to bring it into 
alignment with WTO rules’ Niblock and Malik (n 690) 203 
702 Ibid 
703 Ibid 
704<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3gDAxN3
D0NnN19nAzMPzxBDV0sDKND388jPTdUPTizSL8h2VAQAm2h6Ew!!/dl2/d1/L0lHSkovd0RNQU
ZrQUVnQSEhL1lCWncvZW4!/> accessed 29 June 2011 
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securities market as a separate industry from banks, giving it an independent 
regulator. Pre-CML, SAMA had conducted the consolidated supervision of stock 
markets, insurance, and banks, including having responsibility for the prudential and 
the conduct of business regulations and supervision.705 As a result of the CML, the 
CMA was established as the main regulator monitoring prudential rules, the conduct 
of business, and the supervision of transactions and institutions involved in the capital 
market.706 
Thirdly, the most notable of the very considerable benefits of the regulatory 
structure is the creation of a bond market. Historically, Saudi debt instruments did not 
exist until 1988 when the government decided to issue government bonds but 
restricted subscriptions and trading to institutional investors.707 The issuance of debt 
instruments by the private sector did not start, however, until 2003 when, for the first, 
a Saudi company issued bonds with the assistance of the World Bank.708 A year after 
this, a Saudi company listed in the Tadawul (the official and only organised stock 
exchange) issued the first Sukuk (a bond in accordance with Islamic principles) in the 
domestic market, and several similar issuances followed.709 In 2009 the Tadawul 
launched an automated Sukuk and bond trading system to facilitate exchange and the 
development of a secondary market in debt instruments.710 	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706 Oxford Business Group, The Report of Saudi Arabia 2008 (Oxford Business Group 2008) 61; and 
also see Oxford Business Group, The Report: Emerging Saudi Arabia 2007 (Oxford Business Group 
2007) 
707 Muhammad Al-Jasser and Ahmed Banafe, ‘The Development of Debt Markets in Emerging 
Economies: the Saudi Arabian Experience’ (BIS Papers, No 11, 2002) 178-180 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap11q.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
708 Through its private sector lending arm, the International Financial Corporation; see IFC, ‘IFC 
Guarantees First Corporate Bond Issue in Saudi Arabia’ (press release, 3 March 2003) 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/pressroom/ifcpressroom.nsf/PressRelease?openform&C70CC2A0D0E35A
C985256CDE0052116B> accessed 29 June 2011   
709 Rodney Wilson, ‘Overview of the Sukuk Market’ ch. in Nathif Adam and Abdulkader Thomas 
(eds), Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring and Investing in Sukuk (Euromoney 2004) 
710 Vijay Rabindranath and Parthapartim Gupta, ‘An Overview – Sukuk Market in Saudi Arabia’ 
(Watheeqa Capital Company, March 2010) <http://www.watheeqa.com/An_Overview_-
_Sukuk_Market_in_KSA.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011; also Rodney Wilson, ‘The development of 
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Finally, the current regime aims to widen the backgrounds of investors in 
securities markets. The CMA allowed foreign investors to purchase financial 
instruments traded in Tadawul through a swap agreement with authorized firms.711 It 
is expected that foreign investors will get involved in the Saudi securities markets, 
since it ranks as the twenty-third largest exchange in terms of market capitalisation 
among the members of the World Federation of Exchange.712 By introducing swap 
agreement, the CMA effectively introduced the concept of derivative as part of 
securities markets officially for the first time.713 
 These positive developments in security markets, however, have to be viewed 
in a broader context to understand legal problems that may hinder further 
development of securities markets in Saudi Arabia.  
 One negative issue that may constrain the financial system, as argued in the 
previous subsections, is the influence of the religious perception and concerns. Such 
negative impact might take place as soon as the Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia is 
to declare the incommutability of essential financial tools that are important for the 
maturity of the capital market.  
 For example, Saudi citizens held high expectations from the CML and CMA, 
but during a stock market crash of over 50% in 2006 this trust by investors was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Islamic finance in the GCC’ (Working Paper, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and 
Globalisation in the Gulf States, 2009) <http://w.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEKP/documents/Wilson.pdf> 
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711 Decision No. (2-28-2008), dated 17/8/1429H, corresponding to 18/8/2008, permits swap agreements 
between authorized persons and non-resident foreigners, be they financial institutions or individuals. A 
stock swap agreement is a derivative in which the underlying asset is a stock, a basket of stocks, or a 
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712 <http://www.world-exchanges.org/statistics> accessed 29 June 2011 
713 Simeon Kerr, ‘Gulf Regulators Revive Short-Selling and Derivatives’ Financial Times (London 10 
May 2010) 
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jeopardised.714 An objective examination of the situation at that time reveals that there 
was nothing the authority could do; the problem was with the market structure since 
there were no investment banks, market makers, independent brokerage firms, or 
assets management firms.715 Some of these may be hindered by Shari’a. To be more 
specific, the existence of a market maker requires certain types of financial contracts 
such as options, securities lending and forwards to be available in order to hedge a 
market maker’s exposure to a financial instrument’s volatility;716 otherwise, it could 
easily lead a market maker to bankruptcy by any collapse of stock’s prices. The CMA 
has declared that it is not keen to develop these contracts at the present time because, 
among other reasons, some of them are prohibited under Shari’a as applied in Saudi 
Arabia.717 If this view persists, certain financial contracts will not be seen soon unless 
Islamic finance specialists can develop forms of these contracts, or the regulator and 
participants in the market become more tolerant in dealing in them.718  However, a 
legal issue with the latter approach is that these contracts will lack legitimacy since 
they do not comply with Shari’a, and there is nothing in the Basic Law or provided by 
the King to provide any legitimacy. Simply put, there is an unenforceability risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 AME, ‘Saudi Stock Market Crash a Cause for Concern’ (AME, 20 May 2006) 
<http://www.ameinfo.com/86438.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
715 Khan Zahid, ‘Investment Challenges Facing Oil-rich Countries: Example of Saudi Arabia’ (OECD 
Conference, Istanbul, 2004) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/0/28500016.pdf > accessed 29 June 
2011. See also Robin Wigglesworth, ‘Capital Markets: Tighter Rules and Better Transparency 
Welcomed’ Financial Times (London, 22 September 2009) 
716 Broadly speaking, these contracts permit participants to exchanges securities on a temporary basis. 
For more information as to the development of market structure, see OECD, Bond Market 
Development in Asia (OECD 2001) 
717 Fatwas of Permanent Committee, the General Presidency of Scholarly Research and Ifta’ in Saudi 
Arabia, Group 52, at pp.367-374. Avilable on the internet at 
<http://www.alifta.net/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?lang=ar&view=result&fatwaNum=&FatwaNumID=
&ID=7281&searchScope=2&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLight=1&SearchTyp
e=exact&SearchMoesar=false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple=&SearchCriteria=allwords
&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=216179217136217130032216167217132216167217136
216177216167217130032216167217132217133216167217132217138216169#firstKeyWordFound> 
accessed 29 June.  
718 Besides that, it seems the need for foreign investment is less crucial as a result of the increase in 
revenues, but there is still need for structural changes; see Anthony Cordesman, ‘The Saudi Succession 
and Economic Stability’ (Saudi-US Relations Information Service, 2005)<http://www.saudi-us-
relations.org/articles/2005/ioi/050805-cordesman-succession.html> accessed 29 June 2011	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inherent in these contracts. Consequently, it could be argued that the primacy of 
Shari’a is again restraining the development of securities markets.   
 To sum up, this subsection points out that the CML was introduced in 
response to the policy choice of attracting foreign investment. Positive developments 
in the Saudi securities markets have been identified since the enactment of CML, such 
as the establishment of a stock exchange, the existence of an independent regulator 
for securities markets, permission for foreign investors to participate in secondary 
markets, and the creation of domestic debt markets. Such policy objective fits with the 
general argument that securities regulations aim to achieve the wider social policy of 
increasing the allocation of resources. It is argued, however, that the shadow of non-
compliance with Shari’a is a threat to the legitimacy of certain financial contracts that 
are essential for the development of capital markets. The uncertainty of legal rules has 
been argued may likely increase the legal risk and hence the efficiency allocation of 
resources. Accordingly, it is highlighted that unless Islamic finance scholars are able 
to provide substitutes for these contracts, the issue of illegality and incompatibility on 
the one hand, and the need for moderation may persist for the time being.   
F) Concluding Remarks    
Saudi Arabia’s whole population are Muslim and thus it is expected that Islamic 
principles and Shari’a will play a major role within the legal context. It has been 
illustrated above that the two main sources in Islam provide broad principles with 
respect to contract and transactions and, thus, Islamic jurisprudence has historically 
relied heavily on the deductive reasoning associated with the four main school of 
thoughts within the Sunni Muslim. 
 The Saudi legal system is different from other Muslim countries in that it 
clearly states that Shari’a is the major source of both law and legitimacy. It is pointed 
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out that Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia has been an obstacle to modernising both 
the legal system and economic activities. While Saudi policymakers have developed 
an approach to avoiding any conflict with Shari’a by introducing secular laws and 
restricting jurisdiction to special committees and tribunals, it is argued that this 
approach does not fit with current legal understandings of both the importance of the 
rule of law to Saudi Arabia as a member of the WTO and as a modern state.  
 Also, it is suggested that the policymakers’ approach is responsive rather the 
proactive. The ad hoc approach to problems, overcoming each difficulty faced as it is 
at the time, will not stop the main problem recurring. This was being illustrated in the 
case of the CML, whose introduction was a response to internal pressures represented 
by slow economic growth and high unemployment which made attracting foreign 
investment a necessity. To that end, a modern capital market was thought essential. 
However, it is argued that, notwithstanding positive improvement in the capital 
market, further development is again being hindered by Shari’a as applied in Saudi 
Arabia. Consequently, it is possible to argue that unless policymakers deal directly 
with the issue of conflict with Shari’a, it is likely that Shari’a as an obstacle will 
persist in future development of capital markets law Saudi Arabia.   
 This study has raised two important points as to the problem with the Shari’a 
in Saudi Arabia. Firstly, there are no general principles and theories in Shari’a 
concerning contract, and specifically for obligations. Moreover, it has been declared 
that codification per se is incompatible with Shari’a, and such position of Islamic 
scholars in Saudi Arabia regarding the codification of Shari’a renders any solution 
very unlikely in the near future.  
 Secondly, some modern economic activities are said to be incompatible with 
the Islamic school of thought in Saudi Arabia. This study differs from the general 
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stream of researches into financial markets in Saudi Arabia in showing the difficulties 
with modern practices such as corporations and legal entities instead of merely 
difficulties with usury, interest and banking activities. The difference is that, unlike 
with interest where there is clear prohibition in the Qur’an, there is no such direct 
prohibition on corporations, legal personalities or limited liability per se in Qur’an. It 
could therefore be proposed that it is the rigid application of historic thinking within 
Islamic jurisprudence to modern economic and social times that creates the difficulty 
in Saudi Arabia.    
 Having said that, the question arises as to the reason why other Muslim and 
Arab countries have more easily adopted modern practices within their legal system 
while it is such a struggle in Saudi Arabia. A possible explanation is that other Arabs 
and Muslim countries benefited in this respect from being colonised by the British 
and Ottoman Empires, and were thus able to, firstly, recognise Shari’a as subordinate 
to public interest and, secondly, accept the concept of the codification of Shari’a 
principles.719  
 The latter is more acute in the case of contemporary Saudi Arabia since it is 
still declared unacceptable to codify the Shari’a. Such a process has been denounced 
as both Western and un-Islamic. However, this perception of incompatibility of such a 
process of the administration of justice can hinder any benefits sought after 
modernisation for the legal system in Saudi Arabia in two respects. Firstly, the 
absence of a legal code or a process of case-precedence within the Saudi system 
leaves a huge gap due to the absence of any clarity with respect to contracts and 
obligations, which are essential aspects of any modern economy or for a state 
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claiming to abide by the rule of law.720 Secondly, emphasising that Shari’a is the main 
source of law and legitimacy in the country begs the question of the legitimacy of the 
King to legalise practices that are in direct conflict with Shari’a. Questions of 
legitimacy are not confined to usury, but also to other legal matters such as the legal 
status of limited liability for legal persons which are not recognised within traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence.721 
 These two problems could be attributed to a broader legal issue concerning the 
identity of Saudi Arabia as a geopolitical body, a problem also faced by many Islamic 
societies after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Critically, it is the question 
of the relative hierarchy of Shari’a in modern states as a geopolitical entity,722 which 
has significant effects on other aspects including legal such as the legitimacy of 
legislative authority in clearly subordinating it to the public interest. Traditional 
Islamic jurisprudence provides little guidance on this matter. Up until the beginning 
of the twentieth century, the system of the caliphate was the dominant structure of a 
political entity in Islamic jurisprudence.723 The existence of modern states in the 
Islamic world, however, is relatively a new phenomenon leading to a conflict between 
Shari’a and questions of nationhood and national interest.724 Admittedly, these are 
sensitive and difficult questions that must be dealt with carefully but avoiding them 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 A review of policy pronouncements by Saudi Arabia to the rule of law ca be found in Marar (n 66)  
721 Nicholas Foster, ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I: An Overview of the 
Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (2010) 11 
European Business Organization Law Review 3, 29 
722 Up until the beginning of the 20cnetury, the system of kalifat was the dominant structure of political 
entity in Islamic jurisprudence. The existence of modern states, however, in Islamic world has been a 
new phenomenon that raised a conflict between shari’a and national interest.   
723 Javaid Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism : A 
Critique of the 'Clash of Civilizations' in the New World Order (Hart 2005) 24-26  
724 ‘…the relationship between religious identities and orientations towards authority, community 
change (or transformation), law, justice, and conflict resolution helps shape the dynamics of a national 
civil society. Nationhood … often derives coherence and momentum from the interaction and 
transformation of component identity and values’ in John Paden, Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict 
Resolution (Brookings 2005) 55  
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will not solve the practical legal issues which arise; some of which have been 
identified in this part. 	  
Part II The Capital Market Law Regulatory Regime 
 
From a historical perspective, the CML is the most sophisticated and detailed 
legislation dealing with securities markets in Saudi Arabia. Its significance could be 
compared to that of the FS regime in the UK. It encompasses wide-ranging provisions 
including the establishment of a separate authority, definition of securities and the 
establishment of a separate judicial system to deal with breaches of its provisions. 
Given limited space here, the focus remains on those areas related to private 
enforcement by retail investors for the regulatory requirements of suitability and best 
execution.  
 In contrast to the UK where the legislator is transparent in its process of 
drafting, no consultation papers, policy documents or copies of previous drafts of the 
CML are available to help to determine either the reasons for or the changes 
underlying the approaches taken in the final version of the CML. It is therefore 
fortunate that one of the foreign experts who helped draft the CML, namely Joseph 
Beach, has published on the subject.725 His article provides insights into the rationale 
behind many provisions in the CML, including from which legal systems provisions 
were transplanted. For this reason, Beach’s article is central to any attempt to identify 
the purposes and policies behind the provisions in the CML.  
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A) The Primary Legislation: the CML  
Beach points out that the CML was drafted as an enabling law with two fundamental 
themes in mind: firstly, administrative independence, promoting separate authority 
and entities to play a specific role in regulations and functioning of securities markets; 
and secondly, professionalism, where those professionals chosen to oversee the 
securities markets are charged with developing rules and procedures and running the 
markets.726 Accordingly, it could be suggested that the CML draftsmen were of the 
opinion that they should promote a system of self-regulating organisations (or SROs) 
akin to the system established by the FS regulatory regime in the UK. 
 The CML established an independent authority, the CMA, which directly 
reports to the President of the Council of Ministers who is the King himself.727 The 
CML states that ‘the Authority shall be the agency responsible for issuing regulations, 
rules and instructions, and for applying the provisions of this Law’.728 To achieve 
these ends, the CML states that the CMA shall: (1) regulate and develop the 
exchange, develop and improve systems and entities trading in securities, and develop 
the procedures that would reduce the risks related to securities transactions; (2) 
regulate the issuance of securities and monitor dealing in securities; (3) regulate and 
monitor the works and activities of parties subject to the control and supervision of 
the CMA; (4) protect citizens and investors in securities from unfair and unsound 
practices or practices involving fraud, deceit, cheating or manipulation; (5) seek to 
achieve fairness, efficiency and transparency in securities transactions; (6) regulate 
and monitor information disclosure of issuers, the dealings of informed persons and 
major shareholders, and make available information ‘which the participants in the 
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727 CML Art.4 
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market should provide and disclose to shareholders and the public’; and (7) regulate 
proxy and purchase requests and public offers of shares.729   
 The first difficulty with the CML is in recognising the objectives of the 
regulatory framework. In comparison to the UK where the main objectives of the 
FSMA are clearly defined, the CML is not clear about the objectives which the 
regulatory regime should aim to achieve.730 A similar approach to that of the FSMA is 
adopted by providing a set of aims as objectives for the authority,731 but the wording 
of the provision indicates the low levels of the sophistication, clarity and 
specification. Beach notes various problems generated by the process of drafting, 
which was initially proposed in English, then translated into Arabic and circulated to 
different government agencies for feedback. The feedback in turn was translated back 
into English. 732  
 Several different issues can be identified with the outcome of the process in 
the CML. Firstly, there is no clarity of the objective itself. The wording of the CML 
provides that the objective of the CMA is to exercise its powers and to implement the 
CML. The functions stipulated in the CML are not objectives of the regulatory 
framework but a mix of elements to be considered (fairness and efficiency, for 
example) by the CMA. Put simply, the objective of the CMA is to implement the 
CML and in exercising its powers it has to consider different factors including, inter 
alia, fairness and efficiency.  
 Secondly, confusion between the objectives, the regulator’s tasks and the 
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729 An official full translation of the CML to English is available at the following link: <http://www.cma.org.sa/cma_cms/upload_sec_content/dwfile20/Capital%20Market%20Law.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
730 The way of stating the objectives of the authorities is in contrast to the SEC, see the at 
<http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml#laws> accessed 29 June 2011	       
731 CML Art.5 
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the work of the CMA to be evaluated. Article5 (b) states that ‘the regulations, rules 
and instructions issued by the Authority shall be effective in the manner prescribed 
under their provisions’. It is unclear whether this means that the effectiveness of each 
provision should be considered on its own merit in isolation from criteria such as 
fairness and efficiency imposed on the CMA, or if those regulations and rules should 
be balanced against efficiency and fairness. For instance, should the provision related 
to suitability be considered on their fairness and efficiency or by taking the efficiency 
of the framework into account? 
 Thirdly, as far as investor protection is concerned, the CML is silent as to 
elements to be used in judging the fairness and soundness of a given practice; for 
example, whether or not fairness should be considered from the provider’s or 
investor’s point of view. Furthermore, there is no guidance upon which the CML 
should side with in the event there are reasonable grounds on both sides.  
 Fourthly, it is interesting to note that there is no mention in the objectives of 
the authority of the reputation of the Saudi economy or the promotion of the securities 
market abroad. Yet, as explained above, the aim for the reform was to attract foreign 
investors. Nor does it emphasise maintaining the confidence of investors as it is the 
rationale for the protection of investors.   
 Finally, the role of the exchange is unclear within the CML framework.733 
Beach suggests that the role of the Exchange was intended to be similar to that of a 
SRO in bringing participants opinions and expertise in dealing with the CMA and to 
organise the participants themselves.734 Given the draftsmen are American, it is likely 
that they relied on the U.S. experience with the NYSE and its rulebook in not only 
detailing the duties of brokers, but also in developing those duties to respond to future 	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challenges that would be dealt with better by participants.735 However, the Saudi 
experience since the enactment of the CML in 2003 suggests a different path has been 
taken from those of the U.S. The exchange-rules if they exist are not made accessible 
by the public and therefore investors are not able to determine the required standards 
of professional behaviour.736 Moreover, in contrast to the US experience where the 
regulatory requirements of suitability and best execution are imposed through the 
exchange-rules, they are imposed on brokers by the Implementing Regulations 
published by the CMA. Thus, since it could be argued that the way the regulatory 
duties are imposed within the CML framework is different from the US experience, it 
follows that the CML regulatory framework may be unable to develop effective 
professionalism through SROs in a similar way to the US. It is likely that the Saudi 
experience of the role of the exchange as an SRO is more about bringing the 
perspective of participants, rather than a means to regulate participants among 
themselves.737   
 Acknowledging some of these criticisms, Beach attempts to excuse himself by 
a heavy reliance on problems of translation during the process of drafting, and the 
need to ‘give the Authority … the flexibility to develop and adapt as the Saudi capital 
market evolves’.738 For this reason, the CMA, argues Beach, was given various 
powers including the issuance of regulation, oversights of the exchanges, supervision 
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736 In its websites, under the heading of the rules and regulations of the Exchange (Tadawul), there is 
only an introduction, a snapshot of CML chapters and requirements for non-Saudi to open an account 
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and monitor listing of securities.739 However, the main problem is the absence of 
institutionalised checks on the powers provided to the CMA, or indeed any grounds to 
criticise the practice of the authority. Except for its power to suspend trading, which 
must refer to the ministry for suspension of more than one day, no checks or 
limitation are imposed upon the CMA, except with regards to fairness and efficiency. 
Given that it is not binding to consult or to exercise any analysis, it could be argued 
that there is a possibility that these extensive powers may result in negative results for 
securities markets, such as regulatory capture of the CMA.740 Moreover, ambiguity 
and lack of legislative guidance make it very difficult to assess and evaluate the 
CMA’s efforts including its rule-making powers; a difficulty faces this study.  
B) The Authority: The CMA  
The CMA enjoys many powers conferred to it by the CML and is restricted only by 
its jurisdiction, which is founded on the traded instrument, namely a ‘security’.  
 Article two specifies that, for the purpose of the CML, the term ‘security’ 
includes ‘convertible and tradable shares of companies’,741 ‘tradable debt instruments 
issued by companies, the government, public institutions or public organisations’,742 
‘investment units issued by investment funds’,743 ‘any instruments representing profit 
participation rights, any rights in the distribution of assets; or either of the 
foregoing’,744 and ‘any other rights or instruments which the Board determines should 
be included or treated as Securities’ in order to ‘further the safety of the market or the 
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740 Beach indirectly recognises the problem but argues that the CML is an ‘enabling law, relying of the 
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741 CML Art.2(a) 
742 CML Art.2(b) 
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protection of investors’.745 Article three specifically excludes ‘commercial bills such 
as cheques, bills of exchange, order notes, documentary credits, money transfers, 
instruments exclusively traded among banks, and insurance policies’ from the scope 
of Article two.746 Moreover, the CMA has the right to exclude from the definition of 
security any instrument which is already deemed as a security since the CML states 
that the CMA may ‘exempt from the definition of Securities rights or instruments that 
otherwise would be treated as Securities’ under previous paragraphs if it is believed 
that ‘it is not necessary to treat them as Securities, based on the requirements of the 
safety of the market and the protection of investors’.747  
 While admitting that the approach of the CML invests extensive powers into 
the CMA under its own jurisdiction, Beach insists that adopting such approach was 
necessary for certainty and practicality within the Saudi context on three grounds.748 
Firstly, it is doubtful that a litigation-driven definition of security, as in the US, will 
work within the Saudi judicial system since there is no prohibition on ex post facto 
regulations or actions by a government entity within the concept of law in Saudi 
Arabia.749 Secondly, both detailed lists and a single definition were rejected because it 
would be too vague and may result in a litigation-driven approach.750 Thirdly, Saudi 
administrative law is already accustomed to investing too much power in a single 
authority. Simply put, the draftsmen invested so many powers in the CMA, including 
amending its own jurisdiction, because litigation development is not workable and, 
hence, wanted to avoid litigation and any means that facilitate litigation by conferring 
so much powers to the authority, which was acceptable in Saudi Arabia.   
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749 Ibid 
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 However, Beach’s account of the investiture of so many powers in the CMA, 
including its own jurisdiction, could be criticised on many grounds. Firstly, it is 
evident that markets and participants may outpace regulators. Secondly, in current 
financial markets difficulties may arise as to complex financial products that are very 
difficult to categorise as securities given they cut across many financial industries, 
which is explained further below. Thirdly, and most importantly, a key element of the 
rule of law is that the law be known and that it be impartially applied. Article 38 of 
the Basic law states that ‘There shall be no punishment except for acts committed 
subsequent to the coming into force of the organizational law’. Accordingly, if CMA 
decisions would involve penalties or financial burden concerning contracts concluded 
before that specific kind of contract was brought within the jurisdiction of CML by 
the CMA, an argument could be made that this may be against the rule of law and the 
primacy of the Basic Law in Saudi Arabia.751 Finally, reliance on previous actions by 
the government should not have guided the draftsmen of the CML. In fact, it could be 
argued that previous actions by the government should not be used as a rationale for 
investing much power here, since Saudi Arabia was about to become a member of the 
WTO and thus needed to observe the rule of law, which had been absence hitherto.752  
 Consequently, it could be argued that this approach, which invested too much 
power in the authority, should have been avoided and a litigation-led definition 
adopted instead. Such an approach could have fitted easily within the CML 
framework, since the same line of reasoning used to reject a litigation-driven 
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definition are also the same reasons used to establish a specific tribunal to settle 
disputes under the CML framework.  
C)  The Dispute Settlement 
It was noted in the previous section that dispute settlement for brokerage business was 
taken out of the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts and ascribed to the CSBD. The 
difficulty here, however was that the need for the modernisation of securities markets 
in Saudi Arabia required the introduction of certain criminal charges associated with 
certain fraud activities. Hence, the option of returning securities’ jurisdiction to 
Shari’a’s courts was rejected on grounds that they were unsuitable for enforcing a 
system of malum prohibition regulations criminalizing behaviour which may on the 
face of it not be inherently wrong.753 Thus, there was an understanding that there was 
a need for a special dispute settlement mechanism separate from Shari’a courts. 
 An option considered at the time was the creation of a centralised investor 
compensation system where investors would receive redress from the government 
who would then take actions against the offender.754 However, such a system was 
rejected on the grounds that it would reduce the incentive for private enforcement.755 
To maintain incentive for private enforcement, it was deemed a private cause of 
action for a breach a suitable instrument.756 Given that a private cause of action was 
introduced in the CML, it is reasonable to maintain that private enforcement by 
investors is considered part of the CML framework.  
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 The CML created an independent committee to supplant Shari’a courts in the 
process of resolving securities disputes resolution, the Committee for the Resolution 
of Securities Disputes (henceforth CRSD).757 The CML states that the CRSD: 
‘shall have jurisdiction over the disputes falling under the provisions 
of this Law, its Implementing Regulations, and the regulations, rules 
and instructions issued by the Authority and the Exchange, with 
respect to public and private actions’.758 
Hence, the CRSD jurisdiction is wide enough to include claims against decisions and 
actions taken by the CMA or the exchange, private cause of actions and enforcement, 
and criminal actions.759 The CML also provides for appeal against a decision by the 
CRSD to a special Appeal Panel, within thirty days.760 
 While the CML confers on the CRSD the jurisdiction over private and public 
actions, it separates private and public enforcement as far as procedure is concerned. 
Firstly, it differentiates between awards issued in favour of the authority and those for 
private persons. The latter would be enforced through normal civil proceedings 
similar to judicial judgement, while the former would be dealt with by the 
government agency responsible for the enforcement of judicial judgments.761 
Secondly, there is no active role for the CMA in private enforcement. The only role is 
that the CML states that no complaints shall be brought before the CRSD until they 
have been lodged with the CMA for ninety days, which could be shortened or waived 
by the CMA.762 This contrasts with the UK, where the FSMA provides for an active 
role for the authority in private enforcement through different provisions such as 
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ss.382 and 384 which gives right to the authority to seek compensation on behalf of 
authorised or unauthorised persons.763 
 To sum up, the CML established a special tribunal to deal with disputes 
resulting from a breach of a provision in the CML regulatory framework. This 
tribunal has a jurisdiction over criminal offences provided in the CML, actions taken 
by the CMA and private action by investors. It is noted that private enforcement is 
part of the regulatory framework established by the CMA and therefore it could be 
argued that there is a role for private enforcement of the regulatory requirement of 
suitability and best execution. A detailed analysis of the private enforcement within 
the CML framework is provided in the next section. 
D)  Private Enforcement 
Given that private enforcement is part of the CML framework, it could be suggested 
therefore that private enforcement within the CML is considered an instrument in 
achieving policy objectives. However, it should be emphasised that the instrument 
employed is different from the one used in the FSMA framework. The private 
enforcement regime of the CML was built similar to the one used in the U.S, 
presumably for two reasons: the first being the reliance on help from American 
experts to draft the CML; and secondly, the institutional design of financial markets 
dividing them into three separate industries: banking, securities and insurance. 
However, the discussion below suggests that notwithstanding the existence of a 
regulatory private cause of action similar to the US, the CML regulatory regime may 
rely on traditional tort action in the private enforcement of the regulatory 
requirements of suitability and best execution. In addition, the complexity of the 
American approach requires an established judiciary system with high trust, but in the 	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Saudi case trust is lacking for the judiciary and courts as well as the absence of 
published judgement which can spell out the interpretation and the role of courts. 
 To begin with, the CML provides two different routes for disputes leading to 
CRSD depending on the nature of the complaint. The first is where an investor is 
willing to bring an action against a licensed broker. A complaint should start at the 
formal exchange (Tadawul), which enjoys the jurisdiction of ‘settling disputes among 
members of the Exchange and between the members and their clients’.764 The CMA 
has published a non-exhaustive list of disputes within Tadawul’s jurisdictions, 
including problems in executing an order placed by a customer, refusal to provide 
brokerage services to a customer, or mismanaging a customer’s account on technical 
grounds.765  
 The second route is through the CMA itself. That includes complaints against 
licensed brokers as well as unlicensed and any other cause of action provided by the 
CML. The CMA has published a non-exhaustive list for complaints falling within its 
jurisdiction, which include cancelling or suspension of a service without referring to 
the client, broker’s failure to manage the portfolio due to defective and inefficient 
procedures rather than technical failure, violations of the CML’s provisions, breach of 
Implementing Regulations governing brokers’ activities, levying of fees or 
commissions exceeding the established ones, or objection to low levels of service 
provided by the authorized persons.766 The CMA permits investors to make 
complaints electronically through the CMA’s website.767 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
764 CML Art.23(a) 
765 CMA, “How To Make A Complaint’ (CMA publication No.11) 4-5 
<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/static/pages/en/InvestorGuide/PDF/IG_11.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 	  
766 The list is accessible through the Internet at the following link: <http://www.cma.org.sa/en/FormsSite/Pages/HowtoFileaComplaint.aspx> accessed 29 June 2011 
767 Ibid 
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 Inevitably, there are some overlaps between the jurisdictions of Tadawul and 
the CMA with regards to investor complaint. The CMA indicates that it would reject 
any complaint submitted which is within the jurisdiction of Tadawul, and requires 
investors to submit initially a request to Tadawul in case of any doubt as to the 
appropriate authority to consider a dispute.768 On proper examination, both the CMA 
and Tadawul routes are merely informal means to settle disputes since an investor 
lodging a complaint with Tadawul or the Authority still enjoys the right to bring an 
action before the CRSD if the complaint is not solved within a period of time by 
agreement between the investor and the service provider. The difference between the 
two routes is that the CML states that the CMA is not permitted more than ninety 
days to consider a complaint, otherwise an investor can bring an action directly to the 
CSDR.769 In contrast, the CML is silent as to the limit of time that Tadawul is 
permitted in considering a complaint. However, since the CMA is a higher authority, 
it could be reasonable to argue that what binds it should also be binding on the 
exchange, and thus there should be limited period of ninety days.  
 There are two further areas where the CML is silent as to investors’ 
complaints. First, in the event that Tadawul decides that a complaint falls outside of 
its jurisdiction, whether the ninety days limitation is fully available to the CMA or 
should be reduced by the time taken by the Exchange in considering the complaint. 
Secondly, in the event that Tadawul refuses to refer a case within its jurisdiction to 
CRSD, it is unclear whether an investor is permitted to bring the action directly to 
CRSD or has to lodge the complaint again with the CMA. The CML, CMA and 
Tadawul are all silent on these issues.  
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 The importance of the previous paragraphs to this study arises from the fact 
that both of the disputes settlement routes are applicable in case an investor is willing 
to sue for a breach of the regulatory requirement of “best execution”. 
 The CML also provides for statutory private causes of action. It provides for 
four private causes of action for damages. Firstly, it provides for a cause of action to 
recover damages resulting for a material misrepresentation in a prospectus.770 
Secondly, a private cause of action is available in the event that an individual makes 
(or is responsible for another making) an untrue written or oral statement of material 
fact, or a material omission, in connection with another’s purchase or sale of a 
security.771 Thirdly, a private cause of action for a person who, by any intentional 
acts, manipulates the price of a security;772 and, finally, a private cause of action is 
provided against unlicensed brokers.773 Among these, this study examines the second 
and the final private causes of actions, which are relevant to the questions posed in 
this research.  
 As with the general prohibition in s.19 of the FSMA, the CML provides that 
any agreement reached with unlicensed brokers is unenforceable, but the unlicensed 
broker has the right to recover any money or property transferred under the 
contract.774 The other party, however, may recover any money or property provided 
that it also returns any money or property received. To avoid any conflict with Shari’a 
courts, the CML states that the CRSD has the sole jurisdiction over these matters.775 
However, as far as remedy is concerned, in contrast to the FSMA where the right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
770 CML Art.55(a) 
771 CML Art.56 
772 CML Art.57 
773 CML aAt.60(b) 
774 Ibid 
775 Ibid 
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compensation is an alternative remedy available to a consumer, there is no such 
alternative right in the CML. 
 Consequently, the general prohibition with regards to unlicensed brokers is 
detailed out in art.32 which defines a broker as a person acting as a broker, not one 
who seeks the status of a broker. The basic test for deciding whether a company or an 
individual is a broker is whether or not they are undertaking one of a list of activities 
which includes acting in a commercial capacity as an intermediary in a securities 
trade,776 offering securities accounts to others,777 acting as a portfolio manager,778 
acting as a market maker,779 acquiring or placing securities for an issuer,780 or acting 
as an intermediary, in a commercial capacity, in interest, currency or share swaps.781 
The CML provides the CMA with powers to exempt from licensing any dealer-like 
group which needs to be regulated.782 
 Some comments need to be made about the way brokers are recognised 
according to the CML. Firstly, emphasis is placed on the action and the commercial 
capacity of a person, which effectively would rule out from the scope of the CML 
those cases of fraudulent actions by a person representing himself as being engaged in 
buying and selling securities but without so acting.783 Secondly, it is argued that the 
CML is broad enough to cover the commercial behaviour of financial service 
providers other than brokers, such as financial planners.784 However, as far as private 
enforcement is concerned, it is very difficult to accept such a claim, given that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
776 CML Art.32(a)1 
777 CML Art.32(a)2 
778 CML Art.32(a)1 and Art.32(b) 
779 CML Art.32(a)3 
780 CML Art.32(a)4 
781 CML Art.32.(a)5 
782 CML Art.32(c) 
783 Beach notes that the original drafts of CML borrowed from the UK a part that covered individuals 
who hold themselves out as engaged in buying and selling securities. However, the final draft deleted 
this provision. Beach does not provide any justification or rationale for this, Beach (n 68) 334 footnote 
134	  
784 Beach, ibid, 335 
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advising on a security is not an act that requires obtaining a licence. There might be a 
cause of action for a fraudulent financial advice, but there is no duty upon financial 
advisers to apply for a licence. It follows that while suitability is imposed by the CML 
regulatory framework upon financial advice provided by a broker, this approach may 
exclude financial advice on a security that is not provided by a broker.  
 Consequent to this approach with regards to the definition of brokers, it could 
be argued that the system established by the CML is narrow in comparison with the 
UK. It is narrower since it focuses on the activities performed by brokers but omits 
the same activities or services normally associated with brokers but not provided by 
them, such as financial advice.  
 The other important cause of action is for recovery of damages against an 
individual who makes, or is responsible for another person making, written or oral 
statements of material facts which is untrue, or a material omission, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security.785 The CMA permits an investor to seek 
damages and provides details as to the remedy and the requirements for an investor, 
or a customer, to vindicate his or her right.  
 For a successful cause of action according to the CML, the plaintiff must 
prove that he or she had no knowledge that the misrepresentation was untrue (or 
omitted), that they would not have bought or sold (or bought or sold at the transaction 
price) if they had known, and that the person who made the misrepresentation (or was 
responsible for it) knew that it was untrue or was aware of a substantial likelihood that 
the representation was false.786 The requisite state of mind is actual knowledge or 
reckless disregard of the truth, and materiality is proven by showing that the statement 
or omission affected the price at which the investor would have purchased the 	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security.787 Civil damages for this cause of action would amount to the difference 
between the price actually paid for the security and either the value at the time of the 
suit, or any price of the securities prior to filing the suit with the CMA.788 The CMA 
provides the defendant in such an action with a right for a claim to reduce the 
measures of damages by showing that all or any portion of the decline in value of the 
security was not caused by the malfeasance in question.789 All defendants are jointly 
and severally liable.790 The CMA also states that any complaint must be instituted 
within one year after the complainant reasonably should have known of the facts 
which gave rise to the complaint.791 In any event, suits based on this private cause of 
action are barred five years after the occurrence of the violation.792 
 This cause of action, also known as the anti-fraud provision, is articulated in 
art.56 of the CML and it is reasonable to expect it would form the cornerstone of any 
action brought by an investor for a breach of the regulatory requirement of suitability. 
It is reasonable given that this provision is based on U.S. securities law and that the 
suitability requirement has been enforced by federal courts in the US on reliance on 
the anti-fraud provision in US securities law.793 Moreover, the provisions of the CMA 
discussed above are similar to those principles in common law in requiring the 
materiality of the statement and reliance by the plaintiff on it for a cause of action to 
be successful. To the credit of the CML, the provisions are clearly stated and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787 CMA Art.56(c) states that ‘for the purpose of this Article, a statement or omission shall be 
considered related to an important material fact in accordance with the standard provided for in 
paragraph (a) of Article 55 of this Law’. Art.55 (a) states that ‘a statement or omission shall be 
considered material for the purposes of this paragraph if it is proven to the Committee that had the 
investor been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have affected the purchase 
price’. 
788 CML Art. 56(b) refers Art.55(e) for the measure of damages.   
789 CMA Art.55(e) 
790 CML Art.56 
791 CMA Art.58 
792 Ibid 
793 The Securities Act of 1933 §11 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1998) 
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identified which is advantageous in overcoming any ambiguity with Shari’a principles 
as applied in Saudi Arabia to anti- fraud behaviour.  
 However, there are some important reservations that need to be considered. 
Firstly, the defence available to the defendant in this cause of action concerning the 
right to seek reduction in the amount of damages is broad; it is not confined to 
negligence constituted by the plaintiff, but also for any reduction in the price of the 
security in the market. Such defence could be questionable in the event that the 
defendant intentionally aimed to defraud the investor. Secondly, art.56(a) states that 
‘it is not required that a relationship exists between the claimant and the defendant’. 
Such a statement could be suggested to attempt to include relationships that are not 
contractual. But it is unclear as to what the position of the CMA framework is 
concerning the legal requirement of proximity in the relationship between the 
plaintiff’s damages and the defendant’s act. Thirdly, the CML requires the statement 
or omission to have affected the price at which the investor would have purchased the 
security. But what if a broker provides an unsuitable advice as to the strategy adopted 
rather than the security chosen. In such a case, it is unlikely that an investor would be 
entitled to compensation. Finally, it is unclear whether or not the time-limitation 
imposed by the CML would extend to non-statutory causes of actions, such as tort or 
general principles of fraud.  
 Moreover, by adopting the American approach, the CMA brought into the 
Saudi legal context an unresolved area of securities law from the US into Saudi 
Arabia in relation to the private enforcement of a breach of regulatory requirements. 
Particularly, an investor entitlement to seek compensation against a service provider 
in case of tort, given that there is no provision to the contrary in the CML.  
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 As far as a tort action for unsuitable financial advice is concerned, there are 
some important uncertainty issues. In principle, it is very uncertain as to how a 
financial adviser is to be held liable under Shari’a. Such uncertainty could be 
attributed to the difficulty of ascertaining the position of previous Shari’a scholars 
who have dealt with nominal contracts referring to modern professional services. To 
illustrate this with reference to the liability of doctors, Al-Mushaigih, evaluates 
various positions and concludes that three main factors would determine whether or 
not a doctor is liable: the knowledge of the doctor, the knowledge of the patient of the 
inexperience of the doctor, and a fault by the doctor.794 In particular, Al-Mushaigih 
argues that a knowledgeable doctor who makes a mistake is not liable so long as he or 
she has shown reasonable care.795 Al-Mushaigih furthermore argues that there are two 
positions for Shari’a in this case. Firstly, in the event that the doctor neglects to take 
into account important information relevant to the patient as agreed by other doctors, 
the doctor is liable.796 Secondly, where a mistake happens even though enough 
information had been gathered, there are two views under Shari’a some of which hold 
him liable and others not.797 Thus, by analogy to doctors liability, it could be 
suggested that different opinions exist on the position of Shari’a as applied in Saudi 
Arabia to the liability of financial adviser depending on various factors which make it 
difficult to be applied to a specific case. 
 Once an attempt is made to apply these views of Shari’a to professional 
financial services, different difficulties could be expected. The completely different 
views of Shari’a on the matter of liability make it difficult to determine which view a 	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judge would rely on to form his judgement. Furthermore, with reference to the vital 
information which needs to be considered if a doctor is liable, Shari’a scholars, 
according to Al-Mushaigih, do not refer to general practice and other medical 
opinions; rather, they have developed twenty-one factors which a doctor should take 
into account in treating his or her patient.798 Al-Mushaigih also does not discuss the 
position of Shari’a with respect to principles and guidance published by general 
medical associations to the liability of a doctor. Consequently, it could be suggested 
that there would be a very high level of uncertainty if Shari’a principles as applied in 
Saudi Arabia were applied to modern practices of financial advice.          
 This prediction of a high level of uncertainty is supported by the approach that 
CSBD has developed in relation to liability in tort. The CSBD’s approach is akin to 
the liability in tort under civil law, which is different in reasoning and style from the 
Shari’a approach mentioned in the previous paragraph. According to CSBD, it is 
recognised that the liability of a defendant for damages, whether upon contract or tort, 
requires a plaintiff to establish that there was a breach by the defendant, that the 
plaintiff suffered damage, and that a relationship exists between the breach and the 
damages.799 The published principles by CSBD unambiguously affirms the position 
that in principle, compensation aims to return the injured party to the position 
occupied before the breach.800 The amount of compensation then will be determined 
on the basis of the value of the damage, the breach itself, the behaviour of the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff’s contribution to the damage.801 It is also affirmed that no 
compensation would be granted for mere breach of an obligation without actual 
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799 Principles 725 in decisions 27/1425 and 59/1425 (2005) in SAMA, Banking Disputes: Litigation 
Procedures Before The Committee of Banking Disputes and The General Principles that Have 
Approved (SAMA 2006) 
800 Principle 732 in decision no. 103/1425 (2005) 
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damage, unless there is a compensation clause.802 Accordingly, it could be suggested 
that this approach to tort in disputes over financial transactions is clearer than those 
provided by Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia. It is thus reasonable to expect CRSD 
to follow the general principle laid down by CSBD given the uncertain application of 
Shari’a and absence of any guidance as to tort in the CML.   
 Consequently, it could be argued that, for a successful action for a breach of 
the regulatory requirement of suitability in tort, a claimant must establish that there is 
a breach by the adviser, that the claimant had suffered a loss, and that there is a 
relationship between the loss and the breach. Similar requirements are imposed in 
cases of a broker in a breach of best execution.  
 However, both tort and a private cause of action according to art.56 of CML 
may lead to difficulties in practice with private enforcement of the suitability 
requirement in particular. It was illustrated in the previous chapter that, through civil 
litigation American courts developed the concept of a private cause of action for 
suitability through the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and Exchanges Act 
1934.803 As far as the suitability obligation is concerned, a difficulty was the 
theoretical justification for imposing the regulatory requirements of suitability on an 
investor-broker relationship. American jurisprudence developed four theories in 
justifying this approach by the American courts.    
 The first of these is the common law of agency. Under common law, 
stockbrokers are agents for customers for whom they execute trade. Agents have long 
been held to owe a specific duty to provide material information about the matters 
entrusted to them. The suitability obligation requires a broker to make a disclosure to 
the customer that may deter the customer’s purchase of a security and to decline to 	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803 Gedicks (n 341) 
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sell certain securities altogether on the basis of reasonable grounds. Thus, since a 
broker is an agent, the agent owes fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the customer, 
including the duty to advise a customer whenever a recommended transaction is not 
suitable. The problem with this approach is that fiduciary law is based on the 
particular situation of the context of a specific relationship which makes it very 
difficult to construct general principles for the application of suitability.804 
 Secondly, suitability is imposed through the theory of special circumstances. 
This provides that a broker owes a fiduciary duty to a customer whenever they create 
a relationship of trust and confidence in their dealing with that customer. This 
relationship is recognised when a broker solicits a customer to purchase a security, or 
acts as a salesman. The practical importance of this theory in the US context is that it 
extends the application of suitability to a relationship where agency is not recognised, 
such as dealers.805 The disadvantage of the theory is that it recognises the fiduciary 
duty only when the circumstances of the relationship seem to demand it. While in the 
former theory suitability associated with agency is a matter of law, under this theory 
suitability is a question of fact, which concerns whether or not the circumstances of 
the case amount to the establishment of a “ trust and confidence” relationship. 
 Thirdly, the duty of suitability is imposed on the basis of the shingle theory of 
a broker-dealer, which holds that merely by identifying themselves as brokers and 
dealers in securities – by ‘hanging out a shingle’ - a broker or a dealer impliedly 
represent that they will deal fairly with the public and be bound by standards imposed 
on other professionals.806 The 1934 Act provides that no broker or dealer may effect 
or solicit securities transactions unless he or she is a member of a registered securities 
association or registered ‘national securities exchange’. Within this understanding, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
804 Ibid, 553  
805 Ibid, 555 
806 Louis Loss, ‘The SEC and the Broker-Dealer’ (1948) 1 VAND. L. REV. 516, 518 
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suitability is recognised to be imposed by different SROs on their members, although 
these SROs differ in the process, history and origin as to how the suitability rule is 
incorporated.807 This statutory obligation is reinforced by an American common law 
doctrine of ‘holding out’, which provides that one who represents himself or herself 
as possessing expert knowledge and skill is held to the higher standards of care 
consistent with the representation. This doctrine applies to any person who provides 
services to others in the practice of a profession or skilled trade. Thus, by holding 
themselves out as experts in securities and securities markets, brokers are held to 
fiduciary standards of care in accordance with the standards in the industry with 
respect to the recommendations they make to their customers. As the recommendation 
of an expert, it carries with it an implied representation that the security meets the 
customer’s ‘particular needs and investment objectives’. The benefit of this theory is 
that it holds a broker to suitability as soon as a broker goes into business, regardless of 
whether or not those dealing are in an agency relationship as broker or a principal 
relationship as a dealer. While the advantages of the shingle theory appear to avoid 
the uncertainty of case-by-case analysis inherent in the former two theories, it can be 
argued to have shifted the uncertainty and case-by-case analysis weakness from the 
legal point of whether or not to impose the regulatory duties, to determining the 
content of those duties.808 
 Finally, a claim for a fraud could be raised, but even here every element of 
fraud must be proven, including reasonable reliance. The unsuitability claim is based 
on the assertion that the broker made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted 
to state a material fact necessary so that the information would not be misleading.809 	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809 Roger Reinsch, J. Reich and Nauzer Balsara, ‘Trust Your Broker: Suitability, Modern Portfolio 
Theory, and Expert Witnesses’ (2004) 17 St. Thomas L. Rev. 173, 179 
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The limitation of this approach is obvious; it restricts the duty of suitability to 
fraudulent financial advice and thus restricts the scope of private action.  
 In retrospect, the Saudi framework would not be able to apply the different 
theories developed in the U.S. because of the way the CML has been introduced. 
Firstly, it is unlikely that Saudi financial law would develop a reasoning in line of the 
shingle theory, since there is no prohibition in the CMA on financial advice by 
unauthorised persons, nor is there a requirement of registration for advising on 
securities. Secondly, the private cause of action introduced in the CML is similar to 
the American approach, which relates unsuitable advice to fraud. This approach 
would be difficult to provide effective private enforcement for suitability within the 
Saudi context since it not only involves a higher level of proof of different elements 
such as the knowledge of the provider and reliance, but also fails to take into account 
cases of negligent unsuitability. 
 Consequently, it could be argued that the easiest theory to develop within the 
Saudi context is likely to be agency theory. Previous decisions by the CBDR affirm 
its recognition of the existence of an agency relationship between banks acting as 
brokers and their customers.810 It is also recognised that a bank, acting as an agent, 
must behave with good faith and as expected from any professional in their 
industry.811 In one case, CBDR held that for not following the instruction given by the 
client in selling shares that bank failed to act as expected from an agent in that context 
and, hence, obliged the bank to return the shares disputed, their multiplies and 
profits.812 
 In short, this section points out to the importance of private enforcement 
within the CML regulatory framework. It reviews the instrument used to provide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
810 For example Principle 791 decision 42/1424 (2004) 
811 Principle 796, decision no.251/1425 (2005) 
812 Principle 320 decision 77/1423 (2003) 
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private enforcement and suggests ineffectiveness of statutory causes of action for the 
regulatory requirement of suitability, save in case where fraud is claimed. 
Consequently, it argues that both suitability and best execution will be enforced 
through traditional tort actions. Given that the CML was introduced on the basis of 
the US system, the study reviewed literatures which analyse how the suitability 
requirements has been employed in the American system. Following such literature 
review, it is illustrated that it is the agency theory which is most likely to suit the 
Saudi context.  
E) Concluding Remarks 
It has been pointed out that the CML framework is the first sophisticated system of 
regulation that has dealt with securities markets in the history of Saudi Arabia. The 
CML establishes a separate authority, the CMA, that is responsible for regulating 
securities markets, including the conduct of business. It is noted that the CMA enjoys 
extensive powers combined with lack of clarity as to the regulatory objective. On 
grounds that the ambiguity of regulatory objectives, lack of regulatory tools to assess 
the authority actions, and the CMA’s right to extend the definition of securities, it is 
argued that the CML enjoys too many powers. It should be noted that, at one point, 
the government considered granting the CMA the power to amend the CML itself but 
sidestepped this.813 Such a way of thinking is likely to reflect confusion on the part of 
the government between regulation and legislation and the difference in legitimacy 
between them. This also suggests a lack of understanding of the importance of the 
legitimacy of the sources of law and the rule of regulators in the general 
understanding of policymakers in Saudi Arabia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
813	  Beach (n 68) 326	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 It has been demonstrated also the important role that the CML regulatory 
framework ascribes to Tadawul, the formal exchange, in the institutional structure of 
securities markets. This was shown in the requirement, inter alia, of lodging a claim 
against a broker with Tadawul and its role as an SRO. However, the broad role of 
Tadwul diverges from international best practice. According to the World Bank, it is 
common for a regulator and an exchange enjoying monopoly powers to have mutual 
interests, especially in emerging markets, including the regulating of participants.814 
Nonetheless, the World Bank’s recommendation is that if an exchange should retain 
self-regulatory responsibilities, ‘it must establish a separate corporate entity with 
independent governance to administer them’.815 In 2007 and in accordance with art.20 
of the CML, the Council of Ministers approved the formation of the Saudi Stock 
Exchange Company (Tadawul).816 Thus, Tadawul shares sooner or later will be listed. 
It is difficult to understand the reason why the draftsmen of the CML gave such an 
important role to Tadawul even though such approach is inconsistent with the best 
international practice. Beach and his colleagues may be excused of some 
responsibility since their attempts were to establish a new framework from the scratch 
and their intention was that the CML should be workable for a decade during which 
time an appropriate approach for the Saudi legal system would evolve.817 There are 
many questions, however, which need to be answered. Is there a need to change the 
institutional structure once the exchange becomes a listed public company? Is there a 
need for a new law after a decade of implementation? How should conflicts and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
814 John Carson, ‘Conflict of Interests in Self-Regulation: Can Demutualized Exchanges Successfully 
Manage Them’ (World Bank Research Working Paper, No. 3183, 2003) 15 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=636602>	  accessed 29 June 2011	  
815 Ibid, 25 
816<http://www.tadawul.com.sa/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3g_A-
ewIE8TIwMLj2AXA0_vQGNzY18Q1wAoH4kk7x4QZmrgaeITbBQc4GVs4GlEQHdwYpG-n0d-
bqp-QW5EOQAsB49z/dl2/d1/L0lHSkovd0RNQUprQUVnQSEhL1lCWncvZW4!/> accessed 29 June 
2011 
817 ‘The CML, however, was created with an idea of the kind of development necessary over the next 
decade for Saudi capital market to flourish’, Beach (n 68) 320  	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tensions be solved once the CMA starts giving more consideration to competition 
policies in exchanges services?    
  This part has also demonstrated that private enforcement is recognised as a 
means for regulatory enforcement within the CML framework. It has listed the four 
statutory causes of actions provided within the CML itself, and argues that an investor 
still has a cause of action against a service provider in tort. Furthermore, it is pointed 
out that suitability could be based on a private cause of action in a similar way to 
those in the U.S., in theory at least. In such an event, the suitability requirement will 
be more likely to be on the basis of agency theory, which is compatible with the way 
the Saudi legal system considers relationships between agents in financial services 
and their clients. That brings different legal issues that must be dealt and is likely to 
be dealt with through litigation.  For example, one of the questions before the CSDR 
is whether or not a financial adviser is bound by the regulatory requirement as an 
agent even though he or she is not a broker within the meaning of the CML. If the 
answer is in the affirmative, it has to be clarified how a customer is entitled to sue in 
tort for a breach of suitability according to general principles. Unfortunately, 
answering these questions is a matter of speculation, given the general tendency for 
courts and judicial tribunals in Saudi Arabia not to publish their decisions. A central 
recommendation of this thesis is that decisions made by the CRSD should be 
published which would help in determining the position of Saudi law and would allow 
the development of general theories for Saudi financial law. 
 It could be reasonably claimed from this discussion, similar to the UK, that 
private enforcement has been considered as an instrument in achieving policy 
objectives within the Saudi context. However, the two countries differ in how this 
instrument is implemented. Firstly, while the FSMA accommodates private 
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enforcement of a regulatory duty imposed by the FSA in a tort action, the CML 
provides only a cause of action with respect to fraudulent misrepresentation. 
Secondly, there is no restriction of the statutory cause of action per se to a particular 
type of investor within the CML regulatory framework. The FSMA, however, 
restricts any statutory action for a breach of regulatory rules to ‘private persons’. It is 
true that the two regulatory causes of actions are different both in nature and in their 
scope; s.150 of the FSMA is wider since it deals with tort and it is applicable to many 
regulatory duties, whereas the CML, in contrast, provides for a cause of action in case 
of fraud alone as far as suitability and best execution is concerned.  
 These differences between Saudi Arabia and the UK could be ascribed to the 
reliance on the American system of securities regulations, which influenced the CML 
through its draftsmen. It is a question, hence, of the desirability of each approach. It is 
argued that the American approach, which depends on a strong judicial institution, 
will bring the complexity identified within the American context into the Saudi legal 
context. Since in Part I it was claimed that there have been difficulties with the 
Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia in the development of securities markets, it is thus 
reasonable to maintain that bringing in complexity from the American system, which 
therefore would further increase the overall complexity, is undesirable. More 
appropriate is the UK approach which provides private enforcement through a tort 
action. Such approach enjoys a subtle advantage; it avoids the need for theoretical 
justification for the imposing regulatory duties in tort actions. Consequently, it is a 
recommendation of this thesis that an approach similar to the UK is adopted for the 
CML regulatory regime.   
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Part III Best Execution and Suitability 
It is illustrated in Part II that the CML does not provide a cause of action for a breach 
of a regulatory rule but it is argued that an investor may have a cause of action in 
traditional tort against a financial service provider. Additionally it is suggested that 
the statutory cause of action provided by the CML deals mainly with fraudulent 
misrepresentation and thus would be beneficial for investors of fraudulent financial 
advice.  
 A traditional tort action therefore is the more important cause of action for any 
breach of a regulatory duty by a service provider. Such action will be based upon a 
failure on the part of a service provider to adhere to professional standards. That being 
the case, there is a need to determine what the level of standards imposed upon 
professionals is within the jurisdiction of the CML. The difficulty with this approach 
is the need to go through many provisions to identify what the CML regulatory 
framework imposes upon a service provider. Consequently, it is important to refer to 
different provisions of the CML and its Implementing Regulation, in order to identify 
a duty and its breach by a service provider. 818  The CML’s framework imposes both 
suitability and best execution through the implementing regulations, namely the 
Conduct Market Regulation (henceforth CMR) and Authorised Persons Regulations 
(henceforth APR).  
 This part examines separately the regulatory duties of best execution and 
suitability as provided by the CML framework. However, before doing this, it is 
necessary to clarify the duty imposed upon service providers to classify their clients 
and its subsequent implication on the duties of best execution and suitability. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
818 The Implementing Regulations are accessible through the CMA’s website at 
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Pages/Implementing_Regulations.aspx> accessed 29 June 2011 
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A) The Regulatory Requirement of Client Categorisation 
Similarly to the COBS, APR requires authorised persons to categorise a client in one 
of three classes: a customer, an execution only customer, or a counterparty.819 For the 
purpose of the APR, a counterparty is ‘a client who is an authorised person, an 
exempt person, an institution or a non-Saudi financial services firm’.820 A customer is 
defined as a client who is not a counterparty including an individual or legal 
person.821 An execution only customer is defined as one ‘whom the authorised person 
only deals as agent in accordance with instructions provided by the customer and 
whom an authorised person does not advise’.822  
 For an execution only customer, it is clearly provided that an authorised 
person acts as an agent with specific instruction from the customer and must not 
provide an advice.823 It is unclear, however, throughout the provisions of the 
Implementing Regulations what the legal consequences are in case that an execution 
only customer receives a financial advice: whether he or she is entitled to the 
protection of ‘customer’ and hence entitled to be re-categorised, or the advice 
provided is not subject to the provisions governing financial advice including 
suitability. 
  The wording of the APR suggests that financial advice could be provided to 
counterparties and customers but not to an execution only customer. Given that part 
of the focus of this study is on retail investors receiving financial advice, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
819 APR Art.36 (a) and (b) 
820 Ibid 
821 In ‘Glossary of Defined Terms Used in the Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market Authority’ 
available on the internet at 
<http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Pages/Implementing_Regulations.aspx>accessed 29 June 2011. Note that 
the Glossary refers to non-individual as ‘juristic person’ rather than legal person.   
822 Ibid 
823 APR Art.36(c) 
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necessary to spell out how the CML regulatory regime provides additional protection 
for investors categorised as ‘customers’. 
 The APR imposes different duties on authorised persons dealing with 
investors categorised as ‘customers’, providing that they owe statutory fiduciary 
duties to their customers as follows:824 (1) the duty of loyalty, where authorised 
persons must act in good faith and in the interest of the customer; (2) the duty not to 
be involved in conflicts of interest unless this follows the procedure provided; and (3) 
authorised persons are not permitted to obtain secret profits from their relationships 
with customers. The latter prohibition includes acts in relation to property of 
customers, or relevant information or opportunities unless the authorised person 
obtains the customer’s consent pursuant to full disclosure of such usage. Finally, there 
is a duty to exercise care, appropriate skill and due diligence similar to those 
exercised by a person in similar circumstances having regards to the actual experience 
and knowledge that a person has, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the 
knowledge and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in the same 
position as the authorised person.  
 Given that statutory duties imposed upon service providers by the CML 
framework, it is therefore reasonable to claim that a service provider authorised by the 
CML holds regulatory fiduciary duties. The fiduciary duties imposed require a service 
provider, inter alia, to exercise reasonable care and due diligence taking into account 
what may reasonably be expected of a person in the same position as the authorised 
person. Considering that an authorised person is subject the Implementing 
Regulations, it could be argued that it is reasonable to expect the authorised person to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
824 APR Art.40, and APR Annex 5.4 ‘Fiduciaries Duties’   
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be subject to suitability and best execution as imposed by the Implementing 
Regulations.   
B) The Regulatory Requirement of Best Execution  
It could be suggested that art.14 of the CMR is the main provision which deals with 
the regulatory duty of best execution, since in the English version of the CMR the 
provision is directly and clearly headed ‘best execution’. It should be noted that the 
Arabic language is the main language used in Saudi Arabia and within the CML 
regulatory regime its terminology prevails. According to the Arabic version of CMR, 
best execution is introduced as altenfeeth bea’afthal alshroot. An exact translation of 
this phrase would mean ‘execution in the best conditions’, but reference to the 
English version clearly refers to ‘best execution’ and thus it is reasonable to maintain 
that it is ar.14 that imposes the duty of best execution in Saudi securities markets on 
authorised persons.  
 Article 14(a) of CMR states that ‘where an authorised person deals with or for 
a client, it must provide best execution’. The CMR provides guidance as to how 
authorised persons can fulfil the best execution obligation, but differentiates between 
a broker acting as an agent and as a principal when dealing with a client.825 The CMR 
provides that where a broker acts as an agent, he must ensure that the order is 
executed at the best prevailing price in the relevant market or markets for the nature 
of the order.826 In contrast, where the service provider is acting as a principal, the 
broker must execute the transaction at a better price for the client than would have 
obtained if the order was executed in accordance with obligations imposed on a 
broker acting as an agent in a timely manner depending of the circumstances of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
825 CMR Art.14(b) 
826 CMR Art14 (b) 1 
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around the order.827. Since a better price is required in comparison with acting as an 
agent, it could be suggested that the CMR imposes a higher duty upon a broker who is 
a market dealer or is acting as a principal, in order to ensure that the sale price for a 
client does not exceed the price generally available in the market. Regardless of 
whether or not that would make difference in practice, it could be suggested that the 
CMR sets price as the priority in executing customers, which is similar to the concept 
of best execution provided in the COBS in the UK.  
 Having said that, there are differences between the CMR and COBS. Clearly, 
the CMR imposes additional requirements for execution in different provisions which, 
unlike the UK, are provided under the heading of best execution. For example, a 
customer’s order has priority in execution over the broker’s order.828 Furthermore, 
there are other subtle differences between the two regulatory regimes. In COBS, best 
execution is suggested to deal with the overall judgement of the broker in relation to 
the order of the client and, therefore, it includes provisions related to the timing, size 
and priority of the client’s order. In contrast, the CMR provides the obligation of best 
execution focusing on the broker’s judgement as to the market where the order is to 
be executed. The COBS approach is wider since it requires brokers to balance various 
factors in fulfilling the duty of best execution, whereas the CMR approach omits to 
mention considerations of timing and priority within the provision that deals with best 
execution. Whereas it can be argued that it is a difference in style rather than 
substances, it is possible to suggest, nevertheless, that the COBS and CMR envisage 
the regulatory duty of best execution slightly different.  
 In practice, it is unlikely that these differences between the COBS and CMR 
will result in dissimilar outcomes for investors, namely retail ones. Firstly, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
827 CMR Art.13 and CMR Art14 (b) 2 
828 CMR Art.12 
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scarcely conceivable that it would be possible to separate timing as an element from 
the duty of best execution duty, since price, timing and size are co-determining. This 
is clearly illustrated in the CMR where it imposes a requirement to execute a 
customer’s order in a timely manner in a separate provision, but it re-states timing 
again under the provision for best execution. Secondly, the existence of a single 
exchange in Saudi Arabia renders secondary the importance of difficulties in fulfilling 
the duty of best execution. The discussion in the previous chapter relating to the UK 
experience suggests that the duty of best execution depends strongly on the context in 
which it is implemented, and it is argued that best execution and difficulties in 
fulfilling it are crucial in multi-exchange securities markets. This is illustrated within 
the UK context by showing that when the LSE was the only place to fulfil orders, best 
execution did not cause any concerns or create any problems. Therefore, given the 
important role of Tadawul in the institutional arrangement of CML framework for 
regulating securities markets, it is unlikely that the duty of best execution will raise 
any concerns, at least for the foreseeable future.  
 But it is unlikely that the concept of duty of best execution as it is is 
sustainable once a change occurs as to the status of Tadawul, the formal exchange. 
Changes within the CML framework could occur in one of two ways. Firstly, a 
decision by policymakers might change the institutional structure of the CML 
framework by reducing the role of Tadawul and promoting the establishment of other 
exchanges. Secondly, alternative means may develop for or by participants in 
securities markets to execute customers’ orders. Given the reactive and ad hoc 
approach by policymakers, it is more likely that changes will occur as a result of the 
latter rather than the former. However, in both events, such a change would require a 
change in the implementation or the fulfilment of the regulatory duty of best 
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execution within the CML. Thus, this study hypotheses that, in the future, Saudi 
Arabia should take a similar approach to the UK where developments in securities 
markets led to developments in the regulatory duty. 
 As far as private enforcement is concerned, it could be argued that the duty of 
best execution as provided by the CML framework is simple and clear which makes it 
relatively simple to be incorporated in a traditional tort action against a broker in 
breach of it, for two reasons. Firstly, all brokers have to be licensed in order to 
provide brokerage services, otherwise the contract is unenforceable. Secondly, given 
that all services providers are licensed, they are subject to the CMA’s powers 
including its Implementing Regulations. Hence, it could be concluded that all 
contracts reached with service providers will be subject to the regulatory duty of best 
execution as introduced by the CML regulatory framework.  Accordingly, it could be 
claimed that, within the current context, the CML is effective in facilitating private 
causes of action in tort for breach of the duty of best execution.   
 However, similar to the criticism advanced to the UK regulatory regime, the 
CML does not provide a regulatory remedy to supply an incentive for enforcing the 
regulatory duty. The reliance on damages as the only remedy as well as the absence of 
systemic enforcement and a class-action regime would make it unlikely that retail 
investors will have the financial incentives to sue for breaching the regulatory duty of 
best execution.  	  
C) The Regulatory Requirement of Suitability 
While best execution is introduced by CMR, the regulatory duty is imposed through 
the APR.829 The Arabic version of APR refers to suitability as Mula’amah, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
829 APR Art. 1 states that ‘[t]he purpose of these Regulations is to regulate authorised persons and 
registered persons and to specify the procedures and conditions for obtaining a license, as well as the 
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means appropriate, adequate and proper, whereas the English version clearly refers to 
suitability. While it may be argued that there would be a difference between the 
Mula’amah and suitability, it is assumed that the meaning of Mila’amah is similar to 
suitability.   
 It is important to note that the APR deals with many obligations imposed on 
authorised persons in addition to conduct of business.830 Among these obligations 
provided are general principles ‘intended to form a universal statement of the 
standards of conduct expected of authorised persons under these Regulations’.831 
Eleven principles relate to the recommended conduct of business affairs: 1. integrity, 
2. skill, care and diligence, 3. management and control, 4. financial prudence, 5. 
market conduct, 6. customers’ interests, 7. communications with clients, 8. conflicts 
of interest, 9. relationships of trust with customers, 10. clients’ assets, and 11. 
relations with regulators.832  
 It is noted that under the FSMA regulatory regime, similar principles are 
provided by the authority, the FSA, and also pointed out that the English courts refuse 
to make them a basis for a statutory cause of action.833 Within the CML framework, 
however, these principles are likely to be incorporated within the judicial reasoning 
similar to the UK, but whether or not a breach of them is enough to result in a 
successful tort action without a breach of a provision in the implementing regulation 
is unclear. Such distinction in private enforcement is so vital given that the principles 
provided by the APR are of such similarity to those in the COBS which participants in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conditions for the maintenance of the license or the registration, to provide for the rules of conduct that 
authorised persons must comply with when conducting their business, as well as the rules and 
provisions governing the conduct of business’. 
830 APR Art.5 (a) 
831 Ibid 
832 APR Art5(b) 
833 Text to n 533 in ch 4  
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the UK have insisted that they alone cannot form a cause of action. 834 Thus, it could 
be suggested additional clarification by the CMA of the role of these principles in the 
APR in a tort action by investors is important for the certainty of the regulatory 
regime. 
 While the position is unclear under the CML framework as to the right for 
investors to sue in tort for a breach of suitability on the basis of a principle in the 
APR, it is likely that the suitability ‘principle’ would be of little benefit for an 
investor. As far as the regulatory duty of suitability is concerned, the APR provides 
that an authorised person must take ‘reasonable care to ensure the suitability of its 
advice and discretionary managing decisions for any customer to whom it provides 
those services’.835 If that is the case, it could be suggested that this duty under the 
CML regulatory regime requires the financial adviser to make sure that reasonable 
care is taken in giving suitable advice. It could therefore be argued that a customer 
willing to sue has to prove to the court that the service provider allegedly in breach 
failed to take reasonable care in providing the unsuitable advice. In such a case, it is 
likely that a customer would be better advised and in an easier position to a claim for 
a breach of other suitability provisions rather than a claim of the unsuitability of the 
advice provided mere on the suitability principle, since then it would be more 
specific, easier to identify, and easier to establish a breach. Therefore, it could be 
expected that the suitability principle may be inadequate on its own to form the basis 
for a tort action. The provision headed ‘suitability’ in the APR provides 
additional guidance to the suitability duty. According to the APR, authorised persons 
must not deal, advise or manage for a customer or take collateral for their own 
account from a customer, unless the advice given or transaction made is suitable for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
834 Because of its generality, participants in the UK insisted that the principles must not form a basis for 
statutory action, Ibid 
835 APR Art.5(b) 11 
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that customer.836 Such a wording is ambiguous since it may suggest a meaning that an 
authorised person should not make a transaction which is unsuitable for the customer. 
Effectively, that would extend the duty imposed on authorised person to ensure the 
suitability of transactions made by the customer. English courts have been cautious 
not to extend such duty under English law,837 and further clarification by the CMA 
should be provided.   
 It seems that the CMLA regulatory regime has a wider application for the 
suitability in comparison to the FSMA regime. For instance, an authorised person is 
prohibited even from advertising a ‘non-retail’ investment fund or a securities 
derivative unless it has been determined that they are suitable for the customer.838  
 As far as the requirements of the duty are concerned, the APR states that 
suitability should be determined by authorised persons on the basis of facts disclosed 
by the customer and other relevant facts of which ‘the authorised person is, or 
reasonably should be, aware’.839 The APR provides the minimum amount of 
information that an adviser should be aware of by stating that authorised persons 
attempting to fulfil the duty of suitability should have regards to: (1) the customer’s 
knowledge and understanding of the relevant securities and markets, and of the risks 
involved; (2) the customer’s financial standing, including an assessment of his net 
worth or of the value of his portfolio based on the information disclosed by that 
customer; (3) the length of time the customer has been active in the relevant markets, 
the frequency of business and the extent to which he relies on the advice of the 
authorised person; (4) the size and nature of transactions that have been undertaken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
836 APR Art.43(a) 
837 For example, see JP Morgan Bank (formerly Chase Manhattan Bank) v Springwell Navigation Corp 
[2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm) 
838 APR Art.35 
839 Ibid 
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for the customer in the relevant markets; and (5) the customer’s investment 
objectives.  
 Given that these requirements are lists of factors that the APR states that an 
adviser should have regards to, it could be suggested they are the least required 
factors that a reasonable authorized person should be aware of. However, in the event 
that an adviser has obtained only some of this information, the APR is silent on 
whether the adviser is permitted to assess suitability on the basis of the available 
information, or if he should refrain from providing any advice at all.  The impact of 
the difference on private enforcement is significant. In the case of the latter approach, 
if a service neglects to take into account one of these factors and subsequently 
provided an unsuitable advice that resulted in a loss, it could be argued that a 
customer may have a case against the service provider. Therefore, it could be 
suggested that the CML regulatory regime facilitates private enforcement by 
providing the factors that a financial adviser should take into account. However, if the 
former approach is preferred, the court should assess first whether or not the advice 
provided was suitable considering the available information with reference to the 
standards of the industry. Thus, there is a limit of uncertainty as to this approach that 
may hinder private enforcement.        
 The previous paragraphs demonstrate the position of the CML’s regulatory 
framework as far as the regulatory requirement of suitability is concerned. 
Nevertheless, several points are worth mentioning.  
 Firstly, the provisions of APR restrict the applicability of suitability to 
authorised persons dealing with customers only. Effectively, this excludes from its 
scope those who provide financial advice but are not considered to be brokers for the 
application of the CML. Moreover, it is unclear what the position is under Saudi legal 
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framework with regards to imposing these requirements upon non-authorised persons 
who are not brokers. It is pointed out in Part II that the easiest application for 
imposing such duties is the ‘shingle theory’, but it is argued that it is unlikely that this 
theory could fit within the Saudi context. Additionally, since a mere financial adviser 
does not need authorisation, it is difficult to suppose that regulatory fiduciary duties 
can be imposed upon such a person given that, firstly, the adviser is not authorised 
and hence is not obliged to categorise clients, and, secondly, ambiguity exists with 
regards to general law in this case since there is no code for tort, contracts or 
obligations, nor are there general principles in Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia on 
the subject.840 Thus, if a non-broker unauthorised person has provided unsuitable 
financial advice, it is doubtful that the CSDR would hold him directly liable for 
falling to take reasonable care in accordance with the CMA. 
 Secondly, while the APR prohibits the provision of financial advice to an 
execution only customer, the CML regime does not clearly spell out what financial 
advice is. It has been suggested that, in modern markets, it is very difficult to 
determine the boundary between a selling process and that of financial advice; this 
was a grey area exploited by participants for which the concept of suitability was 
developed in the U.S.841 The main provision that determines what constitutes financial 
advice is art. 1 of the CML, which refers to investment advice as given by someone 
who: 
‘… provides, offers or agrees to provide, advice to others in 
their capacity as investors or potential investors, in relation to 
purchasing, selling, subscribing or underwriting a security, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
840 Further discussion in this chapter Part I a, b, c and e 
841 Text to n 397 and 308 in ch 3 
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exercising any right conferred by a security to acquire, dispose 
of, underwrite or convert a security’.842 
Given that there is no further clarification on the matter by the CMA or the 
Implementing Regulations, it could be argued that a clear breach of suitability by an 
authorised person exists when that authorised person is advising on a security; but 
there is no clarity in this area in the CML framework as to what the meaning of advice 
is. Is advice to a customer ever subject to suitability even in a sales process? Is an 
authorised person obliged by the suitability rule although it is clear from the context 
that it is not expected that a customer would rely on such an advice? These questions 
and others are left open to judicial discretion to deal with.  
 Thirdly, if, according to the CML’s definition of ‘investment advice’, 
suitability is restricted to securities, there are two categories of financial advice which 
are not included with it: firstly, unauthorised persons who are not brokers but are 
recommending a security, as discussed above; and, secondly, authorised persons 
recommending non-securities financial products such as insurance. The former create 
difficulty as to how to impose the duty of suitability on this class of financial advisers, 
whereas the latter excludes authorised service providers from the regulatory duty of 
suitability because they are not advising on securities. This is not necessarily 
problematic per se, but it fails to deal with the reality of both financial markets in 
Saudi Arabia and the financial products themselves. 
 The current institutional structure adopted in Saudi financial markets is the 
separation of its sector by providing separate regulatory authorities, separate 
regulatory frameworks and separate judicial tribunals for each sector of banking, 
securities and insurance. The reality of the Saudi markets is represented in the fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
842 CML Art1 
 305	  
that banks have been permitted to engage in securities and insurance markets 
provided that they establish subsidiaries in each sector. Thus, it is not unreasonable to 
expect some level of co-ordination in promotion or cross-selling of financial products 
among those entities. By restricting investment advice to securities, an authorised 
person within the CML framework might be tempted to provide unsuitable advice for 
non-securities products.  
 Moreover, by restricting investment advice on securities, the CML approach 
does not take into account the complexity of modern financial products that cut across 
the three financial sectors. Accordingly, the principal question is whether jurisdiction 
over this product is subject to the CML, banking or to the insurance authority? Given 
that there is no institutionalised system to deal with such conflicts, it is likely that 
confusion and overlapping jurisdictions would be likely to exist.     
 Finally, it should be noted that the concept of suitability in the ARP is 
different from those in the UK and the US, in principle because it fails to recognise 
quantitative suitability at all. The requirement to consider the frequency of trade is 
provided by the CMR rather than the APR. Oddly, given the influence of American 
thought in drafting the CML, there is no distinct differentiation in the APR between 
‘customer-basis’ suitability and ‘reasonable-basis’ suitability as developed in the 
US.843   
 In short, the regulatory requirement of suitability is imposed on authorised 
services providers by the CML regulatory regime but there are some shortcomings. 
Similarly to the COBS, the APR does not detail exactly when a financial advice is 
provided or how to differentiate between the sales process and a recommendation. It 
is also argued that the benefit of suitability is restricted for two reasons: firstly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 For more information as to the difference, the American approach and the UK approach, refernce is 
made to text to n 366 in ch 4  
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because the APR is imposed upon authorised persons only; and secondly, due to the 
restriction of the CML itself of investment advice to recommendations related to 
securities. It is suggested that this approach in the CML fails to take into account the 
political economy of the financial markets in Saudi Arabia and the complexity of 
modern financial products.   
 
 Part IV  Concluding Remarks   
 
This chapter has attempted to evaluate whether or not the current regulatory regime in 
Saudi Arabia ensures that the duties of both suitability and best execution are 
implemented in such a way that facilitates private enforcement by retail investors. It is 
illustrated that, as regulatory requirements, both suitability and best execution are 
imposed on service providers through the rule-making power of the CMA exemplified 
in the Implementing Regulations.  
 The historical analysis of Saudi financial law shows that different policy 
decisions have been implemented by the CML, including the establishment of a 
special judiciary system for the securities market in Saudi Arabia. However, it is 
argued that this approach does not solve underlying issues of financial law and 
regulation in Saudi Arabia such as the incompatibility of modern financial practices 
with Shari’a principles. It is argued that failure to deal with these issues increases 
uncertainty, hinders market development and raises questions of legitimacy with 
regards to the rule of law. Such difficulties in Saudi Arabia are clear examples of how 
failures to solve theoretical questions have several practical implications. In contrast, 
the UK did not have such underlying problems at the time of the introduction of the 
FS regime, and English courts have dealt with financial and securities markets 
 307	  
disputes for years, if not centuries. This suggests that these countries differ in the 
efficiency of their court systems as well as their jurisprudence at the time of the 
introduction of their initial regulatory regime. Whereas in the UK the enjoyed a wider 
role with higher level of efficiency as well as clarity as to jurisprudence, Saudi Arabia 
started from a lower level of efficiency, the courts’ refusal to deal with financial 
claims, and uncertainty of jurisprudence.      
 With similarity to the FSMA in the UK, it is pointed out that private 
enforcement is part of the CML regulatory regime in Saudi Arabia. The instrument 
used in CML is to provide a statutory cause of action for specific breaches, including 
against fraudulent misrepresentation. The positive side of this cause of action is that it 
is not restricted to a class of investors, being available to all investors against not only 
licensed brokers but extended to unauthorised persons as well. It is argued that it is 
possible, in theory, that a private enforcement of suitability and best execution could 
be based on this right of action, which would be similar to Rule-10(b) in the U.S. 
There are, however, two negative issues as far as this study is concerned. Firstly, it is 
noted how American jurisprudence provides different justifications which hold 
services providers to their regulatory duties in the absence of fraud; and, secondly, the 
private enforcement of suitability through the anti-fraud provision is unlikely to be 
easy to establish by retail investors given the high requirements of materiality and 
reliance on fraud which need to be proven for an action to be successful. Accordingly, 
it is argued that the CML’s approach with regards to the statutory instrument chosen 
for providing private enforcement is too narrow in its usefulness in enforcing either 
suitability or best execution.   
 Having said that, this study argues that a retail investor might have a cause of 
action in tort against a service provider who is in breach of the suitability or best 
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execution regulatory requirements. For a successful tort action within the Saudi 
financial context, a retail investor must show that there was a breach by the defendant, 
the plaintiff suffered damage, and there was a relationship between the breach and the 
damage. There is a lack of clarity concerning how the duties imposed by the 
regulatory regime could be useful for a tort action in Saudi Arabia, however, which 
renders it difficult to facilitate a cause of action by retail investors. This, accordingly, 
contradicts the argument provided in chapter two that an effective enforcement 
regime including private action should take into account the difficulties that face retail 
investors.  
 Both the provision of a direct right of action as well as ambiguity as to 
traditional tort actions make the likelihood of an effective private cause of action for 
the regulations very questionable. Any argument based on actions similar to 
Rule10(b) in the U.S. is unconvincing; since such a framework requires an effective, 
reliable judiciary as well as clarity of the substantive law as to the relationship 
between regulatory duties and traditional tort law, both of which are lacking in Saudi 
Arabia. In contrast, the U.K. institutional design is more direct and provides clarity. It 
leaves to the authority, and not courts, the task of identifying those duties which could 
be privately imposed. The UK approach permits an uncomplicated, coherent and 
explicit example of how to accommodate regulatory duties within established and 
existing private law institutions. On balance, the UK approach is more favourable 
since it is a simpler process and relies more on the regulatory authority rather than the 
courts.        
 Subsequently, the analysis focused on the provisions relating to both 
suitability and best execution, with a view to evaluating how these provisions could 
facilitate retail investor action in tort.  The discussion above in relation to suitability 
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indicates that the APR framework adopts a concept of suitability which is different 
from those in either the UK and the US. In theory, the APR does not impose 
‘reasonable basis suitability’ or a requirement to conduct an assessment of 
quantitative suitability. In practice, it is argued that the wording of the CML and APR 
themselves results in the restriction of suitability to recommendations provided by 
licensed brokers.  
 However, it noted that there are negative impacts of this approach by the CML 
framework, since it increases uncertainty. The CML regulatory regime fails not only 
in providing guidance as to when a recommendation is in fact ‘investment advice’ for 
the purposes of the CML regime, but also does not take into account the modern 
complexity in structure of financial products that cut across the boundaries of 
financial sectors. These issues, combined with the systemic avoidance of the 
publication of judgements and awards, is argued to increase uncertainty for both 
investors and service providers as to the position of Saudi law and how the CSDR 
would treat these rules.     
 Accordingly, it could be argued that, as implemented by the CML, the 
regulatory regime of private enforcement of the regulatory duty of suitability is 
ineffective.   
 Furthermore, it is noted that, under the CML regulatory regime, the best 
execution rule is clear and detailed and suitable for the current Saudi context. The fact 
that there is only one exchange in Saudi Arabia renders the application of the best 
execution regulatory rule a straightforward task. However, it is likely that best 
execution will be more important and create difficulties once the Saudi securities 
market starts to evolve towards a multi-exchange system. Such a development may 
require a new regulatory framework, since it is argued that the current institutional 
 310	  
framework is not in line with best practice for the development of multi-exchanges 
markets. It is also noted that the CML regulatory regime does not provide a systemic 
or collective mode of private actions or remedies that would be important in 
overcoming difficulties identified with the private enforcement of the best execution 
rule. 
 As to the substantive duties, the analysis indicates there are similarities as to 
the drawbacks in both the U.K. and Saudi Arabia. As far as suitability is concerned, 
both regulatory regimes fail to provide a clear and simple way to both measure and 
comply with the regulatory duty of suitability. However, it could be suggested that, in 
both case studies, the duty of suitability imposed requires an adviser to recommend a 
suitable investment rather than the most suitable one. The reason provided for lack of 
detailed provision for suitability in theory is that it depends on the context and 
circumstances of each case, and this could explain the lack of clarity. However, this 
very same reason supports arguments for an increased role for private enforcement, 
given that private parties are better suited to detect violations.844  
 In contrast, the regulatory duty of ‘best execution’ in both countries is more 
straightforward in comparison to suitability. While many factors have been provided 
by the regulatory regime in determining how to comply, an emphasis on the price in 
dealing with retail investors is arguably the reason for such clarity. The analysis 
suggests that the weight ascribed by the regulatory regimes to price helps retail 
investors in bringing private actions because, firstly, it is easier to identify a breach, 
and, secondly, it shifts the burden of evidence to the service provider (i.e. the broker). 
The service provider thus has to demonstrate why compliance with duty requires 
disregarding the best available price in a specific case. With these advantages in mind, 
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the analysis of regulatory regimes in both countries reveals that retail investors 
attempting to enforce best execution lack incentives in pursuing such an action 
because of the insignificant rewards compared to the costs of pursuing action. In both 
countries, it is argued that it is the absence of remedies which provide additional 
incentives that render private enforcement ineffective.  
 The similarity between both countries with regard to the substantive obligation 
suggests that there is a subtle link between the substantive obligations imposed by the 
regulatory duties themselves and the role of private enforcement. Taking best 
execution as an example, it is the focus of both regulatory regimes on price that 
makes private enforcement less burdensome for retail investors. In contrast, suitability 
as a regulatory duty depends strongly on the context in which is applied. Therefore, as 
far as substantive obligations are concerned, it could be advanced that regulatory 
duties imposed for the benefits of retail investors require clarity as to how a breach of 
the obligations could be detected.  
 Such clarity is likely to differ from one regulatory duty to another. Experience 
and knowledge of the particular regulatory problem can help in identifying what the 
important factors are for retail investors, which could be incorporated subsequently 
into the regulatory obligations. This, however, take us back to arguments advanced in 
chapter two that the effective private enforcement of securities markets regulations 
involves considerations of, inter alia, the regulatory problems as well as the 
characteristics of retail investors.845  
 Following our analysis, it is a question of how to design a private enforcement 
framework for securities regulations within a regulatory regime which can effectively 
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encompass private enforcement. The next chapter provide a paradigm for an optimal 
design following the summary and main findings of this thesis.            
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Chapter Five 
The Conclusion 	  	  	  
Summary 
  
The main objectives of this thesis are twofold: firstly, to emphasise the importance of 
enforcement in general and private enforcement in particular for compliance with 
secondary securities market regulations; and, secondly, to explore how a regulatory 
regime may increase or decrease the role of private enforcement through not only 
making available to investors causes of action grounded in breach of regulatory 
obligations, but also provisions delimiting substantive obligations. To these ends, the 
analysis contained in this thesis has shown how effective the implementation of the 
regulatory doctrines of ‘best execution’ and ‘suitability’ within the regulatory regimes 
of national securities markets have been.  
 The UK and Saudi Arabia have both incorporated elements of private 
enforcement into the overall enforcement of their regulatory rules, which is in line 
with the broad theme of this thesis and its argument as to the importance ascribed to 
private enforcement within the regulatory regimes. In both jurisdictions, the legal, 
political and economic environments that existed when securities markets laws were 
first introduced determined the instruments used in facilitating private enforcement as 
well as the manner in which the two regulatory requirements of suitability and best 
execution were introduced by current regulatory regimes. The principal finding is that 
the two countries have differed as to the design of the regulatory private enforcement 
within their regulatory regimes.   
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 As a necessary part of the main argument of this study, therefore, chapter two 
has presented a theoretical background concerning the importance of securities 
markets in general and secondary securities markets in particular as well as the need 
to regulate them. Chapter two thus discussed secondary securities markets under fully 
developed systems of regulation, and started by defining the difference between 
primary and secondary securities markets as well as the important role of financial 
services intermediaries, focusing on stockbrokers in particular, within the existing 
structure of the overall benefits sought from securities with specific attention to 
secondary securities markets. Subsequently, this chapter illustrated the importance of 
legal actions of private actors in enforcing securities markets regulations and 
concluded that, given our current knowledge of secondary securities markets and the 
available empirical data, private means of enforcement cannot be fully replaced by 
public enforcement. It was also suggested that available explanations as to how law 
affects economic growth are weak once they are applied to secondary securities 
markets, and that the empirical data available point in different directions. 
Accordingly, it was suggested that no connection between trading rules and corporate 
law can explain differences in the performance of secondary securities markets in two 
different legal jurisdictions. Such a claim is significant since, as a source of legal 
differences among legal families, corporate law has been dominant in explanations of 
differences between legal systems. Consequently, because of the absence of an 
optimal framework, the chapter hypothesised that, in terms of the role of private 
enforcement within regulatory regimes, countries will differ in the design of their 
regulatory protection. Given the absence of an existing optimal framework, the 
chapter demonstrates that, on the basis of the literature as to private enforcement of 
public law, a framework for retail investors in securities markets regulations should 
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take into account the characteristics of these investors concerning enforcement, 
namely the lack of incentives, the ambiguity of law and their lack of awareness of 
their rights. A framework should also take into account the regulatory problems that 
private enforcement is aimed at correcting or overcoming. Contextualising these 
regulatory issues by focusing on suitability and best execution, this chapter points out 
the importance of suitability and best execution, as regulatory duties, not only to 
ensure investors confidence, but also the appropriate allocation of resources.  
 Chapter three presented an evaluation of the UK securities regulatory regime 
and discussed private enforcement with a particular focus on suitability and best 
execution. The chapter gave a brief overview of the historical development of 
regulatory frameworks for securities markets, as well as how the regulatory concepts 
of both suitability and best execution evolved within the UK context. The chapter 
showed that the two duties have been implemented within the FSMA regulatory 
regime and explained how investors are permitted to privately enforce the two rules. 
The chapter demonstrated that both of these regulatory rules have been introduced 
through the COBS, and their private enforcement is permitted through a cause of 
action in tort for a breach of statutory duty in accordance with s.150 of the FSMA. It 
was shown that this approach to private enforcement by the FSMA increases certainty 
and predictability and therefore is more able to enhance the functioning of securities 
markets. Set against these advantages of the instrument used to provide private 
enforcement, some shortcomings were identified. Firstly, even though the instrument 
has been subject to criticism as to its effectiveness in the previous regulatory regime 
on the grounds that it was restricted to those who might not have the financial means 
to exercise it, it was subsequently re-introduced into the current regulatory regime 
without any change. Secondly, the instrument necessitates the actionability of the rule 
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to invoke it and it was demonstrated that the FSA was granted the power to determine 
the actionability of rules in COBS. It was argued that the FSA’s decision to restrict 
the main regulatory protection to ‘retail clients’ has subtly reduced the scope of the 
instrument and hence limited its effectiveness. Finally, it was claimed that the 
effectiveness of the instrument used for private enforcement is affected by the clarity 
in and the details of the regulatory rules concerning the substantive obligations and 
duties. A lack of clarity was demonstrated concerning the issue of what constitutes a 
personal recommendation from the perspective of COBS, and it is unclear how wide 
the scope of the duty of advisers actually is. In addition to the absence of a means to 
assess how to fulfill the requirement of suitability, the conclusion was drawn that 
these factors increase uncertainty about the duty imposed. Consequently, it was 
argued that the increase in uncertainty associated with the rule has had a negative 
impact on private enforcement. It was shown that the best execution rule introduced 
by the COBS does indeed provide a fair degree of the detail necessary to facilitate 
private investment. Reference to the historical development of the regulatory rule 
itself, however, draws attention to the absence of an effective class action system 
within the UK as well as the non-recognition of punitive damages as an available 
remedy. The effectiveness of the private enforcement of the regulatory rule of best 
execution is therefore limited. Overall, there is a room for substantial improvement in 
the effectiveness of the private enforcement of regulatory rules within the FSMA 
regime.  
 Chapter four then evaluated Saudi securities law, regulations and judicial 
practice. The chapter examined public policy in Saudi Arabia, the importance of the 
Shari’a as a source of law, and the application and effects of the school of thought of 
Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia, which has proved to be problematic in various 
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ways due to its nature being fundamentally different from those in current Western 
legal systems. The chapter included some important examples of the interpretation of 
Shari’a as applied in Saudi Arabia, since this is the main source of law, in creating 
various difficulties for modern securities markets. This part of the chapter showed that 
there are serious questions of legitimacy and the rule of law in Saudi Arabia which 
not only problematise some current practices but will also hinder the development of 
securities markets. The chapter then examined the provisions of the CML and the 
Implementing Regulations introduced by the CMA with reference to available 
relevant published case law in Saudi Arabia, in order to examine issues related to the 
private enforcement of suitability and best execution. This section started by assessing 
how best execution and suitability are privately enforced within the CML regulatory 
regime. It was demonstrated that there are novel statutory causes of action introduced 
in the CML, but as far as the inquiry in the present study is concerned, these are 
limited to fraudulent activities, which require a higher burden of proof. Hence, it was 
demonstrated that requirements of suitability and best execution in the event of breach 
are more likely to be privately enforced through traditional tort actions as developed 
by previous judicial tribunals. The chapter then examined how the regulatory 
requirements of suitability and best execution were introduced through the 
Implementing Regulations. It was shown that, although the duty of best execution is 
detailed enough to suit the present situation that prevails in Saudi Arabia of a single 
exchange in which securities trading takes place, a lack of incentives will undermine 
private enforcement of the rule once the Saudi market is capable of developing a 
multi-exchange system. As far as the regulatory duty of suitability of investment 
advice is concerned, it is shown that the regulatory regime is silent on how to 
differentiate between a sale process and a mere recommendation. In addition, the 
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CML regime fails to take into account the political economy of the securities markets 
in Saudi Arabia and the complexity of modern financial products when restricting the 
imposition of suitability to authorized persons advising on securities. This generates 
many questions that need to be addressed for the practical application of the rule so as 
to increase certainty, predictability and investor protection. Moreover, the fact that 
judicial decisions are not published in Saudi Arabia contributes to the persistence of 
uncertainty among both the general public and prospective foreign investors, given 
that practitioners may only obtain answers to such questions through their own 
litigation and not through recourse to any settled, clear and accessible legal principles. 
These issues of uncertainty are in direct conflict with both the importance of certainty 
and clarity of the law for efficient securities markets and the Saudi public policy of 
attracting foreign investment for the purpose of job creation and economic growth.  
 Throughout the discussion in chapter four, the analysis compared the 
treatment of suitability and best execution in financial intermediation under the Saudi 
regulatory regime with that in the UK. It was seen that the Saudi approach is not as 
effective as that in the UK in providing for or increasing certainty about the private 
enforcement of suitability and best execution. Whereas the U.K. provides a more 
appropriate institutional design for the private enforcement of regulations, the Saudi 
regime, which has been built on a way similar to that in U.S, relies on the courts to a 
large extent. Notwithstanding the differences in design for the private enforcement of 
securities markets regulations, it is pointed out that both countries are similar in other 
respects. The two countries provide less clarity as to how to comply, and subsequently 
detect violation, with the regulatory duty of suitability , whereas more clarity is 
available for the best execution duty. The two countries’ regulatory regimes are 
restrained from providing incentives for retail private investors for the enforcement of 
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best execution, where the costs involved are greater than the rewards or the benefits 
sought after by retail investors.  
    
Main Findings 	  
This thesis has derived findings of considerable interest from the comparative 
methodology adopted. A comparison of the two case studies reveals significant 
differences. The two countries have adopted different approaches to the institutional 
structure of their regulatory frameworks for securities markets. The UK developed a 
unified regulator responsible for the conduct of the business of practitioners in all 
financial sectors, whereas Saudi Arabia chose a separate regulator for each financial 
sector and confined to the CMA responsibility for securities markets. It is not within 
the remit of this thesis to examine the reasons behind these differences or the 
appropriateness of each type of institutional structure but, nevertheless, it must be 
pointed out that one difficulty identified in the Saudi approach is the existence of 
regulatory arbitrage created by modern financial products. 
 Perhaps surprisingly, notwithstanding these substantive differences, there are a 
number of similarities between the UK and Saudi Arabia. 
 Firstly, the two countries introduced regulatory frameworks for securities 
markets for the first time in attempting to implement policy decisions which would 
change their social and economic structures. Accordingly, the two countries provide 
examples of the use of law as an instrument in achieving economic policy. 
 Secondly, both countries impose the two duties on service providers in their 
countries not through primary legislation but via regulations introduced by the 
authorities responsible for regulating securities markets. Consequently, differences of 
perception among regulators concerning what a regulatory duty entails would affect 
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the implementation of the concept. This is proven by the fact that the two countries 
have developed their own perceptions of what suitability and best execution entail, 
and these are different from those currently predominant in the US where both duties 
originally developed. 
 Thirdly, both countries have incorporated private enforcement within their 
regulatory regime by providing a cause of action. Support for private enforcement is 
reflected in the introduction of statutory causes of action arising from a breach of the 
statutory framework. As far as this thesis is concerned, the FSMA directly permits 
private enforcement through a tort action for a breach of a statutory duty; whereas the 
CML relies on a less effective statutory cause of action in cases of fraud. 
 Finally, although the two countries associate the imposition of the duty of 
suitability with the provision of a recommendation, there is no clarity in practice in 
their regulatory regimes as to when a recommendation will be subject to the 
regulatory duties imposed to ensure its quality, including suitability. This creates 
further legal issues. For instance, the development of technology in communications 
and computer programming gives service providers the ability to provide their 
customers with automated financial advice online.846 Legal questions arising from 
such innovations include whether or not there is a need to ensure the quality of 
automated advice over the Internet using regulation. If the answer to this question is 
in the affirmative, a question arises as to the responsibilities of both investors and 
service providers concerning inappropriate advice in contrast to conventional means 
of providing financial advice or recommendation. The clarity of regulatory duties is 
important not only for private enforcement, but also for service providers in order for 
them to comply with regulatory requirements efficiently and at low cost. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
846 On this subject see, for example, Dimity Smith, ‘Financial Services Regulation and The Investor as 
Consumer’ in Geraint Howell and others (eds), Handbook on Research on International Consumer 
Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 475-476  
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 The thesis posed several questions in the introductory chapters which have 
been dealt with in the thesis thoroughly and promptly. It is thought appropriate to 
briefly provide answers in this conclusion chapter and to leave the reader with a sense 
of the relevant arguments and findings.  
 The main question of the thesis is whether or not regulatory duties, introduced 
on the basis of investor protection supported by private causes of action in secondary 
securities markets by retail investors, are effective to ensure the appropriate 
behavioural standards in these markets. The thesis has shown that, in both case 
studies, notwithstanding the recognition of the role of private enforcement, its 
effectiveness is questionable in practice due to the instruments chosen. In the UK, few 
cases have been brought based on s.150, while express provisions are made by the 
FSMA to permit investors to enforce a breach of a regulatory rule and seek damages. 
From the analysis of private enforcement in the UK, it is maintained that s.150 as it 
stands now might be unsuitable for the UK context; the fact that many complaints are 
brought before the FOS but are rejected on grounds of compensation limit indicates 
that there is a potential for private enforcement alongside public enforcement at best, 
or to make up for the lack of public enforcement at worst. The argument put forward 
here is that, even though the FOS was meant to increase access to justice rather than a 
means for private enforcement, it may be the only efficient and effective method 
available to retail investors.847 
 On the other hand, the lack of a case reporting system in Saudi Arabia makes 
it impossible to conclude with certainty as to the lack of effectiveness of the chosen 
instruments provided by the regulatory regime for private enforcement. However, the 
analysis in this thesis points out that the scope of the regulatory mechanism for 	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  Such a claim supports MacNeil’s description of s.150 as a ‘dead letter’ in MacNeil, ‘The Evolution 
of Regulatory Enforcement Action in the UK Capital Markets: A Case of ‘Less is More’? (n 579) 362	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private enforcement chosen by the regulatory regime is limited to breaches which 
involve fraud. Relying on courts to develop a right of action similar to the situation in 
the U.S. requires an independent, strong and trusted judiciary, which is absent in 
Saudi Arabia. Thus, it is argued that it is more plausible that suitability and best 
execution would be more effectively enforced privately through traditional tort 
actions.  
 Accordingly, it could be claimed that in both case studies the chosen 
regulatory instruments for the private enforcement by retail investors of applicable 
behavioural standards are ineffective. Detailed analysis of the factors that have 
influenced the effectiveness of the instruments as well as suggestions for increasing 
their efficiency have been summarised in the conclusions of each separate case study.  
 The current thesis posed several sub-questions in the introductory chapter that 
are worth detailing here. 
 The first involves whether or not policymakers should be concerned with the 
regulation of securities markets in general, and secondary securities markets in 
particular. 
 It was noted that there are compelling arguments showing the impact of the 
law concerning securities markets in reducing the costs of finance and improving the 
process of the allocation of resources. Secondary securities markets are of 
considerable importance since they increase trust in the primary markets as well as 
increasing the provision of credit and reducing the costs of finance. Given the impact 
of efficiency in securities markets on the broader economy, there is a social welfare 
consideration in maintaining their functioning. However, these markets depend on 
trust and information and, in the absence of regulations, informational disadvantages 
as well as opportunistic behaviour that decrease the integrity of these markets will 
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persist. Regulations, therefore, are needed to maintain the investors’ trust as well as 
ensuring a level of fair play between investors, issuers and other participants. 
 A second sub-question posed in the thesis asked whether or not the pursuit by 
the state of investor protection using specific laws, through the provision of regulatory 
obligations and remedies in secondary securities markets, is a desirable legal 
objective to justify the substitution of traditional principles of law.  
 Scholars have pointed that out spontaneous developments in traditional law 
are rarely adequate in financial markets in general for two reasons: firstly, the 
improvement of financial market law requires simultaneous changes in different legal 
rules;848 and, secondly, spontaneous developments in traditional law take far longer 
than the time limits imposed by a country’s specific challenges, such as the present 
need for privatisation or implementing a market orientation programme. Thus, it 
could be suggested that the natural evolution of traditional law is unsuitable in 
providing the needed substantive protection promptly.  
 As far as private enforcement is concerned, it is pointed out that traditional 
legal mechanisms are unlikely to be adequate; firstly, there are several problems with 
enforcement within the realm of retail investors in particular; and secondly, 
regulations introduced by a state are necessary to maintain investor confidence in 
times of crisis. It is possible that traditional legal mechanisms may or may not 
introduce such duties after a long period of litigations. But the urgent need to reassure 
investors can not be provided by traditional mechanisms within the time available.  
 Furthermore, the analysis in this thesis identifies three broad categories of 
justifications for regulations introduced by states on the basis of investor protection in 
securities markets, and financial markets in general: economic, moral and political. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
848 See Black (n 3)  
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was demonstrated that none of these justifications is sufficient on its own to justify 
every action taken by a state in securities markets, but, nonetheless, they provide the 
principal justifications for state intervention based on investor protection.  
 The economic explanations state that deterring malpractice is not an objective 
of securities regulations or state intervention per se; state ‘intervention’ seems likely 
to reduce the unnecessary misuse of resources as a result of the unwillingness of 
investors to invest or participate in financial markets. In other words, it is all about 
increasing the efficiency of securities markets; hence if markets are efficient there are 
no grounds for a state to intervene. Morality as a ground was suggested to be too 
broad to constitute a universally applicable explanation irrespective of context or the 
moral values of societies. Political theory was argued to limit state intervention to 
political motivations or threats of instability; it was proposed that if there is no risk to 
the political system, there is no need for the state to intervene. However, the literature 
on political motivations for state intervention suggests that a state could intervene, 
notwithstanding the nonexistence of any threat to political stability, moral duty or 
economic efficiency.  
 In short, traditional legal mechanisms and institutions are not appropriate for 
the protection of investors. There are many compelling arguments justifying state 
involvement to protect investors, which can be broadly categorised as economic, 
moral and political.  
 A third sub-question concerns what the effects are of the importation of legal 
rules and principles that have characteristics foreign to a national legal system, 
especially in the case of the regulation of secondary securities markets.  
 Initially, the thesis attempted to review the relevant literature to identify the 
types of law important for secondary securities markets and which are capable of 
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generating economic growth. The thorough discussion in chapter three demonstrated 
that there is still disagreement among scholars as to what types of legal rules are 
important for well-functioning secondary securities markets in general, and capital 
markets in particular. However, the list was narrowed to three areas of law: (1) 
corporate law; (2) securities law; and (3) trading law.  
 While it was argued that none of these three areas alone is capable of 
satisfying the needs of the different relationships identified in secondary securities 
markets, it was pointed out that the shares of many companies are able to enjoy a high 
level of liquidity and trading, which are factors considered to represent success, even 
though they are listed in legal systems that have different legal characteristics of 
corporate law from those in their home countries. Accordingly, it was suggested that, 
as far as the law of trading as an activity is concerned, there is a weak connection 
between trading rules and corporate law. Corporate law matters since it is often 
argued that convergence between systems based on common or civil law is unlikely 
because of irreconcilable theoretical differences between them as to corporate law. 
 Given that trading rules are weakly connected to corporate law, it follows that 
they are able to be borrowed and transplanted without any difficulties or negative 
impact on predictability and certainty.  
 In contextualising the theory in the present case studies, the thesis has shown 
that both regulatory duties of ‘suitability’ and ‘best execution’ were developed in the 
US and were transplanted to the UK and Saudi Arabia, and, hence, it is argued that 
both duties are foreign to the national legal systems of the case studies in the thesis. 
However, it was shown that there are substantive differences between the existing 
regulatory rules in the case studies from those in the country from which they were 
transplanted, namely the US. Interestingly, while the present thesis identified 
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differences between the traditional law and regulatory rules in the UK, no such legal 
pluralism has been identified. In fact, the substantive content and entitlements 
provided by the regulatory rules have prevailed.849 It was not possible to examine 
whether or not the same is happening in Saudi Arabia due to the lack of a case 
reporting system. Despite this, it was speculated that such a legal pluralism would 
exist due to the separation in the judicial system in Saudi Arabia of securities disputes 
from general law rather from the introduction of the duties themselves. In general, 
therefore, it seems that one should exercise caution before concluding that borrowing 
legal rules is a sufficient condition for legal pluralism within a legal system. 
 Accordingly, the conclusion drawn is that the substantive regulatory 
obligations introduced in the two countries are different from those in the source 
country. However, such a conclusion, on the face of it, seems to contradict the 
previous suggestion that, in theory, the regulatory duties concerning trading rules in 
secondary securities markets should have been transplanted into the national legal 
system without being changed.  
 Two possible explanations can be advanced for the existing differences. A 
possible explanation for this might be that, as a positive law enacted by the state, 
regulations are not intended to substitute for traditional law but to strengthen it and 
clarify its applicability and therefore need to be compatible with the institution of 
contract law of a country. The differences identified that exist, therefore, are a result 
of differences in traditional contract law.  
 Another possible explanation for this is the role of the authority in shaping the 
duty itself. The respective authorities have introduced both of the regulatory duties in 
both case studies, and hence it is the perception and the subjective judgement of the 
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  Hamilton (n 600) and discussion in ch 3	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regulator of what a regulatory duty entails that matters. This means that the 
entitlement and what the duty entails may not only depart from those of traditional 
law, but may also differ from time to time within one country. This suggests that, 
where it is possible for a regulatory duty to have several meanings, it is the view of 
the authority that counts.  
 The suggestion in the preceding paragraph leads to the conclusion that legal 
pluralism may occur not as a result of borrowing legal rules per se, but from the 
perception of the authority of what the legal rule is. This being the case, it follows that 
the effectiveness of a legal pluralism, once established, will depend strongly on the 
authority governing the markets itself. Such a conclusion may assist in enhancing our 
understanding of the role of the authority governing securities markets in the 
transplantation process in secondary securities markets. 
 It is also important to point out some preliminary remarks regarding the 
previous discussions. First, the two explanations are identified on the basis of our 
analysis as likely factors to influence the substantive obligations, but the analysis does 
not validate or negate either of them. It is possible for other, better, more accurate 
explanations, but they have not been identified in the analysis. Second, it should be 
emphasised that the conclusions are drawn from the analysis of the case studies 
included in the current thesis and, thus, it is important to be cautious since different 
criteria may result in different conclusions. For instance, the two duties examined are 
found to have existed before the intervention of the regulatory regime. It is not clear, 
however, if the suggestions would be valid in cases where introduced regulatory duty 
is novel, such as ‘know your customers’.  
 Moreover, whereas an analysis of the regulatory rules themselves suggested a 
lower possibility of pluralism, a broader view of the regulatory regime may reveal 
 328	  
external factors from the rules themselves which could create legal pluralism. In the 
UK, for example, the requirement of the FOS to be fair, just and reasonable resulted 
in its ability to depart from traditional legal principles and norms, and, hence, the 
existence of legal pluralism for the application of both suitability and best execution 
as regulatory duties. Thus, it could be suggested that regulatory duties transplanted 
from a different legal system, while they are a necessary, are not a sufficient condition 
for legal pluralism.   
 The final sub-question presented in the introduction is whether or not those 
who draft legislation and hence shape securities markets law within a country should 
take into account the social and political context in addition to economic and 
administrative considerations. 
 So far, the discussion has emphasised two main specifications for effective 
securities markets: (a) the need for the predictability and certainty of law as a criterion 
to lower the level of legal risks, which is then able to facilitate economic growth; and 
(b) a need to ensure that investors have confidence in securities markets and engage 
fully with these markets. It is the role of policymakers and draftsmen to strike the 
appropriate balance between protecting investors and encouraging capital formation. 
 Unfortunately, the findings in this thesis suggest that there is no easy answer 
or common rational foundation to guide such choices in securities markets regulations 
in general, or private enforcement in particular. The two countries have adopted 
different approaches to the institutional structure of their regulatory frameworks for 
securities markets. For instance, the UK developed a unified regulator responsible for 
the conduct of the business of practitioners in all financial sectors, whereas Saudi 
Arabia chose a separate regulator for each financial sector and confined to the CMA 
responsibility for securities markets.  
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 Such differences raise the question of whether or not the appropriate balance 
may differ from one country to another as far as suitability and best executions are 
concerned. It should be re-emphasised that the two regulatory duties of best execution 
and suitability were chosen in order to determine whether or not countries differ in 
their private enforcement of investor protection regulations in secondary securities 
markets. The thesis has shown that the two case study systems differ substantially and 
instrumentally. One of the more significant findings to emerge from the analysis of 
the private enforcement of regulatory duties is that regulatory doctrines are 
implemented differently through regulatory rules, even though participants put a high 
premium on achieving legal certainty and, accordingly, regulations are rationalized on 
the grounds, inter alia, that they reduce transaction costs by increasing certainty as 
well as maintaining investor confidence. 
 It was claimed in chapter two that, within the existing state of knowledge in 
the comparative literature on the private enforcement of securities market regulations, 
epistemological questions need to be addressed that are not answered by the currently 
promoted concepts of the optimal enforcement of securities market regulatory 
frameworks able to support economic growth. Nevertheless, in approaching the issue 
at hand, the thesis advanced three explanations for these differences. 
 Firstly, it could be hypothesised that differences exist between specific 
geopolitical entities in their regulatory regimes for secondary securities markets, 
including the private enforcement of regulations, because the economic policies that a 
society wishes to achieve differ. However, while this argument is powerful, it can be 
argued from a policy point of view that most countries state that their aim is to 
develop their securities markets in accordance with IOSCO’s objective and principles, 
which is based on investor trust. Such a claim, notwithstanding the fact that IOSCO 
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does not provide a framework for private enforcement, is supported by one of this 
study’s findings that suitability and best execution, as required by IOSCO principles, 
are found in both Saudi Arabia and the UK, but, nevertheless, they are implemented 
differently and different understandings exist of what they entail. Accordingly, it 
could be claimed that the impact of the policy on the structure of private enforcement 
of regulations is unclear, if not minimal. 
 Secondly, it may be hypothesised that differences arise because the policies 
pursued as well as the implementation process are affected by the costs of achieving 
different goals. To put this more clearly, some of these goals are explicit (regulatory 
objectives) and some are implicit (private interests). The implicit goals can be so 
strongly present and powerful as to affect the implementation process of policies and 
laws in such a way as to subvert the desired outcomes and stipulated methodologies 
developed to reflect accepted best practice as promoted by international organizations 
such as the IOSCO. Accordingly, the objective of investor protection, including 
private enforcement, is affected by national politics and differing cultures, particularly 
where there is a mismatch between what should have been done and what has been 
done. Subsequently, since it is common for private interest to prevail, differences 
between the political economies of countries result in different outcomes. This 
argument is supported in the analyses in chapter four which demonstrated that one 
problem identified in the UK regulatory regime was the restriction of private action 
for a breach of a regulatory rule, according to FS s.62A, to a ‘private person’. Despite 
criticism at the time, this was carried forward into the current regulatory framework 
through s.150 of the FSMA.   
 However, while this hypothesis seems sound on the face of it, underlying such 
a claim is the assumption that there is an agreement between policymakers in the two 
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countries as to the policy, strategy, and means of implementation to reach certain 
outcomes. This study’s analysis showed that there is no such detailed list of objective 
strategies and outcomes available to choose from and to be implemented, By way of 
illustration, the two countries differ as to the main objectives of the regulators as well 
as the instrument used to facilitate private enforcement of the regulatory framework. 
The two countries also differ in their regulatory regimes for private enforcement in 
implementation and indeed the relative importance of ensuring the perceived fairness 
of markets: the CML provides that the CMA should ensure that securities markets are 
fair, whereas the FSMA regime provides fairness as a standard to a class of investors 
eligible to bring a complaint before the FOS. 
 Finally, it can be hypothesised that, even when these policies are the same, 
they will be implemented differently and with different degrees of success because of 
the persistence of specific legal problems and contexts in which these legal rules are 
applied in secondary securities markets. The findings of this thesis support this 
premise. The legal differences are exemplified by the different legal instruments 
provided for private action: the FSMA through a tort for a breach of statutory duty, 
given the existence of such action in the previous regulatory regime; while the CML 
provides for a novel statutory anti-fraud cause of action given the uncertainty of the 
position of Shari’a law and Shari’a courts as well as the influence of foreign 
draftsmen. But so far, the analysis suggests that these legal problems do not impair an 
appropriate institutional design for the regulatory regime. The UK was able to 
introduce the financial ombudsmen scheme with binding awards upon service 
providers, subject to certain conditions. In contrast, the Saudi legal regime introduced 
the concept of regulatory private enforcement similar to that in the U.S. even though 
the country differs from the U.S both in substantial law and legal families.  
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 In short, policymakers in both case studies were able, notwithstanding such 
legal problems, to overcome them and introduce what was deemed appropriate in 
achieving the broader social policy objectives. This suggests that, whereas following 
taking account of the legal context and considerations is important, it should not 
impair draftsmen from introducing a new instrument for the private enforcement of 
regulations within the legal context. The next section considers what an optimal 
framework for private enforcement should look like. 
An Optimal Framework for Regulatory Private Enforcement 
  
In order to clarify how an optimal framework for the private enforcement of 
regulations aiming to protect retail investors is able to increase the deterrence effect of 
the regulations, it is better to attempt to summarise the arguments of the previous 
chapters; taking the factors in the reverse order to that in which we have introduced 
them.  
 Saudi Arabia has introduced a system similar to that in the U.S. where private 
enforcement for breach of the statute is expressly provided; for instance, in cases of 
price manipulation. However, as far as suitability and best execution are concerned, 
whereas no direct right of enforcement is provided, it has been suggested that it is 
possible that a right for a private action would be recognised by reliance on the anti-
fraud provision within CML. Another possible way to enforce the regulatory duties of 
suitability and best executions provided by the analysis in this thesis is through 
traditional tort actions. Thus, it is argued that it is more plausible that suitability and 
best execution would be more effectively enforced privately through traditional tort 
actions in order to avoid the higher burden of proof of fraud. But in both cases, 
however, a more central role for courts is relied on for effective enforcement, and that 
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is likely to re-introduce problems of the shortcomings of private enforcement 
identified within the U.S. legal context. Whereas absence of a class-action system 
may be likely to eliminate problems of over-enforcement, legal uncertainty as to the 
complexity of interaction between regulatory duties and traditional law persists. Such 
ambiguity is unlikely to support the development of law of securities markets in Saudi 
Arabia, given the lack of clarity and uncertainty about legal rules advanced by 
participants, academics and international organizations. Additionally, given that 
participants put a high premium on achieving legal certainty and, accordingly, 
regulations are rationalized on the ground, inter alia, that they reduce transaction 
costs by increasing certainty, the lack of a case reporting system in Saudi Arabia 
makes it impossible to conclude with certainty what the law is.  The lack of clarity of 
the law has been pointed out in chapter two to be a substantial obstacle to 
enforcement, and given increased complexity and lack of clarity, it is reasonable to 
expect a low level of enforcement.  
 In contrast, the UK relies on a right of action based on tort for breach of 
statutory duties in terms of a breach of the rules imposed by the authority. This 
approach provides a clear recognition of the role of private enforcement while at the 
same time relies on the authority to decide its scope through identifying these rules 
which can be enforced privately and by which classes of investors. The institutional 
design of private enforcement has limited the power of the authority by providing 
such a right to a specific class of investors identified by the Treasury as ‘private 
investors’. Thus, as far as enforcement by retail investors is concerned, there are three 
terms which may possible represent the concept of retail investors: ‘private investors’, 
‘retail client’ and ‘eligible complainant’. As a result, few cases have been brought 
based on s.150, while express provisions are made by the FSMA to permit investors 
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to enforce a breach of a regulatory rule and seek damages. From the analysis of 
private enforcement in the UK, it is maintained that s.150 as it stands now might be 
unsuitable for the UK context; the fact that many complaints which are brought before 
the FOS and are rejected because of the cap limits, indicates that there is a potential 
for private enforcement alongside public enforcement at best, or to make up for the 
lack of public enforcement at worst.  
 But it was argued in chapter two that private enforcement should be able to 
increase the deterrence effects of regulations by providing additional sources for 
enforcement, compensate for lax enforcement and provide clarity of the law. An 
effective regulatory private enforcement designed to achieve this should deal 
effectively with three issues: (a) context-specific information about the regulatory 
problem; (b) the characteristics of the potential private plaintiffs; and (c) the effect of 
private enforcement on public enforcement efforts.  
In terms of the institutional design of private enforcement, it is presumed that 
reliance on the judiciary for an implied right of action is likely to be inadequate, since 
it may result in over-enforcement and thus conflict with the deterrence objective of 
the regulations, as exemplified in the U.S., even before taking into account issues of 
the independence and resources of the judiciary as necessary conditions for the 
effective role of courts in securities markets.  
Moreover, the effect of private enforcement on public enforcement efforts is 
maintained to depend on the overall public enforcement policy and strategy, which 
varies in practice and applications. But there is also the question of how regulations, 
such as those concerning suitability and best execution, that are intended to interfere 
with contractual relations can be adequately publicly enforced given that the analysis 
suggests that private agents are in a better position to identify violation. Public 
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enforcement is more effective in primary markets where regulations are able to 
standardise the terms of contracts and liabilities between issuers and subscribers. 
However, for secondary securities markets, enforcement agencies lack the ability to 
standardise the terms of contracts in similar vein to primary markets, and it is unclear 
how compliance with regulatory duties for these contracts can be supervised. Private 
agents, therefore, are more likely to be able to detect violations.  
Having said that, the public agency responsible for regulating securities 
markets, as part of the executive branch, may be in a better position than the 
legislative or judiciary branches to make judgements as to when and how private 
enforcement is likely to increase the deterrence effect of regulations. In line with 
arguments advanced by supporters of public enforcement,851 the regulatory agency 
has more knowledge, experience and resources to determine both the regulatory 
problems and what regulations aim for. Therefore, the regulatory agency has more 
experience and knowledge of the regulatory problems for which a specific regulatory 
duty is imposed. It follows that the agency is likely to be able to deal with the third 
issue concerning the effectiveness of private enforcement by measuring how and 
when best private enforcement complements public enforcement so as to support the 
agency’s enforcement chosen policy and strategy. Therefore, the best policy solution 
is likely to be to delegate decisions regarding the extent and scope of private 
enforcement to the agency rather than leaving them to the courts.   
Considering the significant role of the regulatory agency in current securities 
markets regulatory regimes, the two case studies also suggest that there is a 
significant role for this authority in the distribution of legal rights among 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
851 See ch 2 Part II 
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participants.852 In this thesis the subtle role of the authority has been emphasized in 
this process in determining who is eligible for substantive regulatory protection. The 
role of the FSA in determining the scope of private enforcement through the 
definition of ‘retail clients’ as a class of investors in need of additional regulatory 
protection, supports such a proposition. The position of the CMA in Saudi Arabia is 
similar, but with less clarity concerning outcomes due to the definition of a 
‘customer’ for the purpose of the Implementing Regulations.   
Given that current regulatory practices, as exemplified by the U.K. and Saudi 
Arabia, invest considerable authority and power in the regulatory agency in securities 
markets, it is a question of how to design a regulatory structure which can take 
advantages of such practices with the objective of enhancing the role of private 
enforcement.  
It is argued that the institutional design for private enforcement should take into 
account the characteristics of retail investors when it comes to enforcement through 
litigation. It is pointed out that three variables are of importance: retail investors do 
not know they have a right to action; the substantive law is unclear, which increases 
the difficulties of litigation and uncertainty about its outcome; and there is a lack of 
incentives to pursue a cause of action. The characteristics of retail investors should be 
accorded higher significance, as the analysis in this thesis shows; whereas in Saudi 
Arabia it is argued that the difficulty is caused by the reliance on courts to imply such 
a right for action which increase uncertainty, the U.K.’s framework neglects the 
characteristics in retail investors for lacking the incentive to pursue a legal action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852 It should be noted that there is no issue with the distribution of legal rights through regulation since 
it is asserted that regulations are instruments used not only to prescribe the economic conduct of 
individuals in certain ways, but which can also be used to define spheres of influence, including the 
creation of rights.Hans Jarass, ‘Regulation as an Instrument of Economic Policy’ in Terence Daintith 
(edt), Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and Critical Approaches (Walter de 
Gruyter 1988) 79 
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It also suggested previously that it is the regulatory agency which is best suited 
to answer several questions as to the regulatory problems as well as the impact of 
private enforcement on the public enforcement. It is suggested, subsequently, an 
optimal framework for private enforcement should be relying on the regulatory 
agency to some extent.  
Therefore, such an optimal framework for private enforcement should depend 
on a statutory cause of action with reliance on the regulatory agency, and also it could 
take into account the characteristics of retail investors and provide statutory remedies 
to enhance the role of private enforcement. There are many remedies available, some 
of which would aim to provide additional economic incentives, such as punitive 
damages or allowing for a class-action system, while others would involve the design 
of the right of action such as limitation periods, the burden of proof required and 
levels of compensation.  
Accordingly, the optimal framework suggested by this thesis is one where the 
regulatory regime relies on the regulatory agency to determine what regulatory duties 
should be privately enforced by a right of action provided by the statute, taking into 
account the regulatory problems as well as the impact of private actions on public 
enforcement. The draftsmen of a statute should take into account certain shortcomings 
in the remedies in traditional private law identified within the national legal systems 
that might impair private action by retail investors, which could be corrected through 
the statute. It could be even possible, if there were adequate checks on the power of 
the regulatory agency, to allow the authority to preempt or bar specific remedies 
provided by the statute for specific breaches or particular regulatory duties.  
A starting point for such a framework for private enforcement should be to look 
at s.150 in the U.K. rather than at s.10-(b) in the U.S. for the creation of the effective, 
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efficient private enforcement of regulations for securities markets. In fact, the 
framework introduced in the UK which relies on tort for a breach of statutory duty 
provides a blueprint that could be promoted internationally. First, it gives the 
regulatory authority the power to determine what regulatory duties could be privately 
enforced; secondly, it clearly institutes private enforcement within the institutional 
regulatory design; and thirdly, and most importantly, it takes into account the 
traditional law principles such as reliance and causation upon which the regulatory 
regime can rely. Finally, the U.K. approach permits flexibility for private enforcement 
to be restricted to specific classes of investors and not be available to all investors.  
Two caveats need to be noted regarding the proposed framework. This is not the 
first study to argue for a framework which relies on the discretion of public agency in 
securities markets to control private enforcement.853 The previous researches have 
been based mainly on the analysis of and recommendations for the U.S. context. The 
proposal in this thesis has been built on the insights of prior work to make a more 
comprehensive and substantive argument for the broad delegation of power to 
regulatory agencies for securities markets concerning the existence and scope of 
private remedies. The thesis has surveyed existing practices in the two countries to 
identity the different frameworks available, and to subsequently propose a framework 
on the basis of the advantages and disadvantages identified in each case study. An 
important and practical finding is that, in building their regulatory regimes, other 
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countries should not look at the U.S. but rather at the U.K. for an effective regulatory 
private enforcement.  
A second caveat in the analysis is the reliance in developed countries on 
alternative disputes resolutions or complaints systems as a means to solve complaints 
by retail investors in securities markets is evident. The cost and complexity of 
litigation as well as the interest of retail investors in concrete and immediate 
resolution means that ‘ombudsmen services, small claims tribunals, mediation 
services and other ADR techniques are central to the resolution of retail claims’.854 
Within the EU, for example, the ADR rather than a right of action appears to be the 
best choice for a redress mechanism in the harmonised regulatory regime.855 Moloney 
correctly identified the suitability of ADR for the EU project rather than a right of 
action, since ‘it avoids some of the difficult questions concerning remedies and 
procedures which are engaged with civil redress through the courts.’856  
Notwithstanding its benefits, such schemes rely more on the compensatory 
element rather than deterrence, which is not within the scope of this analysis. 
Furthermore, the reliance on the ADR process neglects an important element of the 
benefit of private enforcement, which is to spell out and provide certainty about the 
substantive law. In some cases, however, this may lead to confusion as to how to 
comply with securities markets regulations. For instance, in case of the FOS in the 
UK, the ability of ombudsmen to reach conclusions on the basis of what is ‘fair’, 
combined with their ability to depart from law, creates difficulties for financial firms 
in terms of how to comply with regulations.857 Particularly, the FSA imposes 
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857 See ch 3 Part II 
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regulations and the FOS awards require them to comply with regulation in a fair and 
reasonable way. Through its principles the FSA requires firms to treat their customers 
fairly, but it is possible that a gap may exist between the FSA’s perspective and the 
FOS. Such a gap is what critics of private enforcement warn about. That is not to say 
that the FOS is harmful, and indeed, the FOS is a good illustration from the 
perspective of distributive justice. However, from a deterrence perspective, the FOS 
in fact does not add to the deterrence benefits of the enforcement of regulations.  
Overall, the design of an appropriate private enforcement framework for 
securities market regulations is a difficult but crucial task. While the foregoing 
discussion follows straightforwardly from analysis of the role of the enforcement of 
securities regulations, it also requires further reflection on administrative and 
constitutional law within a country. For instance, an optimal framework should take 
into account ensuring that the authority does not abuse its power and how and when to 
permit retail investors to sue the agency if its does not use its discretion or misuses it, 
or both. Such considerations should be answered within the specific constitutional, 
administrative and legal contexts, since what works for one country may not work for 
another. However, the paradigm for private enforcement proposed in this thesis 
should be able to take into account national differences more effectively and 
efficiently to achieve the broader social policy objectives underpinning securities 
markets regulations. The discussion in the next section therefore makes some 
recommendations for reform based on the proposed framework.   
Recommendations for Reform 
 
The UK    
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It was suggested in the conclusion of chapter three that there was room for some 
reform in order to enable the regulatory regime to serve the important underlying 
objective of enhancing the efficiency of the economy through increasing private 
enforcement through s.150. However, the UK government announced its intention to 
reform the law of financial markets during the writing of the present thesis. 
 The new institutional structure will give more consideration to regulations 
concerned with the conduct of business. The current government expresses the view 
that ‘the regulation of conduct in financial services has not always received the 
attention and focus that it requires within the integrated FSA’ even though the 
regulation of conduct ‘has a fundamental role to play in protecting and enhancing that 
confidence in the UK financial system’.858 In the opinion of the government, there 
should be ‘effective conduct regulation’ capable of ‘protecting and enhancing 
consumer confidence’ by, firstly, ‘setting out the standards to which firms are 
expected to adhere’; and, secondly, ‘monitoring and enforcing compliance by firms 
with these standards’.859 The rationale for such a perspective on the conduct of 
business regulations is the assumption that the willingness of investors to ‘enter into 
financial transactions will ultimately depend on the extent to which they have 
confidence that regulated firms will conduct themselves appropriately’.860 To achieve 
the desired end with regards to conduct regulation, a new institutional structure is 
needed to give this type of regulation ‘the required mandate and prominence’ by 
establishing ‘a separate and focused conduct regulator with tailored objectives, 
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functions and powers’.861 The proposed new authority will be named the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA).  
 As far as retail investors are concerned, the FCA is expected to depart from 
the FSA’s previous approach of ‘scrutinising sales processes to make sure that 
customers were treated fairly and received appropriate and transparent information’. It 
will now intervene ‘in the early stages of the product lifecycle where appropriate to 
deliver better outcomes for retail customers’.862 Accordingly, the FCA will develop a 
‘proactive, interventionist approach’ with ‘a greater use of judgement, with the 
regulator using its expertise to judge where consumer detriment is most likely to 
occur, and intervene, on a forward-looking basis’.863  
 Interestingly, in line with the criticism offered in this study of the reliance on 
the disclosure approach to regulatory duties, the government admits that ‘relying on 
the disclosure of information has not proven to be effective in preventing consumer 
detriment and protecting consumers’.864 Thus, the government is effectively relying 
on the judgement of the regulator to determine the appropriateness of financial 
products for retail investors, rather than the choices made by the retail investors 
themselves. To that end, the FCA is given a variety of powers to intervene, such as 
blocking a financial product before it reaches volume sales and declaring the 
unenforceability of contracts, without even the existence of ‘widespread consumer 
detriment’.865  
 Thus, it is reasonable to expect that more consideration will be devoted to 
conduct regulation in the proposed regime, and it is likely that the FCA will be the 
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authority responsible for introducing and enforcing the duties of both suitability and 
best execution. 
 Regardless of any new institutional structure that will be in place, if the 
proposed regulatory regime will rely on an instrument similar to s.150 for private 
enforcement, then the argument made in this thesis concerning ineffectiveness of 
s.150 to facilitate private enforcement and deter malpractice remains valid. Moreover, 
the FCA should avoid some of the shortcomings identified in the COBS in respect of 
the classification of investors, the suitability of advice and best execution which have 
increased the ambiguity of the substantive law and are negatively affecting private 
enforcement.     
 Accordingly, and in answering the question as to the way forward and what 
courses of action could be suggested for improvement, the discussion in this research 
has highlighted many areas of concern. 
 Firstly, unless both the ambit and exact meanings of the requirement of 
suitability and what constitutes a personal recommendation are clearly defined, no 
improvement in private enforcement will be attained. Certainly, considerable 
improvement would have been achieved should the suitability duty imposed be seen 
as coterminous with a duty to achieve something (or a specified outcome) rather than 
to make reasonable efforts or take reasonable care. However, that would be difficult 
since it is unreasonable to hold a financial adviser to the outcome of products whose 
future performance is inherently uncertain, and it may reduce the engagement of 
service providers in advisory activities. One suggestion would be to detach the 
requirement of suitability from the requirement of advice and impose it on the selling 
process with the objective of ensuring that retail investors are not mis-sold unsuitable 
financial products. Another suggestion would be to provide more guidance as to when 
 344	  
financial advice should be considered a ‘personal recommendation’ under the 
proposed regulatory regime. One area of concerns is how suitability should be 
construed in relation to Internet activities; given that developments in technology and 
innovations in approaches to sales and distribution are still likely to create 
uncertainty.  
 Secondly, there is a need for legislative intervention to enhance the role of 
private enforcement. The present research suggests two areas that need attention: (1) a 
new punitive damages remedy for financial disputes should be introduced; and (2) a 
system similar to class-action in the US should be introduced at least within the 
financial services framework. The nature of certain regulatory rules, exemplified in 
this research by best execution, suggests that there is a need for these changes in order 
for these rules to be effective in private enforcement. The optimal situation would be 
to provide for punitive damages and a system similar to a class-action in the US, at 
least for financial services.  
 The idea of seeking damages for a group of investors is not unfamiliar within 
the FSMA regulatory regime or the English legal system in general. For example, Part 
XXV, s.382 of the FSMA gives the FSA the right to seek restitution through a court 
order from firms that have made profits or caused losses by acting in contravention of 
the regulatory requirements.866 Moreover, the English civil litigation system 
recognises multi-party procedures in the form of ‘group litigation’ and ‘representative 
proceedings’867 which, unlike the class-action system in the US,868 have had only a 
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slight impact.869 Nevertheless, it is possible to extend these rights, with some 
amendment, by permitting investors to sue on behalf of each other. Further research 
might explore the applicability of such an idea to the English legal system. 
 Lastly, the approach to a diversity of classes of investors who enjoy different 
levels of substantive protection given by the regulations on different grounds needs to 
be amended. For the sake of certainty and clarity, a unified rationale for the protection 
of retail investors should be adopted, which would decrease the costs accruing to 
service providers. This could be achieved by restricting disputes which include the 
unified class of investors to the sole jurisdiction of the FOS. It would be possible for 
some to opt out of protection once they understood the consequences. In this case, 
financial firms would be able to assess the risk, including the legal risk of fairness, 
and including the applicability of the Principles to their business. Such an approach 
would not only furnish an element of fairness combined with the principles 
established in English law, but also provide certainty to legitimate legal expectations 
among both investors and service providers at the time of transacting. 
Saudi Arabia 
 
Given that Saudi policymakers introduced the CML, amongst other legislation, in 
response to the need for internal growth and job creation, it could be suggested that 
more substantive reform is needed in order for securities markets to achieve the wider 
social policy objectives. Developing securities markets is an ongoing process and 
policies aiming for such an objective ‘should be persistent over a somewhat 
prolonged period of time’.870 There is no better time than now given the higher prices 
of oil; and empirical studies suggest that financial markets in oil-rich countries such 	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as Saudi Arabia tend to enhance economic growth gradually and in the long run 
following economic growth.871 Thus, additional reforms taking into consideration the 
shortcomings of the current regulatory system are likely to support the economic 
growth expected later.  
 Indeed, in its assessment of Saudi financial markets, the IMF states that efforts 
made by the governments are praiseworthy, but insisted that ‘additional reforms could 
accelerate market deepening and the system’s capacity for risk diversification’.872 
Accordingly, it could be argued that further changes are needed to comply with 
international standards.  
 However, given the ad hoc approach of Saudi policymakers to legal issues, as 
identified in this research, it is not expected that any such reforms will be seriously 
considered unless and until a major crisis occurs. One benefit of these 
recommendations, nevertheless, is that they are available to policymakers once they 
do decide to conduct legal reform. The discussion in this thesis highlights many areas 
of concern.  
 Firstly, unless both suitability and personal recommendations are clearly 
defined, it would be difficult both for investors to enforce suitability and best 
execution and for service providers to determine whether or not a regulatory 
requirement has been fulfilled. This problem has been noted in the UK legal context 
where judicial judgements are published, and therefore it is reasonable to maintain 
that the problem is more acute in Saudi Arabia where there is no such publication.873 	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The regulator in Saudi Arabia would benefit from the recommendations advanced in 
the chapter three which examined the UK, but a step in the right direction would be to 
start by publishing decisions made by the CRSD and its appeals.  
 Secondly, there is a need for legislative intervention to increase the role of 
private enforcement in the CML regulatory regime in two areas. First, the Saudi 
context already suffers from high levels of uncertainty and, given the absence of 
general principles and the lack of published judgements, a reliance on traditional tort 
actions for the enforcement of regulatory duties as in the US increases uncertainty. A 
more appropriate approach that would suit the Saudi context is an instrument similar 
to s.150 provided by the FSMA in the UK, where a clear and direct right is provided 
in tort but it is left to the authority to decide the actionability of a given regulatory 
rule. This then avoids problems with the theoretical justifications of imposing 
suitability and best execution in normal tort actions. Second, given the importance of 
collective private enforcement as noted above in the UK and its absence in the Saudi 
legal system, it would be beneficial to provide the authority initially with the powers 
to enforce and seek damages on behalf of clients in a similar way to s.382 and 384 in 
the FSMA. A second step would be to provide a mechanism for collective 
enforcement, which has been critical not only for enforcement but also for the 
development of regulatory duties.    
 Thirdly, the definition of ‘investment advice’ subject to the jurisdiction of the 
CML regulatory regime should be amended.  It is argued that the definition does not 
take into account the structure of financial markets in Saudi Arabia or the complexity 
inherent in structured financial products. However, caution must be exercised before 
suggesting either that all recommendations relating to securities be included within 	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the jurisdiction of the CML, because this would include service providers from other 
sectors, or that all advice provided by authorised persons including recommendations 
as to non-securities should be under the CML, since this would be problematic given 
that there is no guidance or systematic approach to deal with overlapping jurisdictions 
among the regulators of different financial sectors. A better approach would be to 
subject all financial advice provided by authorised persons to the jurisdiction of the 
CML, and at the same time to provide fast and effective means to settle disputes 
relating to overlapping jurisdictions among regulators or tribunals. Such amendments 
are likely to facilitate private enforcement and compliance with the regulations.  
 Fourthly, the application of Shari’a principles should be developed to 
accommodate current circumstances so that its rulings can be codified without 
prejudice towards its established values. The provisions in the CML in relation to the 
amounts of damages and causation are good models that could be followed in such 
codification.  
 Fifthly, transparency and public access to law should be improved. 
Transparency is one of the most important elements of any successful legal system, 
but is largely lacking in Saudi Arabia. Details of the outcomes and reasoning in all 
cases should be published and the relevant provisions of the law of the judiciary with 
regard to the publication of court proceedings should be activated. This is necessary, 
as has been demonstrated in the present research, because with the CML as it stands 
now, a critical role is ascribed to the judiciary to clarify regulatory obligations and the 
scope of private enforcement. For example, it is unclear how suitability provisions in 
the Implementing Regulations will be construed in the light of the principles for 
business and statutory fiduciary duties. Furthermore, this would help in allowing the 
understanding of the position of Saudi law not only in relation to regulatory duties, 
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but also in constructing general principles of contracts, tort and obligations applicable 
to modern commercial and financial transactions. 
 Sixthly, the role of the formal stock-exchange (Tadawul) within the 
institutional arrangements should be reduced. The current arrangements do not take 
into account widely accepted international standards published by the World Bank, 
and neither will it be workable once the exchange becomes a listed company and 
faces competition.  
 Finally, the CML should clearly define certain important procedural issues, 
such as the limitation of the periods of disputes which arise within the CML 
framework. The present wording of the CML may suggest that the limitation period is 
restricted to the statutory cause of actions, and hence there is no time limitation on 
traditional tort.  
Limitations of the Research 
 
As with any other study concerning Saudi Arabia, the present author has struggled 
with many issues including the lack of publicly available information, details of court 
decisions and other official documents. Although tribunals are obliged to publish their 
decisions, the CRSD treats all of its decisions as secret. An attempt to gain access 
using personal connections to certain judicial decisions was of no avail on the grounds 
that the names of the parties to disputes should not be publicised. The Saudi system 
could never have been properly evaluated without the availability of the research 
paper by Beach or the single publication of the CSBD’s general principles. These two 
publications were of great help in identifying policy considerations and the general 
principles of traditional tort law applicable to the resolution of financial disputes. 
Other problems, such as the paucity of literature on Saudi law in general and Saudi 
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financial law in particular, as well as on the impact of regulation on Shari’a principles 
as applied in Saudi Arabia, were obvious difficulties encountered on many occasions. 
The reader should also be reminded that, although some Arabic books in addition to 
some PhD theses have referred to these topics, they are usually somewhat descriptive, 
do not attempt to introduce any fundamental critical perspective on the Saudi legal 
system as a whole, and tend to be concerned mainly with the problem of the 
prohibition on interest in Islam and banking disputes.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
     
This thesis has identified many areas worthy of research in both countries. However, 
one of the main findings of this research is the observation in both countries of the 
importance of traditional tort law principles in the private enforcement of securities 
regulation. It is one thing to suggest that a pattern exists; it is quite another to do 
something useful with it. Thus, future comparative research may study whether or not 
divergence among countries with respect to the private enforcement of securities 
regulation may persist due to differences in traditional tort law. Of more practical 
importance for policymakers and draftsmen is how best to utilize traditional tort law in 
the private enforcement of securities regulation. The UK experience through an 
express action of tort for a breach of statutory duty is an example that could work as a 
model for such use, but caution should be exercised to avoid some of the issues 
identified in this thesis concerning its effectiveness as well as how a similar 
instrument would be effective in different legal systems such as those based on civil 
law or on a religious order such as Sharia law. While this thesis has proposed an 
optimal framework to accommodate such concerns, regulatory duties may still 
influence standards of care imposed by traditional law. Therefore, how securities 
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regulations eventually influence the substantive institution of private law, such as tort 
and contract, would be well worth examining. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 352	  
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY  
 
 
 
 
 
Books 
 
• Andrews N, English Civil Procedure: Fundamentals of the New Civil Justice 
System (OUP 2003) 
• Antwerp W, The Stock Exchange From Within (1st published in 1913, Arno 
Press, 1975) 
• Atiyah P, Promises, Morals, and Law (Clarendon Press 1981) 
• Baamir A, Shari'a Law in Commercial and Banking Arbitration: Law and 
Practice in Saudi Arabia (Ashgate 2010) 
• Bagehot W, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market, (1873), 
(Orion Editions 1991) 
• Bagheri M, International Contracts and National Economic Regulation: 
Dispute Resolution (Kluwer 2000) 
• Bailey R, The Economics of Financial Markets (CUP 2005) 
• Baldwin R and Cave M, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and 
Practice (OUP 1999) 
• Baldwin R, Scott C and Hood C, A Reader On Regulation (OUP 1998) 
• Ballantyne W, Essays and Addresses on Arab Laws (Curzon 2000) 
• Banner S, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political Roots 
(1690-1860 ) (CUP 2002) 
• Barr N, Economics Welfare State (3 ed, Stanford University Press 1998) 
• Beatty J and Samuelson S, Introduction to Business Law (South-Western 
Cengage Learning 2010) 
• Benjamin J, Financial Law (OUP 2007) 
• Benston G, Regulating Financial Markets: A Critique and Some Proposals 
(Inst. of Economic Affairs 1998) 
• Bernstein M, Regulating Business By Independent Commission (Princeton 
University Press 1995) 
 353	  
• Bhatia R, Encyclopaedia of Investment Management (Anmol Publications 
2000) 
• Bines H and Thel S, Investment Management Law and Regulation (Aspen 
2004) 
• Black J, Rules and Regulators (Clarendon Press 1997) 
• Black J, Cranston R and Scott C,, Cranston's Consumers and the Law, 
(Butterworths 2000) 
• Blair M, Financial Services, the New Core Rules (Blackstone 1991) 
• Blair M and Walker G, Financial Markets and Exchanges Law (OUP 2007) 
• Borrie G, The Development of Consumer Law and Policy: Bold Spirits and 
Timorous Souls (Stevens & Sons 1984) 
• Bortolotti B and Siniscalco D, The Challenges of Privatization: An 
International Analysis (OUP 2004) 
• Braithwaite J, Regulatory Capitalism: How It Works, Ideas for Making It 
Work Better (Elgar 2008) 
• Carmichael J and Pomerleano M, The Development and Regulation of Non-
bank Financial Institutions (World Bank 2002) 
• Cartwright P, Banks, Consumers, and Regulations (Hart 2004) 
• Casey J and Lannoo K, The MiFID Revolution (CUP 2008) 
• Chaturvedi S, Financial Management: Entailing Planning for the Future 
(Global India 2009) 
• Cherednychenko O, Fundamental Rights, Contract law and the Protection of 
the Weaker Party (European Law 2007) 
• Chiba M, Asian Indigenous Law: In Interaction With Received Law (KPI 
1986) 
• Chiue I, Regulatory Convergence in EU Securities Regulation (Wolters 
Kluwer 2008) 
• Choudhry M and others, Capital Market Instruments: Analysis and Valuation 
(Financial Times Prentice Hall 2001) 
• Choudhry M, The REPO Handbook (Elsevier 2002) 
• Cirasino M and others, Payments and Securities Settlement Systems in Latin 
America (World Bank 2006) 
• Coates D, Models of Capitalism: Debating Strengths and Weaknesses 
(Edward Elgar 2002) 
 354	  
• Collins H, Regulating Contracts, (OUP 1999) 
• Connolly D, The UK Trader's Bible: The Complete Guide to Trading the UK 
Stock Market (Harriman House 2005) 
• Cordesman A, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century (Greenwood 
2003) 
• Curley M and Walker J, Barron's How To Prepare For The Stockbroker 
Examination (series 7, Barrons 2005) 
• Darwiche F and Darwiche F, The Gulf Stock Exchange Crash: The Rise and 
Fall of the Souq Al-Manakh (Croom Helm 1986) 
• De Cruz P, Comparative Law in a Changing World, (Routledge-Cavendish 
2007) 
• De Soto H, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and 
Fails Everywhere Else (Black Swan 2001) 
• Downes J and Goodman J, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 
(Barron’s Educational Series 2003) 
• Easterbrook F and Fischel D, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 
(Harvard University 1991) 
• Elliott C and Quinn F, Contract Law (Pearson Longman 2007) 
• Farsy F, Saudi Arabia (Kegan Paul 1986) 
• Federal Research Division, Saudi Arabia A Country Study (Kessinger 
Publishing 2004) 
• Forssbaeck J and Oxelheim L, Money Markets and Politics: A Study of 
European Financial Integration and Monetary Policy Options (Edward Elgar 
2003) 
• Geva B, Bank Collections and Payment Transactions: Comparative Study of 
Legal Aspects, (OUP 2001) 
• Glenn H, Legal Traditions of the World (2ed ed, OUP 2004) 
• _______ Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (OUP 
2007) 
• Gomiz C, Financial Markets Institutions And Financial Services, (New Delhi, 
Prentice-Hall, 2008) 
• Goodhart C, The Central Bank and the Financial System (MIT Press 1995) 
• _________  Financial Regulation: Why, How, and Where Now? (Routledge 
1999) 
 355	  
• Gras N, An Introduction to Economic History, (Harper and Bros. 1922) 
• Green E and others, U.S. Regulation of the International Securities and 
Derivatives Markets: Volume 1 (9ed, Aspen Publication 2006) 
• Gurusamy S, Essentials Of Financial Services (2 ed, McGraw-Hill 2009) 
• Halliday S, Judicial Review and Compliance with Administrative Law, (Hart 
Publishing 2004) 
• Harpwood V, Modern Tort Law (7th ed., Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 
• Harris R and Milkis S, The Politics of Regulatory Change: A Tale of Two 
Agencies (OUP 1996) 
• Harris L, Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners 
(OUP 2003) 
• Hayek F, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago press 1960) 
• Hood C, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals (Open University Press 1994) 
• Hood C and others, Regulation Inside Government: Waste Watchers, Quality 
Police, and Sleaze-Busters (OUP 1999) 
• Hooker M, Legal Pluralism : An Introduction To Colonial and Neo-colonial 
Laws (Clarendon Press 1975) 
• Horn M, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice 
in the Public Sector (CUP 1995) 
• Howells G and Weatherill S, Consumer Protection Law (Ashgate 2005) 
• Hudson A, Credit derivatives: Law, Regulation and Accounting Issues (Sweet 
& Maxwell 1999) 
• ________ Securities Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 
• ________ The Law of Finance (Sweet & Maxwell 2009) 
• IMF, Saudi Arabia: Financial System Stability Assessment including Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes on the Following Topics, 
Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency, Banking Supervision, and 
Payment Systems (IMF 2006)  
• ____  United Kingdom: Financial Sector Assessment Program Technical 
Notes and Detailed Standards Assessments (IMF 2003) 
• Ingham G, Capitalisms Divided: The City and Industry British Social 
Development (Schocken 1984) 
• Jackson R and Powell J, Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability (Sweet & 
Maxwell 2007) 
 356	  
• Johnson N, Jefferies P and Ming Hui P, Financial Market Complexity (OUP 
2003) 
• Johnson P and Hazen T, Derivatives Regulations (Aspen 2004) 
• Kay J, ‘Narrow Banking: The Reform of Banking Regulation’ (Centre for the 
Study of Financial Innovation 2009) 
• Kroszner R, Is the Financial System Politically Independent? Perspectives on 
the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulation (University of 
Chicago 1999) 
• Leyland P and Wood T, Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old 
Constraints and New Horizons (Blackstone 1997) 
• Lopez-de- Silanse F, A Survey of Securities Laws and Enforcement (World 
Bank 2004) 
• Loss L and Seligman J, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (Aspen 2003) 
• MacNeil I, An Introduction to the Law on Financial Investment (Hart 
Publishing 2005) 
• Malkiel B, A Random Walk Down Wall Street: A Time-Tested Strategy for 
Successful Investing (Norton 1999) 
• Mathieson D and Schinasi G, International Capital Markets: Developments, 
Prospects, and Key Policy Issues (IMF 1999) 
• McCleskey S, Achieving Market Integration: Best execution, Fragmentation 
and the Free Flow of Capital (Butterworth-Heinemann 2004) 
• McGraw T, Prophets of Regulations: Charles Francis Adams, Louis D. 
Brandeis, James M. Landis, Alfred E. Kahn (Belknap Press of Harvard 
Univeristy ress 1984) 
• McInish T, Capital Markets: A Global Perspective (Blackwell 2000) 
• McMeel G and Virgo J, Financial Advice and Financial Product (OUP 2001) 
• Menski W, Comparative Law in a Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia 
and Africa (CUP 2006) 
• Milhaupt C and Pistor K, Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal 
About Legal Systems and Economic Development Around The World (Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2008) 
• Montano D, The Twenty-First Century Stockbroker: A New Wave 
(Montano1993) 
 357	  
• Morgan E and Thomas W, Stock Exchange: Its History and Function (Elek 
Books 1969) 
• Mulheron R, The Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A 
Comparative Perspective (Hart 2004) 
• Murphy J and Street H, Street on Torts (12th ed, OUP 2007) 
• Nelson P, Capital Markets law and Compliance: The Implications of MiFID 
(CUP 2008) 
• Niblock T and Malik M, The Political Economy of Saudi Arabia (Routledge 
2007)  
• North D, Understanding The Process Of Economic Change (CUP1990) 
• OECD, Bond Market Development in Asia (OECD 2001) 
• Ogus A, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (OUP 1994)  
• Otto J, Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of 
Twelve Muslim Countries in the Past and Present (Leiden University Press 
2010) 
• Oxford Business Group, The Report of Saudi Arabia 2008 (Oxford Business 
Group 2008) 
• ___________________ The Report: Emerging Saudi Arabia 2007 (Oxford 
Business Group 2007) 
• ___________________ The Report: Saudi Arabia 2008 (OUP 2008) 
• Paden J, Muslim Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution (Brookings 2005) 
• Page A and Ferguson R, Investor Protection (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1992) 
• Pal L and Maxwell J, Assessing the Public Interest in the 21st Century: A 
Framework (Canadian Policy Research Networks 2004) 
• Pettet B, Lowry J and Reisberg A, Pettet’s Company Law: Company and 
Capital Markets Law (Pearson Longman 2009) 
• Pohl M and Freitag S, Handbook on the History of European Banks (Elgar 
1994) 
• Ramsy I, Rationales for Intervention in the Consumer Market Place, (Office 
of Fair Trading 1984) 
• Rehman J, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from 
Terrorism: A Critique of the 'Clash of Civilizations' in the New World Order 
(Hart 2005) 
 358	  
• Reynolds F, Graziadei M and Bowstead W, Bowstead and Reynolds on 
Agency (18 edt, Sweet &Maxwell 2006) 
• Rickett C and Telfer T, International Perspectives on Consumers' Access to 
Justice (CUP 2003) 
• SAMA, Banking Disputes: Litigation Procedures Before The Committee of 
Banking Disputes and The General Principles that Have Approved (SAMA 
2006) 
• Schlesinger R, Comparative Law: Cases, Text, Materials (Foundation Press 
1998) 
• Self P, Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice (Macmillan 
1993) 
• Shim J and Constas M, Encyclopedic Dictionary of International Finance and 
Banking (St. Lucie Press 2001) 
• Shleifer A, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (OUP 
2003) 
• Smith A, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776) (Arlington House 1965) 
• Smith J, Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 
2006) 
• Spencer P, The Structure and Regulation of Financial Markets (OUP 2002) 
• Spencer P, The Structure and Regulation of Financial Markets (OUP 2002) 
• Stake R, The Art of Case Study Research (Sage 1995) 
• Subramanyam P, Investment Banking: Concepts, Analyses and Cases (Tata 
McGraw-Hill 2008) 
• Tench R and Yeomans L, Exploring Public Relations (2nd ed., FT Prentice 
Hall 2009) 
• Teweles R and Bradley E, The Stock Market (7th ed, Wiley 1998) 
• Tremblay L, The Rule of Law, Justice, and Interpretation (McGill-Queen's 
University Press 1997) 
• Vogel D, National Styles of Regulation. Environmental Policy in Great 
Britain and the United States (Cornell University Press 1986) 
• Vogel F, Islamic Law and Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Brill 2000) 
• Watson A, Legal Transplants: An Approach To Comparative Law (University 
of Georgia Press 1993) 
 359	  
• Wei Y, Securities Markets and Corporate Governance: A Chinese Experience 
(Ashgate Pub. 2009) 
• Wilson R and others, Economic Development in Saudi Arabia 
(RoutledgeCurzon 2004) 
• Woelfel C, The Fitzroy Dearborn Encyclopaedia of Banking & Finance 
(Fitzroy Dearborn 1994) 
• Wood P, Conflict of Laws and International Finance (Sweet and Maxwell, 
2007) 
• World Bank and IMF, Financial Sector Assessment: A Handbook (World 
Bank and IMF 2005) 
• Yeung K, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (Hart Publishing 
2003) 
• Yilmaz I, Muslim Laws, Politics and Society In Modern Nation States 
(Ashgate 2005) 
 
Chapters In Books 
  
 
• Avgouleas E, ‘Reforming Investor Protection Regulation: The Impact of 
Cognitive Biases’ in Faure M and Stephen F (eds), Essays in the Law and 
Economics of Regulation: In Honour of Anthony Ogus (Intersentia 2008) 
• Aysan A, Nabli M and Véganzonès M, ‘Governance, Institutions, and Private 
Investments’ in Nabli M (edt.), Breaking the Barriers to Higher Economic 
Growth: Better Governance and Deeper Reforms in the Middle East and 
North Africa (World Bank 2007) 
• Barysch K, Friedrich H and Steiger M, ‘Bonds Markets in Advanced 
Transition: A Synopsis of the Visegrád Bond Markets’ in MacDonald R and 
Cross R (eds), Central Europe Towards Monetary Union: Macroeconomic 
Underpinnings and Financial Reputation (Kluwer 2000) 
• Beatson J, ‘The Regulations Governing The Financial Services Industry and 
Fiduciary Duties Under the General Law’ in McKendrick E (ed.), Commercial 
Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon press, the Norton rose 
M5 group 1992) 
 360	  
• Black B, 'The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets: The Non-triviality of Securities Law' in OECD, Corporate 
Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective (OECD 2001) 
• Blommestein H and Spencer M, ‘The Role of Financial Institutions in the 
Transition to a Market Economy’ in Caprio G, Folkerts-Landau D and Lane 
T(eds), Building Sound Finance in Emerging Market Economies (IMF and 
World Bank 1994) 
• Chain S, ‘Financial Services Regulation: Can History Teach Us Anything’ in 
Cartwright P (edt.), Consumer Protection in Financial Services (Kluwer Law 
International 1999) 
• Cominelli L, ‘An Ombudsman for the European: Gradually Moving Towards 
“Effective Dispute Resolution” Between Citizens and Public Administration’ 
in Reif L (ed.), The International Ombudsman Yearbook Vol. 6, 2002 (Brill 
2004) 
• Dansieger E, ‘Derivative Risk- OTC and ETD’ in Cox D (edt), Frontiers of 
Risk Management: Key Issues and Solutions (Euromoney 2007) 
• Earl J, ‘When bad things happen: Toward a sociology of troubles’ in Sandefur 
R (edt), Access to Justice (Emerald 2009) 
• El-Erian S and Tareq S, ‘Economic Reform in the Arab Countries: A Review 
of Structural Issues’ in El-Naggar S (edt), Economic Development of the Arab 
Countries: Selected Issues (IMF 1993) 
• El-Naggar S, ‘Privatization and Structural Adjustment: The Basic Issues’ in 
El-Naggar S (edt), Privatization and Structural Adjustment in the Arab 
Countries (IMF 1989) 
• Finn P, ‘Fiduciary Law and Modern Commercial World’ in McKendrick E 
(ed.), Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Clarendon 
press, the Norton rose M5 group 1992) 
• Foot M, ‘Working with market forces’ in Mizen P (edt.), Monetary History, 
Exchange Rates and Financial Markets (Edward Elgar 2003) 
• Foster N, ‘Owing and Owning in Islamic and Western Law’ in Cotran E and 
Lau L (eds), Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, Volume 10 (2003-
2004) (Brill 2006) 
• Hartley J, ‘Case Study Research’ in Cassell C and Symon G (eds.), Essential 
Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research (Sage 2004) 
 361	  
• Herring R and Santomero A, ‘What Is Optimal Financial Regulation’ in Gup 
B (edt), The New Financial Architecture: Banking Regulation in the 21st 
Century (Quorum 2000) 
• Jarass H, ‘Regulation as an Instrument of Economic Policy’ in Daintith T 
(edt), Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and Critical 
Approaches (Walter de Gruyter 1988) 
• Jordana J and Sancho D, ‘Regulatory Designs, Institutional Constellations and 
the Study of the Regulatory State’ in Jordana J and Levi-Faur D (eds), The 
Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of 
Governance (Edward Elgar 2004) 
• Kagan R, ‘Regulators and Regulatory Process’ in Sarat A (edt), The Blackwell 
Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell 2007) 
• Krugman P, ‘International Finance and Economic Development’, in 
Giovannini A (edt), Finance and Development: Issues and Experience (CUP 
1993) 
• La Porta R, ‘Comment on “Ownership Structure, Legal Protections, and 
Corporate Governance” by I. J. Alexander Dyck’ pt of Pleskovic B and Stern 
N (eds), Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 2000 
(World Bank 2001)  
• Levine R, ‘Financial Functions, Institutions, and Growth’ a chapter in 
Harwood A and Smith B (eds), Sequencing? Financial Strategies for 
Developing Countries (Brookings Institution Press 1997) 
• Llewellyn D, ‘A Regulatory Regime for Financial Stability’ in Kaufman G 
(edt), Research in Financial Services: Private and Public Policy: v. 12 Bank 
Fragility and Regulation: Evidence from Different Countries (JAI 2000) 
• _________ ‘The Optimal Regulatory Environment’ in Kuppens T, Prast H and 
Wesseling S (eds.), Banking Supervision at the Crossroad (Edward Elgar 
2003) 
• Mayer C, ‘Regulatory Principles and Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000’ in Ferran E and Goodhart C (eds), Regulating Financial Services and 
Markets in the 21st Century (Hart 2001) 
• Petit P, ‘From Cumulative Growth to Régulation Theory’ in Boyer R and 
Saillard Y (eds) Régulation Theory: The State of the Art, (Carolyn Shread tr, 
Routledge 2001) 
 362	  
• Pistor K, 'Law as a Determinant for Equity Market Development: The 
Experience of Transition Economies', in Murrell P (edt), Assessing the Value 
of Law in Transition Economies (University of Michigan Press 2001) 
• Ridley A, ‘Priorities in International Financial Regulation’ in Booth P and 
Currie D (eds.), The Regulation of Financial Market (Institute of Economic 
Affairs 2003) 
• Rosen L, The justice of Islam: Comparative Perspectives on Islamic Law and 
Society (OUP 2000) 
• _______ Varieties of Muslim Experience: Encounters With Arab Political and 
Cultural Life (University of Chicago Press 2008) 
• Rubin P, ‘Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges’ in Ménard C 
and Shirley M (eds), Handbook of New institutional Economic (Springer 
2005) 
• Schmitthoff C, ‘Agency in International Trade: A Study in Comparative Law’ 
in Cheng C (edt), Clive M. Schmitthoff's Selected Essays on International 
Trade Law (Graham & Trotman 1988) 326 
• Scott C, ‘Regulation in The Age of Governance: The Rise of The Post 
Regulatory State’ in Jordana J and Levi-Faur D (eds) The Politics of 
Regulation : Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for The Age of Governance 
(Edward Elgar Pub 2004) 
• Smith D, ‘Financial Services Regulation and The Investor as Consumer’ in 
Howell G and others (eds), Handbook on Research on International Consumer 
Law (Edward Elgar 2010) 
• Wilson R, ‘Overview of the Sukuk Market’ in Adam N and Thomas A (eds), 
Islamic Bonds: Your Guide to Issuing, Structuring and Investing in Sukuk 
(Euromoney 2004) 
• Wood N, ‘International Political Economy in an Age of Globalization’ in 
Baylis J, Smith S and Owens P (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations (OUP 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 363	  
Journal Articles and Periodicals 
 
 
• ________ ‘Securities Regulation--Damages--The Possibility of Punitive 
Damages As a Remedy for a Violation of Rule 10b-5’ (1970) 68 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1608 
• Abraham D, ‘Investor-Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two 
Barriers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing’(1992) 43 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 1297 
• Akerlof G, ‘The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism’ (1970) 84 Quart. J. Econ. 488 
• Akinbami F, ‘Financial Services and Consumer Protection After the Crisis 
(2011) 29 International Journal of Bank Marketing 134 
• Al-Mushaigih K, ‘The Liability of a Doctor Under Shari’a’ (2001) 6 Al-Adl 1. 
• Al-Qahtany M, ‘Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: Implication for International 
Investors, (2003) 8 Journal of Transnational Management Development 3 
• Al-Sultan S, ‘Maintenance in Saudi Arabia: Needs and Recommendations for 
Improvement, (1996) 2 Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering 5 
• Al–Abdulqader K, Hannah G and Power D, ‘A Test of the Weak form of the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis for the Saudi Stock Market’ (2007) 6 Journal of 
Emerging Market Finance 167 
• Alajlan W, ‘Ownership Pattern and The Saudi Market’ (2004) 9 Advances in 
Financial Economics 161 
• Alexander K and others, ‘Transatlantic Financial Services Regulatory 
Dialogue’ (2006) 7 EBOR 647 
• Allen W, ‘Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital 
Market Hypothesis’ (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 556 
• Anderws E, ‘Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation’  New York Times 
(New York, 23 August 2008 
• Apergis N, Lyroudi K and Vamvakidis A, ‘The Relationship Between Foreign 
Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Evidence From Transition 
Countries’  (2008) 15 Transition Studies Review 37 
• Arestis P and Demetriades P, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: 
Assessing the Evidence’ (1997) 107 The Economic Journal 783 
 364	  
• Atiyah P, ‘Contract and Fair Exchange’ (1985) 35 U. Toronto L.J. 1 
• Ayyagari M and Doidge D, ‘Does Cross-Listing Facilitate Changes in 
Corporate Ownership and Control?’ (2010) 34 Journal of Banking and 
Finance 208 
• Banner S, ‘What Causes New Securities Regulation--300 Years of Evidence’ 
(1997) 75 Wash. U. L. Q. 849 
• Beach J, ‘The Saudi Arabian Capital Market Law: A Practical Study of the 
Creation of Law in Developing Markets’ (2005) 41 Stan. J. Int'l L. 307 
• Bebchuk L and Neeman Z, ‘Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics’ 
(2010) 23 Rev. Financ. Stud. 1089 
• Beck T, Levine R and Loayza N, ‘Finance and the Sources of Growth’ (2000) 
58 Journal of Financial Economics 261 
• Beck T, Levine R and Loayza N, ‘Finance and The Sources of Growth’ 
(Policy Research for The World Bank 2057/1999, 1999) 
• Benbasat I, Goldstein D and Mead M, ‘The Case Research Strategy in Studies 
of Information Systems’ (1987) 11 MIS Quarterly 396 
• Beny L, ‘US Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of Current Regulatory and 
Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Competition’ (2002) 2002 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 399 
• Berglof E and Bolton P, ‘The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial 
Architecture in Transition’ (2002) 16 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 
77 
• Bernstein P, ‘Liquidity, Stock Markets and Market Makers’ (1987) 16 
Financial Management 54 
• Bertocco G, ‘Finance and development: Is Schumpeter’s analysis still 
relevant?’ (2008) 32 Journal of Banking & Finance 1174 
• Bevan A, Estrin S and Meyer K, ‘Foreign investment location and institutional 
development in transition economies’ (2004) 13 International Business 
Review 43 
• Biais B and Perotti E, ‘Machiavellian Privatization’ (2002) 92 Amer. Econ. 
Rev. 240 
• Black B and Gross J, ‘Elusive Balance between Investor Protection and 
Wealth Creation’ (2005) 26 Pace L.Rev. 27 
 365	  
• Black B, 'Information, Asymmetry, The Internet, and Securities Offerings' 
(1998) 2 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 91 
• ________, ‘Are Retail Investors Better Off Today’ (2007) 2 Brook. J. Corp. 
Fin. & Com. L. 301 
• Black B, Jang H and Kim W, ‘Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' 
Market Values? Evidence From Korea’ (2006) 22 JLEO 366 
• Black J and Nobles R, ‘Personal Pensions Misselling: The Causes and Lessons 
of Regulatory Failure’ (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review 789 
• Black J, ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Austl. J. Leg. Phil. 1 
• Bortolotti B and others, ‘Privatization and Stock Market Liquidity’ (2007) 31 
Journal of Banking and Finance 297 
• Buchanan J, ‘Let Us Understand Adam Smith’ (2008) 30 Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought 21 
• Cao L, ‘Book Review: Law and Economic Development: A New Beginning?’ 
(1992) 32 Tex.Int'l L.J., 544 
• Carlina W and Mayer C, ‘Finance, Investment, and Growth’ (2003) 69 Journal 
of Financial Economics 191 
• Choi S and Guzman A, ‘Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International 
Reach of Securities Regulation’ (1998) 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 
• Choi S, ‘Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal’ (2000) 
88 CLR 279 
• Coase R, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1961) 3 J. Law Econ 1 
• Coates D and Penrod S, ‘Social Psychology and the Emergence of Disputes’ 
(1980) 15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 658 
• Coffee J, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System’ (1984) 70 Va.L.Rev. 717 
• ________  'Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from 
Securities Market Failure' (1999) 25 J. Corp. L. 1 
• _________ ‘The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in 
Corporate Governance and Its Implications’ (1999) 93 Nw. UL Rev. 641 
• Cohen N, ‘Internationalizing the Law of Secured Credit: Perspectives from the 
U.S. Experience’(1999) 20 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 430 
• Collin H, ‘Methods and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’ (1991) 11 
Oxford J.Leg.Stud. 396 
 366	  
• Costanzo L and Ashton J, ‘Product Innovation and Consumer Choice in the 
UK Financial Services Industry’ (2006) 14 JFR&C 285 
• Darrat A, ‘Are Financial Deepening and Economic Growth Causally Related? 
Another Look At the Evidence’ (1999) 13 International Economic Journal 19 
• Davis K and Trebilcock M, ‘The Relationship Between Law and 
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics’ (2008) 56 Am.J.Comp.L 895 
• Davis K, ‘Joint-Stock Investment in the Later Seventeenth Century’ (1952) 4 
Econ. Hist. Rev. 293 
• Dobson J, ‘The Role of Ethics in Finance’ (1993) 49 Financial Analysts 
Journal 57 
• Doidge C, Karolyi G and Stulz R, ‘Why Do Countries Matter So Much for 
Corporate Governance?’ (2007) 86 Journal of Financial Economics 1 
• Donaldson J and Fafaliou I, ‘Underlying Values and Consequences in 
Financial Services’ (2003) 16 International Journal of Value-Based 
Management 265 
• Dore R, ‘Stock Market Capitalism and its Diffusion’ (2002) 7 New Political 
Economy 115 
• Dow S, ‘Mainstream Methodology, Financial Markets and Global Political 
Economy’ (2008) 27 Contributions to Political Economy 13 
• Downs A, ‘An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy’ (1957) 
65 J Pol Econ 135 
• Doyle C, ‘Self Regulation and Statutory Regulation’ (1998) 8 Business 
Strategy Review 35 
• Dritsaki C and Dritsaki-Bargiota M, ‘The Causal Relationship Between Stock, 
Credit Market and Economic Development: An Empirical Evidence for 
Greece’ (2005) 38 Economic Change and Restructuring 413 
• Dullien S and Christian Kellermann, ‘Good Capitalism… and what would 
need to change for that’ (2010) 4 Social Europe Journal 26 
• Dunbar F and Sabry F, ‘The Propensity To Sue: Why Do People Seek Legal 
Actions?’ (2007) 42 Bus. Econ. 31 
• Edward G, ‘Legal Transplants and Economics: The World Bank and Third 
World Economies in the 1980s - A Case Study of Jamaica, the Republic of 
Kenya and the Philippines’ (2007) 9 E.J.L.R. 243 
 367	  
• Esmaeili H, ‘On A Slow Boat Towards The Rule of Law: The Nature of Law 
in the Saudi Arabian Legal System’ (2009) 26 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1 
• Etzioni A, ‘The Capture Theory of Regulations—Revisited’ (2009) 46 Society 
319 
• Fabbri D and Padula M, ‘Does Poor Legal Enforcement Make Households 
Credit-Constrained?’ (2004) 28 Journal of Banking and Finance 2369 
• Facciolo F, ‘Broker's Duty of Best Execution in the Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries’ (2005) 26 Pace L. Rev. 155 
• Fergusson L, ‘Institutions for Financial Development: What Are They and 
Where Do They Come From?’ (2006) 20 Journal of Economic Surveys 27 
• Fiorina L, ‘Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or 
Administrative Process?’(1982) 39 Public Choice 33 
• Fletcher G, ‘Two Modes of Legal Thoughts’ (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 970 
• Foster N, ‘Islamic Perspectives on the Law of Business Organisations I: An 
Overview of the Classical Sharia and a Brief Comparison of the Sharia 
Regimes with Western-Style Law’ (2010) 11 European Business Organization 
Law Review 3 
• Frankel T, ‘Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract and 
Property Law’ (1993) 73 B.U. L. Rev. 389 
• Frankel T, ‘Regulation and Investors' Trust in the Securities Market’ (2003) 
68 Brook. L. Rev. 439 
• Franks J, Schaefer S and Staunton M, ‘The Direct and Compliance Costs of 
Financial Regulation’ (1997) 21 Journal Banking and Finance 1547 
• Friedman W, ‘One Country, Two Systems: The Inherent Conflict between 
China's Communist Politics and Capitalist Securities Markets’ (2002) 27 
Brook. J. Int'l L. 477 
• Gedicks F, ‘Suitability Claims and Purchases of Unrecommended Securities: a 
Theory of Broker-Dealer’ (2005) 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 535 
• Georgosouli G, ‘The Debate Over the Economic Rationale for Investor 
Protection Regulation: A Critical Appraisal’ (2007) 15 JFR&C. 236 
• Gilad S, ‘Accountability or Expectations Management? The Role of the 
Ombudsman in Financial Regulation’ (2008) 30 Law and Policy 227 
 368	  
• Girasa R, ‘ Commentary: The Quiet Revolution: The Opening of Saudi Arabia 
Securities Market to the West’ (Luben School of Business Newsletter, Pace 
University, May 2005)  
• Glaeser E, Johnson S and Shleifer A, ‘Coase Versus the Coasians’ (2001) 116 
Quart. J. Econ. 853 
• Glinavos I, ‘Transition or Development? Reassessing Priorities for Law 
Reform’ (2010) 10 Progress in Development Studies 59 
• Gray J, ‘Financial Services Act 1986 reforms: Part 2’ (1991) 9 Int. Bank. L. 
414 
• ______ ‘The Legislative Basis of Systemic Review and Compensation for the 
Misselling of Retail Financial Services and Products’ (2004) 25 Stat. L.R. 196 
• Graziadei M, ‘Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge’ 
(2009) 10 Theoretical Inq. L. 723 
• Grossman S, ‘An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under 
Asymmetric Information’ (1981) 48 Rev. Econ. Stud. 541 
• Grundfest J, ‘Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal 
Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority’ (1994)107 Harv. L. Rev. 961 
• Guest D, ‘Is the Psychological Contract Worth Taking Seriously?’ (1998) 19 
J. Organiz. Behav. 649 
• Hail L and Leuz C, ‘International Differences in the Cost of Equity Capital: 
Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter?’ (2006) 44 Journal of 
Accounting Research 485 
• Haiss P and Sümegi L, ‘The Relationship Between Insurance and Economic 
Growth in Europe: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’ (2008) 35 Empirica 
405 
• Hamilton J, ‘Negligence in the Corridor? The Interaction Between ‘Separate 
Rooms’ of Regulation and the Common Law in Financial Services’ (2007) 23 
PN 134 
• Hanson M, ‘Influence of French Law on the Legal Development of Saudi 
Arabia’ (1987) 2 Arab L.Q. 272 
• Hantke-Domas M, ‘The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence 
or Misinterpretation?’ (2003) 15  European Journal of Law and Economics 
165 
• Hayek F, ‘Economics and Knowledge’ (1937) 4 Economica 33 
 369	  
• Hendershott R, Darrell E. Lee and James Tompkins, ‘Winners and Losers as 
Financial Service Providers Converge: Evidence from the Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999’ (2002) 37 The Financial Review 53 
• Hewko J, ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Transitional Economies: Does the 
Rule of Law Matter’ (2002) 11 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 71 
• Huang P, ‘Trust, Guilt, and Securities Regulation’ (2003) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1059 
• Hurvitz N, ‘Schools of Law and Historical Context: Re-Examining the 
Formation of the Hanbali Madhhab’ (2000) 7 Islam L & Soc 37 
• Inderst R and Ottaviani M, ‘Consumer Protection in Markets with Advice’ 
(2010) 6 Competition Policy International 49 
• Jackson H, ‘Response, The Impact of Enforcement: A Reflection’ (2008) 156 
U. PA. L. Rev. 400  
• Jackson H and Roe M, ‘Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence’ (2009) 93 Journal of Financial Economics 207 
• Jensen M and Meckling W, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305 
• Johnson S, McMillan J and Woodruff C, ‘Property Rights and Finance’ (2002) 
92 American Economic Review 1335 
• Kahn-Freund O, 'On Use and Misuse of Comparative Law' (1974) 37 Modern 
Law Review 1 
• Kanda H and Milhaupt C, ‘Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director's 
Fiduciary Duty to Japanese Corporate Law’ (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 889 
• Karmel R, 'The Case for a European Securities Commission', (1999) 38 
Colum. J. Trans. Law 9 
• Kay J and others, ‘Regulatory Reform in Britain’ (1988) 3 Economic Policy 
285 
• Kerr S, ‘Gulf Regulators Revive Short-Selling and Derivatives’ Financial 
Times (London 10 May 2010) 
• Khan A, ‘Financial Development And Economic Growth’ (2001) 5 
Macroeconomic Dynamics 413 
• Knight F, ‘Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost’ (1924) 38 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 582 
 370	  
• Knoll M, ‘The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial Innovation: The Early 
History of Regulatory Arbitrage’ (2004) 87 Oregon Law Review 1 
• Koford K and Miller J, ‘Contract Enforcement in the Early Transition of an 
Unstable Economy’ (2006) 30 Economic Systems 1 
• Kolm S, ‘Moral Public Choice’ (1996) 87 Public Choice 117 
• Korobkin R, ‘Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability’ (2003) 70 U Chi L Rev. 1203 
• La Porta R and others, ‘Legal Determent of External Finance’ (1997) 52 
Journal of Finance 1131 
• _________________‘Investor Protection and Corporate Governance’(2000) 
58  J. Finan. Econ 3  
• ________________ ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) 106 The Journal of Political 
Economy 1113 
• _______________ Lopez-de-Silane F and Shleifer A, ‘What Works in 
Securities Laws?’ (2006) 61 J. Finance 1  
• Lagoarde-Segot T and Lucey B, ‘Efficiency in Emerging Markets—Evidence 
from the MENA Region’ (2008) 18 Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Money 94 
• Latimer P, ‘Principles of Investment Business--An Anglo-Australian 
Perspective’ (1991) 17 Brook. J. Int'l L. 577 
• Levi-Faur D, ‘Regulatory Capitalism and the Reassertion of the Public 
Interests’ (2008) 27 Policy and Society 181 
• Levine R and Zervos S, 'Capital Control Liberalization and Stock Market 
Development' (1998) 26 World Dev. 1169 
• __________________ ‘Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth’ (1998) 
88 The American Economic Review 537 
• Levine R, ‘Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and 
Agenda’ (1997) 35 Journal of Economic Literature 688 
• ________ 'The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth' 
(1998) 30 J.M.C.B. 596 
• Lipton D, ‘Best Execution: The National Market System's Missing Ingredient’ 
(1982) 57 Notre Dame Law. 449 
• Litch A, ‘International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the 
Way to Convergence’ (1998) 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 227 
 371	  
• Loss L, ‘The SEC and the Broker-Dealer’ (1948) 1 VAND. L. REV. 516 
• Lutz S, ‘Convergence Within National Diversity: A Comparative Perspective 
on the Regulatory State in Finance’ (2004) 24 Journal of Public Policy 169 
• Macey J and O'Hara M, ‘The Law and Economics of Best Execution’ (1997) 6 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 188 
• MacNeil I, ‘FSA 1986: Does s.62 Provide an Effective Remedy for Breaches 
of Conduct of Business Rules?’ (1994) 15 Comp.Lawy 172 
• ________  ‘Legislation: The Future for Financial Regulation: The Financial 
Services and Markets Bill’ (1999) 62 The Modern Law Review 725 
• _________ ‘The Evolution of Regulatory Enforcement Action in the UK 
Capital Markets: A Case of ‘Less is More’?’ (2007) 2 CMLJ 345 
• MacVea H, ‘Financial services regulation under the Financial Services 
Authority: A Reassertion of the Market Failure Thesis?’ (2005) 64 C.L.J. 413 
• Mahoney P, ‘The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be 
Right’  (2001) 30 The Journal of Legal Studies 503 
• Majone G, ‘From the Positive to the Regulatory State: Causes and 
Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance’ (1997) 17 Journal of 
Public Policy 139 
• Marar A, ‘Saudi Arabia: The Duality of the Legal System and the Challenge 
of Adapting Law to Market Economies’ (2004) 19 Arab L.Q. 91 
• Mattei U, ‘Opportunity Not to Be Missed: The Future of Comparative Law in 
the United States’ (1998) 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 709 
• Maurer A, ‘Consumer Protection and Social Models of Continental and 
Anglo-American Contract Law and the Transnational Outlook’ (2007) 14 Ind. 
J. Global Legal Studies 353 
• McCormick R, ‘Legal Risk, Law and Justice in a Globalising Financial 
Market’ (2007) 1 Financial Markets Review 284 
• McCubbins M, ‘The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure’ (1985) 29 
AJPS 721 
• McCubbins M, Noll R and Weingast R, ‘Structure and Process, Politics and 
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies’ 
(1989) 75 Va. L. Rev. 431 
• Milken M, ‘Prosperity and Social Capital’ Wall Street Journal, opinion, 23 
June 1999 
 372	  
• Miller J, ‘Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process’ (2003) 51 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 839 
• Milner M and Syrett K, ‘Personal Pensions and the Financial Services 
Authority: New Chapter or Same Old Story’ (2000) 51 N. Ir. Legal Q. 141 
• Mitchell J, ‘Response to the Commission Green Paper: Financial services: 
Meeting Consumers’ Expectations’ (1997) 20 Journal of Consumer Policy 379 
• Moe T, ‘Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the 
NLRB’ (1987) 2 Studies in American Political Development 236 
• Moor J, ‘Rationality and the Social Sciences’ (1976) 1 PSA: Proceedings of 
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 3 
• Moor P, ‘Rentier Fiscal Crisis and Regime Stability: Business-State Relations 
in the Gulf’ (2002) 37 Studies in Comparative International Development 34 
• Moran M, ‘Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory State’ (2002) 32 
B.J.Pol.S. 391 
• Nelken D, ‘The Meaning of Success in Transnational Legal Transfers’ (2001) 
19 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 349 
• Noll R, ‘The Economics and Politics of Regulation’ (1971) 57 Va. L. Rev 
1016 
• North D, ‘Government and the Cost of Exchange in History’ (1984) 44 J. 
Econ. Hist, 255 
• OECD, ‘Policy Framework for Effective and Efficient Financial Regulation’ 
(2009) 2 Financial Market Trends 267 
• Olsen J, ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life 
(1984) 78 Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev.734 
• Orchard L and Stretton H, ‘Public Choice’ (1997) 21 Camb. J. Econ. 409  
• Peerenboom R, ‘What Have We Learned about Law and Development - 
Describing, Predicting, and Assessing Legal Reforms in China’ (2006) 27 
Mich. J. Int'l L. 823 
• Peltzman S, ‘Toward A More General Theory of Regulation’ (1976) 19 JL & 
Econ 211. 
• Perry A, ‘Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search 
of the Evidence’ (2000) 49 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 779 
 373	  
• Perry A, ‘Effective Legal Systems and Foreign Direct Investment: In Search 
of The Evidence’ (2000) 49 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 779 
• ________  ‘The Relationship Between Legal Systems and Economic 
Development: Integrating Economic and Cultural Approaches’ (2002) 29 
Journal of Law and Society 282 
• Pettersson P, ‘An Empirical Investigation of the Strategic Use of Debt’ (2001) 
109 J. Polit. Economy. 570 
• Pistor K, ‘Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in 
Transition Economies’ (2004) 1 EBOR 59 
• Posner R, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 335 
• Prentice R, ‘Whither Securities Regulation--Some Behavioral Observations 
Regarding Proposals for Its Future’ (2002) 51 Duke L.J. 1397 
• Pritchard J, ‘Investor Protection Sacrificed: the New Settlement and s.62: Part 
2’ (1992) 13 Comp. Lawy. 210 
• Qian J and Strahan P, ‘How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: 
The Case of Bank Loans’ (2007) 62 The Journal of Finance 2803 
• Ramsy I, ‘Framework for Regulation of the Consumer Marketplace’ (1985) 8 
J. Cons. Pol. 353 
• ________ ‘Consumer Credit Law, Distributive Justice and the Welfare State’ 
(1995) 15 OJLS 177  
• ________ ‘Consumer Law, Regulatory Capitalism And The ‘New Learning’ 
In Regulation” (2006) 28 SydLRev 9 
• Rapaczynski A, ‘The Roles of The State and The Market in Establishing 
Property Rights’ (1996) 10 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 
• Reinsch R, Reich J and Balsara N, ‘Trust Your Broker: Suitability, Modern 
Portfolio Theory, and Expert Witnesses’ (2004) 17 St. Thomas L. Rev. 173 
• Relis T, ‘Civil Litigation From Litigants' Perspectives: What We Know and 
What We Don't Know About the Litigation Experience of Individual 
Litigants’ (2002) 25 Stud Law Polit Soc. 151 
• Ribstein L, ‘Law v. Trust’ (2001) 81 B.U. L. Rev. 553  
• Rioja F and Valev N, ‘Finance and the Sources of Growth at Various Stages of 
Economic Development’ (2004) 42 Economic Inquiry 127 
 374	  
• Roberts L, ‘Suitability Claims under Rule 10b-5: Are Public Entities 
Sophisticated Enough to Use Derivatives’ (1996) 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 801 
• Romanoo R, ‘Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation’ (1998) 107 Yale L.J. 2359 
• Ronall J, ‘Banking Regulation in Saudi Arabia’ (1967) 21 Middle E.J. 399 
• Schoombee A, ‘The Financial Systems Approach to Development Finance: 
Origin, Evolution and Prospects’ (1998) 15 Development Southern Africa 379 
• Schooner H and Taylor M, ‘Convergence and Competition: The Case of Bank 
Regulation in Britain and the United States’ (1999) 20 Mich. J. Int'l L. 653 
• _____________________ ‘United Kingdom and United States Responses to 
The Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets’ (2003) 38 Tex.Int'l 
L.J. 317 
• Sfeir G, ‘The Saudi Approach to Law Reform’ (1988) 36 Am.J.Comp.L. 729 
• Shefrin H and Statman M, ‘Ethics, Fairness, Efficiency, and Financial 
Markets’ (1993) 49 Financial Analysts Journal 21 
• Shepsle K and Weingast B, ‘The Institutional Foundations of Committee 
Power’ (1987) 81 Amer. Polit. Sci. Rev. 85 
• Shleifer A, ‘Understanding regulation’ (2005) 11 Europ. Finan. Manage 439 
• Siems M and Deakin S, ‘Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Present and 
Future Research (2010) 166 JITE 120 
• Smits J, ‘The Harmonisation of Private Law in Europe: Some Insights from 
Evolutionary Theory’, (2002) 31 Special Volume in Honor of Alan Watson, 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 79 
• Solomon L and Corso L, ‘The Impact of Technology on the Trading of 
Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implications for Regulation’ 
(1990) 24 J. Marshall L. Rev. 299 
• Soutar G, ‘Do Retail Stockbrokers Understand Clients' Investment 
Preferences?’ (2008) 13 J.F.S.M. 135 
• Stigler G, ‘Public Regulation of the Securities Market’ (1964) 37 Journal of 
Business 117 
• ______ ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3 
• Stiglitz, J ‘Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth, and Instability’ 
(2000) 28 World Development 1075 
 375	  
• Stout L, ‘The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of 
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation’ (1988) 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613 
• ______ ‘The Investor Confidence Game’ (2002) 68 Brook. L. Rev. 407 
• Stringham E and Boettke P, ‘Brokers, Bureaucrats and the Emergence of 
Financial Markets’ (2004) 30 Managerial Finance 57 
• Strigham E, Boettke P and Clark J, ‘Are Regulations the Answer for Emerging 
Stock Markets? Evidence from the Czech Republic and Poland’ (2008) 48 The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 541 
• Stulz R and Williamson R, ‘Culture, Openness, and Finance’ (2003) 70 
Journal of Financial Economics 313 
• Tomb, ‘Book Review: Understanding Regulation’ (2002) 11 Soci. & Leg. 113 
• Trebilcock M, ‘Winners and Losers in the Modern Regulatory System: Must 
the Consumer always Lose’ (1975) 13 Osgoode Hall. 619 
• Trubek D, ‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ (1972) 1972 
Wis.L.Rev. 720 
• Twining W, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ (2004) 49 J. Legal 
Pluralism & Unofficial L 1 
• Vidmar N, ‘Seeking Justice: An Empirical Map of Consumer Problems and 
Consumer Responses in Canada’ (1988) 26 Osgoode Hall L.J. 757 
• Wachtel P, ‘How Much Do We Really Know About Growth and Finance?”, 
(2003) 88 Economic Review - Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 33 
• Walker W, ‘Punitive Damages for Securities Regulation’ (1970) 8 Hous. L. 
Rev. 137 
• Walter I, ‘Conflicts of Interest and Market Discipline Among Financial 
Service Firms’ (2004) 22 European Management Journal 361 
• Watson A, ‘Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture’ (1983) 131 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1136 
• Weitzman M, ‘Optimal Rewards for Economic Regulation’ (1978) 68 The 
American Economic Review 683 
• Whitford W, ‘The Function of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer 
Transactions’ (1973) Wis.L.Rev. 400 
• Wigglesworth R, ‘Capital Markets: Tighter Rules and Better Transparency 
Welcomed’ Financial Times (London, 22 September 2009) 
 376	  
• Yiannopoulos A, ‘Brokerage, Mandate, and Agency in Louisiana: Civilian 
Tradition and Modern Practice’ (1959) 19 La. L. Rev. 777 
 
Conference Paper 
 
 
• Alfon I, ‘An Additional Perspective for Retail Financial Products and their 
Regulation’ (2004) a paper presented in the FSA conference 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/consumer-research/rfp_paper.pdf > accessed 29 
June 2011 
• Benmelech E and Moskowitz T, ‘The Political Economy of Financial 
Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 18th and 19th 
Century’ (AFA 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, March 2006) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891663> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Briault C, ‘Markets, Regulation and Disputes’ (the International Federation of 
Financial Ombudsmen Conference, September 2007) 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/0928_cb.shtml> 
accessed 29 June 2011  
• Crockett A, ‘Market Stability (June 2001) a speech at the Annual Confereance 
of IOSCO, Stockholm, Sweden, 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/annual_conferences/pdf/ac15-8.pdf> accessed 29 June 
2011 
• Egli D, ‘How Global Are Global Financial Markets? The Impact of Country 
Risk’ (2000) a paper presented in International Financial Markets and The 
Implications for Monetary and Financial Stability, BIS Conference Papers No. 
8, <http://www.bis.org/publ/confer08.htm> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Fischer R and Gerhardt R, ‘Investment Mistakes of Individual Investors and 
the Impact of Financial Advice’ (the 20th Australasian Finance and Banking 
Conference, 2007) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009196> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Lawton A, ‘Revisiting the Public Interest’ (September 2007) Paper presented 
at EGPA Conference, Madrid, 
<http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Alan%20Lawkon_tcm31-41275.pdf > 
accessed 29 June 2011 
 377	  
• Levy D, Peart S and Hanson R, ‘The Rise, Preservation, and Transformation 
of the Virginia School of Political Economy’(July 2006) a paper presented at 
the 11thannual European Conference on the History of Economics, 
<http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/HES%202007/papers/10c%20levypeart.pdf>  
accessed 29 June 2011 
• Salini C, ‘Recent Evolution in Securities Market Price Formation 
Mechanisms’ (IOSCO Conference, Amman, 2004) 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/annual_conferences/pdf/ac18-14.pdf> accessed 29 June 
2011 
• Spalek B, ‘White-Collar Crime Victims and the Issue of Trust’ (the British 
Criminology Conference, Leicester, July 2000) 
<http://www.britsoccrim.org/v4.htm> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Stiglitz J, ‘The Role of The State in Financial Markets’ (World Bank Research 
Observer, Annual Conference on Development Economics Supplement 19) 
<http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1994/03/01/000009265_3
970702134931/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Twining W, ‘Generalizing About Law: The Case of Legal Transplants’’ The 
Tilburg-Warwick Lectures 2000: General Jurisprudence, (Lecture 4) 
<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/jurisprudence/publications.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Zahid K, ‘Investment Challenges Facing Oil-rich Countries: Example of Saudi 
Arabia’ (OECD Conference, Istanbul, 2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/0/28500016.pdf > accessed 29 June 2011 
 
Working Papers 
 
 
• Al-Jasser M and Banafe A, ‘The Development of Debt Markets in Emerging 
Economies: the Saudi Arabian Experience’ (BIS Papers, No 11, 2002) 178-
180 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap11q.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Allen F and Herring R, ‘Banking Regulation Versus Securities Market 
Regulation’ (2001) The Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper 
No.01-29, 10-11 <http://escal.free.fr/docs/finance/bankingregulation.pdf> accessed 29 
June 2011 
 378	  
• Carson J, ‘Conflict of Interests in Self-Regulation: Can Demutualized 
Exchanges Successfully Manage Them’ (World Bank Research Working 
Paper, No. 3183, 2003) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=636602> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Carvajal A and Elliott J, ‘The Challenge of Enforcement in Securities 
Markets: Mission Impossible?’ (IMF Working Paper No. 09/168, 2009) < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1457591> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Coffee J, ‘Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’(Weiss 
CentreWorking Paper 07-3/2007, 2007) < 
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/weiss/papers2007.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Giorgio G, Di Noia C and Piatti L, ‘Financial Market Regulation: The Case of 
Italy and a Proposal for the Euro Area’ (Wharton Financial Institutions Center 
Working Paper, No. 24-B, 2000) 
<http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/00/0024.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Grais W and Kantur Z, ‘The Changing Financial Landscape: Opportunities 
and Challenges for the Middle East and North Africa’ (World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3050, 2003) 9 < http://ssrn.com/abstract=636412> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
• Hendricks D, ‘Defining Systemic Risk’ (Pew Financial Reform Task Force, 2, 
2009) <http://www.pewfr.org/project_reports_detail?id=0012> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Huang P, ‘Emotional Impact Analysis in Financial Regulation: Going Beyond 
Cost-Benefit Analysis’ (Temple University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 
2006-21, 2006) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=870453> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Jackson H, ‘An American Perspective on the U.K. Financial Services 
Authority: Politics, Goals & Regulatory Intensity’ (Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 522, 2005) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=839284> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
• Kroszner, ‘On the Political Economy of Banking and Financial Regulatory 
Reform in Emerging Markets’ (CRSP Working Paper, No. 472, 1998) < 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=143555> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Levine R, ‘Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence’ (NBER Working 
Paper, Paper No. W10766/2004, 2004) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10766> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
 379	  
• Llewellyn D, ‘The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation’ (FSA 
Occasional Paper No. 1, 1999)  <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/P14.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2011  
• Lunt P, Livingstone S and Kelay T, ‘Risk and Regulation in Financial 
Services and Communications’ (Social Contexts and Responses to Risk 
Network, paper no. 990, London School of Economics, 2005) 
<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/990/> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Mulligan C and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Population and Regulation’ (NBER 
Working Paper No. W10234, 2004) < http://ssrn.com/abstract=485722> accessed 
29 June 2011 
• Pistor K and Xu C, ‘Law Enforcement Under Incomplete Law: Theory and 
Evidence from Financial Market Regulation’ (Columbia Law and Economic 
Working Paper No. 222, 2002) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1160987> accessed 29 
June 2011 
• Stout L, ‘Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets’ 
(UCLA School of Law/ Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-15, 2009) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=144202> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Tommasino P, ‘The Political Economy of Investor Protection’ (Bank of Italy 
Economic Research Paper No. 604, December 2006) 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=954907> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Wilson R, ‘The development of Islamic finance in the GCC’ (Working Paper, 
Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the 
Gulf States, 2009) <http://w.lse.ac.uk/collections/LSEKP/documents/Wilson.pdf> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
 
PhD Thesis  
 
• Al-Bogami S, ‘An Examination of the Usefulness of Interim Financial 
Statements to Investors in the Saudi Stock Market’ (PhD Thesis, University of 
Dundee, 1996) 
• Al-Qahtani M, ‘The Role and Jurisdiction of the Board of Grievances in Saudi 
Arabia’ (PhD thesis, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 2008) 
• Baamir A, ‘Saudi Law and Judicial Practice in Commercial and Banking 
Arbitration’ (PhD Thesis, Brunel University, 2008) 
 380	  
 
Electronic References 
 
• <www.isda.org/> accessed 29 June 2011 
• AME, ‘Saudi Stock Market Crash a Cause for Concern’ (AME, 20 May 2006) 
<http://www.ameinfo.com/86438.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
• BIS. <http://www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Bluethgen R and others, ‘Financial Advice and Individual Investors' 
Portfolios’ (SSRN, March 2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=968197> accessed 
29 June 2011 
• BME Research Department, ‘Close To the Investor’ (2009) Focus, World 
Federation of Exchanges <http://www.world-
exchanges.org/files/focus/pdf/focus%201109.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Cambridge Dictionary Online <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/> accessed 29 June 
2011 
• Cardiff Index of Legal Abbreviations < http://www.legalabbrevs.cardiff.ac.uk/> 
accessed 29 June 2011.  
• Cordesman A, ‘Saudi Arabia: Saudi Economic Health’ (Diplomatic Traffic, 17 
August 2005) < http://diplomatictraffic.com/debate_archives.asp?ID=458> accessed 29 
June 2011 
• Cordesman A, ‘The Saudi Succession and Economic Stability’ (Saudi-US 
Relations Information Service, 2005)<http://www.saudi-us-
relations.org/articles/2005/ioi/050805-cordesman-succession.html> accessed 29 June 
2011  
• Economist Intelligent Unite, Saudi Arabia, Market Assessment, 
<http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1977856382&Country=Saudi%20Arabia&topi
c=Finance&subtopic=Market+assessment&subsubtopic=Regulatory%2fmarket+assessment> 
accessed 29 June 2011    
• eStandardsForum < http://www.estandardsforum.org/> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Fatwas of Permanent Committee, the General Presidency of Scholarly 
Research and Ifta’ in Saudi Arabia, Group 52, at pp.367-374. Avilable on the 
internet at 
<http://www.alifta.net/Search/ResultDetails.aspx?lang=ar&view=result&fatwaNum=&Fatwa
NumID=&ID=7281&searchScope=2&SearchScopeLevels1=&SearchScopeLevels2=&highLi
 381	  
ght=1&SearchType=exact&SearchMoesar=false&bookID=&LeftVal=0&RightVal=0&simple
=&SearchCriteria=allwords&PagePath=&siteSection=1&searchkeyword=2161792171362171
300322161672171322161672171362161772161672171300322161672171322171332161672
17132217138216169#firstKeyWordFound > accessed 29 June.  
• Futures and Options Association, ‘A Response to the Paper ‘The Future 
Regulation of Derivatives Markets: Is the EU on the Right Track?” 
(Memorandum by the Futures and Options Association, 2010), 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldselect/ldeucom/93/93we13.htmb> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
• IFC, ‘IFC Guarantees First Corporate Bond Issue in Saudi Arabia’ (Press 
Release, 3 March 2003) 
<http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/pressroom/ifcpressroom.nsf/PressRelease?openform&C70CC2A0
D0E35AC985256CDE0052116B> accessed 29 June 2011   
• International Ombudsman Organisation, 
<http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ioi/About-the-I.O.I./Concept-and-Organization.php> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
• IOSCO, ‘Customer Suitability in the Retail Sale of Financial Products and 
Services’ (2008) , The Joint Forum 2008 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD268.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011. 
• _______, ‘IOSCO Principles Assessment Methodology’ 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD266.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011   
• _______ ‘IOSCO Resolution No. 41, ‘Resolution on IOSCO Adoption of the 
Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (P.C.)” (September 1998)  
• _______ ‘IOSCO Expands Its Global Membership to Include Iceland, the 
Maldives, Saudi Arabia and Syria’ (June 2010), IOSCO News Release, < 
http://www.iosco2010.com/pdf/com09juin2010-2.pdf> accessed 29 June 
2011<http://www.iosco.org/library/resolutions/pdf/IOSCORES16.pdf> accessed 29 June 
2011 
• _______ ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (2010), 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD323.pdf > accessed 29 June 2011 
• ________ ‘Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation’ (May 2003), 
<https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
• ________ ‘Regulatory and Investor Protection Issues Arising from the 
Participation by Retail Investors in (Funds-of) Hedge Funds’ (Report of the 
 382	  
Technical Committee of the IOSCO, 2003) 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD142.pdf > accessed 29 June 2011 
• Kiekbaev D, ‘ Comparative Law: Method, Science or Educational Discipline?’ 
(2003) 7.3 Web EJCL <http://www.ejcl.org/41/abs41-1.html> accessed 29 June 
2011 
• King T, ‘Speech’ (Pensions Management Institute Annual Dinner, February 
2006) <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/speech/PM_feb06.htm> accessed 
29 June 2011 
• MeasuringGrowth.com, 
<http://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/result.php?use%5B%5D=CPI&use%5B%5D=N
OMINALEARN&year_late=1981&typeamount=100000&amount=100000&year_source=198
1&year_result=2010> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Örücü J, ‘Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal 
Systems in Transition’ (2000) 4(1) Web EJCL17 <http://www.ejcl.org/41/abs41-
1.html> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Owen G, ‘Corporate Governance in Britain: Is Incremental Reform Enough?’ 
(CGEP Project Paper, January 2001) 
<http://www.insead.edu/v1/projects/cgep/Research/NationalSystems/CGUK.pdf> accessed 
29 June 2011 
• Oxford Dictionary Online <http://oxforddictionaries.com/> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Oxford Law Faculty, ‘Oxford Standard for Citation Of Legal Authorities’ (4th 
ed., November 2010) <http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/publications/oscola.php> accessed 29 
June 2011 
• Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat, ‘World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision’ 
(UN, 2008) <http://esa.un.org/unpp> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Rabindranath V and Gupta P, ‘An Overview – Sukuk Market in Saudi Arabia’ 
(Watheeqa Capital Company, March 2010) 
<http://www.watheeqa.com/An_Overview_-_Sukuk_Market_in_KSA.pdf> accessed 29 
June 2011 
• Samba Financial Group, ‘Saudi Arabia and the WTO’ (2006,) 
<http://www.susris.com/articles/2006/ioi/060318-samba-wto.html> accessed 29 June 
2011 
 383	  
• Strauss-Kahn D, ‘Crisis Management and Policy Coordination: Do We Need a 
New Global Framework?’ (May 2009) 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/051509.htm> accessed 29 June 2011 
• The LSE, ‘Understanding MiFID’ (October 2005) 
<http://www.londonstockexchange.com/traders-and-brokers/rules-
regulations/mifid/understanding-mifid.pdf> accessed 29 June 2011 
• The Options Industry Council, Glossary 
<http://www.optionseducation.org/help/glossary/default.jsp?letter=S> accessed 29 June 
2011 
• _______ ‘The Right To Borrow’ (1995) Public Policy for the Private 
Sector/Note 44 <http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/publicpolicyjournal/044fleisi.pdf  > 
accessed 29 June 2011 
• _______ ‘World Development Indicators’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS> accessed 29 June 2011 
• ________ ‘Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP)’ 
<http://data.worldbank.org/topic/financial-sector> accessed 29 June 2011 
• Waters D, Asset Management Sector Leader in the FSA, ‘Developments in the 
Retail Financial Services Market’ (November 2006) PIMA Conference 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2006/1101_dw.shtml > 
accessed 29 June 2011 
• World economic Forum, The Financial Development Report 2009 (World 
Economic Forum 2009) 
<http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/FinancialDevelopmentReport/index.htm> 
accessed 29 June 2011 
• WTO, ‘Accession Saudi Arabia’ 
<http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO_e/acc_e/a1_arabie_saoudite_e.htm> accessed 29 
June 2011 	  
 
